Concerning the scope of normativity
Wherever a mistake can be made, there is a corresponding norm. Normativity is divided into correctness and rationality. These two dimensions are independent of each other, as shown by the fact that rational actions can be performed by speaking incorrectly, and irrational actions can be performed by speaking correctly. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the scope of both aspects of normativity. The main focus is on the pervasiveness of normativity in linguistics, exemplified here in particular through linguistic semantics and the use of explanations in the field of ‘causal’ linguistics (e.g. psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, diachronic linguistics). In addition, it is shown that normativity permeates such broader areas as scientific activity in general as well as our everyday lives.
Keywords: philosophy of linguistics, methodology, semantics, truth, belief, reasoning, rationality, causality, explanation, normativity, norms
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.Generalities
- 2.1Truth as norm
- 2.2On knowledge and belief
- 2.3The dual nature of beliefs
- 2.4Descriptive vs. prescriptive attitude vis-à-vis norms
- 3.Semantics
- 3.1Necessary truth as the basis of philosophical/linguistic semantics
- 3.2Necessary truth as an exemplification of normativity
- 3.3Normativity prevails over psychology/cognition
- 3.4Linguistic vs. cognitive semantics
- 4.Rational explanation
- 4.1Definition
- 4.2Justification in three different situations
- 4.2.1No laws
- 4.2.2Statistical laws
- 4.2.3Universal (= deterministic) laws
- 4.3Theoretical vs. practical reasoning
- 4.3.1Two inverse types of inference
- 4.3.2Sufficient vs. necessary conclusions of practical reasoning
- 4.4Conclusion
- 5.The implicit normativity of everyday life
- 6.Epilogue
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Notes
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References