ORDERLY AFFECT:
THE SYNTACTIC CODING OF PRAGMATICS
IN WELSH EXPRESSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

H. Paul Manning

Abstract
This paper describes and analyzes a series of paradigmatic oppositions between N’ constructions in the P-Celtic languages (Welsh, Breton, Cornish) which serve to code expressive pragmatics of adjectives. The paper considers both paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects of these constructions, and shows that asymmetric interaction of constructions in paradigms influences their purely formal syntagmatic interactions. A typology of expressive categories is built to serve as a framework for comparison between constructions. It is argued that a view of grammar that includes both formal and functional dimensions (‘the coding view’) also provides valuable insight in matters of purely formal constructional interaction.

Keywords: Affect, Syntactic coding, Expressives, Welsh.

1. All subjects leak: On expressives and ‘expressivism’

There are few terms in linguistics that are so multivalent as the term ‘expressive’ (Stankiewicz 1964; Irvine 1982). The term belongs as much to the ‘practical’, ‘folk’ vocabulary of the linguist as it does to the ‘theoretical’, ‘expert’ vocabulary. The various nuances it has seem to encapsulate an entire Western folk theory of creative subjective ‘expression’, what Taylor (1975: Chapter 1, 1985, 1989: chapter 21) calls ‘expressivism’. Expressivism is a broadly subject-centered view of language associated with post-Enlightenment thought (as opposed to object-centered referentialist or ‘designativist’ Enlightenment theories of language, embodied, for example, in truth-conditional semantics (Taylor 1985: 243); that, in its most basic form, privileges those features of language that embody properties of subjects (creativity, agency, affect, play, poeticity, style, variation, and so on (Taylor 1975: chapter 1, 1985, 1989: chapter 21)). These opposed theories of language have long since become theories of opposed sets of phenomena within language (Taylor 1985). The class of linguistic phenomena called ‘expressives’ usually consists of all those linguistic phenomena that best embody our intuitive notion of ‘expressivism’ in language, that is, all those heterogenous linguistic features related to subjective expression. The coherence of this system of classification does not derive from any coherence in the

1 For a similar opposition between Saussurean ‘abstract objectivism’ and Vosslerian ‘individual subjectivism’ see Voloshinov 1973.
linguistic phenomena denoted (Dressler and Barbaresi 1994: 37), but rather derives from
the folk theory of ‘expressivism’ that involves a whole set of assumptions about the
subject-centered properties of language and their formal expression.

As a result, what is ‘expressive’ is all that which is not grammatical, or marginal,
a ‘fuzzy periphery’ (Stankiewicz 1964: 267), so much so that the term no longer denotes
solely the linguistic coding of affective dispositions of subjects, but a ‘nebulous realm’
consisting of all that does not belong to ordinary grammar or denotational language (Irvine
1990: 41, 46n5). In short, all those places where, as Sapir famously put it, ‘grammars
leak’ (Stankiewicz 1964: 241). ‘Expressives’, both as categories of form and categories of
function, are frequently opposed as a separate (or at the very least ‘peripheral’) competence
alongside ordinary ‘core’ grammatical competence, forming a kind of quasi-natural
‘allolinguistics’ that requires different methodologies and has different lessons than
‘ordinary’ linguistic phenomena (Zwicky and Pullum 1987). The heterogeneity of the class
of phenomena that results from this segregation (Dressler and Barbaresi 1994: 37) is often
taken to be typical of the nature of the phenomena itself: A heterogeneous grouping of
peculiar and variable peripheral phenomena united by their unruly rebellion against core
grammar.

As an unruly and quasi-natural outward objectification of subjective states of affect,
expressives (or emotives, since these are identified in Jakobson’s initial definition (1960:
354; Staniewicz 1964) are often treated as being at the same time a functional category
focusing on speaker affect, and a formal category of ill-behaved devices which
characteristically code this affect, the latter of which are almost all marginal or peripheral
to the ‘cognitive’ grammar. Thus, expressives consist of those places where both
‘grammars’ and ‘subjects leak’, where subjective properties are quasi-naturally objectified
in linguistic form. Most definitions of ‘expressive’ (or ‘emotive’) include, then, some
conflation of functional and formal considerations, even where expressives are still felt to
be part of a conventional grammar (explicitly in Stankiewicz 1964: 229). Most influential
has been the recent definition of ‘expressive morphology’ (as opposed to ‘plain
morphology’) of Zwicky and Pullum 1987, in which pragmatic considerations of
‘expressive, playful, poetic or simply ostentatious effects of some kind’ (ibid.: 335-6) are
considered to be as diagnostic of the underlying difference in competence involved as is
peculiar (ibid.: 336) or variable behavior (ibid.:337) with respect to phonology, morphology
and syntax (ibid.: 336-8). Since none of these criteria, as stated, is sufficient or necessary,
it is possible for a given phenomenon to be expressive in function, but not in form, or vice
versa, or both.

Since expressives are seemingly indifferent to the opposition of linguistic form and
linguistic function, it becomes possible for one to speak of ‘expressive phenomena’ that do
not express affect or any other subjective property (Irvine 1982: 32) Here, expressives
become a purely formal class. Hence, a whole group of signs, called ‘ideophones’, are also
often called expressives (for example Difflloth 1972; also Zwicky and Pullum 1987: 334-5).
Ironically, ideophones and their ilk (for example, language-games, Zwicky and Pullum
1987: 332-4) usually involve self-conscious modifications of the sign form (for example

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2 This multifactor definition gives rise to a continuum (compare Bat El 2000: 65), though Zwicky
and Pullum stipulate (ibid.: 338) that it is to be interpreted as a binary distinction, they do not explain how
this can be.
atypical phonology and reduplication) that draw attention to the sign form itself, so the
iconism that results is more a product of what Jakobson called the poetic function (a point
Zwicky and Pullum (1987: 332) raise, but do not address), that is, a linguistic function
which draws attention to the ‘palpability of signs [and] deepens the fundamental dichotomy
of signs and objects’ (Jakobson 1960: 356) As Zwicky and Pullum restate it ‘the fact that
[expressive formations] use linguistic resources in ways that grammatical rules do not
enables them to stand out, to call attention to themselves - and so to serve their expressive
function’ (Zwicky and Pullum 1987: 338). In fact, Dressler and Barbaresi (1994: 36) draw
attention to this self-conscious poetic manipulation of linguistic form by calling such
morphology ‘metamorphology’ to replace Zwicky and Pullum’s ‘expressive morphology’.
And it is this poeticization of linguistic form that renders much ‘expressive morphology’
and its ilk marginal or peripheral to grammatical competence, and accounts for this
terminological quibble in which ‘expressives’ do not express affect or other subjective
states.

Yet it is clear that what sorts of formal operation count as ‘expressive’ is not given
once and for all, but is relative to what counts as ‘plain’ morphology in any given grammar
(Baldi and Dawar 2000). If this is so, then ‘plain’ and ‘expressive’ alternants are
nevertheless in relations of systematic and meaningful paradigmatic contrast, better
expressed as intimate paradigmatic relations between unmarked and marked forms within
a grammar, than as estranged relations between grammar-abiding and grammarless forms.
This implies that the opposition between marked expressesives and unmarked non-
expressives is the same as the broader opposition between ‘marked periphery’ and
‘unmarked core’ in grammar. Expanding a recent series of arguments broadly associated
with Construction Grammar (CG), I wish to argue that as we transcend the often empty and
circular distinction between expressesives and non-expressives as not-grammar versus
grammar, we should at the same time transcend the equally empty and circular distinction
between marked periphery and unmarked core as oppositions between types of competence
(Culicover and Jackendoff 1999; Kay and Fillmore 1999; Kay 2002), while retaining the
distinction between marked and unmarked within a single grammatical competence. I wish
to argue that to do this, we must not only admit, with practitioners of CG, that constructions
are meaningful, but that they are meaningful because they oppose each other
paradigmatically. The distinction between ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ that haunts the
terminology of CG implies the comparison of constructions in absentia (negatively, by
paradigmatic opposition, by partial difference) as well as in presentia (positively, by
syntagmatic composition, by partial identity, as insisted by Construction Grammarians).
Syntactic constructions must code not only positive relations (semantically stetable in terms
of compositionality) between co-present items (syntactic form), but the formal differences
of arrangement between these co-present items often form the stuff from which meaningful
paradigmatic contrast between constructions (paradigmatic form) can be formed (the sense
of stuff and form intended here is that of Humboldt (1988)).

The goal of this paper is to show that the category of ‘expressive’ can be treated as
being a relatively well-behaved grammatical category with relatively well-behaved formal
exponents, and that these exponents can be found within both morphological and syntactic
paradigmatic oppositions. This is not to say that expressives will not, from time to time,
be expressed in a manner that is grammatically non-canonical, but in other respects they are
yet grammatical. In so doing, I hope to create a more usable metalanguage for the
pragmatics of expressives, and at the same time to show that expressive categories are susceptible to being coded in regular paradigmatic opposition to non-expressive categories in syntax, as in morphology. My data for this project is drawn from expressive syntactic constructions in Middle Welsh, Middle Cornish, and Middle Breton.³

2. Expressive constructions in P-Celtic.

In each of the P-Celtic languages (Middle Welsh, Middle Cornish and Middle Breton, henceforth MW, MC and MB) there exists a non-maximal nominal phrasal construction (N’) which concatenates an adjective (A) and a noun (N) using a partitive construction, represented in a conventional phrase structure diagram as (1), where a is identifiable with preposition meaning ‘of’ in MB and MC.⁴ In order to distinguish this sort of N’ (all N’s in which N is attributively modified by A) from all others, I will label it Nᴬ henceforth. The Nᴬ in question (exemplified in (1)) has a peculiar syntax compared to canonical Nᴬ constructions (2), so I will call this the ‘non-canonical’ Nᴬ construction.⁵

\[
(1) \quad [N^A \quad A \quad [PP \quad a \quad N]]
\]

(1a) tec a wr
    fair  ?    man
    ‘A fair man’ W.SG.364

³ Data are cited by language (Middle W[elsh], C[ornish], B[reton]). Welsh (W) texts are cited according to standard abbreviations as used in Evans (1976), Breton (B) texts are cited according to the standard abbreviations given in Hemon (1975). Some Welsh examples have been culled from various texts published over the years in the Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies (abbreviated as B) and these are cited by volume, page (and line, where appropriate). Cornish data cited are from Origo Mundi (O), Passio Nostri Domini (D) and Ressurexio Nostri Domni (R) (Norris 1968 [1859]), as well as Pryce 1972 [1790]. Numbers following the textual abbreviation refer to the page and line of the standard edition.

⁴ Since this paper is not aimed at any particular syntactic formalism, I will use a phrase structure koine (traditional node labels like N’, NP, AP etc.) throughout to indicate that my phrase structure labels refer to empirical “phenogrammatical” constituency (constituent structure within the order of Saussurean signifiers, that is, perceptible formal categories) rather than “tectogrammatical” constituency (constituent structure as a (partial) diagrammatic icon of semantic (or similar universally stipulable but not immediately empirical) relations, constituent structure with the order of Saussurean signifieds). For the distinction see Dowty 1996. An adequate coding statement requires that these two orders scrupulously be kept distinct. My other abbreviations in the glosses are as follows: DIR (direct relative particle), OBL (Oblique relative particle) (see Manning 1996 for the distribution), PT (progressive aspect marker or predicating particle), AFF (affirmative clause marker), SG (singular number), PL (plural number).

⁵ This partitive construction bears superficial resemblance to similarly partitive constructions used to code similar pragmatics of affect, such as English a bitch of a problem, so nice of a man, just as some of the adjective word order inversions found in MB and MC have uncertain parallels in French (e.g. Marouzeau 1923). The exclamative pragmatics of this construction are paralleled in syntactic constructions in other languages (see, for example Elliot 1974; Rosengren 1994; Maynard 1995; Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996). Considerations of space and relevance prevents me from making explicit comparisons here.
This N^A form minimal pairs with a denotationally synonymous N^A counterpart (composed of the same lexemes), which I will call the ‘canonical’ N^A construction:

(2) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{[N}^A \quad \text{N} \quad \text{A]}
\end{array}
\]

(2a) teyrndynyon tec
kingly-men fair
‘Fair kingly men’ W.KO.126

(2b) an aval tek
the apple fair
‘The fair apple’ C.O.267

(2c) un den brao
a man brave
‘A brave man’ B.BD.943

Within the N^A category in Middle period P-Celtic languages we find ‘paradigms of constructions’ (oppositions between non-canonical and canonical N^A constructions), so that the form the N^A construction itself takes conveys some additional differential and specific coded paradigmatic value beyond the compositional attribution relation between N and A. These opposed N^A constructions are denotationally synonymous, that is, the compositional relation of ‘attributive modification’ between (intensions of) N and A is semantically identical in both constructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Denotational Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canonical</td>
<td>([N^A \quad N \quad A])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-canonical</td>
<td>([N^A \quad A \quad [PP \quad a \quad N]])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The further difference coded by this syntactic opposition is pragmatic. The non-canonical N^A specifically and differentially codes some nuance of expressive, and more specifically exclamative, pragmatic value, which the canonical N^A lacks. Moreover, this pragmatic value applies only to the adjective, the position of which is distinctive formally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Pragmatic Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canonical</td>
<td>([N^A \quad N \quad A])</td>
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</table>
H. Paul Manning

The form of the non-canonical construction is peculiar and has attracted attention in the past (Fife 1993). A certain amount of attention has been directed to the identity of the ‘head’ (whether A or N) and the resultant categorial status of the phrase (AP or NP) (Fife 1993). Since neither the form nor function of this construction have ever been fully described, part of the objective of this paper will be to provide a full description to clarify this matter. The evidence of a fuller description will show that this construction behaves in every respect as a variety of N in its internal and external syntax. In addition, since any set of A and N lexemes that can participate in the non-canonical construction can also participate in the canonical one (but not vice versa), the formal opposition between syntactic constructions here is meaningful in itself in the same way as lexical or morphological oppositions are.

A second peculiarity of this construction, for MW at least, is that the partitive preposition used in this construction (a ‘of’) is found in no other construction in MW, the usual variant being o ‘of’. It is, however, the normal form of the partitive preposition ‘of’ in MC and MB. By later MW, we see this constructional parochialism being eliminated in favor of the residual form of the partitive preposition, o ‘of, from’ (3ab). For this reason I will gloss all occurrences of MW a as ‘of’.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3a)} \quad \text{mawr} & \quad \text{a} & \quad \text{ovit} \\
&\text{great} & \quad \text{of} & \quad \text{grief} \\
&\text{‘A great grief’ W.SG.252}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3b)} \quad \text{mawr} & \quad \text{o} & \quad \text{ovit} \\
&\text{great} & \quad \text{of} & \quad \text{grief} \\
&\text{‘A great grief’ W.SG.228}
\end{align*}
\]

As the data above shows, each P-Celtic language shows some reflex of the non-canonical N\textsuperscript{A} construction, though differing in important points of form and distribution. My argument for this paper is that a thorough description and sustained analysis of this formal constructional alternation both in terms of distinctive form and coded content will prove interesting for a view of syntactic arrangements (‘constructions’) as being a kind of ‘form’ entirely analogous to distinctive morphological ‘form’ in terms of their potentiality for contributing to differential coding of grammatical categorial ‘meaning’.

My approach, the ‘coding view’, which derives from a theory of grammar somewhat analogous to ‘Construction Grammar’ (such as Zwicky 1987, 1994; Goldberg 1995; Fillmore 1999; Kay and Fillmore 1999; Kay 2002), though without any attendant cognitive or psychological commitments, treats categories of differential perceptible form (formal categories) and categories of differentially coded ‘meaning’ (grammatical categories) as

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\footnote{Another MW deviation from partitive expressive structure involves cases of omission of the preposition a entirely, as in examples like da varchawc ‘good knight’ (W.SG.294), as opposed to the expected ‘da a varchawc’. This occurs only after the adjective da ‘good’, which might be explained plausibly by a contraction (da a N = da: N = da N). The covert presence of the preposition a is secured by the lenition (marchawc ~ varchawc) that it triggers.}
being in a mutually constituting (‘dialectical’) relationship, so that it is impossible, even in principle, to make arguments about the one without simultaneously making arguments about the other (Silverstein 1993). This dialectical mutual constitution of categories of form and function in language is the central interest of the coding view of grammar, which is thus neither merely ‘formal’ nor ‘functional’ in any of the senses these have been used in recent debates.\(^7\)

My description and analysis will therefore have two related goals. I illustrate, formally how these constructions interact both paradigmatically (in relations of contrast captured by the idea of ‘paradigms of constructions’ (Silverstein 1993: 326)) as well as syntagmatically (section 3). I also illustrate, functionally, how the pragmatic value coded by this construction foregrounds the expressive potentiality latent in certain adjectives, and develop a metapragmatic vocabulary to capture some important differences between such constructions (section 4). This typology I apply to Middle Welsh, with a comparison to cognate syntactic constructions in Middle Cornish and Middle Breton (section 5.). Since the opposition between ‘normal’ and ‘expressive’ constructions is a paradigmatic opposition, I argue that instead of allocating the former to the unmarked ‘core’ and the latter to the marked ‘periphery’ of grammar, we should instead bring the notion of paradigms of constructions, as well as the notion of categorial markedness based on paradigmatic contrast and opposition, back into a unitary theory of grammar, wherein there is no core and periphery (section 6). The opposition between non-expressive and expressive is not an opposition between what is grammatical and what is not, it is a grammatical opposition.

### 3.1. Formal categories: Internal syntax

In previous descriptions, the structure in question has been described as an “headless NP”, having undergone a process of “decapitation” (Fife 1993). The partitive structure of the non-canonical phrase is exocentric (there is a conflict between categorial and structural intuitive definitions of headedness: The most plausible categorial candidate for ‘head’ (N) is not structurally dominated by the N’ node, but by a PP node), unlike canonical N\(^A\)s, which are endocentric. I argue instead that the category I have labeled N\(^A\) is a type of N’ in its internal syntax, but that its external syntax depends on paradigmatic factors and the referential status of its head N.

In terms of internal syntax, rules of number agreement can be stated uniformly for all N\(^A\) constructions, suggesting their categorial identity. Adjectives in normal N\(^A\) constructions optionally agree in number with their N heads. This is true whether the

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\(^7\) Sapir’s formulation (“language is a system of phonetic symbols for the expression of communicable thought and feeling”(1949 [1933]: 7)) captures this mutual and reciprocal conditioning of categories of form (formal categories) and categories of content (grammatical categories) elegantly, opposing “phonetic symbols” (and not merely meaningless ‘sound’, but meaningful ‘form’) to “communicable thought and feeling” (not merely inchoate and formless ‘concepts’, but (formally) communicable concepts). In his brilliant phrasing, each term contains the opposed term as an ‘internal relation’. Form and meaning are brought together in ‘internal relations’ (where each term contains and conditions (forms) its opposite), rather than merely conjoined in a kind of ‘external relation’. For a more extensive drawing out of the consequences of this ‘configurational’ view see Sapir (1994: 120).
adjective precedes (the adjective *hen* is unique in this positioning in MW) (4) or follows the N head (5):

\[
\begin{align*}
(4a) & \quad \text{hen-yon} & \text{amser-oed} & \quad (4b) & \quad \text{eu} & \text{hen} & \text{pech o d-eu} \\
& \text{Old-PLtimes-PL} & \text{their old:SG sins-PL} & \quad & \text{Their old sins} & \text{W.BD.106.19} & \text{W.BD.83.28}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(5a) & \quad \text{wyn} & \text{bychein} & \quad (5b) & \quad \text{kwyss-eu} & \text{llydan} \\
& \text{lambs:PL small:PL} & \text{furrows-PL wide:SG} & \quad & \text{Wide furrows} & \text{W.B.2.12.22}
\end{align*}
\]

The fronted adjective in the non-canonical N\(^A\) shows the same agreement properties as a normal adjective in a normal N\(^A\): The adjective may show plural agreement with the following N (6a), or it may not (6b). In this construction as in the others, the N is the head for the purposes of Plural agreement.

\[
\begin{align*}
(6a) & \quad \text{drud-yon} & \text{a veirt-yon} & \quad (6b) & \quad \text{meredic} & \text{a wyr} \\
& \text{brave-PL of bards-PL} & \text{foolish:SG of men-PL} & \quad & \text{Foolish men} & \text{W.KO.763}
\end{align*}
\]

The position of the adjective relative to the noun within the N\(^A\) is irrelevant as far as the distribution of number features is concerned: The rule can only be phrased with regard to a structurally generic N\(^A\) in which the relative structural placement of N and A is irrelevant.

In addition, in both Middle Welsh and Middle Breton the N serving as head of the N\(^A\) (as a kind of N’) may be modified recursively by other N’ constructions, leading us to believe that in both the N\(^A\) construction is a form of N’ headed by N. There are two possible loci for such recursive N’ modification, working on the assumption that the N\(^A\) is a form of N’, either internally or externally to the N\(^A\). In Middle Welsh the locus of such recursion is internal to the N\(^A\) construction (the N within the apparent PP), while in Middle Breton the locus of recursion is external to the N\(^A\) construction. Once this stipulation (on stipulation see Zwicky 1994) is made, these modifiers in all other respects behave normally. Hence, numerals precede the N in normal N’ constructions in both languages. In Middle Welsh, therefore, they appear within the PP of the N\(^A\) construction, preceding N:

\[
\begin{align*}
(7) & \quad [N^A] & \quad [PP] & \quad [N] \\
& \quad \text{good of two island} & \quad \text{dwy} & \text{ynys} & \text{W.PKM.45.17}
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly, in MW all other forms of N’ construction (recursive modifications of N) occur internally to the N\(^A\). Adjectives that cannot participate in the non-canonical construction, for example, appear in their normal position following the N head:

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\footnote{Fife (1993: 389) claims the opposite for ModW, namely that “it is the initial Adjectives which determine the...features of the phrase as a whole”, but it is not clear on what data he bases this claim, and the MW data is at variance with it.}
What this data shows (following a suggestion by Zwicky 1994) is that seemingly purely formal asymmetric interactions between constructions on the syntagmatic plane (of the sort considered by Zwicky 1994) may reproduce grammatical categorial (‘functional’) asymmetries on the paradigmatic level. Grammatical categories are directly invoked in the organization of formal categories into paradigms, but grammatical categorial markedness is indirectly involved in resolving formal interactions between constructions syntagmatically. The asymmetries in formal syntagmatic behavior are intuitively the result of the requirement imposed by coding to preserve in un-neutralized form the differential structure of this ‘marked’ non-canonical N.A.

The non-canonical N.A formally contrasts paradigmatically with a normal N.A by violating certain expectations of homogeneity of phrasal structure within its category type (it is exocentric while normal N.A’s are endocentric), and in particular by the extremely unusual positioning of the adjective. These features allow it to contrast formally with the canonical N.A structure and so code a differential pragmatic value for the adjective. These stipulations of the non-canonical N.A are in conflict with the requirements of more basic AP constructions for phrasal integrity; here the stipulations of the more specific ‘marked’ non-canonical N.A structure are sovereign over the ‘unmarked’ AP construction (it is a “firm construction” in the sense of Zwicky 1994: 621) insofar as adjective positioning is concerned. Following a suggestion of Zwicky’s (1994), I will suggest that grammatical categorial markedness guides and regiments

In the same way, N’ internal PP modifiers (30), such as are complements of N and not A, appear in their normal position (after the head N they modify).

In MB, by contrast, numerals appear externally to the construction.

This is also true of determiners in MB:

Further evidence comes from discontinuous Adjective phrases produced by the unusual location of the A required in the non-canonical construction. One might expect the A to be attended by its phrasal modifiers in this new position. However, with the exception of the particle *mor*, which always attends the adjective it modifies (see example 24 below), phrasal modifiers of A are placed where they would be in a normal adjectival modification structure, following the N, in MW (12). The requirements of the more specific marked N construction take precedence over the more general requirements of integrity of AP, leading to discontinuities.9

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purely formal categorial interaction here. Zwicky has wondered if this form  
of unyielding ‘firmness’ (or its corollary ‘softness’, which determines which  
construction will ‘win’ in any purely formal competition  
between constructions) can be motivated by something other than pure stipulation  
(ibid.: 621-2). He has also suggested tentatively that “markedness” in at least something  
approximating the sense intended here (Zwicky 1994: 620) correlates well with formal  
asymmetries of interaction between constructions (so that ‘unmarked’ constructions in grammatical  
categorial terms are also ‘elsewhere’, ‘default’, ‘basic’, or ‘fall back’ constructions in formal terms  
(ibid.; also Silverstein 1993: 343). I would further suggest that the data here indicates a way that  
paradigmatic asymmetries between constructions can be systematically related to syntagmatic asymmetries of privilege between them, and that asymmetries of the coding of grammatical categories (markedness) are  
reproduced in asymmetries of formal categorial interaction (‘firmness’). Paradigmatic asymmetries of interaction captured by notions of markedness are immediately syntagmatic asymmetries captured by notions of firmness, and vice versa.

Similarly in the following example, the adjective anhebic ‘unexpected’ is construed  
discontinuously with its ‘experiencer’ PP (gan y tylwyth ‘(unexpected) by the family’) and the VN  
complement (y wneuthur ‘to do it’), both found inside the ‘lower’ N’.  

ys anhebic a gyflafan gan y tylwyth  
is unexpected of crime by the family  
y wneuthur a wnaf i yr awr honn  
its do DIR I:do I the hour this  
‘It is a crime unexpected by the household to be done that I shall do now.’  
W.PKM.43.22
precede the N, the requirements of the integrity of AP must be relaxed, so that phrasal modifiers are placed where they would appear in a normal N’, following N, resulting in discontinuous APs. Hence, paradigmatic markedness relations between constructions (canonical versus non-canonical arrangement of A with attendant unmarked versus marked pragmatic values that these arrangements code) produces asymmetries of syntactic privilege between co-occurring constructions (thus, more general constructions dealing with, for example, the disposition of A modifiers with respect to A must defer to constructions which are paradigmatically marked, for example, the non-canonical A construction (see Zwicky 1994 for a parallel set of suggestions on paradigmatic markedness as a factor in explaining syntagmatic constructional asymmetries).

3.2. External syntax

A previous analyst (Fife 1993: 384) has suggested that the A is in fact the head of the non-canonical construction. If this is so, then presumably the construction must be a ‘projection’ of A in its external syntax as well, if we are to cleave to any form of “strictly categorial determination” (Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996: 225) of external syntax by internal syntax. The data from external syntax suggests that at least some examples of this construction (those with referential N heads) are headed by Ns, having the distribution of N’, that is, a construction that can indifferently serve in some NP and some AP distributions. On the other hand, those with non-referential N heads (with the ‘dummy head’ peth ‘thing’) have precisely the distributions of A. The two distributions overlap (hence an ‘underspecified’ categorial identity as ‘nominal’ may be in order), but the specific syntagmatic categorial identity of the construction in external syntax (as phrasal projection of N or A) in some sense depends as much on the categorial identity of its paradigmatic alternant and the referential properties of its head. We cannot, therefore, predict syntagmatic identity in external syntax from any principle of strictly categorial determination (internal syntax). Rather, paradigmatic alternation is the determinative factor resolving external syntactic identity.

Non-canonical N’s may occur in a wide variety of syntactic positions in earlier MW, but increasingly they seem to be restricted to appearing as cleft of a cleft of some sort (also noted for ModW by Fife 1993: 380). This restriction on external distribution is a deviation from earlier MW, as well as cognate constructions in B and MC, for which my data on external syntax is scanty. In MW poetry, we find the non-canonical N serving as a normal predicate N’ in copular constructions, with an expressed copula (13), or without (14).

(13)  Cop  Pred  (N’)  Subj
   bu   [truj  a  dynghetwen]  anghen  gywir
was sad of fate need true
‘A sad fate was true need.’ W.CA. 6.136

(14)  Pred  (N’)  Subj
   [drwc  a  serch]  hwnnw
bad of love that
By MW, we find that the non-canonical N^A is more or less completely limited to cleft position (which may be treated as kind of predicate position syntactically). Since virtually any phrasal constituent type may be clefted in constructions of one sort or another in MW (Richards 1940; Manning 1996), this does not resolve matters per se.\textsuperscript{11}

This restriction to the pragmatically focussed role of cleftee, however, does not place any limitation on the syntactic role the N^A may play in the lower clause of the cleft.

We also find them serving as predicates, which is open to both N’ (17) and AP (18).

Lastly, we find them playing an adverbial role (19), where primarily APs are possible. In this position it alternates only with non-canonical APs. These results are summarized in Table 1.

\textsuperscript{11} One further constructional peculiarity of the external syntax of this construction is that this kind of cleft is one of the last environments which shows the absolute initial position version of the copula (ys), which has been replaced in other MW clefts by nothing (Ø) and in other copular constructions by a post-positive form of the copula (yw) (Richards 1940). To the extent that it is limited to such constructions it becomes a further constructional marker of exclamative pragmatics.
Whatever the categorial status of this construction, it cannot be headed by A in all distributions (15-17), though it could be in some (18-19). Therefore, strictly categorial determination cannot produce a homogenous answer to the question; internal syntax does not determine external syntax. There must be some other principle at work.

2.3. Subcategories: Referential and non-referential non-canonical N^A

These distributional facts as well as paraphrase relationships lead us to believe that there are two important classes of non-canonical N^A's: Those with referential N heads which have the distributions of and can be denotationally paraphrased by canonical N^A's (15-17), and those with non-referential N heads (the invariant peth ‘thing’ left untranslated in glosses) which have the distributions of and can be denotationally paraphrased by As (18-19). Therefore, this single construction (non-canonical N^A) formally paradigmatically opposes two types of ‘normal’ phrases, canonical N^A (where the N head is referential) as well as simple A (where it is not).

| Subject cleft | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | – |
| Object cleft  | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | – |
| Predicate cleft | ✓ | – | ✓ | ✓ |
| Adverbial cleft | ✓ | – | – | ✓ |

The first class, the ‘referential’ non-canonical N^A (in subject, object and predicate roles), have canonical N^A paraphrases which are more-or-less denotational synonyms of the non-canonical N^A: That is, formally ‘normalizing’ the syntactic relation between N and A yields a normal N^A which means more or less the same thing in denotational terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referential (Nominal)</th>
<th>Non-referential (Adjectival)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canonical</td>
<td>[N^A N A]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second class, ‘non-referential’ non-canonical NPs (in predicate and adverbial roles), cannot be so paraphrased. Instead, the N head peth ‘thing’ is left untranslated, and the non-canonical NP is best paraphrased denotationally by a simple adjective or projection thereof.

Non-canonical N^A: Paraphrase relationships

| tec a wr = gwr tec | ‘a fair man’ |
| da a gedymdeith = cedymdeith da | ‘a good companion’ |
| ryued a antur = antur ryued | ‘a strange adventure’ |

The second class, ‘non-referential’ non-canonical NPs (in predicate and adverbial roles), cannot be so paraphrased. Instead, the N head peth ‘thing’ is left untranslated, and the non-canonical NP is best paraphrased denotationally by a simple adjective or projection thereof.
(in predicate role) or an adverbial phrase (in the adverbial role) (see also Fife 1993: 380). This latter function is one of the most common functions for a non-canonical NP, and appears to be a general way to form adverbs from adjectives of expressive force (Evans 1976: 37n).

Non-canonical N\(^A\)s with a non-referential N: Paraphrase relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expressive N(^A)</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bychan a beth</td>
<td>bychan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hir a beth</td>
<td>hir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drwc a beth</td>
<td>drwc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Distributions of referential and non-referential non-canonical N\(^A\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referential N</th>
<th>Non-referential N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicate</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adverbial</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The environments where we find only ‘referential’ Ns are those where only NPs may serve: Clefted subject and object of a finite verb (15-16, Table 2). We find non-referential and referential Ns as a predicate of the copula (17-18): Here both phrases headed by N and phrases headed by A may serve as the predicate. In fact, the two can be conjoined in this function, and it seems that if there are conjoined adjectives modifying the same N head the former in the series must make recourse to this non-referential strategy so that both can be distinctively positioned (20).

(20) Non-referential N Referential N

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[glew a beth] a} & \quad \text{[dewr a was] yw bown} \\
\text{valiant of thing and brave of boy is Bown} & \\
\text{‘Bown is (a) valiant (thing) and a brave boy.’} & \quad \text{W.YBH.466}
\end{align*}
\]

In the adverbial environment there are only non-referential Ns (Table 2), although the adverbial environment does not ban NPs in general.

If the referential non-canonical N\(^A\) stands in a paraphrase relationship to a ‘normal’ N\(^A\), then the non-referential variant stands in a paraphrase relationship to a simple adjective (or AP). The dummy head is provided as a way of allowing adjectives by themselves to participate in this construction, so that the pragmatically focussed adjective can be formally distinguished from the unmarked variety in terms of internal syntax. The adjective in both referential and non-referential constructions acquires its distinctive form by virtue of its position with respect to the noun head, whose referential status is irrelevant for these purposes, it serves as the stuff from which paradigmatic form is fashioned. In the
This unusual construction (the ‘non-canonical’ N\textsuperscript{A}) forms minimal pairs in paradigmatic opposition to ‘canonical’ constructions (respectively N\textsuperscript{A} and A) that can be described formally in terms of internal and external syntax independently of the grammatical categories that are encoded by it, as we have already seen. Such purely formal minimal pairs contract ‘coding’ relationships with independently specifiable grammatical categories of reference and modalized predication by virtue of participating in a substantively organized “paradigm of configurations” (Silverstein 1993: 326) or a “syntactic paradigm” (Matthews 1981: 267), organized substantively in the same way as morphological paradigms are, but with configurational exponents:

Some paradigmatic structures of grammatical categories are expressed or coded in paradigm of configurations, the constitution of which as paradigms...depends on having a formal-categorial structure independent of, or definable without reference to, the grammatical categories crossed in the paradigm. (Silverstein 1993: 326)

The canonical version of the N\textsuperscript{A} codes nothing ‘extra’ by virtue of its syntax, it is unmarked in this sense. As we will see below, such a form which is residual (unmarked) from a grammatical categorial perspective also serves as the ‘default’, ‘elsewhere case’, as a formal category (Zwicky 1994: 620-1). On the other hand, the non-canonical member of the N\textsuperscript{A} pair somehow “emphasizes” the adjective (Hemon 1975: 64; Fife 1993: 380). This non-canonical N\textsuperscript{A} construction alternates with and opposes the ‘unmarked’ canonical N\textsuperscript{A} as a ‘marked’ term of the opposition, by specifically and differentially signaling formally the foregrounded ‘expressive’ pragmatic status of the adjective in grammatical categorial terms. But what does ‘expressive’ mean?

### 4. Expressives: Form and content

The category of ‘expressive’ (and similar terms) in linguistic theory often seems like one of those informal notions that we apply often not so much to explain a linguistic phenomenon as to explain it away.\textsuperscript{12} Though there have been serious attempts to develop a discussion of ‘expressives’ as a purely grammatical category, impressionistically, there seems to be a widespread assumption amongst linguists that expressives are an inherently

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\textsuperscript{12} This observation is based on evidence drawn from my own biographical experiences ‘among the linguists’; were this an anthropological journal I would cite my notes from the field.
The descriptive meaning of a judgement will be taken to refer to the speaker’s attitudes at the time of speaking, even though the verb is not in the present tense. Thus ‘King John was bad’ becomes, descriptively, not ‘I disapproved of King John,’ but rather, ‘I now disapprove of King John, who once existed’ (Stevenson 1944: 93). Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 239-40) note that the “deictic anchoring” to indicate that expresses, involve, like other modalities of metapragmatic regimentation (e.g. indexical-denotational like deixtics), stipulative (metapragmatic) reference to a hic et nunc indexical origo (Bühler 1990 [1934]; Hanks 1992). It is this very indexical aspect that leads to their being epistemologically opposed (like evidentials) as ‘private’ (indexing private affect knowable to the speaker alone, an ‘inner’ deictic field (Caffi and Janney 1994: 364)) as opposed to ‘public’ language (whose felicity can be ascertained by manifest public conditions (Richards 1925: 131)). Most definitions of ‘expressive meaning’ therefore assume that the very essence of this modality of indexicality is egocentric, speaker-centered (e.g. Jakobson 1960: 354, Caffi and Janney 1994: 327). Partially this is so because the expressive function posited by Jakobson (and earlier by Bühler (1990 [1934])) conflates a function of language that foregrounds one component of the sign situation (speaker-
centered) with a set of qualitative phenomena taken to be epistemically limited to speakers (expression of subjective states of affect). However, since the indexical orgo involved in expressive meaning can shift to the addressee (Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996: 239), as with deictics (Hanks 1992), we should separate out the modality of indexical expression (expressiveness, subjective states of affect) from the indexical orgo they are predicated of (speaker, addressee, neither). Anticipating further results, I will use ‘emotive’ to denote speaker-centered expressivity (at the token level), reserving ‘expressive’ to denote the more general indexical potentiality of all these terms (at the type level). I will therefore use ‘evaluative’ and ‘expressive’ in roughly similar senses, bearing in mind that in my usage evaluatives are a subset of expressives, which include all indexical terms potentially susceptible to a pragmatic foregrounding of affective engagement, that is, both the (positive/pejorative) evaluatives that have been of the most interest to philosophers, but also intensives (augmentatives and diminutives, for example). Corresponding to these at the type level are constructions which code token-level affectively engaging intensity (Caffi and Janney 1994: 342; Fries 1995: 155), such as exclamative constructions (English Boy, is it cold!), where the intensity of the (sometimes purely denotational) quality of the predication is affectively engaging.

4.2. Pragmatic categories: Emotive and ethical calibrations

Within social scientific approaches to language there has been recently an increasing change of emphasis from the (speaker-centered) emotive and (addressee-centered) evocative modalities of expressive meaning (Ogden and Richards 1923; Ayer 1946; Stevenson 1944; Caffi and Janney 1994: 336), to more sociocentric ones (cf. Shweder 1984; Lutz 1988; Brenneis 1990; Irvine 1990). The transition from egocentric (‘solitary’, subjective) to sociocentric (‘shared’, intersubjective) token-level implementation of an intrinsically evaluative term like good seems to transform the modality of signalling pari passu from “emotive” (“emotionally active”) to “descriptive” (“emotionally inactive” or “ethical”) (Stevenson 1944: 83-4; see also Caffi and Janney 1994: 366). In order to clearly delineate which indexical anchoring I intend, I will follow Stevenson and use the term ‘emotive’ to mean a very specific sort of (token-level) pragmatic implementation (specifically egocentric here-now) of the intrinsic indexical potential of an inherently evaluative term. Residually, any deviation from this reflexivdetic et nunc pragmatic nexus renders usage relatively ‘sociocentric’, for which I will use the term ‘ethical’. Sociocentric expressive implementations of an evaluative term like good (glossable as ‘approved by members of our community’), spatio-temporally (or socially) distantiated implementations (‘approved in ancient Sparta’) or habitual implementations (‘usually approved by you and me’), are, for Stevenson, all equally ‘descriptive’ or ‘ethical’ (Stevenson 1944: 84, for a parallel classification of indexicals see Voloshinov 1983: 12-3; Manning 2001). However, the irreducible indexical potentiality of these expressive terms, whether used with an egocentric ‘emotive’ calibration or a sociocentric ‘ethical’ calibration, is retained in some form across these usages.

4.3. Metapragmatic categories: Thin and thick expressives
In spite of this ‘private’ aspect of terms with expressive potential (the indexical component of potential for expressive meaning at the type level, or the egocentric emotive calibration at the token level), these terms also have a relatively ‘public’ aspect to their meaning (the denotational component at the type level, or sociocentric ethical implementations at the token level) (Ortega y Gasset 1923; Mace 1934: 33-4; Stevenson 1944: 71ff; Black 1948: 116-7). The question is how to relate the indexical and the denotational components of these terms at both the type and token level.

A very simple theory of expressive meaning, the Emotivist ‘Bah-Hurrah’ theory attributed usually to Ayer (Ayer 1946: 108-9), paraphrases the expressive meaning of utterances by periphrasis; “‘This is a bad painting’ is the same as ‘this painting - bah!’” (Dickie 1971: 173). Among other things, this view collapses the distinction between emotive and ethical pragmatic implementations of evaluatives in the favor of the former. If we were to adapt this simple view to lexical semantics, we would assign the expressive and denotational aspects to entirely distinct ‘components’ of meaning, so that positive evaluatives might have appended to their denotational content (if there is any) an (indexical expressive) feature (call it ‘[+Hurrah!]’) and negative evaluatives the opposed feature (‘[+Bah!]’). We would then have a theory of hyponymy in lexical semantics in which, along with so-called “cognitive hyponyms” (e.g. Cruse 1986: 291, the relation of dirty to mucky (cf. Stevenson 1944: 82-3)), we would also have ‘expressive hyponyms,’ so that any positively evaluative adjective is a hyponym of good (being a term whose ‘meaning’ is, for the sake of argument, exhausted by its specification of [+Hurrah!]), and so on.

For a certain (rather small) segment of expressive vocabulary this may be more or less a useful approach. These are so-called ‘thin’ ethical concepts (Williams 1985), equivalent to Murdoch’s “primary and general moral words” (1970: 22), which do not characterize a referent far beyond the expressive meaning, such as good. These are terms “whose significance alludes especially and exclusively to the world of values: Good and bad, better and worse....” (Ortega y Gasset 1923: 320). This is roughly the same as Stevenson’s “independent” emotive meaning (1944: 72-3), which is “not a function of descriptive meaning, but either persists without the latter or survives changes in it.” The expressive potentiality of such terms follows from the fact that they specifically name or stipulate their evaluative content as such.

We must also recognize a level of potentially expressive vocabulary which is so because of the expressive nuances that follow from the denotation of the term. Here we place so-called ‘thick’ ethical concepts (Williams 1985), or “normative-descriptive words” or “specialized secondary value words (such as vulgar, spontaneous etc.)” (Murdoch 1970: 31). These are related to Stevenson’s ‘dependent’ emotive meaning (Stevenson 1944: 73), which ‘is a function of descriptive meaning’ and which, for example “acquires a laudatory emotive meaning partly because it refers, via its descriptive meaning, to something which people favor” (Stevenson 1944: 71). The earliest equivalent distinction is found in the work of (Ortega y Gasset 1923: 320-1). For him, words like noble, for example, “signify both realities and values.” That is, on the one hand they have a clear referent (like non-

---

14 Perhaps Stevenson means ‘acquires a potential for emotive meaning’, because here he would seem to embrace a sociocentric definition of ‘emotive’ meaning for ‘thick’ ethical concepts which he specifically rules out for ‘thin’ expressive concepts (which are ‘emotively active’ only when they are pragmatically implemented in a certain way, and are otherwise ‘emotively inactive’ and therefore ‘descriptive’).
evaluative adjectives such as *red* as well as a positive evaluative value (unlike *red*). But they do not have a positive value in general (as words like *good* do), but rather a determinate positive value, one very distinct from that found in words like *generous, useful, elegant,* this determinate positive value is dependent on the denotation, a kind of “halo of meaning that surrounds the primary, realist, meaning of the word” (ibid.).

4.4. The ‘fade out’ of expressive transparency: A typology of expressive categories.

This lexical division between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ expressives gives us some basis for understanding qualitative changes in the basis or warrant of expressive meaning in the expressive indexical vocabulary in a manner analogous to the qualitative changes of metapragmatic value in organizing other indexical systems, as for example, differences of metapragmatic transparency (Silverstein 1981a; Besnier 1993: 163) for indexicals involved in reference (Silverstein 1981b), which organize what is usually informally called the ‘animacy hierarchy’. Thus, if deictics, proper names, and even natural kind terms all have an indexical component of some kind, the quality of that indexicality surely differs, and this difference can be characterized in terms analogous to differences in “unavoidability and transparency of metapragmatic reference” (Silverstein 1981b). Thus, informally, deictics which refer to pragmatic roles created in-and-by the act of speaking (*I, You*) are more metapragmatically transparent than those deictics that are created by the discourse that ensues (*he, she, it*); so proper names (which unavoidably index a baptismal moment of speaking by which that name is conferred) are more metapragmatically transparent than generic nouns; so too NPs that denote humans imply the potential incumbency to an event of speaking, which NPs that denote non-humans do not, and so on. All such terms make metapragmatic reference to the event of speaking, varying in the transparency of that reference.

So too with expressive vocabulary, for inherently evaluative terms like *good* and *bad* (or better still, *Bah!* and *Hurrah!* (cf. Besnier 1993: 163)) have a stipulative and unavoidable potential for expressive use (although they may or may not be pragmatically implemented with a specifically egocentric origo), and tend to be isolated in folk metalinguistic (specifically metapragmatic) practice and linguistic ideology as the “primary locus of affect in language” (Besnier 1993: 163). They therefore show a high degree of “metapragmatic transparency”, which is “the degree of sameness between any metapragmatic utterances that could be used to talk about a pragmatic form, and the pragmatic form itself” (Silverstein 1981a: 11). Such transparency arises simply from the fact that ‘thin’ evaluatives metapragmatically stipulate or name their own expressive pragmatic value as such. As an illustration of a ‘folk metalinguistics’, Ayer’s ‘bah-hurrah’ theory of expressive meaning (above) relies precisely on the metapragmatic transparency of ‘thin’ terms (*bah!* and *hurrah!* metapragmatically to gloss the pragmatic value (positive and negative evaluation) of ‘thick’ evaluatives with lower transparency (reducing the latter to the former, just as he reduced ethical calibrations of such terms to emotive ones).

On the other hand, ‘thick’ evaluative terms like *vulgar* or *genteel* have an expressive valuation and potential arising indirectly (less transparently) from denotational content that may be rather more contingent on socio-historically and ideologically locatable factors (hence “determinate positive or negative values” as opposed to “general” ones). Even so,
the expressive valuation of such words is not completely independent from their denotational content (cf. Black 1948: 116).

Even further removed from the core of expressive transparency would be those words which have “emotional effects, whose sources cannot be discovered simply from a knowledge of the definitions of the words themselves. Such words have emotional auras, which are by no means evident from their definitions” but which are due to their “cultural history” (Henry 1936: 253-4).

A similar set of transitions exists for intensives. Intensive categories which refer relatively transparently to the scale of intensity itself (big, great, little, small) are ‘thin’ intensives. These can be used in many languages as intensifiers for ‘thick’ intensives and evaluatives (a little tired, great happiness). Essentially any scalar term will fall under this latter category, since any reference to a scale thereby implies a subjective judgement and the normative scale itself (the latter a relatively sociocentric form of indexical relation). Therefore, denotational terms which lack inherent evaluation but are scalar can be deployed in exclamative constructions which “express [emotive] judgements about situations that are beyond the norm on some scale” (Fillmore 1999: 122). It is denotational abnormality with respect to a normative scale that provides the affectively engaging indexical moment here.

Similarly, the token-level transition between egocentric, emotive, ‘solitary’ implementations of individual terms with an inherent expressive value to sociocentric, ethical, ‘shared’ implementations is homologous to the type-level transition of potentiality for such signaling between ‘thin’ (which reflexively and transparently stipulate their expressive potential) and ‘thick’ lexemes (whose expressive potential arises indirectly and contingently from their denotational content). The homology seems to be as follows: Emotive usages are reflexive calibrations at the token level (pragmatically, as egocentric token-reflexive calibrations), while ‘thin’ expressives are reflexive calibrations at the type level (metapragmatically, in that they ‘name’ their own expressive content). ‘Thin’ expressives are more ‘unavoidably and transparently’ susceptible to ‘emotive’ token-level calibrations.

### Expressive meaning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration</th>
<th>Type-level (potential)</th>
<th>Token-level (actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>‘emotive’</td>
<td>pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-reflexive</td>
<td>‘ethical’</td>
<td>‘thin’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coding locus</td>
<td>grammatical</td>
<td>lexical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expressiveness at the type level (‘thin’ versus ‘thick’ inherently expressive lexemes (versus non-expressive lexemes)) will correspond often to lexical selection in grammar, and specifically to inherently expressive ‘thin’ expressive lexemes. On the other hand, expressiveness at the token level (‘emotive’ versus ‘ethical’ uses of inherently expressive lexemes) will correspond to grammatical alternations, open to any lexeme as long as it is at least potentially expressive. Lastly, the locus of affect in language is not merely evaluation (positive versus pejorative) but also intensity, including oppositions like
‘ augmentative’ and ‘ diminutive’ (Fries 1995: 155), but also intensity of purely denotational scalar terms. The oppositions developed above apply equally to both of these qualitative dimensions of affective coding.

For a coding view, grammatical categorial distinctions are of typological interest (‘ etically’) only insofar as they demonstrate their utility by being differentially coded somewhere in some language (‘ emically’) (Silverstein 1993; Manning 1995, 1997). We will see that the MW construction signals emotive (exclamative) pragmatics at the token level, and hence is usable with both ‘ thin’ and ‘ thick’ inherently expressive lexemes, while a separate construction in MBC seems to code expressive potentiality at the type level, and hence is limited to a lexically selected group of relatively ‘ thin’ expressive lexemes.

5. Type-level and token-level expressives

5.1. Type-level expressives: Thin and thick evaluatives in MW

The MW non-canonical NP construction allows both ‘ thin’ and ‘ thick’ evaluative adjectives. Naturally, the most common adjectives in this construction in token frequency are the ‘ thin’ expressives, dividable into two separate dimensions (Fries 1995: 155): INTENSIVE (dividing into AUGMENTATIVE mawr ‘big, great’ and more marginally DIMINUTIVE bychan ‘ little’) (21), and EVALUATIVE (itself dividing into POSITIVE da ‘ good’, and PEJORATIVE drwc ‘bad’) (22). These ‘ thin’ expressive lexemes anchor two of the dimensions of the category ‘ expressive’ both in MW and arguably universally. With these come the various constructionally stipulated ‘ expressive hyponyms’ (labeling ‘ thick’ expressive concepts) of these ‘ thin’ expressives.

(21) INTENSIVE:

(21A) AUGMENTATIVE: mawr ‘big, great’, hir ‘long’, glut ‘diligent’, praf ‘ thick, stout, great’

(a) mawr a drueni
   ‘A great pity’ W.SG.258
(b) hir a beth
   ‘A long thing (i.e. a long time)’ W.YBH.1848
(c) glut a beth
   ‘A diligent thing (continually)’ W.PKM.7.16
(d) praf a beth
   ‘A great thing (i.e. a great deal)’ W.YBH.1106

(21B) DIMINUTIVE: bychan ‘ small’.

(a) bychan a beth
   ‘A little (thing)’ W.PKM.79.1

(22) EVALUATIVE


(a) da varchawc
   ‘A good knight’ W.SG.294
(b) tec a wr
   ‘A fair man’ W.SG.364
The adjectives listed, while all inherently evaluative in some way, vary extraordinarily in manner and degree, ranging from ‘thin’ evaluative adjectives (like *da good*, *drwc bad*) to ‘thick’ evaluatives like *gwybodus well-informed*, *ryued strange* or *anhebic unexpected*, which are rather less clearly intrinsically apt for expressive nuance. Adjectives devoid of any potential expressive nuance are not attested. If the data is representative, this implies that the construction differs from, for example, English exclamatives of the *Boy, was that cold!* variety in not allowing purely denotational adjectives.

### 5.2. Token-level expressives: Emotive pragmatics in MW

The ‘emotive’ pragmatics in which this kind of non-canonical NP in MW is involved tend to be richly overdetermined by co-occurring exclamations, some of which foreground intensity (for example, *rof i a duw between me and God*, *dioer faith*) (23a), others of which focus on the evaluative dimension of affective involvement (for example *och alas*, *gwae vi woe is me*) (23b).
Orderly affect 437

(23a) **myn vymppen i heb y marchawc ys da chwedyl a dywed dy**
‘By my head, said the knight, it is a good story that you tell.’ W.S.G.410

(23b) **och arglwyd heb y vorwyn ys mawr a bechawt awnaethost di amyui**
‘Alas lord, said the maiden, it is a great sin that you did with me.’ W.S.G.281

MW Non-canonical NPs are often found in construction with the particle *mor* ‘so’ when it is used exclamatively (Evans 1976). The particle *mor* may intensify both evaluatives (*mauridic* ‘magnificent (24b)) and intensives (*mawr* ‘great’ (24a)).

(24a) [**mor vawr**] [a **ryfed**]
so great of wonder
‘How great a wonder!’ W.T.79.18

(24b) [**mor mauridic**] [a **kinran**]
so magnificent of prince
‘How magnificent a prince!’ W.C.63.12

To conclude, the non-canonical construction operates on any adjective lexeme type that has inherent expressive potential and stipulatively foregrounds that potential as an emotive indexical calibration (foregrounding the speaker’s affective involvement in the evaluation denoted by the adjective). This stands opposed to the lexically selected construction in MB and MC which operates to code type-level expressive potentiality rather than token-level expressive actuality, and hence tends to be limited to inherently expressive ‘thin’ expressive lexemes.

5.3. Comparison with MB and MC

In sharp contrast to MW, MC and MB have two cognate N^A constructions, one of which is lexical, where certain ‘thin’ evaluative (usually pejorative) adjectives must precede the N (without the characteristic partitive structure involved in this construction), while the other, operating on the residue of evaluative adjectives (essentially positive and intensive evaluatives), is in free (semanticizable) alternation with the non-expressive ordering (described above).

In Cornish, expressively pejorative (and some augmentative) adjectives obligatorily precede the N, while other (positively) evaluative (and diminutive) adjectives generally follow the residual unmarked ‘elsewhere’ pattern following the head N. There is variation: Some adjectives, like *mur* ‘big, great’, *tebel* ‘evil, wicked’, *ber* ‘short’ can appear also in postpositive position (*flehus mur* ‘big children’ (P.168.3), *an dewow tebel* ‘evil gods’

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15 This makes it compatible with exclamative constructions (with *mor*) which foreground the affectively engaging intensity of the quality denoted by the adjective (Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996; Fillmore 1999: 122). Note that some exclamative constructions marking affectively engaging intensity can co-occur with adjectives that have purely denotational values (*Boy, was it red*!), which is not the case with this construction.
Certain other adjectives, such as *bras* ‘big, great’ (compare *mur* ‘great, big’) have only the post-positive order (*gobar bras* ‘great reward’ (R.672)). The allocation of adjectives to these patterns is ultimately lexical and classificatory. The following examples give a particularly striking example of evaluative antonyms showing opposite positionings (25).

(25)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>hager</th>
<th>awel</th>
<th>ha</th>
<th>awel</th>
<th>teg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ugly weather</td>
<td>and</td>
<td>weather</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ugly/bad weather and fair/good weather’</td>
<td>C.Pryce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(26)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pejorative adjective</th>
<th>[A N]</th>
<th>Non-pejorative antonym</th>
<th>[N A]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>drok venen</em></td>
<td>‘A bad woman’</td>
<td><em>flogh da</em></td>
<td>‘A good child’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>an debel bobl</em></td>
<td>‘Bad people’</td>
<td><em>branchys vas</em></td>
<td>‘Good branches’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentative</td>
<td><em>mur varth</em></td>
<td>‘Great shame’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diminutive</td>
<td><em>flogh byhan</em></td>
<td>‘A small child’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(27)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pejorative adjective</th>
<th>[A N]</th>
<th>Non-pejorative antonym</th>
<th>[A N]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>fals marregion</em></td>
<td>‘False knights’</td>
<td><em>gwyr ures</em></td>
<td>‘True judgement’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mar hir forth</em></td>
<td>‘So long a road’</td>
<td><em>a ver termyn</em></td>
<td>‘In a short time’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two pairs of adjectival antonyms (Evaluative *fals* ‘false’ vs. *guyr* ‘true’, Intensive *hir* ‘long’ vs. *ber* ‘short’ (27)) deviate lexically from the norm (26), both being preposed.

Similarly in MB, we find that certain inherently expressive adjectives may precede the noun in normal (non-partitive) constructions. Hemon (1975: 64) notes that such adjectives are “monosyllabic, and express appreciation or depreciation, greatness, or smallness.” Hemon cites *meur* ‘great’, *berr* ‘short’, *guir* ‘true’, *drouc* ‘bad’, *fals*, *fос*, *faux* ‘false’, *queah* ‘poor’, *goall* ‘bad’. In other words, as in MC, they seem to center on the ‘thin’ expressives of each pole of each expressive dimension posited above, especially pejorative concepts, which form the core of the class. Some positive adjectives are occasionally attested preposed: e.g. *goar Mari* ‘meek Mary’ (Jer.1444), *clouar Mab Mari* ‘sweet son of Mary’ (NG.1950). As in MC, some preposable adjectives are also attested in post-positive position: *Glau meur* ‘big rain’ (Pm.67), *an tut guir* ‘the true people’ (BK.104), *an den goar* ‘the meek man’ (Pm.46), *ma maestr clouar* ‘my sweet master’ (J.82). The adjective *coz*, *kozh* ‘old’ has the constructionally stipulated ‘thin’ pejorative sense of ‘bad, wretched’ in prepositive position, and retains its denotational sense of ‘old’ in post-positive position, thus indicating that minimal ‘expressive’/’denotational’ pairs existed for some adjectives, sometimes within the same construct (28):

(28)  
| ur | e’hoz- varc’h | coz |
Many of the same (cognate) adjectives occur in the same (cognate) construction in Cornish (29), while Welsh does not seem to use this construction for any adjective but *hen* ‘old’.

![Image of a table with examples of adjectives in Cornish and Welsh](image)

The allocation of adjectives to this construction in both languages appears to be primarily lexical and arbitrary, since there are very few adjectives which have contrasting N A constructions based on adjective position: The largely pejorative sense of the core of the class is therefore essentially a lexical, classificatory, feature. By contrast, the ‘non-canonical’ partitive construction in MB and MC is rather more ‘free’ to alternate with the normal order (see above), as in MW, with the stipulation that only adjectives that do not belong to the above lexical class may participate. In practice, this turns out to be specifically positive (thin and thick) evaluatives in both MC and MB (see above for examples (also Hemon 1975: 64-5)). In effect we have a neutralization of the ±Emotive paradigmatic alternation (token-level pragmatics) for a lexically defined subclass of ‘thin’ potentially expressive terms (type-level pragmatics) (30).

The key difference between MB and MC, on the one hand, and MW, on the other, is that the latter has generalized the possibility of systematically coding the ±Emotive opposition to all potentially expressive adjectives (thin and thick, positive and pejorative), while simultaneously eliminating for most adjectives the lexically defined preposed adjective N A construction (which is found only with *hen* ‘old’ in Welsh, often in a pejorative or diminutive sense). MW has simultaneously limited the external syntax of the construction to appearing in cleft position. The grammatical and lexical categories posited for the classification of expressive meaning therefore appear to have merit, in that they permit a fairly straightforward characterization of the differences of distributions of cognate formal categories in these languages.
6. Conclusions: On the paradigmatic axis of syntactic relations

I have shown that P-Celtic languages in general have a formal syntactic distinction between three realizations of $N^A$, using this symbol to subcategorize the syntactic class $N'$, coding ‘adjectival modification of $N$’. The first opposition (found only in MC and MB) is a (primarily) lexically mediated alternation selected by the adjective between preposed ([$N^A$, $A$, $N$]) and residual postposed ([$N$, $A$, $N$]) adjectives. While the former class has associated with it (in MC and MB) primarily pejorative lexemes, the construction only marginally forms minimal pairs with identical lexemes. The construction does not necessarily foreground any token-reflexive emotive involvement, but simply classifies a certain set of adjectives as having inherent expressive potential (‘thin’ evaluatives). In addition, the residual class of $N$’s enters into a further opposition with a non-canonical $N^A$ of ‘exocentric structure’ ([$N^A$, $A$, $\{PP\}$, $a$, $N$]). Adjectives are similarly opposed into a canonical (simple $A$) and non-canonical $N^A$ ([$N^A$, $A$, $\{PP\}$, $a$, $N$]) construction with a dummy head (peth ‘thing’), formally parasitic on the nominal construction. This opposition serves to code the specific presence versus residual absence of emotive pragmatics. These relations of lexical selection and expressive coding can be represented in a coding structure (a structure which displays complex conditioning of dependent (formal) variables by multivariate arrays of independent (substantive) variables (Manning 1995, 1997)) (42).

(42) Independent Variables                          Dependent variables

Type-level (‘thin’-‘thick’)           Token-level (±Emotive)

Lexical selection (MCB)              Expressive coding (ALL)   $N^A$ form

[+ Pejorative] $A$                  $\rightarrow$  [$N^A$, $A$, $N$]

Elsewhere                          $\rightarrow$  [+ Emotive] $A$ $\rightarrow$  [$N^A$, $A$, $\{PP\}$, $a$, $N$]

Elsewhere                          $\rightarrow$  [$N^A$, $A$, $\{PP\}$, $a$, $N$]

The structure shows a binary paradigm, coding the pragmatic, token-reflexive grammatical category [± Emotive] as applied to the adjective, ‘nestled’ within a lexical bifurcation between the primarily pejorative ‘thin’ evaluative adjectives which as a type select preposed order, and the remainder, which can undergo token-level differential expressive coding. This latter level of coding applies only to MB and MC, in MW the coding of ±Emotive is possible for all potentially evaluative adjectives (‘thin’ and ‘thick’, positive, intensive, and pejorative). This coding structure shows graphically that the least marked Ntype (in terms of content and form) is the post-posed adjective (since this structure applies both to -Emotive adjectives, and adjectives for which the opposition is irrelevant).

The ‘Coding View’ of this construction (1) denies that it is to be reduced to lexical selection and (2) seeks to relate specificities of its formal behavior (both syntagmatically and paradigmatically) to differentially encoded ‘meaning’. In this respect, we are then viewing this as a ‘construction’ in the sense of Construction Grammar (see also Zwicky 1994):
C is a CONSTRUCTION iff def C is a form-meaning pair \(<F_i, S_i>\) such that some aspect of \(F_i\) or some aspect of \(S_i\) is not strictly predictable from C’s component parts or from other previously established constructions’ (Goldberg 1995: 4)

Whereas CG is almost exclusively concerned with univariate ‘form-meaning pairs’, I am concerned here with multivariate ‘paradigms of configurations’. While CG does in fact have a great deal to say about relations between constructions, it is less concerned with systematic contrasts than with systematic partial similarities or partial inclusions (a notable exception being Zwicky (1994)). In addition, while CG accounts talk in terms of relations between form and ‘meaning’, these categories are seen to be in some sense basically autonomous, contracting ‘external relations’ within the context of the construction that pairs them. The coding view, by contrast, involves a theory of the mutual constitution of form and meaning, a theory of ‘internal relations’, so that the specification of each involves reference to the other. 16

This perspective forces us in a principled manner to consider the non-canonical structure alongside the canonical one, since without a specific difference in formal categories there cannot be a specific and differential coding of grammatical categories (this is precisely what the Saussurean notion of ‘value’ implies in a principled manner (Holdcroft 1991: 107ff)). CG is also explicitly indebted to aspects of the Saussurean notion of the sign, but is primarily interested in Saussurean “relative motivation” (Goldberg 1995: 69), which it captures primarily in terms of relations of “inheritance.” These paradigmatic relations of partial similarity between constructions in absentia are precisely the mirror image of paradigmatic relations of partial contrast foregrounded by the coding view. On this level, CG seems to view the coding process as having, at least on its paradigmatic dimension, the same systematicity as lexical coding: Each form-meaning pairing is an absolutely arbitrary “listeme” (in the sense of Di Sciullo and Williams 1987), except to the extent that it is relatively motivated by relations of inheritance (Goldberg 1995: 4-5; Fillmore 1999: 115). The coding process is seen as an episodic series of “pairings” of autonomous form and meaning (Zwicky 1994: 617), analogous to what Saussure criticized as a ‘nomenclaturist’ view of language (Holdcroft 1991: 48). At best, there is an imperative that differential form code differential content (Saussurean ‘value’) implied in the “Principle of No Synonymy” (Goldberg (1995: 67); Zwicky (1994: 617) similarly stipulates the equivalent of Saussurean ‘value’), but this does not specifically warrant the kinds of local paradigmatic relations between syntactic constructions considered here.

CG is not unique in this regard. In most modern syntactic theories, the paradigmatic relations of Saussurean grammar have languished in the “prison” (Di-Sciullo and Williams 1987) of the lexicon, while syntagmatic relations, to the extent that they are not ‘projected from’ (or analytically ‘reduced to’) lexical particularities, only code pure compositional semantic relations (Silverstein 1993: 328-9). Since the view of grammar espoused here is specifically interested in the semiotic issue of the mutual constitution of categories of form

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16 Virtually all earlier ‘holistic’ theories of grammar (Saussure’s, for example), as well as theories of discourse (Bakhtin’s, for example), involve some sort of theory of internal relations (concepts like ‘value’, ‘dialogism’, respectively). Such a theory of internal relations has its antecedents in Post-Enlightenment expressivist theories of language (Taylor 1985). When two items stand in some relation, but their identity or nature is autonomous of and prior to that relation, they are externally related; when, however, their identity or nature is in some way dependent on, or constituted by, that relation, they are internally related.
and meaning (‘coding’), it seeks to avoid the circularity often implicit in such views (which often reduce configurational coding relations to lexical ones by means of a lexical diacritic (Silverstein 1993; Goldberg 1995)), and to reintroduce the paradigmatic dimension into syntax.

CG, like the coding view espoused here, allows violations of ‘strictly categorial determination’ of phrasal categories by the category of their lexical head. Interpreted rather broadly, this implies that a given lexical head need not have a unique phrasal expansion (as implied in theory, if not always in practice, in classic versions of X-bar theory). If this were not so, then syntactic phrases can only have syntagmatic, compositional values and not paradigmatic, contrastive values. If it is, it follows that there can be meaningful contrasts between phrases (as shown here) just as there are between their lexical heads: What is not predictable is meaningful. Syntactic paradigms are predicted by the latter assumption. Unless, of course, one assigns the normal unmarked form of the phrase to the core grammar represented by the X-bar theory, for example, and the abnormal marked phrase type to a periphery based on ‘expressiveness’. The contrast becomes not a grammatical one, but a contrast between essentialized components of orderly grammar and a disorderly periphery.

CG has also historically been interested in marginal constructions with equally marginal pragmatics, including expressive constructions in syntax like the one here (see, for example, Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996). In doing so its practitioners laudably seek to redeem these marginal phenomena from the condescension of syntactic theories that presume to have somehow located a ‘core’ of explainable syntactic phenomena amidst the empirical phenomena of language (Culicover and Jackendoff 1999; Kay and Fillmore 1999; Kay 2002). But CG identifies the ‘basicness’ of constructions not by reference to paradigmatic relations of contrast, but syntagmatic interactions of inheritance (Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996). I have argued, however, that such marginal phenomena are to be analyzed against a backdrop of ‘unmarked’ phenomena with respect to which these marginal constructions contract their ‘marked’ marginality. These internal relations between constructions include not only positive ones like inheritance, but also negative ones of differentiation captured with the traditional notion of paradigmatic contrast or Saussurean value. If we do not invoke these paradigmatic relations between constructions that link form and content not merely pairwise, but also crosswise in relations of paradigmatic contrast, then we might as well entertain a theory of these marginal constructions in which their abnormality of form is simply a function of their expressive meaning. Under such a circumstance, syntactic and morphological features of these marginal expressive constructions would deviate randomly from the phenomena of ‘core’ grammar, because they do not belong to the core grammar. If we do not treat marked constructions (whatever they may code) in paradigmatic relation to their unmarked kin, equally citizens of the sovereign state of grammar, we risk banishing them once again to a marked hinterland of grammar, which can be studied without reference to the form of the unmarked constructions, as a separate matter, a separate competence.

The opposition between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in grammar (Culicover and Jackendoff 1999; Kay and Fillmore 1999; Kay 2002) is homologous to the opposition between ‘plain’ and ‘expressive’ morphology (or a fortiori, syntax) (Zwicky and Pullum 1987). There are equal and similar confusions in both, and both must be rejected by linguistic theory. Rather than assigning meaningful formal variation to distinct unrelated competences along such lines (always a possibility in a theory of external relations between
constructions as form-meaning pairs, such as CG), we should attempt to see this variation
within the compass of a single competence, which requires the notion of a syntactic
paradigm (a theory of internal relations between constructions).

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