Consciousness and Qualia

Author
Leopold Stubenberg | University of Notre Dame, Indiana
PaperbackAvailable
ISBN 9789027251251 (Eur) | EUR 72.00
ISBN 9781556191855 (USA) | USD 108.00
 
e-Book
ISBN 9789027283498 | EUR 72.00 | USD 108.00
 
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This is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Phenomenal properties or qualia are problematical because they lack appropriate bearers. The relation of having is problematical because none of the typical candidates for this relation — introspection, inner monitoring, higher level thoughts — is capable of explaining what it looks like to have a quale . The qualia problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of phenomenal objects. Phenomenal objects are bundles of qualia. Thus there is no need for independent qualia bearers. The having problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of the self. To have a quale is for it to be in the bundle one is. Thus no further relations are needed to explain how qualia are had. This study strives for phenomenological adequacy. Thus the first-person point of view dominates throughout. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 5] 1998.  x, 368 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Cited by

Cited by 25 other publications

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2011. A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62:3  pp. 489 ff. DOI logo
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2010. Neutral monism reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23:2  pp. 173 ff. DOI logo
Beeckmans, John
2004. Chromatically rich phenomenal percepts. Philosophical Psychology 17:1  pp. 27 ff. DOI logo
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2017. The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness. Disputatio 9:44  pp. 5 ff. DOI logo
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2023. Unconscious transformative experience. Synthese 202:4 DOI logo
Fingelkurts, Andrew A., Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves
2009. Brain and mind operational architectonics and man-made “machine” consciousness. Cognitive Processing 10:2  pp. 105 ff. DOI logo
Janzen, Greg
2008. Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36:3  pp. 355 ff. DOI logo
JANZEN, GREG
2011. IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT-IT-IS-LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49:3  pp. 271 ff. DOI logo
Kriegel, Uriah
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Peters, Frederic
2014. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24:4  pp. 441 ff. DOI logo
Peters, Frederic
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Subjects

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research

Philosophy

Philosophy

Main BIC Subject

HP: Philosophy

Main BISAC Subject

PHI000000: PHILOSOPHY / General
ONIX Metadata
ONIX 2.1
ONIX 3.0
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  98014824 | Marc record