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170008584 03 01 01 JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 86 Eb 15 9789027274632 06 10.1075/aicr.86 13 2012002089 DG 002 02 01 AiCR 02 1381-589X Advances in Consciousness Research 86 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness in Interaction</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness</Subtitle> 01 aicr.86 01 https://benjamins.com 02 https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.86 1 B01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, ISTC-CNR, Rome 01 eng 423 xix 403 PSY031000 v.2006 JMH 2 24 JB Subject Scheme CONS.GEN Consciousness research 24 JB Subject Scheme IS.GIS Interaction Studies 06 01 <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> is an interdisciplinary collection with contributions from philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and historians of philosophy. It revolves around the idea that consciousness emerges from, and impacts on, our skilled interactions with the natural and social context. Section one discusses how phenomenal consciousness and subjective selfhood are grounded on natural and social interactions, and what role brain activity plays in these phenomena. Section two analyzes how interactions with external objects and other human beings shape our understanding of ourselves, and how consciousness changes social interaction, self-control and emotions. Section three provides historical depth to the volume, by tracing the roots of the contemporary notion of consciousness in early modern philosophy. The book offers interdisciplinary insight on a variety of key topics in consciousness research: as such, it is of particular interest for researchers from philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive and social sciences, and humanities. 05 Might consciousness be better understood as an interactive, situated achievement rather than as some kind of mystery ingredient added to passive perception? The <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> research project pursued this fundamental question from multiple perspectives and (fittingly) in a series of highly interactive engagements that structured and informed this wonderful volume of essays. The volume is a fitting tribute to Susan Hurley, to whom it is dedicated, and a landmark publication in the search for a richer understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience. Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh 05 Many hold that conscious experience is determined entirely locally, by internal processes in the brain. But even if that is true, we would also need to understand the subtle flow of contents, the ineffability, the convoluted, many-layered historicity of that target phenomenon, for this is what yields some of the most intriguing aspects of phenomenal experience: the ever-unfolding dance of coupled self-models, dying into each other while dynamically weaving our individual perspectives into the unfathomable mesh of the intersubjective world. Thomas Metzinger, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 04 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.86.png 04 03 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213525.jpg 04 03 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213525.tif 06 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.86.hb.png 07 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.86.png 25 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.86.hb.png 27 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.86.hb.png 10 01 JB code aicr.86.001int ix xx 12 Article 1 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Introduction</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">What does it mean to study consciousness in interaction&#63;</Subtitle> 1 A01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec1 Section header 2 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.01als 1 18 18 Article 3 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">What <i>reason</i> could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Adrian Alsmith Alsmith, Adrian Adrian Alsmith Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen 01 This paper aims to examine the reasons for endorsing the idea of pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. The guiding question will be: why should one think that any description of consciousness that posits PBS is correct&#63; The aim of this discussion is to show how hard this question is to answer and the kinds of considerations that one should bring to bear in attempting to answer it. Keywords: explanation; phenomenology; bodily self-consciousness; attention; introspection 10 01 JB code aicr.86.02kiv 19 40 22 Article 4 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Julian Kiverstein Kiverstein, Julian Julian Kiverstein Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, University of Amsterdam 2 A01 Mirko Farina Farina, Mirko Mirko Farina ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Institute of Human Cognition and Brain Science (IHCBS), Macquarie University, Sydney 01 Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness&#63; Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be &#8220;yes&#8221; to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009), a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn&#8217;t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. Keywords: variable neural correlates; action-space view; dynamic sensorimotor theories; extended consciousness; sensory substitution devices 10 01 JB code aicr.86.03gan 41 58 18 Article 5 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action</TitleText> <TitlePrefix>The </TitlePrefix> <TitleWithoutPrefix textformat="02">extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action</TitleWithoutPrefix> 1 A01 Nivedita Gangopadhyay Gangopadhyay, Nivedita Nivedita Gangopadhyay Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen 01 The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark &#38; Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark&#8217;s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity 10 01 JB code aicr.86.04mad 59 72 14 Article 6 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Showtime at the Cartesian Theater&#63;</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations</Subtitle> 1 A01 Michael Madary Madary, Michael Michael Madary Johannes Gutenberg – Universität Mainz 01 Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva No&#235; (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005a), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, No&#235;, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed &#8216;temporal atomism&#8217;. To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett&#8217;s Cartesian Theater (1991).In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and No&#235;&#8217;s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that No&#235; and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley&#8217;s externalism. Keywords: vehicle externalism; perceptual states; dynamical explanations; Cartesian Theater 10 01 JB code aicr.86.05pie 73 88 16 Article 7 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Bryony Pierce Pierce, Bryony Bryony Pierce Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol 01 The mind-body problem &#8211; how conscious experience can arise from a physical system &#8211; is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the &#8216;hard problem&#8217;. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine&#8217;s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson&#8217;s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action 10 01 JB code aicr.86.06war 89 104 16 Article 8 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Es are good</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended</Subtitle> 1 A01 Dave Ward Ward, Dave Dave Ward School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 2 A01 Mog Stapleton Stapleton, Mog Mog Stapleton School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 01 We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer&#8217;s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. Keywords: enactivism; embodied cognition; situated cognition; affective cognition 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec2 Section header 9 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.07vie 105 124 20 Article 10 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind</TitleText> 1 A01 Tillmann Vierkant Vierkant, Tillmann Tillmann Vierkant School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 2 A01 Andreas Paraskevaides Paraskevaides, Andreas Andreas Paraskevaides School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 01 Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role for a theoretical understanding of psychological states in human cognition. We argue that this is because a theoretical understanding is necessary for all intentional control of the mind. Keywords: mindreading; mindshaping; narrative control; manipulative control; folk psychology 10 01 JB code aicr.86.08cas 125 150 26 Article 11 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">&#8220;My mind&#8221;</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Reflexive sociality and its cognitive tools</Subtitle> 1 A01 Cristiano Castelfranchi Castelfranchi, Cristiano Cristiano Castelfranchi Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 Mind-reading is adapted for social interaction (e.g. coordination, cooperation, exchange), and, in particular, for adoption of beliefs and goals from others, and for influencing, manipulating, persuading them; that is, changing the other mind, beliefs and goals, in order to change their behavior. Given this ability to interpret the others&#8217; mind and to use this representation to induce certain behavior in others, in this paper I discuss the introjection of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition and action to our own selves. Or better, to be &#8220;our selves&#8221; means to have such a social-like representation (image) of us as a person, to know and to build who we are, by creating, updating and operating through this image. I assume that there is <i>self-directed mind-reading</i> and <i>self-influencing</i>: I learn to read my own behavior in mental terms; I learn to have a reflexive mind-reading, based not on introspection but on behavior interpretation; this leads me to meta-represent by beliefs, goals, etc. For what&#63; Not just for understanding what I&#8217;m doing and why, not just for predicting and expecting what I will do, but also (and perhaps mostly) for helping myself and cooperating with myself, for influencing myself: changing my own mind, in particular my goals. In order to <i>fighting</i> or <i>cooperating</i> with myself, &#8220;imposing&#8221; to myself certain preferences, contrasting unwanted needs or dangerous desires. This activity involves reflexive communication acts, requests, duties, emotions, promises, and the like, all of which constitute a form of <i>reflexive sociality</i>: the intrapersonal re-use of skills and mechanisms originally evolved to serve interpersonal needs. Keywords: mind-reading; power; manipulation; self; will; sociality; internalization 10 01 JB code aicr.86.09mic 151 178 28 Article 12 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Coherence of conduct and the self-image</TitleText> 1 A01 Maria Miceli Miceli, Maria Maria Miceli Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 2 A01 Cristiano Castelfranchi Castelfranchi, Cristiano Cristiano Castelfranchi Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 The need for coherence of conduct has been viewed, more or less implicitly, as one of the fundamental human needs, in association with one&#8217;s social image and self-image. Actually it appears to accomplish a variety of possible functions: identity negotiation, as a condition for smooth and predictable social interactions; the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem; and the maintenance of one&#8217;s self-view regardless of either self-esteem or social identity concerns. In the present work, while acknowledging the plausibility and appeal of such general functions, we will proceed in a more &#8220;bottom-up&#8221; fashion, trying to single out and analyze in greater detail the possible &#8220;uses&#8221; of coherence of conduct. We will first specify our notion of coherence of conduct, as well as of its underlying need. Then, we will address its impact on the individual&#8217;s behavior, with reference to its relationships with persistence in goal pursuit, the need to show a stable social identity, perceived self-efficacy, general self-esteem, and personal identity or self-image. We will discuss how the need for coherence comes into play in one&#8217;s self-image, which includes not only one&#8217;s self-evaluations but also, more generally, one&#8217;s self-beliefs, especially those about one&#8217;s own goals and the kind of person one believes or wants to be. We will focus on the crucial impact of the individual&#8217;s values on his or her coherence of conduct. Finally, we will address the issue of self-coherence and change of conduct, pointing to some mechanisms which favor self-coherence without granting actual coherence of conduct. Keywords: coherence of conduct; self-image; persistence; values; defense mechanisms 10 01 JB code aicr.86.10pag 179 206 28 Article 13 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Ulysses&#8217; will</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Self-control, external constraints, and games</Subtitle> 1 A01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 This paper discusses the widespread strategy of controlling one&#8217;s own future behavior by imposing external constraints on possible actions &#8211; a strategy well exemplified by the episode of Ulysses and the Sirens. I first discuss the strategic use of external constraints in the context of other methods to improve self-control, showing that this strategy is ubiquitous and constitutes a proper manifestation of self-control, but not of willpower. I analyze the difference between these two concepts and the possibility of considering the use of external constraints as a way of externalizing self-control, in the vein of the extended mind hypothesis. Then I offer a game-theoretic characterization of constraint-based self-control as sequential games where each player can have limited control over the game structure, with the players being the same self at different points in time. The potential implications of this analysis are discussed, and an alternative game-theoretic representation of the strategic situation is offered, in the form of larger sequential games. The two characterizations have similar explanatory power, and they are used to diagnose the reasons behind a common failure at self-control via external constraints (advanced payment as a form of ineffective pre-commitment) and to suggest a possible remedy (advanced payment with conditional reimbursement). Finally, I discuss the implications of this approach for how rationality should be assessed in intertemporal decisions, i.e. choices that involve trade-offs between subsequent selves: I offer a critique of existing principles of diachronic rationality, and propose expected utility maximization over a collectivity of temporal selves as a viable alternative Keywords: self-control; external constraints; intertemporal choice; diachronic rationality; willpower 10 01 JB code aicr.86.11rie 207 226 20 Article 14 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context</TitleText> 1 A01 Erik Rietveld Rietveld, Erik Erik Rietveld Department of Philosophy/AMC, University of Amsterdam 01 There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective <i>embodied</i> intelligence that is &#8216;motivated&#8217; by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to &#8216;affordances&#8217; (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend&#8217;s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such &#8216;motor intentionality&#8217; can be characterized as &#8220;our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context&#8221; (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a <i>field</i> of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the &#8216;mirror neuron system&#8217; as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances 10 01 JB code aicr.86.12sin 227 238 12 Article 15 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Seeing with the hands</TitleText> 1 A01 Corrado Sinigaglia Sinigaglia, Corrado Corrado Sinigaglia Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano 01 When witnessing someone else&#8217;s action people often take advantage of the same motor cognition that is crucial to successfully perform that action themselves. But how deeply is motor cognition involved in understanding another&#8217;s action&#63; Can it be selectively modulated by either the agent&#8217;s or the witness&#8217;s being actually in the position to act&#63; If this is the case, what does such modulation imply for one&#8217;s making sense of others&#63; The paper aims to tackle these issues by introducing and discussing a series of experimental studies showing how body and space may constrain one&#8217;s own motor cognition reuse in understanding another&#8217;s action. These findings, I shall argue, may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying the primary ways of identifying ourselves with other people and of being connected to them. Keywords: motor cognition; social cognition; space representation; mirror neurons; proactive gaze 10 01 JB code aicr.86.13fri 239 258 20 Article 16 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Recognition of emotion in others</TitleText> 1 A01 Nico H. Frijda Frijda, Nico H. Nico H. Frijda University of Amsterdam 01 This chapter argues that recognition of emotion has a simple basis and a highly complex edifice above it. Its basis is formed by catching intent from expressive and other emotional behavior, using elementary principles of perceptual integration. In intent recognition, mirror neurons under particular circumstances do play a role, but under other circumstances visual perception and prediction may suffice. To arrive at full understanding of emotions of others, and in particular to arrive at empathy, much more elaborate information, and activities of mentalising, are required. Keywords: emotion recognition; emotional behavior; intent understanding; mentalizing. 10 01 JB code aicr.86.14spi 259 286 28 Article 17 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription</TitleText> <TitlePrefix>The </TitlePrefix> <TitleWithoutPrefix textformat="02">Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription</TitleWithoutPrefix> 1 A01 Finn Spicer Spicer, Finn Finn Spicer Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol 01 In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions &#8211; the <i>Paratactic Account</i>. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity &#8211; a <i>content</i>. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one&#8217;s <i>own</i> thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke&#8217;s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects&#8217; folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec3 Section header 18 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.15ric 287 300 14 Article 19 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">From sensation to consciousness</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Suggestions in modern philosophy</Subtitle> 1 A01 Monica Riccio Riccio, Monica Monica Riccio Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Naples 01 The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external &#8211; the body and his surface &#8211; into the inside &#8211; the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If &#8220;nothing but a body can touch and be touched&#8221; (Lucretius, <i>De rerum natura</i>, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of &#8220;being touched&#8221;, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul 10 01 JB code aicr.86.16pal 301 310 10 Article 20 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy</TitleText> 1 A01 Roberto Palaia Palaia, Roberto Roberto Palaia Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome 01 A semantic shift of the word consciousness (<i>conscientia</i>, <i>conscience</i>, <i>Gewissen</i>, <i>Bewusstsein</i>, <i>coscienza</i>) occurred in 17th- and 18th-century European languages. While in pre-modern times the term consciousness had been related to theology and ethics, in early modern thought, a new meaning was added to the term, somehow different from the original one. Early modern philosophers and scientists used consciousness to refer to the knowledge of Self. In addition, it is apparent that the syntagms relating to the word consciousness &#8211; as, for instance, <i>freedom of consciousness</i>, <i>casus conscientiae</i> &#8211; became more frequent in political, religious, scientific and philosophical texts. My contribution will analyse the occurrences of these semantic fields in some important philosphical and scientific texts and will examine their specific uses and contexts. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; bewusstsein; modern philosophy; philosophical dictionary 10 01 JB code aicr.86.17lam 311 326 16 Article 21 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Experience and identity of the self</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The emergence of consciousness as a cognitive concept in the early modern age</Subtitle> 1 A01 Antonio Lamarra Lamarra, Antonio Antonio Lamarra Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome 01 The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes&#8217; as well as to Locke&#8217;s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind 10 01 JB code aicr.86.18san 327 336 10 Article 22 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The modern concept of coscienza in Vico&#8217;s <i>De antiquissima</i></Subtitle> 1 A01 Manuela Sanna Sanna, Manuela Manuela Sanna Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPFCNR Naples 01 This study is intended to follow up and illustrate the theoretical steps through which G.B. Vico defined the concept of &#8220;Consciousness&#8221; (coscienza) in the works that preceded his masterpiece, the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>. The theme of consciousness is elaborated by the Neapolitan philosopher in a very different way from Descartes&#8217;s proposals, since it comes out by approaching <i>verum</i> to <i>facere</i> and, later, <i>verum</i> to <i>conformari</i>. This displacement occurs by means of a theoretical passage through the level of <i>conscire</i>, outlining a deep gap between <i>feeling</i> (<i>sentire</i>) and <i>imagining</i> (<i>immaginare</i>). Vico works on a possible definition of the concept of &#8220;consciousness&#8221; and moves a tight critique to skeptic and neostoic currents posing the question about how to became able to <i>feel</i> something while striving to <i>imagine</i> in a conscious way. The whole anthropological framework which allows the definition of the human is built on this theoretical passage and on the etymologic reconstruction of <i>conscire</i> as <i>cum-scire</i> and of <i>conscientia</i> as a part of <i>scientia</i>. Keywords: consciousness; imagination; G. Vico; science 10 01 JB code aicr.86.19cer 337 354 18 Article 23 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness and faculties in <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> by Vico</TitleText> 1 A01 Geri Cerchiai Cerchiai, Geri Geri Cerchiai Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Milan 01 Face to Descartes&#8217; rationalism, in the book entitled <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> Vico tries to examine non reflexive aspects of thought. According to Vico, the clear and distinct idea cannot originate the <i>cogito</i> as a criterion of truth; moreover, the clear and distinct idea exchanges the <i>intelligere</i> of God with the human <i>cogitare</i>; third, the method of doubt doesn&#8217;t consider the link, in men, of <i>res cogitans</i> and <i>res extensa</i> and the correlation between mind and body. Fourth, this theory arises from a wrong notion of substance. Following these four points, the article will stress the rejection by Vico of the Cartesian idea of consciousness and will try to determine a possible theory of consciousness as it is implied by Vichian reflections. Keywords: Vico; Descartes; consciousness 10 01 JB code aicr.86.20aut 355 360 6 Article 24 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Authors</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.21ref 361 398 38 Article 25 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">References</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.22ind 399 404 6 Article 26 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Index</TitleText> 02 JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia NL 04 20120807 2012 John Benjamins 02 WORLD 13 15 9789027213525 01 JB 3 John Benjamins e-Platform 03 jbe-platform.com 09 WORLD 21 01 00 99.00 EUR R 01 00 83.00 GBP Z 01 gen 00 149.00 USD S 294008583 03 01 01 JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 86 Hb 15 9789027213525 13 2012002089 BB 01 AiCR 02 1381-589X Advances in Consciousness Research 86 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness in Interaction</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness</Subtitle> 01 aicr.86 01 https://benjamins.com 02 https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.86 1 B01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, ISTC-CNR, Rome 01 eng 423 xix 403 PSY031000 v.2006 JMH 2 24 JB Subject Scheme CONS.GEN Consciousness research 24 JB Subject Scheme IS.GIS Interaction Studies 06 01 <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> is an interdisciplinary collection with contributions from philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and historians of philosophy. It revolves around the idea that consciousness emerges from, and impacts on, our skilled interactions with the natural and social context. Section one discusses how phenomenal consciousness and subjective selfhood are grounded on natural and social interactions, and what role brain activity plays in these phenomena. Section two analyzes how interactions with external objects and other human beings shape our understanding of ourselves, and how consciousness changes social interaction, self-control and emotions. Section three provides historical depth to the volume, by tracing the roots of the contemporary notion of consciousness in early modern philosophy. The book offers interdisciplinary insight on a variety of key topics in consciousness research: as such, it is of particular interest for researchers from philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive and social sciences, and humanities. 05 Might consciousness be better understood as an interactive, situated achievement rather than as some kind of mystery ingredient added to passive perception? The <i>Consciousness in Interaction</i> research project pursued this fundamental question from multiple perspectives and (fittingly) in a series of highly interactive engagements that structured and informed this wonderful volume of essays. The volume is a fitting tribute to Susan Hurley, to whom it is dedicated, and a landmark publication in the search for a richer understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience. Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh 05 Many hold that conscious experience is determined entirely locally, by internal processes in the brain. But even if that is true, we would also need to understand the subtle flow of contents, the ineffability, the convoluted, many-layered historicity of that target phenomenon, for this is what yields some of the most intriguing aspects of phenomenal experience: the ever-unfolding dance of coupled self-models, dying into each other while dynamically weaving our individual perspectives into the unfathomable mesh of the intersubjective world. Thomas Metzinger, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 04 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.86.png 04 03 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213525.jpg 04 03 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213525.tif 06 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.86.hb.png 07 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.86.png 25 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.86.hb.png 27 09 01 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.86.hb.png 10 01 JB code aicr.86.001int ix xx 12 Article 1 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Introduction</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">What does it mean to study consciousness in interaction&#63;</Subtitle> 1 A01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec1 Section header 2 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.01als 1 18 18 Article 3 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">What <i>reason</i> could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Adrian Alsmith Alsmith, Adrian Adrian Alsmith Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen 01 This paper aims to examine the reasons for endorsing the idea of pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. The guiding question will be: why should one think that any description of consciousness that posits PBS is correct&#63; The aim of this discussion is to show how hard this question is to answer and the kinds of considerations that one should bring to bear in attempting to answer it. Keywords: explanation; phenomenology; bodily self-consciousness; attention; introspection 10 01 JB code aicr.86.02kiv 19 40 22 Article 4 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Julian Kiverstein Kiverstein, Julian Julian Kiverstein Institute for Language, Logic and Computation, University of Amsterdam 2 A01 Mirko Farina Farina, Mirko Mirko Farina ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Institute of Human Cognition and Brain Science (IHCBS), Macquarie University, Sydney 01 Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness&#63; Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be &#8220;yes&#8221; to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009), a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn&#8217;t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. Keywords: variable neural correlates; action-space view; dynamic sensorimotor theories; extended consciousness; sensory substitution devices 10 01 JB code aicr.86.03gan 41 58 18 Article 5 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action</TitleText> <TitlePrefix>The </TitlePrefix> <TitleWithoutPrefix textformat="02">extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action</TitleWithoutPrefix> 1 A01 Nivedita Gangopadhyay Gangopadhyay, Nivedita Nivedita Gangopadhyay Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen 01 The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark &#38; Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark&#8217;s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity 10 01 JB code aicr.86.04mad 59 72 14 Article 6 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Showtime at the Cartesian Theater&#63;</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations</Subtitle> 1 A01 Michael Madary Madary, Michael Michael Madary Johannes Gutenberg – Universität Mainz 01 Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva No&#235; (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005a), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, No&#235;, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed &#8216;temporal atomism&#8217;. To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett&#8217;s Cartesian Theater (1991).In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and No&#235;&#8217;s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that No&#235; and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley&#8217;s externalism. Keywords: vehicle externalism; perceptual states; dynamical explanations; Cartesian Theater 10 01 JB code aicr.86.05pie 73 88 16 Article 7 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface&#63;</TitleText> 1 A01 Bryony Pierce Pierce, Bryony Bryony Pierce Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol 01 The mind-body problem &#8211; how conscious experience can arise from a physical system &#8211; is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the &#8216;hard problem&#8217;. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine&#8217;s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson&#8217;s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action 10 01 JB code aicr.86.06war 89 104 16 Article 8 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Es are good</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended</Subtitle> 1 A01 Dave Ward Ward, Dave Dave Ward School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 2 A01 Mog Stapleton Stapleton, Mog Mog Stapleton School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 01 We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer&#8217;s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. Keywords: enactivism; embodied cognition; situated cognition; affective cognition 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec2 Section header 9 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.07vie 105 124 20 Article 10 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind</TitleText> 1 A01 Tillmann Vierkant Vierkant, Tillmann Tillmann Vierkant School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 2 A01 Andreas Paraskevaides Paraskevaides, Andreas Andreas Paraskevaides School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh 01 Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role for a theoretical understanding of psychological states in human cognition. We argue that this is because a theoretical understanding is necessary for all intentional control of the mind. Keywords: mindreading; mindshaping; narrative control; manipulative control; folk psychology 10 01 JB code aicr.86.08cas 125 150 26 Article 11 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">&#8220;My mind&#8221;</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Reflexive sociality and its cognitive tools</Subtitle> 1 A01 Cristiano Castelfranchi Castelfranchi, Cristiano Cristiano Castelfranchi Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 Mind-reading is adapted for social interaction (e.g. coordination, cooperation, exchange), and, in particular, for adoption of beliefs and goals from others, and for influencing, manipulating, persuading them; that is, changing the other mind, beliefs and goals, in order to change their behavior. Given this ability to interpret the others&#8217; mind and to use this representation to induce certain behavior in others, in this paper I discuss the introjection of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition and action to our own selves. Or better, to be &#8220;our selves&#8221; means to have such a social-like representation (image) of us as a person, to know and to build who we are, by creating, updating and operating through this image. I assume that there is <i>self-directed mind-reading</i> and <i>self-influencing</i>: I learn to read my own behavior in mental terms; I learn to have a reflexive mind-reading, based not on introspection but on behavior interpretation; this leads me to meta-represent by beliefs, goals, etc. For what&#63; Not just for understanding what I&#8217;m doing and why, not just for predicting and expecting what I will do, but also (and perhaps mostly) for helping myself and cooperating with myself, for influencing myself: changing my own mind, in particular my goals. In order to <i>fighting</i> or <i>cooperating</i> with myself, &#8220;imposing&#8221; to myself certain preferences, contrasting unwanted needs or dangerous desires. This activity involves reflexive communication acts, requests, duties, emotions, promises, and the like, all of which constitute a form of <i>reflexive sociality</i>: the intrapersonal re-use of skills and mechanisms originally evolved to serve interpersonal needs. Keywords: mind-reading; power; manipulation; self; will; sociality; internalization 10 01 JB code aicr.86.09mic 151 178 28 Article 12 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Coherence of conduct and the self-image</TitleText> 1 A01 Maria Miceli Miceli, Maria Maria Miceli Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 2 A01 Cristiano Castelfranchi Castelfranchi, Cristiano Cristiano Castelfranchi Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 The need for coherence of conduct has been viewed, more or less implicitly, as one of the fundamental human needs, in association with one&#8217;s social image and self-image. Actually it appears to accomplish a variety of possible functions: identity negotiation, as a condition for smooth and predictable social interactions; the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem; and the maintenance of one&#8217;s self-view regardless of either self-esteem or social identity concerns. In the present work, while acknowledging the plausibility and appeal of such general functions, we will proceed in a more &#8220;bottom-up&#8221; fashion, trying to single out and analyze in greater detail the possible &#8220;uses&#8221; of coherence of conduct. We will first specify our notion of coherence of conduct, as well as of its underlying need. Then, we will address its impact on the individual&#8217;s behavior, with reference to its relationships with persistence in goal pursuit, the need to show a stable social identity, perceived self-efficacy, general self-esteem, and personal identity or self-image. We will discuss how the need for coherence comes into play in one&#8217;s self-image, which includes not only one&#8217;s self-evaluations but also, more generally, one&#8217;s self-beliefs, especially those about one&#8217;s own goals and the kind of person one believes or wants to be. We will focus on the crucial impact of the individual&#8217;s values on his or her coherence of conduct. Finally, we will address the issue of self-coherence and change of conduct, pointing to some mechanisms which favor self-coherence without granting actual coherence of conduct. Keywords: coherence of conduct; self-image; persistence; values; defense mechanisms 10 01 JB code aicr.86.10pag 179 206 28 Article 13 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Ulysses&#8217; will</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Self-control, external constraints, and games</Subtitle> 1 A01 Fabio Paglieri Paglieri, Fabio Fabio Paglieri Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione ISTC-CNR Rome 01 This paper discusses the widespread strategy of controlling one&#8217;s own future behavior by imposing external constraints on possible actions &#8211; a strategy well exemplified by the episode of Ulysses and the Sirens. I first discuss the strategic use of external constraints in the context of other methods to improve self-control, showing that this strategy is ubiquitous and constitutes a proper manifestation of self-control, but not of willpower. I analyze the difference between these two concepts and the possibility of considering the use of external constraints as a way of externalizing self-control, in the vein of the extended mind hypothesis. Then I offer a game-theoretic characterization of constraint-based self-control as sequential games where each player can have limited control over the game structure, with the players being the same self at different points in time. The potential implications of this analysis are discussed, and an alternative game-theoretic representation of the strategic situation is offered, in the form of larger sequential games. The two characterizations have similar explanatory power, and they are used to diagnose the reasons behind a common failure at self-control via external constraints (advanced payment as a form of ineffective pre-commitment) and to suggest a possible remedy (advanced payment with conditional reimbursement). Finally, I discuss the implications of this approach for how rationality should be assessed in intertemporal decisions, i.e. choices that involve trade-offs between subsequent selves: I offer a critique of existing principles of diachronic rationality, and propose expected utility maximization over a collectivity of temporal selves as a viable alternative Keywords: self-control; external constraints; intertemporal choice; diachronic rationality; willpower 10 01 JB code aicr.86.11rie 207 226 20 Article 14 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context</TitleText> 1 A01 Erik Rietveld Rietveld, Erik Erik Rietveld Department of Philosophy/AMC, University of Amsterdam 01 There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective <i>embodied</i> intelligence that is &#8216;motivated&#8217; by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to &#8216;affordances&#8217; (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend&#8217;s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such &#8216;motor intentionality&#8217; can be characterized as &#8220;our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context&#8221; (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a <i>field</i> of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the &#8216;mirror neuron system&#8217; as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances 10 01 JB code aicr.86.12sin 227 238 12 Article 15 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Seeing with the hands</TitleText> 1 A01 Corrado Sinigaglia Sinigaglia, Corrado Corrado Sinigaglia Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano 01 When witnessing someone else&#8217;s action people often take advantage of the same motor cognition that is crucial to successfully perform that action themselves. But how deeply is motor cognition involved in understanding another&#8217;s action&#63; Can it be selectively modulated by either the agent&#8217;s or the witness&#8217;s being actually in the position to act&#63; If this is the case, what does such modulation imply for one&#8217;s making sense of others&#63; The paper aims to tackle these issues by introducing and discussing a series of experimental studies showing how body and space may constrain one&#8217;s own motor cognition reuse in understanding another&#8217;s action. These findings, I shall argue, may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying the primary ways of identifying ourselves with other people and of being connected to them. Keywords: motor cognition; social cognition; space representation; mirror neurons; proactive gaze 10 01 JB code aicr.86.13fri 239 258 20 Article 16 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Recognition of emotion in others</TitleText> 1 A01 Nico H. Frijda Frijda, Nico H. Nico H. Frijda University of Amsterdam 01 This chapter argues that recognition of emotion has a simple basis and a highly complex edifice above it. Its basis is formed by catching intent from expressive and other emotional behavior, using elementary principles of perceptual integration. In intent recognition, mirror neurons under particular circumstances do play a role, but under other circumstances visual perception and prediction may suffice. To arrive at full understanding of emotions of others, and in particular to arrive at empathy, much more elaborate information, and activities of mentalising, are required. Keywords: emotion recognition; emotional behavior; intent understanding; mentalizing. 10 01 JB code aicr.86.14spi 259 286 28 Article 17 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription</TitleText> <TitlePrefix>The </TitlePrefix> <TitleWithoutPrefix textformat="02">Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription</TitleWithoutPrefix> 1 A01 Finn Spicer Spicer, Finn Finn Spicer Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol 01 In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions &#8211; the <i>Paratactic Account</i>. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity &#8211; a <i>content</i>. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one&#8217;s <i>own</i> thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke&#8217;s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects&#8217; folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports 10 01 JB code aicr.86.00sec3 Section header 18 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.15ric 287 300 14 Article 19 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">From sensation to consciousness</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">Suggestions in modern philosophy</Subtitle> 1 A01 Monica Riccio Riccio, Monica Monica Riccio Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Naples 01 The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external &#8211; the body and his surface &#8211; into the inside &#8211; the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If &#8220;nothing but a body can touch and be touched&#8221; (Lucretius, <i>De rerum natura</i>, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of &#8220;being touched&#8221;, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul 10 01 JB code aicr.86.16pal 301 310 10 Article 20 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy</TitleText> 1 A01 Roberto Palaia Palaia, Roberto Roberto Palaia Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome 01 A semantic shift of the word consciousness (<i>conscientia</i>, <i>conscience</i>, <i>Gewissen</i>, <i>Bewusstsein</i>, <i>coscienza</i>) occurred in 17th- and 18th-century European languages. While in pre-modern times the term consciousness had been related to theology and ethics, in early modern thought, a new meaning was added to the term, somehow different from the original one. Early modern philosophers and scientists used consciousness to refer to the knowledge of Self. In addition, it is apparent that the syntagms relating to the word consciousness &#8211; as, for instance, <i>freedom of consciousness</i>, <i>casus conscientiae</i> &#8211; became more frequent in political, religious, scientific and philosophical texts. My contribution will analyse the occurrences of these semantic fields in some important philosphical and scientific texts and will examine their specific uses and contexts. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; bewusstsein; modern philosophy; philosophical dictionary 10 01 JB code aicr.86.17lam 311 326 16 Article 21 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Experience and identity of the self</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The emergence of consciousness as a cognitive concept in the early modern age</Subtitle> 1 A01 Antonio Lamarra Lamarra, Antonio Antonio Lamarra Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee ILIESI-CNR Rome 01 The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes&#8217; as well as to Locke&#8217;s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind 10 01 JB code aicr.86.18san 327 336 10 Article 22 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico</TitleText> <Subtitle textformat="02">The modern concept of coscienza in Vico&#8217;s <i>De antiquissima</i></Subtitle> 1 A01 Manuela Sanna Sanna, Manuela Manuela Sanna Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPFCNR Naples 01 This study is intended to follow up and illustrate the theoretical steps through which G.B. Vico defined the concept of &#8220;Consciousness&#8221; (coscienza) in the works that preceded his masterpiece, the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>. The theme of consciousness is elaborated by the Neapolitan philosopher in a very different way from Descartes&#8217;s proposals, since it comes out by approaching <i>verum</i> to <i>facere</i> and, later, <i>verum</i> to <i>conformari</i>. This displacement occurs by means of a theoretical passage through the level of <i>conscire</i>, outlining a deep gap between <i>feeling</i> (<i>sentire</i>) and <i>imagining</i> (<i>immaginare</i>). Vico works on a possible definition of the concept of &#8220;consciousness&#8221; and moves a tight critique to skeptic and neostoic currents posing the question about how to became able to <i>feel</i> something while striving to <i>imagine</i> in a conscious way. The whole anthropological framework which allows the definition of the human is built on this theoretical passage and on the etymologic reconstruction of <i>conscire</i> as <i>cum-scire</i> and of <i>conscientia</i> as a part of <i>scientia</i>. Keywords: consciousness; imagination; G. Vico; science 10 01 JB code aicr.86.19cer 337 354 18 Article 23 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Consciousness and faculties in <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> by Vico</TitleText> 1 A01 Geri Cerchiai Cerchiai, Geri Geri Cerchiai Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno ISPF-CNR Milan 01 Face to Descartes&#8217; rationalism, in the book entitled <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i> Vico tries to examine non reflexive aspects of thought. According to Vico, the clear and distinct idea cannot originate the <i>cogito</i> as a criterion of truth; moreover, the clear and distinct idea exchanges the <i>intelligere</i> of God with the human <i>cogitare</i>; third, the method of doubt doesn&#8217;t consider the link, in men, of <i>res cogitans</i> and <i>res extensa</i> and the correlation between mind and body. Fourth, this theory arises from a wrong notion of substance. Following these four points, the article will stress the rejection by Vico of the Cartesian idea of consciousness and will try to determine a possible theory of consciousness as it is implied by Vichian reflections. Keywords: Vico; Descartes; consciousness 10 01 JB code aicr.86.20aut 355 360 6 Article 24 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Authors</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.21ref 361 398 38 Article 25 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">References</TitleText> 10 01 JB code aicr.86.22ind 399 404 6 Article 26 <TitleType>01</TitleType> <TitleText textformat="02">Index</TitleText> 02 JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia NL 04 20120807 2012 John Benjamins 02 WORLD 01 245 mm 02 164 mm 08 905 gr 01 JB 1 John Benjamins Publishing Company +31 20 6304747 +31 20 6739773 bookorder@benjamins.nl 01 https://benjamins.com 01 WORLD US CA MX 21 95 14 01 02 JB 1 00 99.00 EUR R 02 02 JB 1 00 104.94 EUR R 01 JB 10 bebc +44 1202 712 934 +44 1202 712 913 sales@bebc.co.uk 03 GB 21 14 02 02 JB 1 00 83.00 GBP Z 01 JB 2 John Benjamins North America +1 800 562-5666 +1 703 661-1501 benjamins@presswarehouse.com 01 https://benjamins.com 01 US CA MX 21 1 14 01 gen 02 JB 1 00 149.00 USD