Speech act theory
Article outline
- 1.Where does speech act theory come from?
- 1.1Frege and the assertion sign
- 1.2Wittgenstein and the uses of language
- 1.3Austin and the performative utterance
- 1.4Grice and speaker’s meaning
- 2.Utterances as acts
- 2.1Austin’s distinction of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts
- 2.1.1The complexities of saying
- 2.1.2The three kinds of effects of the illocutionary act
- 2.1.3The distinction between illocution and perlocution
- 2.2Searle’s notion of the speech act as illocutionary act
- 2.2.1Illocutionary force and propositional content
- 2.2.2Felicity conditions as rules
- 2.2.3Intention and perlocution
- 3.Main problems in speech act theory
- 3.1Illocutionary force-indicating devices
- 3.2The classification of illocutionary acts
- 3.3Modes of understanding
- 3.4Speech acts and truth
- 3.5Universality vs. the linguistic and cultural relativity of speech acts
- 4.Trends of development in speech act theory
- 4.1From the conventionality of performatives to the naturality of inferences
- 4.2From interpersonal action to the intentionality of the speaker’s mind
- 4.3Some collateral endeavors
- 5.Open issues and possibilities of further development
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