JUSTIFICATION: A COHERENCE RELATION

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Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse formal and functional aspects of constructions based on a Justification (or Claim-Argument) coherence relation, explicitly marked by a connective. The prototype of this construction is an utterance like "Está gente em casa, por quen as luzes estão acertas" ["There is somebody at home, because the lights are on"]'). The empirical data are collected from an online corpus of contemporary written Portuguese (CETEMPúblico).

Following Sanders et al. (2001), I assume the distinction between semantic and pragmatic coherence relations in text representation: Semantic relations connect the situations of the sociophysical world described by the propositional content of the related textual segments; pragmatic relations involve the illocutionary domain, i.e., the relation concerns the speech act status of the segments. Justification relation is a pragmatic relation and I argue that it requires simultaneously a sequence of speech acts and an inference process. In fact, Justification relations occur typically in argumentative contexts, and argumentation, according to van Eemeren & Grotendorst (1984), is a compound illocution, consisting of at least two functionally distinct statements: A main assertion corresponding to the claim being made and a subordinate assertion, which counts as an attempt by the speaker to justify his claim, convincing the listener of its acceptability. The claim being made in prototypical Justification constructions (p, because q) is an assumption, not a fact; it corresponds to a conclusion drawn by the speaker, supported by the premise expressed in the second clause and warranted by a generic implicit premise.

The account presented in this paper contests Sweetser’s (1990) distinction between epistemic causal conjunctions and speech act causal conjunctions: The act of concluding may be speaker-internal, but since it is asserted and then justified, it is not possible to dissociate the epistemic and the illocutionary domains within the field of argumentative texts.

Keywords: Coherence relations; Justification; Cause; Content domain; Epistemic domain; Illocutionary domain.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to discuss a specific coherence relation, which I will call Justification (also referred to in the literature as Claim-argument or Evidence). Text linguistics and cognitive studies of discourse are the framework of my research. My starting point is that discourse is not a random set of sentences or utterances: There are coherence relations that connect discourse segments or spans and I assume, following Sanders & Spooren (1999: 239), that “these relations are conceptual by nature”. This means that coherence is not a formal property of texts: It has to be defined in terms of the mental representation people make of a discourse, by relating the different information units in it. Despite the variety of the terminology used - discourse relations,
coherence relations, rhetorical relations\(^1\) -, it is generally accepted that to establish coherence is a central aspect of discourse understanding; therefore, to process discourse meaning involves recovering the coherence relations that integrate the individual propositions expressed in the text into a larger whole.

Connectives (such as conjunctions, and a wide variety of lexical cue phrases) are linguistic devices used to signal coherence relations explicitly, thereby instructing hearers/readers how to relate discourse segments in the interpretation process. But coherence relations may also be inferred, when two consecutive utterances lack any kind of linguistic linking markers. This is a strong argument supporting their cognitive nature.

I will assume the dominant distinction existing in available categorisation proposals between content or semantic coherence relations, on the one hand, and presentational or pragmatic coherence relations, on the other hand\(^2\). This distinction is based on the domain of interpretation that is activated in each case. Semantic relations involve the content domain, i.e., they connect the states of affairs or situations of the sociophysical world described by the propositional content of the related segments; pragmatic relations involve the illocutionary domain, i.e., the relation concerns the speech act status of the segments.

Justification is a pragmatic coherence relation. In order to fully characterise this relation, I will stress the differences between Cause and Justification relations explicitly marked by a connective in short texts. I will argue that there is empirical evidence, in terms of syntactic and prosodic behaviour, that an account of the Justification relation requires a sequence of two speech acts, and I will point out that this relation occurs in different kinds of argumentative texts.

Some of the examples presented in this paper are mine, others (the ones in inverted commas) are collected from CETEM Público, a Portuguese on line written corpus comprised from journalistic texts.

2. Towards a characterisation of Justification as a pragmatic coherence relation

2.1. Meaning aspects

Let us start with an uncontroversial example (1):

\[
(1) \quad \text{Está gente casa, porque as luzes estão acesas.}
\]

“There is somebody at home, because the lights are on”.

The interpretation of this example does not allow for a causal paraphrase. It is obvious that the fact that the lights are on does not cause the fact that there is somebody at home. Therefore, I will say that in (1) we do not process a Cause relation between the events presented in the two propositions related by *porque* (“because”).

A suitable paraphrase for (1) would be “The fact (that I know) the lights are on leads me to the conclusion (or claim) that somebody is at home”.

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\(^1\) See, among others, Mann & Thompson (1988), Kehler (2004).

\(^2\) Cf., a.o., Sanders et al. (eds.) 2001.
Another acceptable possibility, in terms of paraphrase, could be “The fact (that I know) the lights are on enables me to say/to state that there is somebody at home.” It is relevant to notice the occurrence of a declarative verb in the paraphrase.

The paraphrase test is the analytic heuristics that makes maximally explicit the distinction between Cause and Justification coherence relations. When we compute a Cause relation between two textual spans, it means that we connect their propositional content. Therefore, the paraphrase highlights the relation in terms of Cause-Effect between two situations temporally ordered. Examples (2) and (2a) illustrate a Cause relation at work and its paraphrase:

(2) \[O \text{ Rui faltou às aulas porque está doente.}\]
“Rui missed classes because he’s ill”.

(2a) \[O \text{ facto de o Rui estar doente é a causa do facto de ele ter faltado às aulas.}\]
“The fact that Rui is ill is the cause of the fact that he missed classes”.

When we compute a Justification relation, what the paraphrase explicitly underlines is that the speaker presents one of the segments as an argument to support his (main) claim.

Going back to (1), the proposition introduced by the connective provides evidence for the first claim. Thus, uttering the second segment is relevant as a justification for the statement (conclusion/claim) conveyed in the first segment. Since the segments are related at an illocutionary level, the coherence relation has to be classified as a pragmatic one.

Example (1) can be regarded as a short argumentative text. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, within the speech act theory and plan recognition framework, define argumentation as an “illocutionary act complex” or a “compound illocution”, involving a sequence of elementary assertive speech acts designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion. The goals of each speech act are distinct, though interdependent: Some assertions function as arguments or premises, others as conclusions or claims. In (1), the speaker advances the second statement as an attempt to justify his first statement, and therefore convince the listener of its acceptability.

This perspective stresses the fact that argumentation is a verbal activity, requiring the use of language. Furthermore, this perspective involves a re-elaboration of classic speech act theory: Embedded in sequences, each speech act assumes a specific function, which depends on its local contribution to the overall communicative plan. To compute a Justification coherence relation is not possible without taking into account the illocutionary level of meaning. Shortly, I will present some formal tests to prove that two autonomous speech act are at work in (1).

But an accurate account of examples like (1) also implies an analysis of argumentation as rational activity, an activity founded on thought. In the case under analysis, an inferential process underlies the utterance. In fact, the conclusion drawn by the speaker is based on an explicit premise and warranted by a generic implicit premise. More concretely, the speaker’s commitment to the implicit assumption that ‘usually, when/if the lights are on, there is somebody at home’ allows him to consider the fact that the lights are on as a reason to infer, by default, that there is somebody at home. So, constructions like (1) express a defective inference (an enthymeme, in syllogistic logic), an inference in which one of the premises remains unexpressed or
implicit: The general background assumption endorsed by the speaker enables him to infer the conclusion he asserts, given the available evidence described in the explicit premise (i.e., reasoning from effect to probable cause). And I will add that it is a clear case of abductive reasoning, since the conclusion corresponds to a hypothetical fact which, according to a general law-like assumption, explains a given fact (or a fact taken for granted by the speaker).

Examples like (1) illustrate Sweetser’s 1990 epistemic causal conjunctions. Even though I agree that an inferential process is at work in prototypical Justification constructions like (1), thus involving the epistemic domain or the speaker’s world of reasoning, I contest the dissociation between the epistemic and the illocutionary domains within the field of argumentative discourse: The act of conclusion may be “speaker-internal” (Sweetser 1990: 84), but since the conclusion is asserted and then justified, we cannot exclude or ignore the speech act status of the related segments. Resuming what was said before, advancing a statement to justify an opinion or a claim is making sequential assertions with distinct functional status, and an analysis focused on the inference process is totally compatible with this proposal. In fact, the propositional content of the first assertion has an epistemic reading, since it does not describe some state of affairs in the world, but an inferred assumption, a conclusion drawn by the speaker. Thus the perfectly acceptable occurrence of a modal verb with a probability epistemic value in the paraphrase of (1):

(1 a) There must be someone at home, because the lights are on.

In my corpus, I found several examples of Justification constructions with linguistic markers of an epistemic value of probability: Examples (3) illustrates the occurrence of the Portuguese modal verb dever (must) and in (4) the verbal tense is the Future, a tense with a dominant modal value in contemporary European Portuguese:

(3) “Abel Xavier (...) deverá regressar à luz no final no final desta época, uma vez que o clube italiano ainda não fez valer o direito de opção para garantir o seu concurso para a próxima temporada.”

“(Abel Xavier (...) is expected to return to the stadium Luz at the end of this season as the Italian club has still not exercised its rights over him for the next season”.

(4) “O empréstimo será negociado por tranches, já que o valor em causa é para o biénio 1991-92.”

“The loan will be negotiated in sections, as the amount in question is for the two year period 1991-92”.

When a Cause relation is involved in text interpretation, this kind of paraphrase (a probability epistemic one) is totally excluded.

Another interesting and relevant difference between Cause and Justification relations is the fact that it is possible to find an Imperative sentence in the first member of a Justification construction, as is shown in examples (5) and (6):

(5) Acaba a tese, porque é a única maneira de te renovarem o contrato.
“Finish your thesis, because it’s the only way that they will renew your contract”.

(6) “Façam favor de tomar nota do que vou dizer (...) , porque de vez em quando as coisas não saem de acordo com a verdade dos factos”.
“Please take note of what I’m going to say (...), because sometimes things are not published according to the facts”.

In examples like (5) and (6), the two speech acts related by the connective belong to different classes: A directive illocutionary act is followed by an assertive one. One acceptable paraphrase would be ‘I ask/advise you to p’ and ‘I justify my request/advise saying that p’ (i.e., making explicit the reason of the request). The main speech act is the directive one, and the assertion is a subordinate act, through which the speaker intends to increase the listener’s readiness to accept the request.

It does not seem plausible, in this case, to find an underlying abductive inference process, as in (1). But there is, for sure, a (defective) practical reasoning, based on a general principle along the lines that one must act considering the favourable consequences of our actions.3

Let us stress that when we are dealing with a Cause relation, it is never possible to find a directive speech act in the first span of the construction. Moreover, the first segment of a Justification construction may function as a prediction, as in example (7), which never happens with a Causal construction:

(7) “(...) Conceição não vai abordar a corrida nas melhores condições (...), porque parou a sua preparação após a frustante participação olímpica.
“Conceição is not going to attempt the race in the best of condition, because she stopped training for it after her frustrating performance in the Olympics.”

Until now, I have discussed the core meaning issues that contribute to clarify the boundaries between Justification and Cause constructions.

Languages like French, English and German may mark formally the distinction between Cause and Justification coherence relations through the use of connectives. In French, parce que is used specifically for Cause relation, while puisque or car are used for Justification relation (cf. Ducrot 1980, 1984). In German, the alternative choice seems to occur between weil and denn. In English, because may be used in both cases, but, according to Sweetser 1990, since already has a strong tendency towards a Justification reading, rather than towards a Cause reading. In Portuguese, like in English, porque is polyfunctional, but in our grammatical tradition pois is the connective preferentially used to mark the Justification relation. Further research is needed to validate this assumption.

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3 Argumentation theories acknowledge that argumentative soundness is not restricted to quasi-logical arguments. Cf. Perelman & Tytėca 1958 and their typology of argumentative schemes.
2.2. Syntactic and prosodic aspects

The aim of this section is to provide empirical evidence of the pragmatic nature of the Justification relation. More concretely, I will defend that syntactic and prosodic behaviour reflect the existence of two autonomous speech acts in Justification constructions.

First, when a pragmatic coherence relation is at work, and a connective is marking it, as in (1), the utterance is not, syntactically speaking, a complex sentence. Let us prove it through the formal tests (proposed by Peres 1997). The first test involves embedding the whole construction as a that-complement clause, i.e., an internal argument of the matrix predicate (a verb of cognition or saying):

\[
(8) \quad \ast O\; \text{João acredita} \left[ \text{que está gente em casa, porque as luzes estão acesas} \right].
\]

\[*"\text{John believes} \left[ \text{that there is someone at home, because the lights are on"} \right]."

The asterisk in (8) means that the second clause, prefaced by porque, cannot not be interpreted as a complement of the verb “believe”: Rui’s belief is restricted to the first clause. Therefore, the proposed parenthetical representation is inaccurate— it does not match the semantic structure of the Justification construction \( p, \text{porque} \; q \).

The second test involves checking if a sentence adverb may have scope over the construction as a whole:

\[
(9) \quad \ast \text{Provavelmente, está gente em casa, porque as luzes estão acesas].}
\]

\[*"\text{Probably, [there is someone at home, because the lights are on”}]."

In (9), the asterik means that the adverb only has scope over the first clause; therefore, the proposed parenthetical representation is again inaccurate— it corresponds to an unacceptable structure.

Contrast with what happens with a Causal construction, in examples (10) and (11):

\[
(10) \quad O\; \text{João acredita} \left[ \text{que o Rui faltou às aulas porque está doente} \right].
\]

\["\text{John believes} \left[ \text{that Rui missed the classes because he is ill”} \right]."

\[
(11) \quad \text{Provavelmente, o Rui faltou às aulas porque está doente].}
\]

\["\text{Probably [Rui missed classes because he is ill”}]."

In (10), the construction may be embedded as a that-complement of the same matrix predicate. In (11), the adverb has scope over the whole construction.

The contrast shows that the Causal construction behaves as a sentential object, while the Justification construction does not. These tests allow the conclusion that two illocutionary acts are involved in Justification constructions, while Causal ones correspond to a single illocutionary act (the sentence being the linguistic support of each illocutionary act).

These two tests, in which syntactic and semantic properties interact, point towards the non sentential nature of (1). In other words, the tests point out that the
Justification construction does not fit the sentence category: It is surely a coherent text, but syntactically it does not behave as a (single) sentence. Consequently, we can conclude that (1) is not a complex sentence made up of two clauses: Its second member is not a typical adverbial adjunct clause.

On the contrary, the conjunction of two clauses related by a Cause relation explicitly marked by a connective is syntactically a sentence, a complex sentence with a subordinate adverbial clause, functioning as an adjunct modifier of the matrix clause. Therefore, the whole utterance may be embedded as a that-complement and may occur in the scope of a sentence adverb.

In my opinion, this different syntactic behaviour is a direct reflex of the different illocutionary status of the two constructions: Two illocutionary acts are involved in Justification constructions, while Causal ones correspond to a single illocutionary act.

Let us now check if the second segment of example (1) allows foregrounding or focus.

(12) ?? É porque as luzes estão acesas que está gente em casa.
    ?? “It’s because the lights are on that there is some one at home”.

(13) ?? Só está gente em casa porque as luzes estão acesas.
    ?? “There is someone at home only because the lights are on”.

Example (12) exhibits a cleft structure typically used to mark a contrastive focus and example (13) involves a focus particle (só, “only”). The oddity of both examples shows that the proposition introduced by the Justification connective (or by porque “because” in its justification sense) clearly rejects foregrounding or focus. Structural reasons may be mentioned to explain this resistance: Only the sentence syntactic constituents allow focus and, as we saw before, the proposition prefaced by porque (“because”), in (1), is not an VP adjunct. In other words, it is not a clause embedded in the matrix sentence.

Let us now examine what happens in terms of the scope of negation, contrasting a Justification and a Causal construction:

(14) Não está gente em casa, porque as luzes estão acesas.
    There is nobody at home, because the lights are on.

(15) O Rui não faltou às aulas porque está doente (mas porque é preguiçoso).
    Rui did not miss the classes because he is ill (but because he is lazy).

In (14), only the first clause is interpreted as being in the scope of the negation; in (15), the part of the sentence that is interpreted as being negated is the subordinate causal clause. We are dealing in (15) with a focus negation, a negation with one of the sentence constituents in its scope (not the whole sentence). The negated constituent is the focus constituent: It is implicitly contrasted with other elements and exhibits prosodic prominence, i.e., receives focal stress. Once again, the fact that the subordinate causal clause is a VP adjunct, thus a syntactic constituent of the matrix sentence, explains its behaviour concerning focus marking structures. The impossibility of focusing the second segment of a Justification construction through negation reinforces its syntactic peripheral status.
Semantic arguments may also explain why Justification constructions reject focus. In fact, elements with a presuppositional interpretation can never be the focus of the utterance. Quoting Zubizarreta 1998: 1 “The focus is the non presupposed part of the sentence. The presupposed part of the sentence is what the speaker and the hearer assume to be the case (i.e., the shared assumptions) at the point at which the sentence is uttered in a discourse”. Now, the proposition introduced by the connective porque (“because”) in (1) expresses given information, information that is taken for granted by the speaker: It describes a situation in the world, a fact known by the speaker. And this fact is the relevant evidence or data that supports the new information asserted as a conclusion in the precedent segment. Therefore, the presuppositional status of the second segment explains the impossibility of its being highlighted as a focus.

Let us examine further formal properties of the Justification construction. The second segment cannot function as a non redundant answer to a Wh-question (see (16)):

(16)  
_ Por que é que está gente em casa?  
 _ # Porque as luzes estão acesas.   
 _ ”Why is there somebody at home?  
 _ # Because the lights are on”.

Note, however, that the second segment of a Justification construction can easily occur as an answer to a Wh-question involving a declarative verb:

(17)  
_ Por que é que dizes que está gente em casa?  
_Porque as luzes estão acesas.  
_”Why do you say that there is somebody at home?  
_ Because the lights are on”.

A Justification segment cannot occur in alternative questions, as we can see in (18):

(18)  
* Está gente em casa, porque as luzes estão acesas ou porque o carro está na garagem?  
* “Is there somebody at home, because the lights are on or because the car is in the garage?”

It is obvious that if we submit Causal clauses to the same tests, the results are totally different:

(19)  
_ Por que é que o Rui está a faltar às aulas?  
_Porque está doente.  
_”Why is Rui missing the classes?  
_Because he is ill”.

(20)  
_O Rui está a faltar às aulas porque está doente ou porque é preguiçoso?  
 “Is Rui missing the classes because he is ill or because he is lazy?”

Another interesting syntactic aspect concerns the occurrence of tag-questions. In Portuguese, a Justification clause may occur after a tag-question, as we can see in example (21). But it is odd the insertion of a tag-question before a causal clause (22):
Looking at clause order, we may note that in Justification constructions, it is impossible to move the second clause to the initial position.

In contrast, in Cause constructions, as in other prototypical adverbial subordinate clauses, the flexibility of clause order is an well known fact (i.e. movement is perfectly acceptable):

The last syntactic aspect that clearly distinguishes the constructions under scrutiny concerns their replacement by an infinitive clause. In Portuguese, the justification clause can never be introduced by preposition *por* followed by an infinitive clause:

By contrast, cause clauses are often expressed in this way in Portuguese:

The tests presented up to now show neatly the different formal behaviour of Justification and Cause constructions.

In terms of prosodic behaviour, Justification constructions involve a comma intonation, a pause between the two segments. The comma, in the written examples, marks a phrase-final intonation drop at the end of the initial clause. Quoting Sweetser 1990: 83, “this clause-final intonation drop marks the presentation of a clause as an independent assertion (…)”. Therefore, the speaker asserts both the conclusion and the Justification.

In causal constructions, we find a comma-less intonation-pattern, which corresponds to a single assertion.

Summing up briefly: Prototypically, a justification construction is a discourse involving two sequential speech acts, the second one being an act of justification of the initial assertion, functionally equivalent to a conclusion. When a connective marks explicitly the coherence relation, the illocutionary autonomy of both segments is clearly reflected on the syntactic level:

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4 In this aspect, Justification constructions behave like coordinate ones, where movement is always excluded.
a-The final product is not a complex sentence;
b-Thus, the second clause is not a sentence constituent, a VP adjunct;
c-Consequently, it cannot be focused in any syntactic and/or prosodic way and does not allow any kind of movement;
d-Prosodic properties also signal the syntactic independence of the two segments, which, in turn, reflect their illocutionary autonomy.

3. Portuguese connectives marking a Justification Coherence relation

In the CETEM Público corpus, a corpus taken from one of the leading national newspapers, I collected a set of examples showing that the same coherence relation of Justification may be marked by different connectives in European contemporary Portuguese: porque, pois, visto que, dado que, já que, uma vez que:

(27) “Abel Xavier (…) deverá regressar à luz no final desta época, uma vez que o clube italiano ainda não fez valer o direito de opção para garantir o seu concurso para a próxima temporada”.
“Abel Xavier (…) is expected to return to the stadium Luz at the end of this season as the Italian club has still not exercised its rights over him for the next season”.

(28) “O empréstimo será negociado por tranches, já que o valor em causa é para o biénio 1991-92”.
“The loan will be negotiated in sections, as the amount in question is for the two year period 1991-92”.

(29) “A legalização das drogas duras é mais difícil, pois tem que ser feita à escala internacional”.
“The legalisation of hard drugs is more difficult, as it has to be done on an international scale”.

(30) “Prevê-se um jogo emotivo com bons momentos de râguebi, visto que ambas as equipas possuem jogadores experientes e criativos”.
“An emotional game is expected, with an exciting display of rugby, given that both teams have experienced and creative players”.

All these examples accept the paraphrase test used in (1) and exhibit the same behaviour when submitted to the formal tests used in this study. As Lobo 2003 points out, connectives like uma vez que (literally ‘once that’), dado que (“given that”), visto que (“seeing that”) e já que (literally ‘already that’) include a lexical element that intrinsically signals the presuppositional status of the following clause.

Empirical evidence collected from the corpus support our claim that Justification clauses never occur in the initial position.

All these connectives may also be used in Portuguese as a linguistic clue to a Cause coherence relation, and in some cases ambiguity might arise. But the paraphrase test
with a declarative verb (in the present and first person) is an important key to the Justification interpretation.

4. Conclusions

My approach to the Justification coherence relation can be broadly situated within a cognitive-functional framework of discourse structure.

The coherence relation is a pragmatic one: It corresponds to the specific function the second speech act assumes in the sequence. I am aware of the fact that the pragmatic coherence does not exist independently of the propositional content of the utterances (since each segment has a locutionary and an illocutionary meaning); and this awareness led me to analyse the “thought sequence”/inferential process that underlies (1). But what is relevant here is that the construction of a coherent mental representation of texts like (1) involves computing a relation that involves the illocutionary domain of interpretation.

I found two main subtypes of Justification constructions: (i) the ones which involve two assertions and abductive reasoning (these ones have become prototypical examples since Sweetser’s (1990) analysis of epistemic causal conjunctions) and (ii) those which involve in the first member a non assertive speech act (a directive one) and a different kind of reasoning (a defective practical reasoning).

The account presented in this paper contests Sweetser’s (1990) distinction between epistemic causal conjunctions and speech act causal conjunctions: The act of concluding may be speaker-internal, but since it is asserted and then justified/explained, it is not possible to dissociate the epistemic and the illocutionary domains within the field of argumentative texts.

Besides, stressing the specific function that the second speech act assumes in the sequence allows an unified account of different types of argumentative texts.

References


