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John Benjamins Publishing Company
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eng
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EUR
170008584
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JB
John Benjamins Publishing Company
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JB code
AiCR 86 Eb
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9789027274632
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10.1075/aicr.86
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2012002089
DG
002
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AiCR
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1381-589X
Advances in Consciousness Research
86
01
Consciousness in Interaction
The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness
01
aicr.86
01
https://benjamins.com
02
https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.86
1
B01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, ISTC-CNR, Rome
01
eng
423
xix
403
PSY031000
v.2006
JMH
2
24
JB Subject Scheme
CONS.GEN
Consciousness research
24
JB Subject Scheme
IS.GIS
Interaction Studies
06
01
<i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> is an interdisciplinary collection with contributions from philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and historians of philosophy. It revolves around the idea that consciousness emerges from, and impacts on, our skilled interactions with the natural and social context. Section one discusses how phenomenal consciousness and subjective selfhood are grounded on natural and social interactions, and what role brain activity plays in these phenomena. Section two analyzes how interactions with external objects and other human beings shape our understanding of ourselves, and how consciousness changes social interaction, self-control and emotions. Section three provides historical depth to the volume, by tracing the roots of the contemporary notion of consciousness in early modern philosophy. The book offers interdisciplinary insight on a variety of key topics in consciousness research: as such, it is of particular interest for researchers from philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive and social sciences, and humanities.
05
Might consciousness be better understood as an interactive, situated achievement rather than as some kind of mystery ingredient added to passive perception? The <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> research project pursued this fundamental question from multiple perspectives and (fittingly) in a series of highly interactive engagements that structured and informed this wonderful volume of essays. The volume is a fitting tribute to Susan Hurley, to whom it is dedicated, and a landmark publication in the search for a richer understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience.
Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh
05
Many hold that conscious experience is determined entirely locally, by internal processes in the brain. But even if that is true, we would also need to understand the subtle flow of contents, the ineffability, the convoluted, many-layered historicity of that target phenomenon, for this is what yields some of the most intriguing aspects of phenomenal experience: the ever-unfolding dance of coupled self-models, dying into each other while dynamically weaving our individual perspectives into the unfathomable mesh of the intersubjective world.
Thomas Metzinger, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
04
09
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09
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10
01
JB code
aicr.86.001int
ix
xx
12
Article
1
01
Introduction
What does it mean to study consciousness in interaction?
1
A01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec1
Section header
2
01
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.01als
1
18
18
Article
3
01
What <i>reason</i> could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness?
1
A01
Adrian Alsmith
Alsmith, Adrian
Adrian
Alsmith
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen
01
This paper aims to examine the reasons for endorsing the idea of pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. The guiding question will be: why should one think that any description of consciousness that posits PBS is correct? The aim of this discussion is to show how hard this question is to answer and the kinds of considerations that one should bring to bear in attempting to answer it. Keywords: explanation; phenomenology; bodily self-consciousness; attention; introspection
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.02kiv
19
40
22
Article
4
01
Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind?
1
A01
Julian Kiverstein
Kiverstein, Julian
Julian
Kiverstein
Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, University of Amsterdam
2
A01
Mirko Farina
Farina, Mirko
Mirko
Farina
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Institute of Human Cognition and Brain Science (IHCBS), Macquarie University, Sydney
01
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be “yes” to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009), a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn’t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. Keywords: variable neural correlates; action-space view; dynamic sensorimotor theories; extended consciousness; sensory substitution devices
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.03gan
41
58
18
Article
5
01
The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action
The
extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action
1
A01
Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Gangopadhyay, Nivedita
Nivedita
Gangopadhyay
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen
01
The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark’s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.04mad
59
72
14
Article
6
01
Showtime at the Cartesian Theater?
Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations
1
A01
Michael Madary
Madary, Michael
Michael
Madary
Johannes Gutenberg – Universität Mainz
01
Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005a), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, Noë, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed ‘temporal atomism’. To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett’s Cartesian Theater (1991).In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and Noë’s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that Noë and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley’s externalism. Keywords: vehicle externalism; perceptual states; dynamical explanations; Cartesian Theater
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.05pie
73
88
16
Article
7
01
Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface?
1
A01
Bryony Pierce
Pierce, Bryony
Bryony
Pierce
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
01
The mind-body problem – how conscious experience can arise from a physical system – is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the ‘hard problem’. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine’s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson’s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.06war
89
104
16
Article
8
01
Es are good
Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended
1
A01
Dave Ward
Ward, Dave
Dave
Ward
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
2
A01
Mog Stapleton
Stapleton, Mog
Mog
Stapleton
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
01
We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. Keywords: enactivism; embodied cognition; situated cognition; affective cognition
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec2
Section header
9
01
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.07vie
105
124
20
Article
10
01
Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind
1
A01
Tillmann Vierkant
Vierkant, Tillmann
Tillmann
Vierkant
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
2
A01
Andreas Paraskevaides
Paraskevaides, Andreas
Andreas
Paraskevaides
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
01
Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role for a theoretical understanding of psychological states in human cognition. We argue that this is because a theoretical understanding is necessary for all intentional control of the mind. Keywords: mindreading; mindshaping; narrative control; manipulative control; folk psychology
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.08cas
125
150
26
Article
11
01
“My mind”
Reflexive sociality and its cognitive tools
1
A01
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Castelfranchi, Cristiano
Cristiano
Castelfranchi
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
Mind-reading is adapted for social interaction (e.g. coordination, cooperation, exchange), and, in particular, for adoption of beliefs and goals from others, and for influencing, manipulating, persuading them; that is, changing the other mind, beliefs and goals, in order to change their behavior. Given this ability to interpret the others’ mind and to use this representation to induce certain behavior in others, in this paper I discuss the introjection of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition and action to our own selves. Or better, to be “our selves” means to have such a social-like representation (image) of us as a person, to know and to build who we are, by creating, updating and operating through this image. I assume that there is <i>self-directed mind-reading</i> and <i>self-influencing</i>: I learn to read my own behavior in mental terms; I learn to have a reflexive mind-reading, based not on introspection but on behavior interpretation; this leads me to meta-represent by beliefs, goals, etc. For what? Not just for understanding what I’m doing and why, not just for predicting and expecting what I will do, but also (and perhaps mostly) for helping myself and cooperating with myself, for influencing myself: changing my own mind, in particular my goals. In order to <i>fighting</i> or <i>cooperating</i> with myself, “imposing” to myself certain preferences, contrasting unwanted needs or dangerous desires. This activity involves reflexive communication acts, requests, duties, emotions, promises, and the like, all of which constitute a form of <i>reflexive sociality</i>: the intrapersonal re-use of skills and mechanisms originally evolved to serve interpersonal needs. Keywords: mind-reading; power; manipulation; self; will; sociality; internalization
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.09mic
151
178
28
Article
12
01
Coherence of conduct and the self-image
1
A01
Maria Miceli
Miceli, Maria
Maria
Miceli
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
2
A01
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Castelfranchi, Cristiano
Cristiano
Castelfranchi
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
The need for coherence of conduct has been viewed, more or less implicitly, as one of the fundamental human needs, in association with one’s social image and self-image. Actually it appears to accomplish a variety of possible functions: identity negotiation, as a condition for smooth and predictable social interactions; the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem; and the maintenance of one’s self-view regardless of either self-esteem or social identity concerns. In the present work, while acknowledging the plausibility and appeal of such general functions, we will proceed in a more “bottom-up” fashion, trying to single out and analyze in greater detail the possible “uses” of coherence of conduct. We will first specify our notion of coherence of conduct, as well as of its underlying need. Then, we will address its impact on the individual’s behavior, with reference to its relationships with persistence in goal pursuit, the need to show a stable social identity, perceived self-efficacy, general self-esteem, and personal identity or self-image. We will discuss how the need for coherence comes into play in one’s self-image, which includes not only one’s self-evaluations but also, more generally, one’s self-beliefs, especially those about one’s own goals and the kind of person one believes or wants to be. We will focus on the crucial impact of the individual’s values on his or her coherence of conduct. Finally, we will address the issue of self-coherence and change of conduct, pointing to some mechanisms which favor self-coherence without granting actual coherence of conduct. Keywords: coherence of conduct; self-image; persistence; values; defense mechanisms
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.10pag
179
206
28
Article
13
01
Ulysses’ will
Self-control, external constraints, and games
1
A01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
This paper discusses the widespread strategy of controlling one’s own future behavior by imposing external constraints on possible actions – a strategy well exemplified by the episode of Ulysses and the Sirens. I first discuss the strategic use of external constraints in the context of other methods to improve self-control, showing that this strategy is ubiquitous and constitutes a proper manifestation of self-control, but not of willpower. I analyze the difference between these two concepts and the possibility of considering the use of external constraints as a way of externalizing self-control, in the vein of the extended mind hypothesis. Then I offer a game-theoretic characterization of constraint-based self-control as sequential games where each player can have limited control over the game structure, with the players being the same self at different points in time. The potential implications of this analysis are discussed, and an alternative game-theoretic representation of the strategic situation is offered, in the form of larger sequential games. The two characterizations have similar explanatory power, and they are used to diagnose the reasons behind a common failure at self-control via external constraints (advanced payment as a form of ineffective pre-commitment) and to suggest a possible remedy (advanced payment with conditional reimbursement). Finally, I discuss the implications of this approach for how rationality should be assessed in intertemporal decisions, i.e. choices that involve trade-offs between subsequent selves: I offer a critique of existing principles of diachronic rationality, and propose expected utility maximization over a collectivity of temporal selves as a viable alternative Keywords: self-control; external constraints; intertemporal choice; diachronic rationality; willpower
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.11rie
207
226
20
Article
14
01
Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context
1
A01
Erik Rietveld
Rietveld, Erik
Erik
Rietveld
Department of Philosophy/AMC, University of Amsterdam
01
There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective <i>embodied</i> intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend’s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such ‘motor intentionality’ can be characterized as “our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context” (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a <i>field</i> of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the ‘mirror neuron system’ as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.12sin
227
238
12
Article
15
01
Seeing with the hands
1
A01
Corrado Sinigaglia
Sinigaglia, Corrado
Corrado
Sinigaglia
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano
01
When witnessing someone else’s action people often take advantage of the same motor cognition that is crucial to successfully perform that action themselves. But how deeply is motor cognition involved in understanding another’s action? Can it be selectively modulated by either the agent’s or the witness’s being actually in the position to act? If this is the case, what does such modulation imply for one’s making sense of others? The paper aims to tackle these issues by introducing and discussing a series of experimental studies showing how body and space may constrain one’s own motor cognition reuse in understanding another’s action. These findings, I shall argue, may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying the primary ways of identifying ourselves with other people and of being connected to them. Keywords: motor cognition; social cognition; space representation; mirror neurons; proactive gaze
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.13fri
239
258
20
Article
16
01
Recognition of emotion in others
1
A01
Nico H. Frijda
Frijda, Nico H.
Nico H.
Frijda
University of Amsterdam
01
This chapter argues that recognition of emotion has a simple basis and a highly complex edifice above it. Its basis is formed by catching intent from expressive and other emotional behavior, using elementary principles of perceptual integration. In intent recognition, mirror neurons under particular circumstances do play a role, but under other circumstances visual perception and prediction may suffice. To arrive at full understanding of emotions of others, and in particular to arrive at empathy, much more elaborate information, and activities of mentalising, are required. Keywords: emotion recognition; emotional behavior; intent understanding; mentalizing.
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.14spi
259
286
28
Article
17
01
The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription
The
Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription
1
A01
Finn Spicer
Spicer, Finn
Finn
Spicer
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
01
In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions – the <i>Paratactic Account</i>. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity – a <i>content</i>. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one’s <i>own</i> thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke’s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects’ folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec3
Section header
18
01
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.15ric
287
300
14
Article
19
01
From sensation to consciousness
Suggestions in modern philosophy
1
A01
Monica Riccio
Riccio, Monica
Monica
Riccio
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Naples
01
The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external – the body and his surface – into the inside – the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If “nothing but a body can touch and be touched” (Lucretius, <i>De rerum natura</i>, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of “being touched”, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.16pal
301
310
10
Article
20
01
Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy
1
A01
Roberto Palaia
Palaia, Roberto
Roberto
Palaia
Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome
01
A semantic shift of the word consciousness (<i>conscientia</i>, <i>conscience</i>, <i>Gewissen</i>, <i>Bewusstsein</i>, <i>coscienza</i>) occurred in 17th- and 18th-century European languages. While in pre-modern times the term consciousness had been related to theology and ethics, in early modern thought, a new meaning was added to the term, somehow different from the original one. Early modern philosophers and scientists used consciousness to refer to the knowledge of Self. In addition, it is apparent that the syntagms relating to the word consciousness – as, for instance, <i>freedom of consciousness</i>, <i>casus conscientiae</i> – became more frequent in political, religious, scientific and philosophical texts. My contribution will analyse the occurrences of these semantic fields in some important philosphical and scientific texts and will examine their specific uses and contexts. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; bewusstsein; modern philosophy; philosophical dictionary
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.17lam
311
326
16
Article
21
01
Experience and identity of the self
The emergence of consciousness as a cognitive concept in the early modern age
1
A01
Antonio Lamarra
Lamarra, Antonio
Antonio
Lamarra
Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome
01
The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes’ as well as to Locke’s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.18san
327
336
10
Article
22
01
Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico
The modern concept of coscienza in Vico’s <i>De antiquissima</i>
1
A01
Manuela Sanna
Sanna, Manuela
Manuela
Sanna
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPFCNR Naples
01
This study is intended to follow up and illustrate the theoretical steps through which G.B. Vico defined the concept of “Consciousness” (coscienza) in the works that preceded his masterpiece, the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>. The theme of consciousness is elaborated by the Neapolitan philosopher in a very different way from Descartes’s proposals, since it comes out by approaching <i>verum</i> to <i>facere</i> and, later, <i>verum</i> to <i>conformari</i>. This displacement occurs by means of a theoretical passage through the level of <i>conscire</i>, outlining a deep gap between <i>feeling</i> (<i>sentire</i>) and <i>imagining</i> (<i>immaginare</i>). Vico works on a possible definition of the concept of “consciousness” and moves a tight critique to skeptic and neostoic currents posing the question about how to became able to <i>feel</i> something while striving to <i>imagine</i> in a conscious way. The whole anthropological framework which allows the definition of the human is built on this theoretical passage and on the etymologic reconstruction of <i>conscire</i> as <i>cum-scire</i> and of <i>conscientia</i> as a part of <i>scientia</i>. Keywords: consciousness; imagination; G. Vico; science
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.19cer
337
354
18
Article
23
01
Consciousness and faculties in <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> by Vico
1
A01
Geri Cerchiai
Cerchiai, Geri
Geri
Cerchiai
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Milan
01
Face to Descartes’ rationalism, in the book entitled <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> Vico tries to examine non reflexive aspects of thought. According to Vico, the clear and distinct idea cannot originate the <i>cogito</i> as a criterion of truth; moreover, the clear and distinct idea exchanges the <i>intelligere</i> of God with the human <i>cogitare</i>; third, the method of doubt doesn’t consider the link, in men, of <i>res cogitans</i> and <i>res extensa</i> and the correlation between mind and body. Fourth, this theory arises from a wrong notion of substance. Following these four points, the article will stress the rejection by Vico of the Cartesian idea of consciousness and will try to determine a possible theory of consciousness as it is implied by Vichian reflections. Keywords: Vico; Descartes; consciousness
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.20aut
355
360
6
Article
24
01
Authors
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.21ref
361
398
38
Article
25
01
References
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.22ind
399
404
6
Article
26
01
Index
02
JBENJAMINS
John Benjamins Publishing Company
01
John Benjamins Publishing Company
Amsterdam/Philadelphia
NL
04
20120807
2012
John Benjamins
02
WORLD
13
15
9789027213525
01
JB
3
John Benjamins e-Platform
03
jbe-platform.com
09
WORLD
21
01
00
99.00
EUR
R
01
00
83.00
GBP
Z
01
gen
00
149.00
USD
S
294008583
03
01
01
JB
John Benjamins Publishing Company
01
JB code
AiCR 86 Hb
15
9789027213525
13
2012002089
BB
01
AiCR
02
1381-589X
Advances in Consciousness Research
86
01
Consciousness in Interaction
The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness
01
aicr.86
01
https://benjamins.com
02
https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.86
1
B01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, ISTC-CNR, Rome
01
eng
423
xix
403
PSY031000
v.2006
JMH
2
24
JB Subject Scheme
CONS.GEN
Consciousness research
24
JB Subject Scheme
IS.GIS
Interaction Studies
06
01
<i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> is an interdisciplinary collection with contributions from philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and historians of philosophy. It revolves around the idea that consciousness emerges from, and impacts on, our skilled interactions with the natural and social context. Section one discusses how phenomenal consciousness and subjective selfhood are grounded on natural and social interactions, and what role brain activity plays in these phenomena. Section two analyzes how interactions with external objects and other human beings shape our understanding of ourselves, and how consciousness changes social interaction, self-control and emotions. Section three provides historical depth to the volume, by tracing the roots of the contemporary notion of consciousness in early modern philosophy. The book offers interdisciplinary insight on a variety of key topics in consciousness research: as such, it is of particular interest for researchers from philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive and social sciences, and humanities.
05
Might consciousness be better understood as an interactive, situated achievement rather than as some kind of mystery ingredient added to passive perception? The <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> research project pursued this fundamental question from multiple perspectives and (fittingly) in a series of highly interactive engagements that structured and informed this wonderful volume of essays. The volume is a fitting tribute to Susan Hurley, to whom it is dedicated, and a landmark publication in the search for a richer understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience.
Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh
05
Many hold that conscious experience is determined entirely locally, by internal processes in the brain. But even if that is true, we would also need to understand the subtle flow of contents, the ineffability, the convoluted, many-layered historicity of that target phenomenon, for this is what yields some of the most intriguing aspects of phenomenal experience: the ever-unfolding dance of coupled self-models, dying into each other while dynamically weaving our individual perspectives into the unfathomable mesh of the intersubjective world.
Thomas Metzinger, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
04
09
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09
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10
01
JB code
aicr.86.001int
ix
xx
12
Article
1
01
Introduction
What does it mean to study consciousness in interaction?
1
A01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec1
Section header
2
01
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.01als
1
18
18
Article
3
01
What <i>reason</i> could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness?
1
A01
Adrian Alsmith
Alsmith, Adrian
Adrian
Alsmith
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen
01
This paper aims to examine the reasons for endorsing the idea of pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. The guiding question will be: why should one think that any description of consciousness that posits PBS is correct? The aim of this discussion is to show how hard this question is to answer and the kinds of considerations that one should bring to bear in attempting to answer it. Keywords: explanation; phenomenology; bodily self-consciousness; attention; introspection
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.02kiv
19
40
22
Article
4
01
Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind?
1
A01
Julian Kiverstein
Kiverstein, Julian
Julian
Kiverstein
Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, University of Amsterdam
2
A01
Mirko Farina
Farina, Mirko
Mirko
Farina
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Institute of Human Cognition and Brain Science (IHCBS), Macquarie University, Sydney
01
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be “yes” to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009), a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn’t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. Keywords: variable neural correlates; action-space view; dynamic sensorimotor theories; extended consciousness; sensory substitution devices
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.03gan
41
58
18
Article
5
01
The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action
The
extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action
1
A01
Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Gangopadhyay, Nivedita
Nivedita
Gangopadhyay
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen
01
The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark’s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.04mad
59
72
14
Article
6
01
Showtime at the Cartesian Theater?
Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations
1
A01
Michael Madary
Madary, Michael
Michael
Madary
Johannes Gutenberg – Universität Mainz
01
Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005a), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, Noë, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed ‘temporal atomism’. To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett’s Cartesian Theater (1991).In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and Noë’s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that Noë and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley’s externalism. Keywords: vehicle externalism; perceptual states; dynamical explanations; Cartesian Theater
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.05pie
73
88
16
Article
7
01
Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface?
1
A01
Bryony Pierce
Pierce, Bryony
Bryony
Pierce
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
01
The mind-body problem – how conscious experience can arise from a physical system – is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the ‘hard problem’. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine’s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson’s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.06war
89
104
16
Article
8
01
Es are good
Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended
1
A01
Dave Ward
Ward, Dave
Dave
Ward
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
2
A01
Mog Stapleton
Stapleton, Mog
Mog
Stapleton
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
01
We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. Keywords: enactivism; embodied cognition; situated cognition; affective cognition
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec2
Section header
9
01
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.07vie
105
124
20
Article
10
01
Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind
1
A01
Tillmann Vierkant
Vierkant, Tillmann
Tillmann
Vierkant
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
2
A01
Andreas Paraskevaides
Paraskevaides, Andreas
Andreas
Paraskevaides
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
01
Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role for a theoretical understanding of psychological states in human cognition. We argue that this is because a theoretical understanding is necessary for all intentional control of the mind. Keywords: mindreading; mindshaping; narrative control; manipulative control; folk psychology
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.08cas
125
150
26
Article
11
01
“My mind”
Reflexive sociality and its cognitive tools
1
A01
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Castelfranchi, Cristiano
Cristiano
Castelfranchi
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
Mind-reading is adapted for social interaction (e.g. coordination, cooperation, exchange), and, in particular, for adoption of beliefs and goals from others, and for influencing, manipulating, persuading them; that is, changing the other mind, beliefs and goals, in order to change their behavior. Given this ability to interpret the others’ mind and to use this representation to induce certain behavior in others, in this paper I discuss the introjection of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition and action to our own selves. Or better, to be “our selves” means to have such a social-like representation (image) of us as a person, to know and to build who we are, by creating, updating and operating through this image. I assume that there is <i>self-directed mind-reading</i> and <i>self-influencing</i>: I learn to read my own behavior in mental terms; I learn to have a reflexive mind-reading, based not on introspection but on behavior interpretation; this leads me to meta-represent by beliefs, goals, etc. For what? Not just for understanding what I’m doing and why, not just for predicting and expecting what I will do, but also (and perhaps mostly) for helping myself and cooperating with myself, for influencing myself: changing my own mind, in particular my goals. In order to <i>fighting</i> or <i>cooperating</i> with myself, “imposing” to myself certain preferences, contrasting unwanted needs or dangerous desires. This activity involves reflexive communication acts, requests, duties, emotions, promises, and the like, all of which constitute a form of <i>reflexive sociality</i>: the intrapersonal re-use of skills and mechanisms originally evolved to serve interpersonal needs. Keywords: mind-reading; power; manipulation; self; will; sociality; internalization
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.09mic
151
178
28
Article
12
01
Coherence of conduct and the self-image
1
A01
Maria Miceli
Miceli, Maria
Maria
Miceli
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
2
A01
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Castelfranchi, Cristiano
Cristiano
Castelfranchi
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
The need for coherence of conduct has been viewed, more or less implicitly, as one of the fundamental human needs, in association with one’s social image and self-image. Actually it appears to accomplish a variety of possible functions: identity negotiation, as a condition for smooth and predictable social interactions; the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem; and the maintenance of one’s self-view regardless of either self-esteem or social identity concerns. In the present work, while acknowledging the plausibility and appeal of such general functions, we will proceed in a more “bottom-up” fashion, trying to single out and analyze in greater detail the possible “uses” of coherence of conduct. We will first specify our notion of coherence of conduct, as well as of its underlying need. Then, we will address its impact on the individual’s behavior, with reference to its relationships with persistence in goal pursuit, the need to show a stable social identity, perceived self-efficacy, general self-esteem, and personal identity or self-image. We will discuss how the need for coherence comes into play in one’s self-image, which includes not only one’s self-evaluations but also, more generally, one’s self-beliefs, especially those about one’s own goals and the kind of person one believes or wants to be. We will focus on the crucial impact of the individual’s values on his or her coherence of conduct. Finally, we will address the issue of self-coherence and change of conduct, pointing to some mechanisms which favor self-coherence without granting actual coherence of conduct. Keywords: coherence of conduct; self-image; persistence; values; defense mechanisms
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.10pag
179
206
28
Article
13
01
Ulysses’ will
Self-control, external constraints, and games
1
A01
Fabio Paglieri
Paglieri, Fabio
Fabio
Paglieri
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome
01
This paper discusses the widespread strategy of controlling one’s own future behavior by imposing external constraints on possible actions – a strategy well exemplified by the episode of Ulysses and the Sirens. I first discuss the strategic use of external constraints in the context of other methods to improve self-control, showing that this strategy is ubiquitous and constitutes a proper manifestation of self-control, but not of willpower. I analyze the difference between these two concepts and the possibility of considering the use of external constraints as a way of externalizing self-control, in the vein of the extended mind hypothesis. Then I offer a game-theoretic characterization of constraint-based self-control as sequential games where each player can have limited control over the game structure, with the players being the same self at different points in time. The potential implications of this analysis are discussed, and an alternative game-theoretic representation of the strategic situation is offered, in the form of larger sequential games. The two characterizations have similar explanatory power, and they are used to diagnose the reasons behind a common failure at self-control via external constraints (advanced payment as a form of ineffective pre-commitment) and to suggest a possible remedy (advanced payment with conditional reimbursement). Finally, I discuss the implications of this approach for how rationality should be assessed in intertemporal decisions, i.e. choices that involve trade-offs between subsequent selves: I offer a critique of existing principles of diachronic rationality, and propose expected utility maximization over a collectivity of temporal selves as a viable alternative Keywords: self-control; external constraints; intertemporal choice; diachronic rationality; willpower
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.11rie
207
226
20
Article
14
01
Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context
1
A01
Erik Rietveld
Rietveld, Erik
Erik
Rietveld
Department of Philosophy/AMC, University of Amsterdam
01
There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective <i>embodied</i> intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend’s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such ‘motor intentionality’ can be characterized as “our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context” (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a <i>field</i> of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the ‘mirror neuron system’ as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.12sin
227
238
12
Article
15
01
Seeing with the hands
1
A01
Corrado Sinigaglia
Sinigaglia, Corrado
Corrado
Sinigaglia
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano
01
When witnessing someone else’s action people often take advantage of the same motor cognition that is crucial to successfully perform that action themselves. But how deeply is motor cognition involved in understanding another’s action? Can it be selectively modulated by either the agent’s or the witness’s being actually in the position to act? If this is the case, what does such modulation imply for one’s making sense of others? The paper aims to tackle these issues by introducing and discussing a series of experimental studies showing how body and space may constrain one’s own motor cognition reuse in understanding another’s action. These findings, I shall argue, may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying the primary ways of identifying ourselves with other people and of being connected to them. Keywords: motor cognition; social cognition; space representation; mirror neurons; proactive gaze
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.13fri
239
258
20
Article
16
01
Recognition of emotion in others
1
A01
Nico H. Frijda
Frijda, Nico H.
Nico H.
Frijda
University of Amsterdam
01
This chapter argues that recognition of emotion has a simple basis and a highly complex edifice above it. Its basis is formed by catching intent from expressive and other emotional behavior, using elementary principles of perceptual integration. In intent recognition, mirror neurons under particular circumstances do play a role, but under other circumstances visual perception and prediction may suffice. To arrive at full understanding of emotions of others, and in particular to arrive at empathy, much more elaborate information, and activities of mentalising, are required. Keywords: emotion recognition; emotional behavior; intent understanding; mentalizing.
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.14spi
259
286
28
Article
17
01
The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription
The
Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription
1
A01
Finn Spicer
Spicer, Finn
Finn
Spicer
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol
01
In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions – the <i>Paratactic Account</i>. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity – a <i>content</i>. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one’s <i>own</i> thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke’s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects’ folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.00sec3
Section header
18
01
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.15ric
287
300
14
Article
19
01
From sensation to consciousness
Suggestions in modern philosophy
1
A01
Monica Riccio
Riccio, Monica
Monica
Riccio
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Naples
01
The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external – the body and his surface – into the inside – the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If “nothing but a body can touch and be touched” (Lucretius, <i>De rerum natura</i>, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of “being touched”, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.16pal
301
310
10
Article
20
01
Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy
1
A01
Roberto Palaia
Palaia, Roberto
Roberto
Palaia
Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome
01
A semantic shift of the word consciousness (<i>conscientia</i>, <i>conscience</i>, <i>Gewissen</i>, <i>Bewusstsein</i>, <i>coscienza</i>) occurred in 17th- and 18th-century European languages. While in pre-modern times the term consciousness had been related to theology and ethics, in early modern thought, a new meaning was added to the term, somehow different from the original one. Early modern philosophers and scientists used consciousness to refer to the knowledge of Self. In addition, it is apparent that the syntagms relating to the word consciousness – as, for instance, <i>freedom of consciousness</i>, <i>casus conscientiae</i> – became more frequent in political, religious, scientific and philosophical texts. My contribution will analyse the occurrences of these semantic fields in some important philosphical and scientific texts and will examine their specific uses and contexts. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; bewusstsein; modern philosophy; philosophical dictionary
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.17lam
311
326
16
Article
21
01
Experience and identity of the self
The emergence of consciousness as a cognitive concept in the early modern age
1
A01
Antonio Lamarra
Lamarra, Antonio
Antonio
Lamarra
Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome
01
The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes’ as well as to Locke’s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.18san
327
336
10
Article
22
01
Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico
The modern concept of coscienza in Vico’s <i>De antiquissima</i>
1
A01
Manuela Sanna
Sanna, Manuela
Manuela
Sanna
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPFCNR Naples
01
This study is intended to follow up and illustrate the theoretical steps through which G.B. Vico defined the concept of “Consciousness” (coscienza) in the works that preceded his masterpiece, the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>. The theme of consciousness is elaborated by the Neapolitan philosopher in a very different way from Descartes’s proposals, since it comes out by approaching <i>verum</i> to <i>facere</i> and, later, <i>verum</i> to <i>conformari</i>. This displacement occurs by means of a theoretical passage through the level of <i>conscire</i>, outlining a deep gap between <i>feeling</i> (<i>sentire</i>) and <i>imagining</i> (<i>immaginare</i>). Vico works on a possible definition of the concept of “consciousness” and moves a tight critique to skeptic and neostoic currents posing the question about how to became able to <i>feel</i> something while striving to <i>imagine</i> in a conscious way. The whole anthropological framework which allows the definition of the human is built on this theoretical passage and on the etymologic reconstruction of <i>conscire</i> as <i>cum-scire</i> and of <i>conscientia</i> as a part of <i>scientia</i>. Keywords: consciousness; imagination; G. Vico; science
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.19cer
337
354
18
Article
23
01
Consciousness and faculties in <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> by Vico
1
A01
Geri Cerchiai
Cerchiai, Geri
Geri
Cerchiai
Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Milan
01
Face to Descartes’ rationalism, in the book entitled <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> Vico tries to examine non reflexive aspects of thought. According to Vico, the clear and distinct idea cannot originate the <i>cogito</i> as a criterion of truth; moreover, the clear and distinct idea exchanges the <i>intelligere</i> of God with the human <i>cogitare</i>; third, the method of doubt doesn’t consider the link, in men, of <i>res cogitans</i> and <i>res extensa</i> and the correlation between mind and body. Fourth, this theory arises from a wrong notion of substance. Following these four points, the article will stress the rejection by Vico of the Cartesian idea of consciousness and will try to determine a possible theory of consciousness as it is implied by Vichian reflections. Keywords: Vico; Descartes; consciousness
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.20aut
355
360
6
Article
24
01
Authors
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.21ref
361
398
38
Article
25
01
References
10
01
JB code
aicr.86.22ind
399
404
6
Article
26
01
Index
02
JBENJAMINS
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