The ideological role of selective translation in reconfiguration of news frames

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Drawing on social and cognitive models of news frame theory and argumentative approach to political discourse analysis, we studied how a declaration made by an Iranian general about revoking the citizenship of Bahrain uprising movement’s leader was selectively translated and reframed in 7 English news websites. The findings revealed that the reframed texts, on the one hand, suppressed the values and circumstantial premises of the declaration, and on the other hand, reframed the text in such a way that portrayed Iran as an interventionist seeking sectarianism in Bahrain. This study indicated that what underwent shift were not just arbitrary words and phrases; rather, the whole frame was reconfigured according to the interests of the news websites. In this process, selective translations were merely used as incontrovertible proof to support the frame buttressed by the target news websites.

En nous appuyant sur des modèles sociaux et cognitifs de la théorie du cadrage des actualités, et selon une approche argumentative de l’Analyse du Discours politique, nous nous sommes mis à étudier la Traduction sélective et les nouveaux cadrages d’une déclaration prononcée par un Général iranien, à propos de la révocation de la citoyenneté du Leader du Mouvement insurrectionnel de Bahreïn, à travers sept réseaux d’informations anglaises. Les trouvailles nous ont révélé que, d’une part, les textes ré-encadrés répriment les aspects circonstanciels et valides de la déclaration, et d’autre part, ils ré-encadrent la déclaration d’une telle manière à ce qu’ils présentent l’Iran comme étant un intervenant, en quête de sectarisme de Bahreïn. Cette étude nous a démontré que dans les tournures, ce ne sont pas juste les mots et les phrases arbitraires qui changent, mais également, tout le cadrage est reconfiguré conforme aux intérêts des réseaux d’informations. Dans ce genre de processus, les traductions sélectives, seront utilisées juste en tant que preuves irréfutables et supports pour les cadrages confirmés par les agences de presses cibles.

Keywords: selective translation, frame theory, manipulation, argumentative discourse analysis, ideology
1. Introduction

During the past two decades, exponential increase in journalistic translation research (JTR) (Bielsa 2016, 199; Bassnett 2014, 3; Valdeón 2015) has challenged some of the orthodoxies of translation (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009, 1, 11, 16): for instance, some researchers have demonstrated the multiple source texts used in drawing up the target text (Orengo 2005), the multi-tasking activity of the translator (Tsai 2012), and collective agency during translation (Bani 2006). The radical textual transformations found in this kind of translation which include addition, deletion, reordering and summarization (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009, 62–67) have made some scholars adopt other terms such as transediting to refer to it (Stetting 1989).

These findings, in addition to stretching the horizons of what we think of translation, demonstrate that the practice of translation in newsrooms does not fully correspond to the established understandings of translation. There is, therefore, a necessity to transcend beyond theories and methodologies of translation studies to adequately investigate the phenomenon. Tsai even argues that if we do not do so, we might even march backwards (2015, 630). A few scholars have already turned to news frame theory rooted in communication studies (Tsai 2015; Spiessens and Van Poucke 2016; Valdeón 2016, 2014), but this approach has much more to offer to JTR. Baker (2006, 2010a, b) and Luo (2014) have also utilized frame theory but they mostly rely on the sociological aspect of frame theory.

In this study, we apply a combination of sociological and cognitive approaches of frame theory in order to probe how a statement made by an Iranian general about Bahrain insurrection was selectively translated and reframed in foreign news websites. Since the so-called Arab Spring in Bahrain, the major Shiites population of Bahrain has demanded a bigger voice, but the government has quashed their movement by taking different measures, the last one of which is revoking the citizenship of the movement’s leader known as Sheikh Qassim. This is the critical juncture when general Soleimani who heads the Qods Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran Guardian Corps (IRIGC) issued a statement and denounced the action against Sheikh Qassim.

Within the Middle East boundaries, regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have incompatible stakes in the conflict. Iran, owing to ideologies of defending the downtrodden of Muslim community and the cultural export of the Islamic Revolution, has the penchant for the Shiites to come to power, but the degree of Iran’s involvement in Bahrain is difficult to ascertain (Mabon 2012). On the other
front, we have the Bahraini government. Saudi Arabia has backed the Bahraini
government and has been directly involved in the movement's crackdown. This is
due to the fact that both Al-Khalifa and Al-Saud consider the growth of Shia power
in Bahrain as tantamount to increasing Tehran's power across the region.

Beyond the regional boarders, the United States and the United Kingdom have
supported Bahrain's ruling family who have allowed the United States to operate
naval bases there (Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013). Researchers think this might be
the reason behind the differentiated approach taken by the US toward the devel-
opment in Bahrain compared to other countries that witnessed the Arab Spring
(Cooper, Momani, and Farooq 2014).

In these situations, as Zanettin (2016) notes, mediatized translation seems to
play a crucial role especially in the absence of direct talks between the parties.
Through different instruments, one of which is translated news articles, political
stances enter public discourse and the authorities can gain support for what they do.
All the more important is that reaction to a statement in another country is actually
reaction to the information as it is provided in translation (Schäffner 2004, 120).
However, translations provided by news websites may be ideologically slanted.
The confusions arising from mistranslations, examples of which are deliberated by
Zanettin (2016) and Sharifian (2011, 193–218), demand increased accountability
of the media in carrying out translations and reframing events.

Furthermore, although translation is ubiquitous in newsrooms, the frame theo-
ry literature has not paid sufficient attention to the role of translation in transmitting
or transmuting the frames. Accordingly, this study can highlight the importance of
translation and might have implications for the frame theory as well.

2. Theoretical framework

Three different metaphorical conceptualizations characterize the frames. According
to Tankard (2001, 98), two of them relate to picture frame: frames are used to isolate
some part of reality and draw attention to it. Besides, they are employed to give a
tone to that part they choose to show, in the sense that a wooden frame will evoke
a different feeling than a metal one. The third sense deals with frame as it is used
by an architect in a building or a house: it is the organizing structure in building a
house. Frame, by the same token, can be the organizing ideas on which a story is
built (Gamson 1989).

One of the oft-cited definitions of framing which has these conceptualizations
in its core is Entman’s (1993, 52):
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

An alternative definition is proposed by Reese (2001, 11) who considers frame as “the organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world”. For him, frame is an abstraction and finds manifestation in different locations (Reese 2010, 21). An example of frame can be “terrorism frame” to describe the inhabitants of Gaza Strip. Frame consequently sets the boundaries of discourse concerning an issue and categorizes the relevant actors (Pan and Kosicki 2001, 41).

As for the location of frames in the communication process, Entman (1993, 52–53) believes that they are located in the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. The communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames that organize their belief systems. The text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain key-words, stock phrases, etc. that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments. The frames that guide the receiver's thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator. The culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping.

Scheufele (2004), for his part, maintains that frames and framing occur at three horizontal arenas and can be identified at three vertical levels. The horizontal level includes politicians or the political system, journalists or the media system and finally the recipients or society. In fact, the horizontal level describes who creates the frames. He also adds a vertical level where frames can be looked at, analyzed and identified: level of cognition (a cognitive complex of related schemata for references, such as events, causes, consequences); level of discourse (public or inter-media discourse); and level of discourse products (textual structure of discourse products such as newspaper articles). These locations and levels are intertwined. For example, we can identify and analyze the frames created by the journalists or the media system at all three vertical levels: cognitive, discursive and textual.

A pertinent question, however, is how these frames interact with and affect each other. In other words, how can a communicator change the frame of the audience and ultimately their behavior?

Scheufele and Scheufele (2010) discuss the frames at the cognitive and textual levels: how journalist’s frame is instantiated in the textual level and how this textual level might influence the audience frame. They make a distinction between cognitive schema and frame. Cognitive schema is broadly defined as a configuration...
of salient attributes that helps us process subsequent information. For example, a terrorist schema has the attributes of “anti-Western” and “having military training”. Many people usually associate these attributes to a terrorist. But we also have schemas for causes of terrorism and measures to fight them. Each schema refers to objects (here terrorists) or relations (causes of terrorism and potential ways of fighting them).

It follows that by framing an issue in a specific way, politicians and journalists are able to trigger the related schemas due to what in cognitive network theory is called spreading activation. For example if some people are called terrorists then terrorist-related schemas (the cause and treatment schemas) are activated in the minds of the audience. For that reason, they might support a military action.

Taken together, they consider a cognitive frame as “a consistent set of cognitive schemata emerging in discourse (e.g., among the editorial staff of a newspaper) and becoming manifest in discourse products (e.g., newspaper articles)” (Scheufele and Scheufele 2010, 128; Italics in original). Consequently, what distinguishes schema from frame is that whereas the former refers to a mental representation of a single object or relations between objects, the latter is composed of several schemata for different objects or relations that form a consistent complex of expectations. An example we borrow from Scheufele (2004) is that a person’s ‘victim-of-terrorism-schema’ refers to victims of terror attacks and his or her ‘causes-for-terrorism-schema’ refers to objects causally related to terrorism. The subject’s victim-and causes-schema are part of a coherent cognitive frame of reference for terrorism as a whole (see also Scheufele 2006).

Journalists themselves are the recipient of cognitive frames. They read different sources and some of the schemas present in their sources might resonate with their own schemas. The journalists might adopt those schemas but they will enter their own schemas in the text consciously or unconsciously. In other words, journalists’ cognitive schemas enter news stories as media frames or, as will be discussed below, in frame packages (Section 3). There is, thus, a more or less pronounced correspondence between cognitive levels (a journalist’s schemas) and textual levels (media frame).

A reasonable inference is that if there is a correspondence between the cognitive and textual levels, then this correspondence will manifest itself in the elements of media frame. Consequently, the frames can be identified from the news stories. Similarly, Entman (1991, 7) holds that “since narratives finally consist of nothing more than words and pictures, frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically consonant meanings across media and time”.

These frames might affect the audience frame. Yet, we should resist the temptation that news audience are “passive receptacles” (Entman 2010, 333), since
different factors might moderate the effect of frame including political knowledge, the issue under consideration, the source of framing, and the level of interpersonal communication about the issue (see Vliegenthart 2012, 943). As far as active involvement in journalistic translation is concerned, interesting examples have been discussed by Jaber and Baumann (2011) with regard to how news audience cross-check different versions of BBC and comment on them. Nevertheless, potential framing effects, according to Scheufele and Scheufele (2010, 112), are as follows:

1. audience schemas can be activated because individuals deem these schemas applicable to the frame(s) that they encounter (activation or applicability effect);
2. audience schemas can be modified by media framing (transformation effect);
3. if there is no schema available, cumulative and consonant media framing can establish such a schema (establishing effect); and (4) media framing can alter recipients’ attitudes or opinions (attitudinal effect).

But these discussions do not explicitly rise above the cognitive aspects. In fact, some approaches to news frame theory have been criticized for much emphasis on the consequence or the effect of framing to the neglect of the cause of different framing practices. This is where politics, power and ideology play their significant roles (Carragee and Roefs 2004; Entman 2010; Vliegenthart and van Zoonen 2011). The studies that emphasize the role of power and ideology relate the frames to the broader context of society and culture. As Carragee and Roefs (2004) comment, the process of framing does not take place in a vacuum. This process is sponsored by the politicians and news stories become a forum for framing contests in which they sponsor the frame to promulgate their preferred definitions of the issues. Frames help construct the reality and studying this process necessarily involves examination of power. Here, with Entman (1993, 55) we believe that frame is “the imprint of power” but to be instantiated in news articles and influence the audience it needs to go through the minds of journalists and audience. This amalgam of sociological and cognitive approaches provides a better theoretical foundation.

The final point of this section concerns the issue of reframing and reframed texts. We consider the texts that refer to a source text as reframed texts. Our understanding of reframing and reframed text is in line with Boyd-Barrett’s proposal (2007) stating that a news article is already framed, because it is considered to be a final product in its own right. “Through a process of ‘reframing, what was once constructed as a ‘final’ product becomes a component brick in the construction of a new frame” (2007, 180). In our study, the statement is considered a final product, but in the reframed texts it becomes only a component brick.
3. Procedure

The data for this study consist of a statement by general Soleimani and 7 English news articles that reframed this statement. The statement was published in Farsi and released by Fars News Agency (FNA). The text was then partly translated by the well-known news websites including BBC, Reuters, the Guardian, Bloomberg, the NY Times, Aljazeera and Almonitor. The URLs of these news articles can be found in Appendix I.

Without taking side with any of the parties, we intend to answer two questions: first, if and how the frame set by general Soleimani has undergone any change; and second, given the different provenance of these news websites, whether their reframing processes display any pattern. To answer our research questions, we will first examine Soleimani’s statement. Next, we will analyze the articles that cite this statement to see how they reframed it.

To identify the frame and to understand whether it is kept constant, we follow Van Gorp that each reconstructed frame is presented by a frame package. A frame package is “an integrated structure of framing devices and a logical chain of reasoning devices that demonstrates how the frame functions to represent a certain issue” (Van Gorp 2010, 91). The manifest elements in the texts, as Van Gorp states, are indicators of framing devices and can include visual images, metaphors, catchphrases, depictions, themes, sub-themes, types of actors, actions and settings, lines of reasoning and causal connections, contrasts, lexical choices, sources, quantifications and statistics, charts and graphs, appeals (emotional, logical, and ethical), all of which contribute to the narrative and rhetorical structure of a text.

The reasoning devices are “the defining functions of frames” and “they form a route of causal reasoning” (Van Gorp 2010, 91). Van Gorp mentions that the reasoning devices need not be explicitly included in the text. Connecting this to the cognitive account of frames in Theoretical Framework Section, it can be concluded that during the process of interpretation, the readers will come up with the definition, cause and treatment of an issue as a result of activation of schemas in their minds.

To explore the reframed texts we will borrow a repertoire of reframing devices introduced by Baker (2006) including selective appropriation, labeling and temporal framing. In fact, as Baker (2006, 111) mentions reframing devices can comprise any linguistic and non-linguistic devices and her repertoire rather than being exhaustive is illustrative. In this study, we also found Harding’s (2012) notion of “temporary narrator” useful. Another linguistic reframing device was overstatement. Owing to the fact that these devices discursively work to support a frame, overlap in the reframing devices is unavoidable. To analyze the selective appropriations further, we will adopt argumentative approach to political discourse analysis.
as developed by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). These reframing devices will be elaborated on in their respective sections.

A caveat about frame analysis is an inevitable degree of subjectivity. After all, the linkage between the explicit elements in the texts and central framing idea requires interpretation by the researchers and it is difficult for them to withdraw from their cognitive knowledge (Van Gorp 2010). Nevertheless, to make the analysis as objective as possible, we will make every effort to be as explicit, transparent and systematic as possible.

4. Analysis

4.1 The original statement

In this section, we scrutinize the statement to identify the frame Soleimani builds. Our translation of the statement can be found in Appendix II. Table 1 presents the lexical choices made in the statement about the people of Bahrain, the movement, Sheikh Qassim, and the Bahraini government. It should be noted that it is difficult to draw a clear-cut line between the attributes used to describe people and the government for when the text says that people are under discrimination, it implies that the government takes discriminatory approach toward them.

Taking Table 1 into consideration, one infers that people who are under immense pressure peacefully seek their rights, but their government (“the regime” or “Al-Khalifa”) does whatever illegal action (such as torture, imprisonment, stripping citizenship, etc.) it takes to suppress them and eventually intends to deny their leader of citizenship. A cursory glance at Table 1 shows that negative framing devices and schemas are used to describe the Bahraini government; on the other hand, the people, the leader and their movement are described quite positively.

These framing devices help Soleimani define the issue in such a way that other related schemas such as the cause, moral evaluation and treatment (reasoning devices) are activated in the minds of the readers: the Bahraini Government, “the bloodthirsty regime” or “Al-Khalifa” is to blame for the turmoil in the country and there is a moral responsibility to take side with the “oppressed” who are being “dreadfully tortured” and “imprisoned” but are still “peacefully seeking their rights”.

The cultural, moral, and religious values Soleimani taps into also warrant attention. The verse of the Holy Quran that is quoted at the end of the statement talks about “the oppressed people” who defend themselves only when they are unjustly attacked and eventually “the unjust assailants” will be defeated. Helping the oppressed people is both a cultural and moral value for almost all people from different walks of life. This especially holds true for the Shiite Muslims for whom
helping the oppressed and fighting against injustice have deep ideological roots (see Ricotta 2016). In this regard, Nisbet (2010, 47) mentions that frames are “most influential when they resonate with an audience’s strongly held ‘perceptual lenses,’ which typically mean strong feelings about another issue suddenly made relevant, or with value constructs such as religious beliefs, political partisanship, or ideology”.

In the final paragraph, Soleimani warns that the ignorance of people’s rights and stripping their leader of citizenship might make people abandon their peaceful approach and continue their protests violently. This violation, he predicts, will not be confined to Bahrain but it could embroil the entire region.

### 4.2 The reframed texts

This subsection discusses the reframing devices employed in the target news websites. These devices include selective appropriation, overstatement, labeling, temporal framing and inclusion of temporary narrators.
4.2.1 **Selective appropriation**

According to Baker (2006, 171) “selective appropriation is realized in patterns of omission and addition designed to suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative encoded in the source text or utterance, or aspects of the larger narrative(s) in which it is embedded”. Table 2 shows the ratio of inclusion of translation in the reframed texts which is equal to 9.2%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News website</th>
<th>The reframed text</th>
<th>The translated part</th>
<th>Translation ratio %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NY Times</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aljazzera</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almonitor</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC News</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3669</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To figure out which part of the statement is translated and whether this process of selection in different news websites shows any pattern, we apply argumentative approach to political discourse analysis (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

Based on this model, under particular circumstances (C) which can be composed of some social facts, an arguer makes a claim that an agent ought to take an action (A). The agent needs to do so because, in arguer’s view, there is a goal (G) to achieve. The goal is in turn underlain by values (V). There might be counter-claims that if the agent does not take the action, there will be negative consequences (NS). Obviously, one needs to take action because there are discrepancies between the current circumstances and the goals one has in mind. An important consideration is that the values we esteem make us describe the circumstances in a certain way and set the goals as we do.

Here, Soleimani claims that the Bahraini Government should not violate the rights of the movement leader. The claim is premised upon the circumstances that people, who peacefully demand their own rights, are under pressure, discrimination and injustice (C) and upon goals such as the right to have democracy and reform (G) which are in turn underlain by values like peace, equality and freedom (V). There is also a counter-claim that, in arguer’s view, should the Bahraini government violate the rights of the leader and continue suppressing people, there could be negative consequences (NS) such as armed resistance in Bahrain and unrest across the region.
Table 3. Selective appropriation in news websites under study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News website</th>
<th>The part selected for translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>“Al-Khalifa [the rulers of Bahrain] will definitely pay the price for that and their bloodthirsty regime will be toppled”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NY Times</td>
<td>Bahrain’s action against the cleric, Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim, “is a red line, and passing this red line will create flames of fire in Bahrain and the entire region,” General Soleimani said. “And the people will have no choice but armed resistance.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>“The Al Khalifa (rulers of Bahrain) surely know their aggression against Sheikh Isa Qassim is a red line that crossing it would set Bahrain and the whole region on fire, and it would leave no choice but to resort to armed resistance,” “Al Khalifa will definitely pay the price for that and their bloodthirsty regime will be toppled,” he said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
<td>Backers of Bahrain’s rulers “should know that insulting Sheikh Isa Qassem and administering disproportionate pressure on the Bahraini people will be the start of a bloody uprising,” These actions against “Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassem are a red line that, if crossed, will set fire to Bahrain and the entire region and won’t leave a choice but for the people to take on armed resistance,” Iran general Soleimani said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aljazzera</td>
<td>“Al-Khalifa [the rulers of Bahrain] will definitely pay the price for that and their bloodthirsty regime will be toppled,” Suleimani said in a statement published by Iran’s state-run Fars news agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almonitor</td>
<td>“They certainly know that trespassing the sanctuary of Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim is a red line whose crossing will set fire to Bahrain and the region and will leave people with no path but armed resistance,” the statement by Soleimani read. It continued, “The Al Khalifa [Bahrain’s rulers] will pay the price of their actions, and its result will be nothing but the annihilation of this bloodthirsty regime.” “The supporters of Al Khalifa should know insulting Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim and the continuation of pressure on the people of Bahrain is the beginning of a bloody uprising.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC News</td>
<td>“The al-Khalifa [rulers of Bahrain] surely know their aggression against Sheikh Isa Qassim is a red line and that crossing it would set Bahrain and the whole region on fire, and it would leave no choice for people but to resort to armed resistance,” Gen Soleimani said in a statement released by the semi-official Fars news agency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation is necessarily a process of selection and de-selection. What is not translated is as important as what is translated and can help us understand the ideological decision-making behind the translation process. A glance at the translated parts
of the reframed texts in Table 3 showcases that only the claim, counter-claim and negative consequences are translated but goals, values and circumstances, which constitute the integral parts of argumentation, are excluded. Appendix I contains the URLs and publication dates of these news articles.

4.2.2 Overstatement
Literal translation of a metaphor in the selective translations overstates what Soleimani intends to convey. The metaphor in the original statement “sholeiee az atash ra dar Bahrain va sarasare mantaqeh padid avardan” literally means “to ignite a flame of fire in Bahrain and the entire region”, but metaphorically it connotes sparking unrest. Table 3 shows different renditions that include “create flames of fire” (NY Times, italics added), “set Bahrain and the whole region on fire” (Reuters), “set fire to Bahrain and the entire region” (Bloomberg), “set fire to Bahrain and the region” (Almonitor), and “set Bahrain and the whole region on fire” (BBC). In the previous section, we dealt with the selective nature of translation in the reframed texts. Here it becomes clear that in the small part of the statement selected for translation, the literal translations of a metaphor make the statement increasingly aggressive.

4.2.3 Labels
Reframing by labeling is defined as “any discursive process that involves using a lexical item, term or phrase to identify a person, place, group, event or any other key element in a narrative” (Baker 2006, 167). The labels used to describe different actors such as general Soleimani, Iran, Sheikh Qassim, the people, and Bahrain government and their actions are explored below.

In the Guardian, Soleimani who is “the ruthless face of Iran's strategic reach across the Middle East” warns about the revoking of the Sheikh Qassim’s citizenship. Iran which is “a fierce critic of Bahrain's Sunni monarchy”, furiously threatens Bahrain. The main opposition group is labeled as “sectarian” because it is accused of creating sectarian unrest, inciting hatred and disobedience, and insulting public institutions. The movement’s leader, a “Shia cleric”, who is also labeled as “the spiritual leader of the Shia Muslim majority” is blamed for dividing Bahraini society, encouraging young people to violate the constitution and promoting a sectarian environment and for following foreign religious and political reference. Bahrain is called “the heart of the sectarian fault line”.

In the NY Times story, Soleiman who leads Iran’s military efforts in Syria and Iraq denounces the mistreatment of Sheikh Qassim and threatens “the Sunni-led state of Bahrain” with a bloody Intifada. The “local insurgents” in the movement distance themselves from Iran, but leaders in Tehran lend vocal support for them.
Sheikh Qassim is described as “a leading Shiite opposition cleric”. Bahrain is described as “a majority Shiite country” ruled by “a Sunni royal family”.

In Reuters’ news article, Sheikh Qassim is labeled as “Shiite cleric” who is “the spiritual leader of Shiite Muslim majority”. Bahrain is described as “the Sunni Muslim-ruled country”.

Bloomberg’s narrative mentions that Iran which sees itself “as the protector of the Shiite community in Bahrain” has been accused of interfering in the island’s domestic affairs. The movement is described as “Shiite opposition” that demands greater political freedoms and rights. Sheikh Qassim, the “Shiite Ayatollah”, is accused of forming organizations affiliated with overseas religious and political groups. The “Sunni-ruled Bahrain” has intensified its crackdown and suspended activities by “the main Shiite opposition party”.

In Aljazeera’s article, Bahrain accuses the “top Shia cleric” of using his position to serve foreign interests and to promote “sectarianism and violence”. Bahrain is at “the heart of a growing sectarian divide” across the Middle East. The activities of the country’s leading “Shia opposition group”, Al-Wefaq, have been suspended on charges of “terrorism, extremism and violence” in the kingdom, and having ties to a foreign power – pointing a finger at Iran, which is “a vocal critic of the Sunni-led monarchy”. “The Sunni-controlled kingdom” has been in turmoil since a 2011 uprising backed by “majority Shia Muslims”.

In Almonitor’s text, Soleimani who is currently in Syria and fighting alongside forces aligned with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Russia condemns the decision in an extremely harsh political statement. Sheikh Qassim is described as a “Shiite leader” and “the country’s top Shiite cleric”. Finally, “the Sunni ruling family” has been able to weather the storm of protests with the help of its allies.

When it comes to BBC, the head of IRIGC “overseas operation arm” warns about the move against Sheikh Qassim. The Bahraini government has warned against any protests led by “the majority Shia community”. The leader of the movement has been accused of using his position to serve foreign interests, promoting “sectarianism and violence” and adopting theocracy and being in continuous contact with organizations and parties that are enemies of the kingdom.

Apparently, most of the labels used in these news articles underscore the religious rift in the country. The protesters and their leader are frequently tagged as Shiite and the Bahraini government as a Sunni monarchy. The country itself is called the heart of sectarian divide in the Middle East. Furthermore, Iran is dubbed a fierce critic of the ruling family of Bahrain and the protector of Shiites. Sheikh Qassim is accused of seeking sectarianism and having ties with Iran. Soleimani is described as the ruthless face of Iran’s strategic reach in the Middle East, a commander currently fighting in Syria and Iraq and the head of IRIGC overseas operation arm. All these labels accentuate his allegedly interventionist role. The labels assigned to different
parties might finally create schemas that portray Iran and Soleimani as interfering in the domestic affairs of Bahrain and promoting sectarianism. According to these new articles, Iran actually supports Sheikh Qassim who is sowing the seeds of discord in Bahrain.

4.2.4 Temporal framing
Baker regards temporal and spatial framing as “selecting a particular text and embedding it in a temporal and spatial context that accentuates the narrative it depicts and encourages us to establish links between it and current narratives that touch our lives” (2006, 112). In the corpus under study several such cases could be observed.

BBC and Almonitor point out that Sheikh Qassim has conducted his clerical studies in the 1990s in Iran and Iraq. Aljazeera and the Guardian report that a week before the decision to strip Sheikh Qassim’s citizenship, the government had been investigating his bank account of $10m to determine the source of income. In the Guardian and Aljazeera’s articles, it is said that the main opposition group – al-Wefaq – was banned the week before on charges of fomenting sectarianism and having links with foreign powers which as both articles mention is a clear reference to Iran. As the Guardian narrates, in 2015 the leader of Al-Wefaq was convicted of “inciting hatred and disobedience, and insulting public institutions” and in the previous month his prison term has increased from four to nine years.

Generally speaking, the temporal framings identified here guide the readers to arrive at the conclusion that Iran is involved in inciting the people to topple the Bahrain’s ruling family and in supporting sectarianism and unrest in this country. Media are almost free on what they magnify and downplay. Here by selecting a fact from Sheikh Qassim’s life – his education in Iran, which dates back to almost two decades ago – they foreground Iran’s role in training of the movement’s leader. Investigation of a bank account with huge sum of money, the source of which is unknown is likely to imply foreigners’ sponsoring of the movement. Some articles refer to the closing of Al-Wefaq opposition group and imprisonment of its leader on the grounds that the group has been fomenting sectarianism and disobedience in the country. Al-Wefaq has also been accused of having relations with Iran.

4.2.5 Inclusion of temporary narrators
Harding (2012, 302) defines temporary narrators as the actors to whom the action of narrating is temporarily transferred and in the case of news articles this has to do with the inclusion of texts penned by commentators and/or lifted from other media.

In five cases, FNA is the temporary narrator and in one case it is tagged as Iranian state media. It goes without saying that in all these cases they quote Soleimani.
The US state department mentions that it is alarmed by the news of revoking Sheikh Qassim’s citizenship but it could not find credible evidence to support the news (The Guardian, BBC and Aljazeera). NY Times quotes State Department reaction as “deeply troubling”.

Bahrain News Agency, quoting interior ministry, accuses Sheikh Qassim of fomenting extremist sectarianism and violation of constitution and having ties with foreign powers (the Guardian and Aljazeera). BBC directly cites Bahrain’s Interior Ministry and writes that they accuse Qassim of continuous contact with the enemies of the kingdom.

The Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (Bird), an exiled group, also warns that the issue might lead to violence. Bird also claims that the British funding for human rights have been given to parties that are not totally independent of the government (the Guardian and Aljazeera).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) cautions that the repressions will not eliminate people’s grievance (the Guardian). The Guardian immediately writes that Bahrain has flatly rejected the criticism. In another narrative, UNCHR writes a report on people who have been revoked of citizenship and deported (Aljazeera).

In Guardian’s article, Hezbollah, described as “backed by Tehran”, warns that the behavior will push people to difficult choices and that the “dictatorial regime” has reached an end in dealing with “peaceful and popular movement”. Here the Guardian disclaims this part and adds “what it called” a peaceful movement. In this article, a Bahraini individual on Twitter portrays Qassim as an insect with a spray can labeled “sectarianism”.

In the NY Time’s article, Hamidreza Taraghi, “a political analyst close to Iran’s Shiite leadership”, says that the statement is a new strategy toward supporting an intifada in Bahrain and Soleimani’s statement is just the beginning.

In Bloomberg’s article Glen Ransom, an analyst at Control Risks, states that Iran sees itself as the protector of Shiites. The analyst predicts that the issue will not go beyond rhetorical response but that within Bahrain there might be an escalation of situation.

Almonitor cites the two main parties in Iran. A reformist newspaper in Iran dubs the statement an “unprecedented warning” and a conservative newspaper calls it an “ultimatum to Bahrain’s rulers”. Also, two advisors to President Rouhani tell that the only path to resolving the situation is through peaceful means and that the newly appointed deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs has already faced its first challenge. On the other hand, the conservative analysts assert that this is the beginning of the new geopolitical movement in the region which means finishing the military operation in Syria and Iraq and setting up resistance army in the region. Another like-minded analyst declares that up to now the soft position
with “Al Khalifa” has not worked because the “regime” does not have the ears to listen to the peaceful approach.

To sum up this section, it stands to reason to say that the inclusion of Iranian temporary narrators in the reframed texts lends more credence to the frame supported by these websites since insiders’ views can function as confessions made by the Iranian authorities themselves. FNA, as an authentic temporary narrator, cites the selective translation of the statement. Iranian analysts call this statement an ultimatum and just the beginning of an intifada or setting up the resistance army. Another analyst contends that the Bahraini government does not have the ears for the peaceful approach, intimating that there will be other methods that are not peaceful. These observations that come from the experts close to Iranian leadership are credible enough to persuade any reader of Iran's interventionism and support for an armed rebellion.

Bahrain's interior ministry appears as a temporary narrator and accuses Sheikh Qassim of having ties with the enemies of Bahrain. These statements insinuate that Iran is the cause of turmoil in the country, simply because the movement's leader is affiliated with Iran. When they cite Hezbollah's statement they identify it as “backed by Tehran” to send the subliminal message that Iran is the reason for tension in the region. Hezbollah is known as a terrorist organization in many western countries as well as in the Arab League. What this triggers in the minds of readers is that Iran not only interferes in Bahrain's domestic affairs but also supports what most western readers recognize as a terrorist organization. All the more interesting is when an ordinary individual's Twitter comment is deemed worthy of being a temporary narrator. Not surprisingly, this narrator represents Sheikh Qassim's activities as seeking sectarianism.

Other temporary narrators such as the US state department, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights might have been included in the texts to forestall the criticism of tendentious coverage of the issue.

5. Conclusion and discussion

The analysis indicates that by selecting the claim, counter-claim and negative consequences of the statement for translation, not only do news websites suppress the values and circumstances behind this statement, such as helping the oppressed people who are being deprived of their rights to freedom and democracy, but also exploit it to substantiate their side of the story: Iran as well as interfering in the domestic affairs of Bahrain threatens it.
The ideological role of selective translation in reconfiguration of news frames

The framing packages in the reframed texts, along with the selective translations, include consistent set of schemas that define the circumstances in such a way that depict Iran as a country that interferes in the domestic affairs of Bahrain and even ready to support an armed rebellion. We cannot claim that the whole texts published by the reframing news websites unanimously support a single frame. After all, they work under an aura of impartiality and they need to incorporate some parts of the competing frames. The question is what frame dominates the news articles, which in this case is the intervention of Iran.

What is the role of selective translation in the reframed texts? In this study, the task of reporting the most challenging part of the reframed texts is assigned to translation. For many people, translation still means something that directly comes from the others. The only change they could envisage is the linguistic one. However, people might not be aware that this part is deliberately chosen and then reframed with particular goals in mind. This idea of translation as faithful representation is abused. Translation in such cases can prove to be irrefutable evidence to bolster the frame foreign news websites build.

References


Appendix I. The URLs of news articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News websites</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Publication date</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Appendix II. Full text of the statement

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate the Merciful
The oppressed Muslim nation of Bahrain, for long years, has been under oppression, discrimination, injustice, humiliation, and cruel, inhumane, and unacceptable acts of Al-Khalifa.

The decent and patient people, despite heavy pressures and the racist behavior of Al-Khalifa which included arresting their religious and political leaders, imprisoning and dreadful torturing of women and children, stripping citizenship, violating their rights and tens of other crimes, without giving any pretext to Al-Khalifa, have been peacefully seeking their inalienable rights and intensified pressures have not swayed them from their peaceful approach.

However, the impudence of Al-Khalifa has reached a point where the regime, neglecting the peaceful and decent conduct of the people, and exploiting the meaningful silence of the United Nations, the US and other western countries, takes the opportunity to double its crimes and to intensify pressure and suppression on people.

The illegal arrest of Sheikh Ali Salman and other religious and political figures of Bahrain, under the silence of international organizations, has made the regime even more impudent to such an extent that threatens the rights of the eminent clergy and the religious leader of the Shiites, Sheikh Isa Qassim, causing distressing imaginations in the minds of the people of the region and Bahrain.

Apparently, Al-Khalifa has taken unfair advantage of the peaceful movement of people and underestimated the public wrath.
They surely know that encroachment of Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim’s rights is a redline, crossing of which would spark unrest in Bahrain and the entire region, leaving no alternatives for people other than resorting to armed resistance. Definitely, Al-Khalifa will pay the price and its consequence would be nothing but toppling of this bloodthirsty regime. The supporters of Al-Khalifa must know that insult to Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim and continuance of excessive pressure on Bahraini people will mark the beginning of a bloody Intifada, the repercussions of which would rest on those who legitimize the impudence of the rulers of Bahrain.

“And defend themselves only after they are unjustly attacked. And soon will the unjust assailants know what vicissitudes their affairs will take!”
[Ash-Shu’ara 27: 272; Translated by Yusuf Ali]

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