In this paper we show how some reasoning, though fallacious, can appear to be attractive and useful for beings-like-us. Although they do not provide conclusive evidence to support or reject a certain claim the way scientific statements do, they tell us something interesting about how humans build up their arguments and reasons. First of all, we will consider and investigate three main types of fallacies: argumentum ad hominem (argument against person), argumentum ad verecundiam (appeal to authority), and argumentum ad populum (appeal to popularity or bandwagon). These three fallacies are traditionally considered as examples of a broader category called ignoratio elenchi. Secondly, we show how people who commit these fallacies rely on information about other human beings in their reasoning. That is, they do not follow certain logical procedures that eventually lead them to correct conclusions. But they simply make use of others as social characters. For example, being an authority, being an expert, being part of a class, etc., become the substitutes for more direct evidence to support a certain claim or to make an argument more appealing.
2019. Reasoning ad Ignorantiam. In Ignorant Cognition [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 46], ► pp. 67 ff.
Bertolotti, Tommaso
2015. Gossip as Multi-level Abduction: The Inferential Ground of Linguistic Niche Construction. In Patterns of Rationality [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 19], ► pp. 111 ff.
Bertolotti, Tommaso
2015. On Biological and Verbal Camouflage: The Strategic Use of Models in Non-Scientific Thinking. In Patterns of Rationality [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 19], ► pp. 13 ff.
2014. An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge. Synthese 191:17 ► pp. 4037 ff.
Bertolotti, Tommaso, Lorenzo Magnani & Emanuele Bardone
2014. Camouflaging Truth: A Biological, Argumentative and Epistemological Outlook from Biological to Linguistic Camouflage. Journal of Cognition and Culture 14:1-2 ► pp. 65 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2010. Smart Abducers as Violent Abducers. In Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology [Studies in Computational Intelligence, 314], ► pp. 51 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2015. Naturalizing logic. Journal of Applied Logic 13:1 ► pp. 13 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2016. Violence Hexagon. Logica Universalis 10:2-3 ► pp. 359 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2022. Naturalizing Morality to Unveil the Status of Violence: Coalition Enforcement, Cognitive Moral Niches, and Moral Bubbles in an Evolutionary Perspective. Philosophies 7:2 ► pp. 39 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2024. Multiple Individual Moralities May Trigger Violence. In Understanding Violence [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 69], ► pp. 185 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2024. “Military Intelligence”. In Understanding Violence [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 69], ► pp. 1 ff.
Magnani, Lorenzo
2024. Moral Bubbles: Legitimizing and Dissimulating Violence Distributing Violence through Fallacies. In Understanding Violence [Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 69], ► pp. 69 ff.
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