958014607 03 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 88 GE 15 9789027273598 06 10.1075/aicr.88 00 EA E133 10 01 JB code AiCR 02 JB code 1381-589X 02 88.00 01 02 Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research 01 01 Being in Time Being in Time 1 B01 01 JB code 849136105 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University 2 B01 01 JB code 661136106 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Stony Brook University 3 B01 01 JB code 770136107 Neta Zach Zach, Neta Neta Zach University of Pennsylvania 01 eng 11 277 03 03 xvi 03 00 261 03 24 JB code PSY.COGPSY Cognitive psychology 24 JB code CONS.GEN Consciousness research 10 PSY008000 12 JMR 01 06 02 00

Addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience, the diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis.

03 00 Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B. 01 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.88.png 01 01 D502 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213549.jpg 01 01 D504 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213549.tif 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.88.hb.png 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.88.png 02 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.88.hb.png 03 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.88.hb.png
01 01 JB code aicr.88.001int 06 10.1075/aicr.88.001int vii xvi 10 Article 1 01 04 Introduction Introduction 01 01 JB code aicr.88.01llo 06 10.1075/aicr.88.01llo 1 20 20 Article 2 01 04 Time after time Time after time 01 04 Temporality in the dynamic brain Temporality in the dynamic brain 1 A01 01 JB code 75170517 Dan Lloyd Lloyd, Dan Dan Lloyd Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College, Connecticut, USA 01 01 JB code aicr.88.02mal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.02mal 21 36 16 Article 3 01 04 Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 1 A01 01 JB code 385170518 Rafael Malach Malach, Rafael Rafael Malach Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science 01 01 JB code aicr.88.03mer 06 10.1075/aicr.88.03mer 37 80 44 Article 4 01 04 From probabilities to percepts From probabilities to percepts 01 04 A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience 1 A01 01 JB code 989170519 Bjorn Merker Merker, Bjorn Bjorn Merker 01 01 JB code aicr.88.04ede 06 10.1075/aicr.88.04ede 81 94 14 Article 5 01 04 Being in time Being in time 1 A01 01 JB code 144170520 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA 2 A01 01 JB code 396170521 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Simtat hanarkis 1, Zichron Yaakov, Israel 01 01 JB code aicr.88.05fek 06 10.1075/aicr.88.05fek 95 120 26 Article 6 01 04 The (lack of) mental life of some machines The (lack of) mental life of some machines 1 A01 01 JB code 831170522 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Department of Biomedical Engineering, Stony Brook University 2 A01 01 JB code 35170523 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Department of Psychology, Cornell University 01 01 JB code aicr.88.06lee 06 10.1075/aicr.88.06lee 121 148 28 Article 7 01 04 Restless minds, wandering brains Restless minds, wandering brains 1 A01 01 JB code 487170524 Cees Leeuwen Leeuwen, Cees Cees Leeuwen RIKEN BSI, Japan and KU Leuven, Belgium 2 A01 01 JB code 506170525 Dirk J.A. Smit Smit, Dirk J.A. Dirk J.A. Smit VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands 01 01 JB code aicr.88.07hue 06 10.1075/aicr.88.07hue 149 164 16 Article 8 01 04 Fuzzy consciousness Fuzzy consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 59170526 Stephanie Huette Huette, Stephanie Stephanie Huette University of California, Merced 2 A01 01 JB code 297170527 Michael J. Spivey Spivey, Michael J. Michael J. Spivey University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.08yos 06 10.1075/aicr.88.08yos 165 184 20 Article 9 01 04 Two dynamical themes in Husserl Two dynamical themes in Husserl 1 A01 01 JB code 556170528 Jeffrey Yoshimi Yoshimi, Jeffrey Jeffrey Yoshimi University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.09wie 06 10.1075/aicr.88.09wie 185 210 26 Article 10 01 04 Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 01 04 First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 923170529 Wanja Wiese Wiese, Wanja Wanja Wiese Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 2 A01 01 JB code 150170530 Thomas Metzinger Metzinger, Thomas Thomas Metzinger Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 01 01 JB code aicr.88.10bro 06 10.1075/aicr.88.10bro 211 230 20 Article 11 01 04 The brain and its states The brain and its states 1 A01 01 JB code 595170531 Richard Brown Brown, Richard Richard Brown LaGuardia Community College, NY, USA 01 01 JB code aicr.88.11dal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.11dal 231 258 28 Article 12 01 04 An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 967170532 Rick Dale Dale, Rick Rick Dale Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 2 A01 01 JB code 254170533 Deborah P. Tollefsen Tollefsen, Deborah P. Deborah P. Tollefsen Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis 3 A01 01 JB code 698170534 Christopher T. Kello Kello, Christopher T. Christopher T. Kello Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.12ind 06 10.1075/aicr.88.12ind 259 261 3 Article 13 01 04 Index Index 01 JB code JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 https://benjamins.com Amsterdam NL 00 John Benjamins Publishing Company Marketing Department / Karin Plijnaar, Pieter Lamers onix@benjamins.nl 04 01 00 20120711 C 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company D 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company 02 WORLD 13 15 9789027213549 WORLD 03 01 JB 17 Google 03 https://play.google.com/store/books 21 01 00 Unqualified price 00 99.00 EUR 01 00 Unqualified price 00 83.00 GBP 01 00 Unqualified price 00 149.00 USD
785008611 03 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 88 Hb 15 9789027213549 06 10.1075/aicr.88 13 2012016358 00 BB 01 245 mm 02 164 mm 08 655 gr 10 01 JB code AiCR 02 1381-589X 02 88.00 01 02 Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research 01 01 Being in Time Dynamical models of phenomenal experience Being in Time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience 1 B01 01 JB code 849136105 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/849136105 2 B01 01 JB code 661136106 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Stony Brook University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/661136106 3 B01 01 JB code 770136107 Neta Zach Zach, Neta Neta Zach University of Pennsylvania 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/770136107 01 eng 11 277 03 03 xvi 03 00 261 03 01 23 153 03 2012 BF204.5 04 Phenomenological psychology. 04 Experience--Psychological aspects. 04 Consciousness. 04 Time. 10 PSY008000 12 JMR 24 JB code PSY.COGPSY Cognitive psychology 24 JB code CONS.GEN Consciousness research 01 06 02 00

Addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience, the diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis.

03 00 Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B. 01 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.88.png 01 01 D502 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213549.jpg 01 01 D504 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213549.tif 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.88.hb.png 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.88.png 02 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.88.hb.png 03 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.88.hb.png
01 01 JB code aicr.88.001int 06 10.1075/aicr.88.001int vii xvi 10 Article 1 01 04 Introduction Introduction 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.01llo 06 10.1075/aicr.88.01llo 1 20 20 Article 2 01 04 Time after time Time after time 01 04 Temporality in the dynamic brain Temporality in the dynamic brain 1 A01 01 JB code 75170517 Dan Lloyd Lloyd, Dan Dan Lloyd Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College, Connecticut, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/75170517 01 eng 30 00

A useful theory linking dynamical systems to phenomenal experience will be a story thrice told. It will involve some description of phenomenal experience, which should be true. It will also involve some sort of dynamical model (second). But (third) the model will have to be at least plausibly implementable in human beings – that’s where the theory becomes useful. Finally, once all three stories are told, they must align. It should be evident to all that the phenomenal story, the dynamical story, and the implementation story are really one story, about one entity, described in three different ways, akin to one story as it might be told in three different languages. A theory of consciousness then is an exercise in translation, somewhat like deciphering the Rosetta Stone. This chapter outlines a possible alignment with respect to a foundational, structural property of experience, namely, time.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.02mal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.02mal 21 36 16 Article 3 01 04 Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 1 A01 01 JB code 385170518 Rafael Malach Malach, Rafael Rafael Malach Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/385170518 01 eng 30 00

For a neuroscientist working under the assumption of a complete correspondence between mind and brain, conscious awareness poses a profound mystery. It is a unique phenomenon in which a state of a physical system – i.e. a distributed pattern of neuronal activity is inexplicably transformed into an absolutely private and internal mental experience. Thus, the relevant point of view that needs to be taken when considering neuronal mechanisms underlying phenomenal experience must also be intrinsic – that of the brain’s neurons themselves. In contrast, the perspective taken by most neuroscience research examines neuronal activity from an external observer perspective. Here I will conjecture that the intrinsic perspective is implemented in the brain through rapid and recurrent neuronal activity – local neuronal “ignitions”. In this dynamics, the information about the state of a local neuronal assembly is distributed back to the neurons that form the assembly through recurrent activations. A conscious percept emerges when, through these neuronal reflections, the ambiguity inherent in the activity of isolated neurons is converted into a unique and meaningful assembly state. The rapid distribution of assembly information necessitates high firing rates, sustained activity, and dense local connectivity. All these conditions fit nicely with recent experimental findings. The fourth consequence – the founding of conscious awareness on local reverberatory activity – is still highly controversial – and should be viewed, at this stage, as a prediction of the local “ignition” hypothesis.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.03mer 06 10.1075/aicr.88.03mer 37 80 44 Article 4 01 04 From probabilities to percepts From probabilities to percepts 01 04 A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience 1 A01 01 JB code 989170519 Bjorn Merker Merker, Bjorn Bjorn Merker 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/989170519 01 eng 30 00

A brain charged with guiding its body through a complex and lively world from a position of solitary confinement inside its opaque skull faces a set of functional challenges beset with inverse and ill-posed problems at every turn. Uncertainty and ambiguity therefore encumber all cortical labors, making probability distributions the natural medium of its disambiguating inferential operations. This chapter proposes that those operations take place unconsciously, in keeping with Helmholtz’ original suggestion, and that the functional logic of an inherently probabilistic cortex implies a need for an extracortical “global best estimate buffer” as a means to complete cortical sensory disambiguation through a definitive but ephemeral estimate of current sensory circumstances. It further proposes that the contents of that extracortical buffer are conscious, not by virtue of anything being “added” to buffer operations in order to “make them conscious”, but by virtue of the format of buffer contents alone: its dynamics issue in a nested arrangement placing an ego-center in perspectival relation to a neural model of body-world interactions. Finally, the organization of the higher order nuclei of the dorsal thalamus are scrutinized for their suitability to implement the putative global best estimate buffer, with particular attention to the possibility that the caudal reaches of the dorsal pulvinar might host its specifically sensory aspects, i.e. sensory awareness. Keywords: ambiguity; architecture of consciousness; best estimate buffer; constraint satisfaction; format of sensory awareness; phenomenal content; probabilistic operations; pulvinar

01 01 JB code aicr.88.04ede 06 10.1075/aicr.88.04ede 81 94 14 Article 5 01 04 Being in time Being in time 1 A01 01 JB code 144170520 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/144170520 2 A01 01 JB code 396170521 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Simtat hanarkis 1, Zichron Yaakov, Israel 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/396170521 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.05fek 06 10.1075/aicr.88.05fek 95 120 26 Article 6 01 04 The (lack of) mental life of some machines The (lack of) mental life of some machines 1 A01 01 JB code 831170522 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Department of Biomedical Engineering, Stony Brook University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/831170522 2 A01 01 JB code 35170523 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Department of Psychology, Cornell University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/35170523 01 eng 30 00

The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do so in a manner that is determined by the system itself, simply because the mental life of a machine cannot be up to an external observer. To illustrate just how tall this order is, we carefully analyze the scenario in which a digital computer simulates a network of neurons. We show that the formal correspondence between the two systems thereby established is at best partial, and, furthermore, that it is fundamentally incapable of realizing both some of the essential properties of actual neuronal systems and some of the fundamental properties of experience. Our analysis suggests that, if machine consciousness is at all possible, conscious experience can only be instantiated in a class of machines that are entirely different from digital computers, namely, timecontinuous, open analog dynamical systems.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.06lee 06 10.1075/aicr.88.06lee 121 148 28 Article 7 01 04 Restless minds, wandering brains Restless minds, wandering brains 1 A01 01 JB code 487170524 Cees Leeuwen Leeuwen, Cees Cees Leeuwen RIKEN BSI, Japan and KU Leuven, Belgium 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/487170524 2 A01 01 JB code 506170525 Dirk J.A. Smit Smit, Dirk J.A. Dirk J.A. Smit VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/506170525 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.07hue 06 10.1075/aicr.88.07hue 149 164 16 Article 8 01 04 Fuzzy consciousness Fuzzy consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 59170526 Stephanie Huette Huette, Stephanie Stephanie Huette University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/59170526 2 A01 01 JB code 297170527 Michael J. Spivey Spivey, Michael J. Michael J. Spivey University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/297170527 01 eng 30 00

This chapter explores the consequences of treating consciousness as a fuzzy dynamical system. A fuzzy dynamical system is one in which labeled concepts and percepts are altered as a function of context and conditions, and these changes occur continuously in time. We offer speculations on the groundwork for a consciousness state space in which the sets of trajectories over time form tube-like structures called cylinder sets. Consciousness is a trajectory within this structure, and it passes by or through those fuzzy concepts. When the trajectory of a mental event travels close to a particular concept or percept, one experiences awareness of that concept or percept. As these constrained pathways in mental state space become more heavily traveled, they develop increased density (or attraction strength) in their central threads, and more and more nearby trajectories get captured by that cylinder. At the same time, these tubes slowly gravitate toward short cuts in the state space over the lifespan, thus gradually straightening out and skipping past intermediating concepts that used to get visited as part of the sequence. The fringes of these concepts become a part of conscious experience, and for everyday coping, do not need to be recruited for explicit awareness. The formation and streamlining of cylinder sets over the course of learning may have the paradoxical result. of producing an increase in tacit conscious experience (of “being in time”) and a decrease in explicit awareness (of this or that labeled concept).

01 01 JB code aicr.88.08yos 06 10.1075/aicr.88.08yos 165 184 20 Article 9 01 04 Two dynamical themes in Husserl Two dynamical themes in Husserl 1 A01 01 JB code 556170528 Jeffrey Yoshimi Yoshimi, Jeffrey Jeffrey Yoshimi University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/556170528 01 eng 30 00

I describe and partially formalize two aspects of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, in a way that highlights their relevance to cognitive science. First, I describe “constitutive phenomenology”, the study of structures (what I call phenomenological “models”) that constitute a person’s sense of reality. These structures develop incrementally over the course of a person’s life, and serve a variety of functions, e.g. generating expectations relative to actions, and determining the contents of context awareness. Second, I describe “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology”, which posits a hierarchy of laws, each governing the way consciousness must be organized in order for a particular type of thing (a physical thing, a person, a social institution, etc.) to appear.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.09wie 06 10.1075/aicr.88.09wie 185 210 26 Article 10 01 04 Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 01 04 First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 923170529 Wanja Wiese Wiese, Wanja Wanja Wiese Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/923170529 2 A01 01 JB code 150170530 Thomas Metzinger Metzinger, Thomas Thomas Metzinger Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/150170530 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.10bro 06 10.1075/aicr.88.10bro 211 230 20 Article 11 01 04 The brain and its states The brain and its states 1 A01 01 JB code 595170531 Richard Brown Brown, Richard Richard Brown LaGuardia Community College, NY, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/595170531 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.11dal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.11dal 231 258 28 Article 12 01 04 An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 967170532 Rick Dale Dale, Rick Rick Dale Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/967170532 2 A01 01 JB code 254170533 Deborah P. Tollefsen Tollefsen, Deborah P. Deborah P. Tollefsen Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/254170533 3 A01 01 JB code 698170534 Christopher T. Kello Kello, Christopher T. Christopher T. Kello Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/698170534 01 eng 30 00

We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selfhood, awareness, and conscious experience. The mechanisms that have been identified for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. The first is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.12ind 06 10.1075/aicr.88.12ind 259 261 3 Article 13 01 04 Index Index 01 eng
01 JB code JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 https://benjamins.com 02 https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.88 Amsterdam NL 00 John Benjamins Publishing Company Marketing Department / Karin Plijnaar, Pieter Lamers onix@benjamins.nl 04 01 00 20120711 C 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company D 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company 02 WORLD WORLD US CA MX 09 01 JB 1 John Benjamins Publishing Company +31 20 6304747 +31 20 6739773 bookorder@benjamins.nl 01 https://benjamins.com 21 54 20 01 00 Unqualified price 02 JB 1 02 99.00 EUR 02 00 Unqualified price 02 83.00 01 Z 0 GBP GB US CA MX 01 01 JB 2 John Benjamins Publishing Company +1 800 562-5666 +1 703 661-1501 benjamins@presswarehouse.com 01 https://benjamins.com 21 54 20 01 00 Unqualified price 02 JB 1 02 149.00 USD
958014607 03 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 88 GE 15 9789027273598 06 10.1075/aicr.88 00 EA E133 10 01 JB code AiCR 02 JB code 1381-589X 02 88.00 01 02 Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research 01 01 Being in Time Being in Time 1 B01 01 JB code 849136105 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University 2 B01 01 JB code 661136106 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Stony Brook University 3 B01 01 JB code 770136107 Neta Zach Zach, Neta Neta Zach University of Pennsylvania 01 eng 11 277 03 03 xvi 03 00 261 03 24 JB code PSY.COGPSY Cognitive psychology 24 JB code CONS.GEN Consciousness research 10 PSY008000 12 JMR 01 06 02 00

Addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience, the diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis.

03 00 Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B. 01 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.88.png 01 01 D502 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213549.jpg 01 01 D504 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213549.tif 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.88.hb.png 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.88.png 02 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.88.hb.png 03 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.88.hb.png
01 01 JB code aicr.88.001int 06 10.1075/aicr.88.001int vii xvi 10 Article 1 01 04 Introduction Introduction 01 01 JB code aicr.88.01llo 06 10.1075/aicr.88.01llo 1 20 20 Article 2 01 04 Time after time Time after time 01 04 Temporality in the dynamic brain Temporality in the dynamic brain 1 A01 01 JB code 75170517 Dan Lloyd Lloyd, Dan Dan Lloyd Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College, Connecticut, USA 01 01 JB code aicr.88.02mal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.02mal 21 36 16 Article 3 01 04 Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 1 A01 01 JB code 385170518 Rafael Malach Malach, Rafael Rafael Malach Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science 01 01 JB code aicr.88.03mer 06 10.1075/aicr.88.03mer 37 80 44 Article 4 01 04 From probabilities to percepts From probabilities to percepts 01 04 A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience 1 A01 01 JB code 989170519 Bjorn Merker Merker, Bjorn Bjorn Merker 01 01 JB code aicr.88.04ede 06 10.1075/aicr.88.04ede 81 94 14 Article 5 01 04 Being in time Being in time 1 A01 01 JB code 144170520 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA 2 A01 01 JB code 396170521 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Simtat hanarkis 1, Zichron Yaakov, Israel 01 01 JB code aicr.88.05fek 06 10.1075/aicr.88.05fek 95 120 26 Article 6 01 04 The (lack of) mental life of some machines The (lack of) mental life of some machines 1 A01 01 JB code 831170522 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Department of Biomedical Engineering, Stony Brook University 2 A01 01 JB code 35170523 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Department of Psychology, Cornell University 01 01 JB code aicr.88.06lee 06 10.1075/aicr.88.06lee 121 148 28 Article 7 01 04 Restless minds, wandering brains Restless minds, wandering brains 1 A01 01 JB code 487170524 Cees Leeuwen Leeuwen, Cees Cees Leeuwen RIKEN BSI, Japan and KU Leuven, Belgium 2 A01 01 JB code 506170525 Dirk J.A. Smit Smit, Dirk J.A. Dirk J.A. Smit VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands 01 01 JB code aicr.88.07hue 06 10.1075/aicr.88.07hue 149 164 16 Article 8 01 04 Fuzzy consciousness Fuzzy consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 59170526 Stephanie Huette Huette, Stephanie Stephanie Huette University of California, Merced 2 A01 01 JB code 297170527 Michael J. Spivey Spivey, Michael J. Michael J. Spivey University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.08yos 06 10.1075/aicr.88.08yos 165 184 20 Article 9 01 04 Two dynamical themes in Husserl Two dynamical themes in Husserl 1 A01 01 JB code 556170528 Jeffrey Yoshimi Yoshimi, Jeffrey Jeffrey Yoshimi University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.09wie 06 10.1075/aicr.88.09wie 185 210 26 Article 10 01 04 Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 01 04 First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 923170529 Wanja Wiese Wiese, Wanja Wanja Wiese Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 2 A01 01 JB code 150170530 Thomas Metzinger Metzinger, Thomas Thomas Metzinger Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 01 01 JB code aicr.88.10bro 06 10.1075/aicr.88.10bro 211 230 20 Article 11 01 04 The brain and its states The brain and its states 1 A01 01 JB code 595170531 Richard Brown Brown, Richard Richard Brown LaGuardia Community College, NY, USA 01 01 JB code aicr.88.11dal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.11dal 231 258 28 Article 12 01 04 An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 967170532 Rick Dale Dale, Rick Rick Dale Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 2 A01 01 JB code 254170533 Deborah P. Tollefsen Tollefsen, Deborah P. Deborah P. Tollefsen Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis 3 A01 01 JB code 698170534 Christopher T. Kello Kello, Christopher T. Christopher T. Kello Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 01 01 JB code aicr.88.12ind 06 10.1075/aicr.88.12ind 259 261 3 Article 13 01 04 Index Index 01 JB code JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 https://benjamins.com Amsterdam NL 00 John Benjamins Publishing Company Marketing Department / Karin Plijnaar, Pieter Lamers onix@benjamins.nl 04 01 00 20120711 C 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company D 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company 02 WORLD 13 15 9789027213549 WORLD 03 01 JB 17 Google 03 https://play.google.com/store/books 21 01 00 Unqualified price 00 99.00 EUR 01 00 Unqualified price 00 83.00 GBP 01 00 Unqualified price 00 149.00 USD
5008612 03 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 JB code AiCR 88 Eb 15 9789027273598 06 10.1075/aicr.88 00 EA E107 10 01 JB code AiCR 02 1381-589X 02 88.00 01 02 Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research 11 01 JB code jbe-all 01 02 Full EBA collection (ca. 4,200 titles) 11 01 JB code jbe-2015-all 01 02 Complete backlist (3,208 titles, 1967–2015) 05 02 Complete backlist (1967–2015) 11 01 JB code jbe-2015-psychology 01 02 Subject collection: Psychology (246 titles, 1978–2015) 05 02 Psychology (1978–2015) 11 01 JB code jbe-2015-aicr 01 02 Advances in Consciousness Research (vols. 1–92, 1995–2015) 05 02 AiCR (vols. 1–92, 1995–2015) 01 01 Being in Time Dynamical models of phenomenal experience Being in Time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience 1 B01 01 JB code 849136105 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/849136105 2 B01 01 JB code 661136106 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Stony Brook University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/661136106 3 B01 01 JB code 770136107 Neta Zach Zach, Neta Neta Zach University of Pennsylvania 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/770136107 01 eng 11 277 03 03 xvi 03 00 261 03 01 23 153 03 2012 BF204.5 04 Phenomenological psychology. 04 Experience--Psychological aspects. 04 Consciousness. 04 Time. 10 PSY008000 12 JMR 24 JB code PSY.COGPSY Cognitive psychology 24 JB code CONS.GEN Consciousness research 01 06 02 00

Addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience, the diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis.

03 00 Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B. 01 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/475/aicr.88.png 01 01 D502 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_jpg/9789027213549.jpg 01 01 D504 https://benjamins.com/covers/475_tif/9789027213549.tif 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_front/aicr.88.hb.png 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/125/aicr.88.png 02 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/1200_back/aicr.88.hb.png 03 00 03 01 01 D503 https://benjamins.com/covers/3d_web/aicr.88.hb.png
01 01 JB code aicr.88.001int 06 10.1075/aicr.88.001int vii xvi 10 Article 1 01 04 Introduction Introduction 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.01llo 06 10.1075/aicr.88.01llo 1 20 20 Article 2 01 04 Time after time Time after time 01 04 Temporality in the dynamic brain Temporality in the dynamic brain 1 A01 01 JB code 75170517 Dan Lloyd Lloyd, Dan Dan Lloyd Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College, Connecticut, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/75170517 01 eng 30 00

A useful theory linking dynamical systems to phenomenal experience will be a story thrice told. It will involve some description of phenomenal experience, which should be true. It will also involve some sort of dynamical model (second). But (third) the model will have to be at least plausibly implementable in human beings – that’s where the theory becomes useful. Finally, once all three stories are told, they must align. It should be evident to all that the phenomenal story, the dynamical story, and the implementation story are really one story, about one entity, described in three different ways, akin to one story as it might be told in three different languages. A theory of consciousness then is an exercise in translation, somewhat like deciphering the Rosetta Stone. This chapter outlines a possible alignment with respect to a foundational, structural property of experience, namely, time.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.02mal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.02mal 21 36 16 Article 3 01 04 Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 1 A01 01 JB code 385170518 Rafael Malach Malach, Rafael Rafael Malach Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/385170518 01 eng 30 00

For a neuroscientist working under the assumption of a complete correspondence between mind and brain, conscious awareness poses a profound mystery. It is a unique phenomenon in which a state of a physical system – i.e. a distributed pattern of neuronal activity is inexplicably transformed into an absolutely private and internal mental experience. Thus, the relevant point of view that needs to be taken when considering neuronal mechanisms underlying phenomenal experience must also be intrinsic – that of the brain’s neurons themselves. In contrast, the perspective taken by most neuroscience research examines neuronal activity from an external observer perspective. Here I will conjecture that the intrinsic perspective is implemented in the brain through rapid and recurrent neuronal activity – local neuronal “ignitions”. In this dynamics, the information about the state of a local neuronal assembly is distributed back to the neurons that form the assembly through recurrent activations. A conscious percept emerges when, through these neuronal reflections, the ambiguity inherent in the activity of isolated neurons is converted into a unique and meaningful assembly state. The rapid distribution of assembly information necessitates high firing rates, sustained activity, and dense local connectivity. All these conditions fit nicely with recent experimental findings. The fourth consequence – the founding of conscious awareness on local reverberatory activity – is still highly controversial – and should be viewed, at this stage, as a prediction of the local “ignition” hypothesis.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.03mer 06 10.1075/aicr.88.03mer 37 80 44 Article 4 01 04 From probabilities to percepts From probabilities to percepts 01 04 A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience 1 A01 01 JB code 989170519 Bjorn Merker Merker, Bjorn Bjorn Merker 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/989170519 01 eng 30 00

A brain charged with guiding its body through a complex and lively world from a position of solitary confinement inside its opaque skull faces a set of functional challenges beset with inverse and ill-posed problems at every turn. Uncertainty and ambiguity therefore encumber all cortical labors, making probability distributions the natural medium of its disambiguating inferential operations. This chapter proposes that those operations take place unconsciously, in keeping with Helmholtz’ original suggestion, and that the functional logic of an inherently probabilistic cortex implies a need for an extracortical “global best estimate buffer” as a means to complete cortical sensory disambiguation through a definitive but ephemeral estimate of current sensory circumstances. It further proposes that the contents of that extracortical buffer are conscious, not by virtue of anything being “added” to buffer operations in order to “make them conscious”, but by virtue of the format of buffer contents alone: its dynamics issue in a nested arrangement placing an ego-center in perspectival relation to a neural model of body-world interactions. Finally, the organization of the higher order nuclei of the dorsal thalamus are scrutinized for their suitability to implement the putative global best estimate buffer, with particular attention to the possibility that the caudal reaches of the dorsal pulvinar might host its specifically sensory aspects, i.e. sensory awareness. Keywords: ambiguity; architecture of consciousness; best estimate buffer; constraint satisfaction; format of sensory awareness; phenomenal content; probabilistic operations; pulvinar

01 01 JB code aicr.88.04ede 06 10.1075/aicr.88.04ede 81 94 14 Article 5 01 04 Being in time Being in time 1 A01 01 JB code 144170520 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/144170520 2 A01 01 JB code 396170521 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Simtat hanarkis 1, Zichron Yaakov, Israel 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/396170521 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.05fek 06 10.1075/aicr.88.05fek 95 120 26 Article 6 01 04 The (lack of) mental life of some machines The (lack of) mental life of some machines 1 A01 01 JB code 831170522 Tomer Fekete Fekete, Tomer Tomer Fekete Department of Biomedical Engineering, Stony Brook University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/831170522 2 A01 01 JB code 35170523 Shimon Edelman Edelman, Shimon Shimon Edelman Department of Psychology, Cornell University 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/35170523 01 eng 30 00

The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do so in a manner that is determined by the system itself, simply because the mental life of a machine cannot be up to an external observer. To illustrate just how tall this order is, we carefully analyze the scenario in which a digital computer simulates a network of neurons. We show that the formal correspondence between the two systems thereby established is at best partial, and, furthermore, that it is fundamentally incapable of realizing both some of the essential properties of actual neuronal systems and some of the fundamental properties of experience. Our analysis suggests that, if machine consciousness is at all possible, conscious experience can only be instantiated in a class of machines that are entirely different from digital computers, namely, timecontinuous, open analog dynamical systems.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.06lee 06 10.1075/aicr.88.06lee 121 148 28 Article 7 01 04 Restless minds, wandering brains Restless minds, wandering brains 1 A01 01 JB code 487170524 Cees Leeuwen Leeuwen, Cees Cees Leeuwen RIKEN BSI, Japan and KU Leuven, Belgium 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/487170524 2 A01 01 JB code 506170525 Dirk J.A. Smit Smit, Dirk J.A. Dirk J.A. Smit VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/506170525 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.07hue 06 10.1075/aicr.88.07hue 149 164 16 Article 8 01 04 Fuzzy consciousness Fuzzy consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 59170526 Stephanie Huette Huette, Stephanie Stephanie Huette University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/59170526 2 A01 01 JB code 297170527 Michael J. Spivey Spivey, Michael J. Michael J. Spivey University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/297170527 01 eng 30 00

This chapter explores the consequences of treating consciousness as a fuzzy dynamical system. A fuzzy dynamical system is one in which labeled concepts and percepts are altered as a function of context and conditions, and these changes occur continuously in time. We offer speculations on the groundwork for a consciousness state space in which the sets of trajectories over time form tube-like structures called cylinder sets. Consciousness is a trajectory within this structure, and it passes by or through those fuzzy concepts. When the trajectory of a mental event travels close to a particular concept or percept, one experiences awareness of that concept or percept. As these constrained pathways in mental state space become more heavily traveled, they develop increased density (or attraction strength) in their central threads, and more and more nearby trajectories get captured by that cylinder. At the same time, these tubes slowly gravitate toward short cuts in the state space over the lifespan, thus gradually straightening out and skipping past intermediating concepts that used to get visited as part of the sequence. The fringes of these concepts become a part of conscious experience, and for everyday coping, do not need to be recruited for explicit awareness. The formation and streamlining of cylinder sets over the course of learning may have the paradoxical result. of producing an increase in tacit conscious experience (of “being in time”) and a decrease in explicit awareness (of this or that labeled concept).

01 01 JB code aicr.88.08yos 06 10.1075/aicr.88.08yos 165 184 20 Article 9 01 04 Two dynamical themes in Husserl Two dynamical themes in Husserl 1 A01 01 JB code 556170528 Jeffrey Yoshimi Yoshimi, Jeffrey Jeffrey Yoshimi University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/556170528 01 eng 30 00

I describe and partially formalize two aspects of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, in a way that highlights their relevance to cognitive science. First, I describe “constitutive phenomenology”, the study of structures (what I call phenomenological “models”) that constitute a person’s sense of reality. These structures develop incrementally over the course of a person’s life, and serve a variety of functions, e.g. generating expectations relative to actions, and determining the contents of context awareness. Second, I describe “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology”, which posits a hierarchy of laws, each governing the way consciousness must be organized in order for a particular type of thing (a physical thing, a person, a social institution, etc.) to appear.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.09wie 06 10.1075/aicr.88.09wie 185 210 26 Article 10 01 04 Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 01 04 First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 923170529 Wanja Wiese Wiese, Wanja Wanja Wiese Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/923170529 2 A01 01 JB code 150170530 Thomas Metzinger Metzinger, Thomas Thomas Metzinger Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/150170530 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.10bro 06 10.1075/aicr.88.10bro 211 230 20 Article 11 01 04 The brain and its states The brain and its states 1 A01 01 JB code 595170531 Richard Brown Brown, Richard Richard Brown LaGuardia Community College, NY, USA 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/595170531 01 eng 01 01 JB code aicr.88.11dal 06 10.1075/aicr.88.11dal 231 258 28 Article 12 01 04 An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 1 A01 01 JB code 967170532 Rick Dale Dale, Rick Rick Dale Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/967170532 2 A01 01 JB code 254170533 Deborah P. Tollefsen Tollefsen, Deborah P. Deborah P. Tollefsen Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/254170533 3 A01 01 JB code 698170534 Christopher T. Kello Kello, Christopher T. Christopher T. Kello Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced 07 https://benjamins.com/catalog/persons/698170534 01 eng 30 00

We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selfhood, awareness, and conscious experience. The mechanisms that have been identified for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. The first is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic.

01 01 JB code aicr.88.12ind 06 10.1075/aicr.88.12ind 259 261 3 Article 13 01 04 Index Index 01 eng
01 JB code JBENJAMINS John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 01 JB code JB John Benjamins Publishing Company 01 https://benjamins.com 02 https://benjamins.com/catalog/aicr.88 Amsterdam NL 00 John Benjamins Publishing Company Marketing Department / Karin Plijnaar, Pieter Lamers onix@benjamins.nl 04 01 00 20120711 C 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company D 2012 John Benjamins Publishing Company 02 WORLD 13 15 9789027213549 WORLD 09 01 JB 3 John Benjamins e-Platform 03 https://jbe-platform.com 29 https://jbe-platform.com/content/books/9789027273598 21 01 00 Unqualified price 02 99.00 EUR 01 00 Unqualified price 02 83.00 GBP GB 01 00 Unqualified price 02 149.00 USD