

No-go zones in Sweden

The infectious communicability of evil

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The focus of this article is on the mundane nastiness of language. Drawing on Arendt's (1963) *banality of evil* and Briggs's (2005) notion of infectious communicability, the article highlights the moral dimensions of political and media discourses that spread a communicable image of Sweden as a country in disarray. I demonstrate that this image is made of two discursive ingredients: the spatial trope of the *no-go zone*, and the *truthiness* of its discursive elements, which, through a web of communicable intertextual links, create the illusion of an accurate and coherent account of society. Each of the discursive devices and links are like mycelia in a growing fungus of evil that encourages us not "think from the standpoint of somebody else" (Arendt, 1963: 49), that concomitantly normalise a problematic subjectivity of the threatening migrant, a barbarian at the gates that needs to be excluded from the Swedish future.

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1. Introduction

On 4 December 2019, Ulf Kristersson, the leader of Sweden's second largest political party¹ (the Moderate Party of Sweden, *Nya Moderaterna*), broke with a

1. A summary of the 2018 parliamentary election results are presented here: the Social Democratic Party (28,26%), the Moderate Party (19,84%), the Sweden Democrats (17,53%), the Centre Party (8,61%), the Left Party (8,00%), the Liberal Party (5,49%), the Green Party (4,41%), Feminist Initiative (0,46%), Other parties (1,07%). All parties ruled out the possibility of entering in an alliance with the Sweden Democrats or participating in a government that is supported by the Sweden Democrats. This resulted in a so-called "hung parliament". The deadlock was broken when, in a historical move in Swedish politics, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party made an agreement with the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party to support the Social Democrat Stefan Löfven as Prime Minister. As a result, a minority government of Social Democrats and Greens was formed with the support of the Centre and Liberal Parties.

longstanding consensus by attending an official meeting with his peer from the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD), a far-right party that has roots in Nazism, and enjoys increasing electoral support for its blatantly discriminatory agenda against immigrants. As Kristersson explained in an interview with the Swedish national television broadcaster, “It’s something I’ve been thinking of doing for a long time, but the trigger was when the government called for a discussion on gang crime without inviting the Sweden Democrats. I think it was like playing with an issue that should be taken bloody seriously” (SVT, 4 December, 2019). The meeting caused a flurry of heated reactions from those who had advocated ostracising the SD, a position defended by Kristersson himself on several occasions during the 2018 general election campaign, including when meeting with well-known *Shoah* survivor Hédi Fried. Not unexpectedly, Fried publicly expressed her disappointment with Kristersson. In an interview with one of Sweden’s largest national dailies, *Dagens Nyheter*,² she stated: “I don’t understand how he can’t see around the corner. That’s what happened in Germany. At first people thought ‘yes, change might be good’ and ‘he seems decent’. People are so naïve” (Carlsson Tenitskaja, 2019).

While it could be argued that finding similarities between contemporary Sweden and Nazi Germany is a sensationalist over-reaction, I would venture that such comparisons might be useful to thinking through how liberal regimes can resort to illiberal measures in defence of democracy: that is, by appeals to the interests of a majority. Kristersson’s decision is put in its proper context by considering the discourse that SD advances. A salient recent example is the reaction of an SD politician, Kent Ekeröth, to the deaths of Swedish citizens in the downing of flight PS472 by Iran. Ekeröth tweeted laughing emojis at the representation in a news report of two young victims, who had come to Sweden as unaccompanied refugee children, as “*smålänningar*” (i.e. from the Swedish region of Småland). It has become typical for SD politicians to pronounce themselves on who can legitimately be considered “Swedish”. In this case, who is deserving of the symbolic investment of being mourned as a fellow citizen is delimited. Ekeröth constructs a hierarchy determining which deaths are mournable, and which are not (see Butler, 2004 on mournability): the deaths of two refugee children may be met with laughter. In a powerful op-ed, editor-in-chief of *Dagens Nyheter*, Peter Wolodarski (2020) quoted another tweet, this time by the Swedish actor William Spetz, who had made a general comment on Swedish public debates:

2. *Dagens Nyheter* was founded in 1864. It is the largest quality paper in Sweden and defines itself as “independent liberal” (*oberoende liberal*).

The worst thing about the past year is the normalisation of disgusting racist views or other small nastinesses (*små vidrigheter*) that would have been classified as unacceptable as recently as 2014–2015. Today, it is daily bread, to which one does not even react anymore. (Spetz, 2019)

Drawing on Klemperer's famous quote that "words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in after all" (1947: 15), Wolodarski makes it clear that these "small nastinesses" are significant linguistic and discursive shifts that support an alarming conclusion:

Anyone who makes fun of 'tone', '1930s warnings' and 'political correctness' should consider what the alternative would be. The public sphere that now appears to be emerging – advanced by Donald Trump's aggressive tweeting – has already begun to shift us. These small nastinesses will fundamentally change Sweden if we do not resist. (Wolodarski, 2020)

It is precisely the mundane nastiness of language that is under investigation in this article. Unlike Wolodarski, I argue that small nasty words and the intertextual nets of which they are part have *already* fundamentally changed Sweden. I also argue that the mundane nastiness of language is *not* the prerogative of the far-right alone. Drawing upon some of Hannah Arendt's ideas, my point is that the laughter of the SD politician is not the manifestation of a demonic proclivity rooted deep in the soul of a Nazi-adjacent far-right, but the manifestation of a more widespread and subtle *banal evil* which Swedish media and mainstream political formations have been contributing to circulating and normalising in covert and mundane ways.

Other scholars have explained European political developments and far-right rhetorics in response to migration with the term "shameless normalization" (Wodak, 2019). Here, "shamelessness" seeks to capture the expansion of "the limits of the sayable [...] regarding both the frequency of lies and the violating of discourse conventions – as well as regarding repeated attacks on central democratic institutions" (Wodak, 2019: 195). Shame and lack thereof are emotional responses to moral judgments, and while I do not dispute that emotions are crucial in order to understand media and politics (see also Bucholtz, 2019; Milani, 2015), I also believe that *moral dimensions* should be taken seriously. In saying so, I am inspired by the work of E. Tendai Achiume, a leading legal scholar of migration who argues that nation-states' insistence on their sovereign right to exclude what she calls "economic migrants" is *unethical* on the basis of the colonial heritage of the geopolitical imbalances that underlie current migration patterns. For Achiume, "economic migrant" is a "moniker for a category of international migrant that national populations across the world view generally with suspicion,

occasionally with pity, and increasingly with hostility” (2019: 1512). While as a law theorist Achiume aims to advance a new theory of state sovereignty, as a discourse analyst, I am more interested in asking: How is it possible that the sovereign right to exclude some people is justified and presented as a good and necessary measure by a variety of parties *across* the political spectrum in a state like Sweden, which boasts an otherwise respected track history of welcoming migrants?

As I argue in this article, some answers can be found in the nooks and crannies of global media and political discourse, where the “inability...to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (Arendt, 1963: 49) is circulated, and disregarding the Other as human – as one like us – is becoming normalised. This is, according to Arendt, tantamount to *evil*. I will explain some of her ideas in more detail in the next section. Suffice it to say for now that, for Arendt, evil is not to be found in a monstrous trait, but is something that is quite shallow and mundane, and can be equated to a lack of critical thinking. As such, evil lurks in the normality of everyday life like a fungus (in Arendt’s metaphor) spreading its spores all over the surface. Arendt’s metaphor evokes the banal discursive manifestations of evil and how it becomes “communicable” (Briggs, 2005, 2011) through rather mundane media practices of entextualisation, decontextualisation and recontextualisation. Crucially, the communicability of evil is not typical of totalitarian regimes but is a discursive process that can also be found in what we call liberal democracies (see also Oddo, 2018 on propaganda in the USA). In saying so, I concur with Ushpiz’s standpoint on the contemporary relevance of the concept of the banality of evil for understanding allegedly democratic processes and decisions:

The call not to make comparisons is an attempt to pull the ground out from the definition of evil itself and to enshrine for ourselves demilitarized areas where evil can be perpetrated without it being considered evil. Without the need for constant vigilance to locate the principles of evil also in our “system” – to whose stench our nose is no longer sensitive – we lose our freedom of choice and thought. (Ushpiz, 2016: 6)

While we should certainly be cautious about making too facile connections between Trump’s “aggressive tweeting” and rhetorical shifts in Sweden as Wolodarski (2020) does in his op-ed, I will preface this analysis with a cue from Trump: in particular, his mystifying statement at a rally in Florida in 2017: “You look at what happened last night in Sweden”. In gesturing towards some kind of attack or disaster “last night in Sweden” Trump drew on widespread media and political preoccupations with the supposed relationship between immigration, extremism, and gang criminality that has turned Sweden into a country in disarray. Drawing on Arendt and on Briggs’ notion of “infectious communicability”, I illustrate how Trump’s statement is but a spore of a more pervasive “infectious

communicability” of the image of Sweden as a country that has lost control. This communicable image is made of two discursive ingredients: the spatial trope of the *no-go zone*, an urban area the police allegedly are fearful of entering, and the *truthiness* (see Lakoff, 2017) of its discursive elements, which, through a web of communicable intertextual links, create the illusion of an accurate and coherent account of society. Each of the discursive devices and links are like mycelia in a growing fungus of evil that might not have much depth but is communicable as ‘democratic’.

2. Arendt, the banality of evil, and its infectious communicability

Among Arendt’s most important works is *Eichmann in Jerusalem – A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963), which is a collection of articles she wrote for the *New Yorker* magazine in 1961–1962 to report on the trial of Nazi official Adolf Eichmann in Israel. Her reflections generated a heated and polarised debate. Her work was especially challenging to received senses of the correct attribution of culpability to perpetrators and victims under a totalitarian regime, as well as to the broader problem of the possibility of judgment and justice after the *Shoah*.

In her report on Eichmann’s trial, she provocatively concluded that there was nothing monstrous or exceptional in the master logistician of the *Shoah*:

The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, *terribly and terrifyingly normal*. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied [...] that this new type of criminal [...] commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong

(Arendt, 1963: 276, emphasis added)

This is a point she later expanded and clarified in a letter to a detractor – Gershom Scholem – who found her normalisation of Eichmann unacceptable:

It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never ‘radical’, that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it *spreads like a fungus on the surface*. It is ‘thought-defying’, as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. *That is its ‘banality’*. (Arendt, 2007: 471; emphasis added)

When Arendt argues that evil is never radical, she is opposing a particular history of thought in the philosophical tradition that views evil as deeply rooted in human nature. Critics of Arendt such as Scholem read this as potentially excusing Eichmann, or at least downplaying his responsibility for his actions. Others have countered that Arendt is making a much subtler point: it is not that Eichmann is not absolutely involved in evil, but that the pursuit of this evil is not the result of some innate monstrous impulse: it has “become institutionalized, depersonalized and mundane” as Swift (2008: 133) points out in a critical exegesis of Arendt’s thought.

Arendt’s (1963) description of Eichmann is that of a mediocre *petit bourgeois* whose primary concern was to make a career. His lack of intellectual depth was evidenced in the shallowness of his language, which, as Arendt says, was ridden with clichés. The accuracy of such a depiction has given rise to extensive academic debates, especially in light of subsequent historical analyses of Eichmann’s life in Argentina (see also Bernstein, 2018). In his historiography of the *Shoah*, Browning argues that “Arendt was fooled by Eichmann’s *strategy of self-representation* in part because there were so many perpetrators of the kind he was pretending to be” (2003: 3–4; emphasis added). So, as Browning goes on to clarify, while the banality of evil might not directly apply to Eichmann it does not mean that it should be dismissed altogether because it offers “a very important insight for understanding many of the perpetrators of the Holocaust” (Browning, 2003: 4), and Eichmann strategically positioned himself via discursive means as “one of them” during his trial in Jerusalem.

Whether directly applicable to Eichmann or not, the notion of the banality of evil forces us to fundamentally rethink how we theorise the relationship between politics and morality. If we agree with Arendt that evil is *not* rooted deeply in human nature, but instead grows on the surface, fungus-like in its institutionalised mundanity, then we also recognise that its danger lies in scattering its spores within the structure of institutions, even democratic ones, ‘moulding’ them from within. As Arendt reminds us, “the sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their mind to be either good or bad” (1971: 438). That is, viewed like a fungus, evil is something people do without consciously realising that they are actively involved in its reproduction.

By reading the intertextual trajectory of ‘no-go’ zones between North American and Scandinavia through the lens of Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil, I do not mean to minimise – euphemise even – the magnitude of the *Shoah* and concomitantly trivialise the responsibility of all those actively involved and/or complicit in the systematic extermination of millions of Jews, Roma, homosexuals and disabled people. Nor am I proposing simple parallels between the sociological profiles of Eichmann, Trump and Swedish politicians. Rather, I believe that

Arendt's theoretical reflections on the banality of evil are germane to describing the moral dimensions of democratic processes. For, as Ushpiz notes, "the banality of evil [...] encapsulates the totality of evil's strategies to penetrate into the world and present itself as *acceptable*, *logical*, as *the voice of the majority*, as a mission" (Ushpiz, 2016: 6, emphasis added). It is in the everyday banality of media practices that evil takes discursive shape and circulates. Analytically, then, we need to discursively trace the ways in which the "inability" to think critically, that is, "the inability...to think from the standpoint of someone else" is normalised through media discourse and is legitimised as being in the interests of a majority.

It goes without saying that Arendt was a political theorist, not a sociolinguist. Her work therefore does not offer a readily applicable toolkit for detailed textual analysis. Moreover, she believed in the possibility of drawing clear-cut distinctions between factual truth, and intentional lying and opinions, which runs counter to post-structuralist sociolinguistic work showing how all knowledge, including sociolinguistic knowledge, is ultimately political and produced in a particular space/time nexus (see e.g. Heller and McElhinny, 2017). That being said, I do not believe there to be a fundamental incompatibility between Arendt's ideas and contemporary sociolinguistics. "Infectious communicability" is a useful overarching conceptual bridge between theories of discourse and Arendt's metaphor of evil as a fungus (Briggs, 2005, 2011; see also Borba, 2019; Silva, 2019 for empirical examples of "communicability"). As Briggs notes,

The term puns on various senses of the word. Communicability suggests volubility, the ability to be readily communicated and understood transparently, and microbes' capacity to spread from body to body. I add a new sense to the word in which communicability is infectious – the ability of messages and the ideologies in which they are embedded to find audiences and locate them socially and politically. (2005: 274)

In practice, communicability entails processes of entextualisations into recognisable discursive forms such as political speeches, narratives, fables, etc. and the decontextualisation and recontextualisation of specific elements. More specifically, infectious textual processes "produce subjectivities, organize them hierarchically, and seek to position people in the social spatializations they produce" (2005: 274). That is, central to communicability are: the production of identities, their differential valorisation, and the creation of identity/space nexus points. It is through such rather banal discursive processes, Arendt would say, that individuals do not necessarily and actively decide to be good or bad but simply act 'normally' as interpellated across a variety of discursive genres. It is also through such banal discursive processes that certain Other human positions are *consistently* portrayed as threatening. And because of the threat they pose, these subjectivities

are discursively presented as politically, socially and economically superfluous, and thereby their exclusion from the body politic is justified as morally good. As I will show in more detail below, *no-go zones* is a key spatialising device for the production of a threatening subjectivity that must be expelled from or kept out of the nation-state. Specifically with regard to persuasion, Arendt points out that it is not so much the distinction between ‘real’ facts and ‘invented’ facts that is ultimately the crux of the matter in the creation of what Briggs (2005) would call a communicable model; it is “*only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably a part*” (1976: 351; emphasis added). This notwithstanding, Arendt insists on making distinctions between factual truth and intentional lying, which then leads her to talking about a “lying world of consistency” (Arendt, 1976: 50–51) that underpins the origins of totalitarianism. With a post-structuralist cautiousness about the production of truth, I’d argue instead that it is a coherent world of *truthiness* that characterises the banality of evil in apparently liberal democracies; it is the apparently common-sense connections between elements that *sound* true that play an important rhetorical function in their infectious communicability.

At this juncture, it is important to re-cast Briggs’s cautioning about the role of the discourse analyst in all this:

The point is not that we should assume the position of the scholarly magician who can render visible what is heretofore invisible but rather to develop vantage points that can enable us to see how forms of visibility and invisibility are produced and challenged. (Briggs, 2011: 225)

This article offers an analytical vantage point on how the communicability of no go zones is but one discursive manifestation of the fungal structure of evil in ‘liberal democracies’: not only its fragmentation, dispersion (across social configurations) and interconnectedness, but also the *mundane* nature of its contagious spreading, which, like in the case of many fungi, microbes and bacteria, makes it no less dangerous.

3. “You look at what’s happening...”

The first example I want to focus on is a speech delivered by Donald Trump at a rally in Florida on 18 February 2017. Trump criticised European policy on refugees, offering a list of places that had been hit by terrorists:

You look at what’s happening in Germany You look at what’s happening last night in Sweden. Sweden! Who would believe this? Sweden! They took in large numbers like they’re having problems they’d never thought possible. You look

at what's happening in Brussels. You look at what's happening all over the world. Take a look at Nice, take a look at Paris...we've allowed thousands and thousands of people into our country, and there was no way to vet those people. There was no documentation, there was no nothing. So we are going to keep our country safe. (CNN, 2017)

This is a textbook example of one of Trump's favourite rhetorical strategies: *repetition* (see also Hall et al. (2016) and Hodges (2019) for incisive analyses of Trump's semiosis; see also Wodak (2015) and the contributors to Wodak & Krzyzanowski (2017) and Kranert & Horan (2018) for discourse analyses of right-wing discourses). Two elements are repeated: (1) "Sweden", which creates a mounting sense of incredulity about a country generally perceived as safe; and (2) "you look at", which is a discursive appeal to the 'common viewer' who watches the news. As Johnstone has pointed out, repetition is a powerful rhetorical device because it creates "rhetorical presence" through "the linguistic foregrounding of an idea which can serve to make it persuasive even without logical support" and "make[s] things believable by forcing them into the affective field of the hearer and keeping them there" (1987:208). The gist of Trump's speech is that Europe's accepting of refugees leads to a decrease in safety, and that therefore this is something that should not be allowed to happen in the United States ("we are going to keep our country safe"). While at first glance it might sound as if *migrants* are presented as a gigantic undifferentiated mass ("thousands and thousands") that threatens the "imagined community" (Anderson, 1983) of the American nation ("our country"), it is made clear that the threat lies with those for whom "there was no documentation, there was no nothing", that is, refugees. Moreover, their textual juxtaposition with terrorist attacks in a number of cities suggests a causal relation between refugees and terrorism. We can see here how Trump does not even need to mention the words "refugees" or "terrorism". Nonetheless, a communicable and recognisable identity is brought into being elliptically, that of the menacing Other, who is not one of us but fundamentally threatens us. This, in turn, justifies the moral need for a democratically elected president to intervene and protect the nation. While the references to Paris, Nice and Germany point to actual events (the terrorist attacks of November 2015, July 2016, and December 2016, respectively), "what happened in Sweden last night" is not immediately answerable. Had anything happened in Sweden the night before?

As it turns out, no. In response to Trump, Swedish government spokesperson Catarina Axelsson told the local news agency TT that Sweden would demand an explanation from the Trump administration. Less diplomatically, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, tweeted:



Figure 1. Sweden? Terror attack? What has he been smoking? Questions abound (Carl Bildt 18 February 2017)

In addressing the masses in Florida, Trump never explicitly used the expression “terror attacks”, but the textual association of Sweden with Nice, Paris, and Germany, where actual terror attacks had taken place, warranted Bildt’s interpretation of Trump’s words. One could simply dismiss Trump’s statement as risible, the outcome of smoking marijuana, as Bildt’s question insinuates. Doing so, however, would distract us from how Trump rhetorically builds a sense of natural and coherent *truthiness*. As Arendt points out in the *Origins of Totalitarianism*,

What distinguishes the totalitarian leaders and dictators is rather the simple-minded single-minded purposefulness with which they choose those elements from existing ideologies which are best fitted to become the fundaments of another, entirely fictitious world. (Arendt, 1976: 362; emphasis added)

Truthiness involves the careful selection of rather mundane elements for their discursive force in a new fiction. So why did Trump choose to represent Sweden as playing such an important part in his fictitious world? Sarah Huckabee Sanders, a White House spokesperson, later explained that Trump did not mean to suggest that a particular attack had happened the night before but was instead referring to crime in Sweden in general (see Chan, 2017). This was followed by Trump’s own clarification on Twitter:



Figure 2. My statement as to what's happening in Sweden was in reference to a story that was broadcast on @FoxNews concerning immigrants & Sweden.

(Donald Trump 17 February 2017)

4. The manufacturing of truthiness

In 2017, Fox News ran a series of interviews with the film-maker Ami Horowitz on video he had done on Sweden. One of these interviews was conducted by the British-American economic journalist Stuart Varney (see Appendix 1 for a full transcript). The exchange between Varney and Horowitz builds on a recognisable narrative template deployed in news reporting. More specifically, it is an example of Labov and Waletzky's (1997) model of the structure of storytelling, co-constructed between the interviewer and interviewee.

To begin with, there is an *Abstract* in which Varney gives a summary of the story. This is followed by an *Orientation*, which works "to orient the listener to person, place, time, and behavioral situation" (Labov & Waletzky, 1997), which are in this case crime and supposed "no-go zones" in Sweden. Observe in particular how "person, time, and behavioral situation" are presented as *genuine* through two discursive strategies: (1) through *prima facie* experience – Ami Horowitz went there, saw with his own eyes, experienced them personally, and (2) through reference to what an authoritative institution says: "the police said...". Like in all good stories, there is also a *Complication*, that is, the presentation of a problem culminating in a crisis: the events initiated in the orientation somehow go wrong: Ami Horowitz was actually there and was attacked. But there is *Resolution*: Ami Horowitz gets away and can tell the story on TV. The story concludes with a *Coda*, which returns audiences to the studio, drawing them back out of the world of the story into the world of the storytelling event.

Evaluation, that is, the appraisal of the narrated event, happens throughout the interview (see also De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012 for a critical reading of Labov and Waletzky's (1997) model): (1) the newsworthiness of the story is built on incredulity ("no-go zones in Sweden?"; "I didn't know..."; "I heard about them; the truth is that I actually didn't believe they are real"; "you are kidding?"; "We have not heard of it"; "Why are we not getting the full story?"); (2) a negative evaluation is offered of the events in Sweden: an impending doomsday is hinted at, and the spread of crime from "no-go zones" to the cities is described as happening inevitably and like a virus; (3) there are strategies to intensify the sense of danger such as the visual representation of a burning car; (4) there are also blaming strategies: the Swedish state is trying to "cover up" the situation, and they are also "desperately covering up the ethnicity" of the people involved; (5) there are patronising strategies: "Swedes are nice people", where nice is actually not a positive quality, but is a euphemism for naivety; (6) there is evaluation through *historical references*: "The Swedes are not Vikings – the Vikings are gone", which implies then that things would be better if the Swedes behaved more like Vikings; and finally (7) there is the moral crowning of the narrator/hero: Ami is a "brave man and good man". A compelling communicable narrative has thus been constructed, one in which migrants and refugees are geographically and socially located in particular areas – no go zones – and such spatialization contributes to positioning them as an existential threat to Sweden and dangerous to journalists like Horowitz who try to expose it. Needless to say, such a communicable image of no-go zones as threatening enclaves of migrants outside of mainstream society is partisan. Its truthiness is however not plucked from the air, as certain elements originate in more trustworthy discourses.

First of all, crime has increased in Sweden over the last twenty years, but not to the degree that Varney and Horowitz want their audience to believe (for statistics see Brå, 2019). As the police authority is at pains to explain on their official statistics website (Brå, 2019), one should be careful about interpreting Swedish statistical data because, unlike in other countries, all reported events are recorded as crimes in Sweden even if some of them are found not to have constituted criminal offences after they are investigated. Moreover, while several offences of the same kind against a single victim will be counted in some countries as a single crime, they are counted separately in Swedish statistics. As the police authority also clarifies on their website (Brå, 2019), increases in crimes such as rape are due to two factors: (1) an increase in the proportion of events that are actually reported, which may actually indicate an improvement in social mores around sexual violence; and (2) shifting definitions in Swedish legislation of what is considered rape, to broaden the category in the interests of greater protection for victims.

The second ‘truth’ in the fiction is about race and ethnicity: while Swedish institutions are not trying to “cover up ethnicity”, it is true that Sweden does not collect information about race or ethno/linguistic minority status in relation to crime. This praxis was instituted in order to avoid the drawing of facile causal relations between behaviour and race/ethnicity. While the decision aimed to protect racial, ethnic and linguistic minorities from potential attacks aimed at them, the new narrative erases these intentions.

The third ‘truth’ element is a clip played in the background of the interview (Figure 3), which shows footage of a burning car supposed to visually represent unrest in Sweden. Here we have another *truthy* element: cars have been set on fire in Sweden – it just happens this one was not. It is a stock image that is ‘real’ enough and but it has been placed in a new context. I will return to the burning car in the context of another video that will be presented below (see also Ledin & Machin, 2018; Aiello, 2020 for critical discussions about stock photography).



Figure 3. A burning car. In Sweden?

This kind of highly selective recontextualisations is also at the heart of my fourth point, which is how certain representational choices are made to construct a coherent narrative about Sweden. To understand how this works, let us consider a very short extract from the documentary that Ami Horowitz made about migrants in Sweden.

Horowitz: The Government gives enough to the immigrants?

Migrant 1: Yeah, everything is enough. There's good work here.

Horowitz: Yeah, life is good better

Migrant 1: Yes, life is good better here

Migrant 2: They give me a lot, they give me a house, room, clothes, my school

Horowitz: All these things the Government pays for

The brief sequence of interactions between Horowitz and his interviewees creates the image of migrants as exploiting the Swedish welfare system. As (critical) discourse analysts have highlighted (see e.g. Fairclough, 1995), the ideological manufacturing of texts starts from the selection of who is interviewed and whose face and voice are thereby made visible and hearable/readable for audiences. In this specific case it is interesting that two Black and African migrants have been chosen as the face and voice that shall prove the dangers of Swedish welfare state. Editorial choices of sequence of interviews vis-à-vis a voice-over narration are also ideological. A sequence of interviews creates the illusion that the viewer has *direct access to visual truth* (see also Ehrlich, 2019). In this way, the ideological manufacturing of the video is obscured. Put simply, it is as if audiences were told: look, meet these migrants! Hear what they say, and you can make up your own mind, I am not influencing you, you can hear and see for yourself, can't you?

There is one element, however, that disturbs Horowitz's attempt at building a coherent communicable image of the refugees, where the attempted narrative slips. In response to the question whether the Government gives enough to migrants, the first interviewee replies that life is better in Sweden *because of work*. It emerges here how migrants are not leeching on the welfare system (as Horowitz seeks to present) but are in fact contributing to the Swedish economy. This moment is but a fleeting incoherence. Viewers are quickly rushed to the other interviewee who lists goods and benefits which the Swedish state seems to be dispensing freely, in return for what is implied is to be a mixture of aggression and indolence.

The issue of the editing of the video was raised by the policemen who had been interviewed by Horowitz. In *Dagens Nyheter*, they distanced themselves from the way in which their answers had been used in the documentary:

We don't stand behind it. It shocked us. He has edited the answers. We were answering completely different questions in the interview. This is bad journalism.
(Lindkvist, 2017)

Taking an even stronger stance, cameraman Emil Marczak, who had filmed the interview between Horowitz and the policemen, confirmed the policemen's view and confessed: "I would never have participated if I had known how unethically and frivolously the material would be edited" (Lindkvist, 2017). Invited by Radio Sweden to comment on these accusations, Horowitz replied: "As we say in America, CYA (cover your ass), they have to cover their butts" (Radio Sweden, 2017).

At this juncture, it is legitimate to ask ourselves: Did Horowitz invent the “no-go zones” in Sweden? If one traces the textual history of the word in relation to Sweden, it is possible that the discourse originated with a report published by the Swedish police at the end of 2014 about what they called *utsatta områden* (“vulnerable areas”). Linguistically, it is important to observe that in Swedish *utsatta* is a participle adjective that means “exposed”. In this context, it highlights how certain neighbourhoods have been “exposed” to increased violence, criminality etc. The participle form *utsatta* emphasises that these neighbourhoods are the *targets*, rather than the *agents*, of an action, process or phenomenon. The report was followed by an influential op-ed article in the conservative national daily *Svenska Dagbladet* entitled ‘55 “no go”-zoner i Sverige’ (lit. ‘55 “no-go” zones in Sweden’; Gudmunsson, 2014). While the expression “no-go” is indeed employed in the headline and the body of text of the article, it should also be noted that it is put in scare quotes to indicate the author’s distance from it, not only because it is an English expression in an otherwise Swedish-medium text, but also because the journalist reminds us that

It is worth remembering that many so-called segregated areas haven’t lapsed into lawlessness, and the greatest majority of people who live in segregation are victims, rather than perpetrators. (Gudmunsson, 2014)

Since the publication of the op-ed, the police have repeatedly stated on various national media channels that “there are no ‘no go zones’ in Sweden” (see e.g. Radio Sweden, 2017). That being said, the infectious communicability of Swedish no-go zones can be seen in the way in which this spatial descriptor went viral in the Western media, portraying Sweden as a country that has lost control. In an interview on Fox News in January 2015, a few weeks after Gudmunsson’s op-ed’s publication, Steve Emerson, a self-described “expert on Islamist terrorism”, described parts of Europe as “totally Muslim where non-Muslims just simply don’t go in” (see Sanchez, 2015). According to Emerson, these areas included parts of France, parts of London and the whole of Birmingham, as well as parts of Germany and Sweden. He stated: “You basically have zones where Shariah courts were set up, where Muslim density is very intense, where the police don’t go in, and where it’s basically a separate country almost, a country within a country” (see Mackey, 2015).

Then UK Prime Minister David Cameron said he choked on his porridge when he heard the claim, saying that Emerson “is clearly a complete idiot” (Fishwick, 2015). Emerson later offered a public apology “for having made this comment about the beautiful city of Birmingham” (Rawlinson, 2015). While acknowledging that an apology wasn’t a bad start, Cameron suggested in a fairly typical neoliberal spirit that highlights the economic profit of migration: “what he

should actually do is actually look at Birmingham and see what a fantastic example it is of bringing people together of different faiths, different backgrounds and actually building a world-class, brilliant city with a great and strong economy.” (Fishwick, 2015). Indeed, it is easy to dismiss people like Trump and Emerson as idiots, as Bildt and Cameron did, respectively. But, in doing so, we might be losing track of the fungal circulation of evil and its infectious solidification. As I will show in the next section, by 2018 the communicable image of the “no-go zone” had become normalised to the point that it was included in the Moderate Party’s electoral campaign.

5. No-go zones during the 2018 general election

For contextual purposes, it should be clarified that the Moderate Party of Sweden has over the past twenty years been a solidly liberal, if by Swedish standards conservative, political formation that supports free markets, personal freedom, EU membership, and same-sex unions. The Moderate Party was in power between 2006 and 2014, and its (then) leader Fredrik Reinfeldt gave a powerful speech on 16 August 2014 in the wake of that year’s sharp increase in asylum seekers from war-torn Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq:

Show openness. Show tolerance when it is said that “there will be so many”, “it will be trying”, “it will be difficult”. Show tolerance and show that you remember we’ve done it before. We have seen people who have come from distress, and escaped oppression, who have entered our society, learned the Swedish language, found work, and now help to build a better and a free Sweden. (Reinfeldt, 2014)

By the end of 2017, however, the party rhetoric had shifted quite radically. Despite the number of asylum seekers diminishing dramatically in 2016, and figures continuing to wane in the following years as a result of the introduction of ‘temporary’ border controls by the Social Democrat-led coalition government, at a congress in preparation for the upcoming general elections the new leader of the Moderate Party, Ulf Kristersson suggested: (1) introducing quotas for the maximum number of refugees that the EU should accept; (2) abolishing the possibility of applying for asylum from within the EU; and (3) introducing a Swedish language and culture test. Thus, within a period of only three years, the party moved from viewing migrants and refugees as hardworking potential members of the Swedish national and language community to burdens that ought to be avoided where possible, and where not coerced into proving their commitment to Swedish linguistic and cultural assimilation.

Two Moderate Party posters that appeared in the linguistic landscape of Stockholm in 2018 are contiguous with this rhetorical shift and more or less covertly rely on the communicable image of no-go zones:



Figure 4. In Stockholm there shall only be go zones

In the first poster, the Swedish modal verb *ska* is a strong marker of deontic modality and is the equivalent of the English word ‘ought’, implying a solid level of commitment to duty on the part of the speaker/writer. It is also a marker of futurity, similar to the English ‘shall’/ ‘will’. Obviously, the slogan builds on the existential presupposition that there *are* indeed some neighborhoods that are off-limits, i.e. the idea that “no-go” zones actually do exist, and that the Moderate Party promises to change this situation in the future. The second slogan is also interesting in its many layers of references. On the level of content, it plays with a well-known slogan of the Moderate Party’s archenemy – the Social Democrats: *alla ska med* (“everyone should be included”). Yet it twists the Social Democratic plea for inclusion by replacing *alla* “everyone” with “*ayna*”, a derogatory slang word for the police. The word comes from the Turkish expression *aynasiz*, which means “those without mirrors”, and refers to a supposed lack of honour among police too ashamed to look at themselves in the mirror. Why Turkish here? *Ayna* is one of the best-known words in the Swedish contemporary urban vernacular known as “Rinkeby Swedish” (see Stroud, 2004; Jonsson, 2007; Milani, 2010). And Rinkeby is one of the supposed “no-go zones”



Figure 5. The cops should be included

in Horowitz's documentary. As a large body of scholarly work has demonstrated (see e.g. Jonsson, 2007), Rinkeby Swedish is spoken by adolescents from many ethnic backgrounds, including some who identify, and are viewed by others, as "ethnic Swedes". Research has also demonstrated that usage of Rinkeby Swedish is not limited to Swedish urban suburbs but occurs in interactions between adolescents across many social contexts (see e.g. Årman, 2018). That being said, Rinkeby Swedish continues to be associated by politicians and other commentators with violence, urban segregation and "ethnic otherness" – i.e. as a language belonging to "them".

In the same way that Trump did not need to say the words "refugee" or "terrorism" in order to create an association between them in Extract 1, this slogan does not explicitly name "no-go zones". But the image of a no-go zone is nonetheless brought into being, in this case through the indexicalities of the choice of Rinkeby Swedish. As scholars of language ideologies have pointed out (see e.g. Hill, 1995), choice of linguistic code is *never* ideologically neutral. Rather, the use of a particular language, variety or style (and not another) serves to spatialise a speaker within a particular moral universe and legitimise such presence in that space. In the case of the slogan of the Moderate Party represented in Figure 5 above, the choice of a Rinkeby Swedish word for police (*ayna*) instead of a standard form for the same referent (*polis*) or another Swedish slang word (*snutar*) is a discursive device that spatialises the police in relation to a no-go zone, the suburb of Rinkeby.

Concomitantly, the choice of Rinkeby Swedish works as a device that discursively produces a sense of “hood” authenticity (to use a parallel American expression). Paradoxically, this authenticity is employed by a mainstream political party in order to argue for increased securitisation and exclusion. On the one hand, as some commentators have pointed out (Shakir, 2018), the usage of *ayna* makes it sound as if the Moderate Party is ‘wise’ to youth culture. But the usage is clearly in bad faith, especially considering the party’s latter pronouncements on immigrants’ ‘lack’ of proficiency in the Swedish language and need for improvement through language testing in order to qualify for permanent residence or naturalisation. It is also in bad faith if we read both slogans together. On the one hand, the police should be included, and securitisation should be enhanced, but, on the other hand, the Moderate Party does not trust the Swedish police’s repeated statements that there are no “no-go zones” in Sweden (Radio Sweden, 2017).

Once again, it is worth repeating Arendt’s words about how elements from existing discourses are fitted together to become the fundamentals of a *coherent* communicable world, one in which migrants are linked spatially to criminality via the image of no-go zones. This collage is a communicative problem that needs to be solved. To form this coherence, anything that does not fit must be edited out. We can see this practice in action in the way that the Moderate Party presents Sweden’s second largest city – Gothenburg – in a promotional video that went viral on social media in the context of the general elections in 2018 (see Appendix 2 for a full transcript and translation of the video).

While the communicability of no-go zones was entextualised in a traditional narrative in the Fox News interview with Horowitz, in this video it takes discursive shape in a contemporary tale that is told within a particular moral, historical, and political framing. The historical frame is a useful starting point. Starting with the formulaic expression *det var en gång*, which is the Swedish equivalent to “once upon time”, the video orients the tale temporally around a mythical time in which Gothenburg was a “proud” city with a specific “character”. The script follows a strategy of exceptionalism: “Nowhere else could one find such a great atmosphere” but “Not because life was easy”. The mythical *incipit* is corroborated visually by birds-eye views of the city, which give away to a more realistic portrayal of the city’s working-class character linked to the fishing and heavy industries – both Volvo and SKF headquarters and assembly lines are based in Gothenburg. Needless to say, the mythical image of working-class solidarity being advanced here does not dwell on class conflict, much of which would go directly *against* the historical platform of the Moderate Party. In fact, the municipality of Gothenburg has had one of the longest left-wing rules in Sweden. Either way, myth reaches its climax in the narration of the past: “nothing felt impossible”... but “that was a long time ago”.

It is at this point the tale switches to the reality of the present: “people are shot dead”, “cars are set on fire”, “cities have developed within the city”, and the “city is

being torn apart”, followed by: “How did the front side of Sweden [an affectionate geographical reference to Gothenburg’s position facing the Atlantic] become a lair for *jihadis* and criminal gangs?” (emphasis added). This is more of a rhetorical question than a genuine request for information. It is patent that the implied answer is: “immigration” primarily because the narrated message is coupled with the visual representation of a burning car, an image that (as above) has become an icon of the “no-go zone”.




Figure 6. The burning car in the Moderate Party’s campaign video

In mainstream Swedish politics, where overtly negative references to religion are frowned upon, it is noteworthy that Islam is *overtly* thematised in the mention of *jihad*. In terms of narrative structure, the rhetorical question builds up to the climax of the section about the present. “Enough is enough” marks a shift to inspiring descriptions of what will be seen in the future if the Moderate Party has its way: more employment, a reduced reliance on benefits, more police, more construction, less red tape for industry. How this change will be achieved is left to the speculation of the audiences. Considering the party’s neoliberal inclination, it can only be assumed that they would promote competition on the free market, lower taxes, and implement outsourcing and privatisation.

There is an implied dimension to the solution that is even more sinister. The future is so bright in the video that it is actually *blond*, as can be seen in the visual association of fair-haired kids with the message about a future city in which “young families put down roots, and students stay on after graduation”, a future furthermore “where we are one city again”. In a text where (1) the main assumption is that immigration has led to fragmentation, and (2) fair-haired kids are visually represented as the embodiment of “reproductive futurity” (Edelman, 2004), it is not completely unfounded to infer that “the future where we are one city again” and “the best days that are yet to come” are those which do not feature

unassimilated immigrants. Yes, “nobody is left out” – provided that you are ethnically Swedish, or, as signified by the inclusion of only one person who appears to be from a migrant background – and who, on investigation, turns out to be a Moderate Party politician – provided you blend in, preferably by being a member of the Moderate Party.



Figure 7. The Moderate Party’s “reproductive futurity” (Edelman, 2004)

The video generated a flurry of very heated reactions. Central to the negative responses was the image of the burning car: the state radio channel P3 revealed that the video was actually taken during a riot in Vancouver, Canada after the local ice hockey club lost the Stanley Cup to the Boston Bruins. Hampus Magnusson, the local representative of the Moderate Party, justified the usage of the video footage saying:

We ordered this movie from our agency, and it is obvious that we cannot light up cars ourselves. And nobody can deny that there have been cars burning, so it does not change the credibility [of the film] in the least. (P3 2018)

Why, if the situation was so bad in Gothenburg, was there no footage available for use? As Arendt puts it,

Totalitarian propaganda thrives on escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency

[...]

Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a *lying world of consistency* which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations (Arendt, 1976: 50–51)

In the context of democratic Sweden, on the other hand, what is created is a consistent world of *truthiness* where “nobody can deny” the emerging picture of “no-go” zones, never mind that they have been conjured from thin air. And yet the burning car also works to distract our attention from the far more problematic issue of the subtly Aryan grounds on which the film rests, in which the future of unity is actually based on the implicit promise of the recreation of racial and ethnic homogeneity. This world is also the world where Kent Ekenroth’s laughter (see Introduction above) is the appropriate response to the use of a regional demonym for dead citizens – who were always also migrants. These young men did not count as Swedes: their connection to Småland was seen as risible. By the same token, in the video of the Moderate Party, a similar demographic is presented as tightly linked to crime and to no-go zones; it constitutes a threat in the present and is therefore excluded from the future of Gothenburg.

6. Concluding remarks

Commenting on the relationship between the individual and the state in Sweden, Michel Foucault, who spent three years in Uppsala, once stated in an interview that

A human is but a moving dot, obeying laws, patterns and forms in the midst of a traffic that is more powerful and defeats him/her. In its calmness, Sweden reveals a brave new world where we discover that the human is no longer necessary

(Foucault in Lindung, 1968)

If Foucault’s sketch sounds a tad dystopian, trust in authorities has been singled out as a ‘typically Swedish’ trait in the main textbook used in compulsory civic orientation courses for unemployed migrants (City of Gothenburg and the Country Administrative Board of Västra Götaland, 2018). While what is characteristic of a nation should always be taken with some caution (see also Milani et al., 2019 for a critical perspective on the Swedish orientation textbook), it is perhaps this faith in institutions, combined with a firm belief in the infallible character of their democratic order, that banal evil is spreading quite unchecked in its infectious communicability through the spatial image of the *no-go zone*, an image in which viewers are consistently interpellated to disregard migrants and refugees as being quite as human as we are. Rather, through no go zones a *specific group of migrants* (typically Muslim, from the Middle East and Africa) are spatialized in a way in which they are presented as *fundamentally external* to mainstream Swedish society, and a threat to it. This communicable image is like a spore that spreads the fungus over new surfaces, without much depth but penetrating quickly into the very body of ordinary politics, becoming normalised without people necessarily realising it.

Discursively, it is in the *consistent truthiness* of these apparently banal discourses that lies their terrifying character, not least because they are gaining traction and becoming hegemonic *across* political formations. For example, the Social Democratic Prime Minister has recently stated in an interview with *Dagens Nyheter*:

Now it is important to show results in terms of gang crime, explosions and shootings. On the whole, Sweden is a reasonably safe country, but it is clear that when there are explosions and shootings, there is understandably a sense of insecurity. We will show that the number of asylum seekers will decrease – significantly fewer if we are to cope with integration. Then people will see that those who come here also go to work and contribute – duties, rights.

To conclude, it might be worth re-casting Arendt's words:

It is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political possibilities, that one fine day a highly organised and mechanised humanity will conclude quite democratically – namely by majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof. (Arendt, 1976: 298–99)

While we have certainly not yet reached this extreme eventuality, the banality of evil as manifested in the infectious communicability of the image of *no-go zones*, and its concomitant subjectivity of the threatening migrant – the barbarian at the gates that should be excluded from the Swedish future – is already at work in mainstream Swedish politics.

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Appendix 1

Varney: Our next guest has just returned from a trip to Europe. He went over there because he wanted to see the migrant crisis firsthand for himself. He went to no-go zones in Sweden – I didn't think there were such places, but there are – no-go zones where the police do not go. While he was there, he was jumped by five apparently Islamic thugs. The filmmaker Ami Horowitz is the man who went over there, and he joins us right now. First of all, I didn't know there was any such thing as a no-go zone in a place like Stockholm, Sweden. There is?

Horowitz: I, I heard about them. The truth is I didn't actually believe they were real, right?

Varney: Right.

Horowitz: Figured this is probably some kind of propaganda.

Varney: Yes.

Horowitz: I went there, met with the police officers, they said, 'When we're pursuing a suspect, and they cross that threshold' – and there's about thirty or forty of them in Sweden – they will not pursue. They will simply not pursue.

Varney: There are thirty or forty no-go zones in Swedish towns and cities?

Horowitz: Correct.

Varney: Thirty to forty of 'em?

Horowitz: That's right.

Varney: Did you say that there were guns being used in these no-go zones?

Horowitz: Th-th-they used to have, about five years ago, the police officers who I met with would say, they'd have an incident of gun violence, let's say, once a month, once every few months. Every day there's gun violence going on. And it's not simply staying – here's the problem, it's not simply staying in these enclaves, which, by the way, they say are states within states. Swedish law doesn't apply in these places. What they do is, they're now coming out, and the rape – it's become the rape capital of Europe.

Varney: You're kidding.

Horowitz: No. I kid you not.

Varney: But we know nothing about this. Well, well, we've not heard of it.

Horowitz: That's my job, Stuart. That's what I do for a living, I warn you guys.

Varney: Yeah, I know, but we've not heard of this. I mean, okay, now you went into one of the no-go zones.

Horowitz: I did.

Varney: Right? And you went in – now, were you wearing your yarmulke?

Horowitz: I wasn't.

Varney: Did they know that you were Jewish?

Horowitz: They did not know I was Jewish. My nose is slightly larger than normal, but it was not exactly –

Varney: No, no, no, no, don't get into that. But you walked in with a camera crew?

Horowitz: Yes.

Varney: That identified you as an outsider?

Horowitz: Correct.

Varney: They jumped you? Tell me.

Horowitz: Yeah, they said, 'You guys have to leave right now.' They gave us a little bit of a warning. My crew, they're smart, they took off, and I just said, listen, I just tried to explain what I was gonna do, and that was it, five guys.

Varney: They jumped you?

Horowitz: Yeah.

Varney: Beat you up?

Horowitz: Pretty good, yeah. Beat pretty good.

Varney: Uh, and what was the response of the Swedish police?

Horowitz: The police said, 'Listen, you can stay here for, you know, a month or two, and you can go through the system, but we're not going there to find those guys, and it's, it's gonna end up being pointless.

Varney: Now, h-here in America, uh, we're told, frequently told, that everything's going just fine in Europe. We know there are isolated incidents of culture clashes, and we, we know about that, but we did not know that there were thirty or forty no-go zones in a place like Sweden. What's going on? Why are we not getting the full story?

Horowitz: Well, first of all, Sweden has done a phenomenal job of trying to cover it up. So, for example, there were a series of music festivals in Sweden, and there were these gang rapes that went all across these music festivals. They specifically tried to hide the attacks themselves, but they couldn't, 'cause there were just so many victims. It wasn't dissimilar to what happened on New Year's Eve in Germany.

Varney: In Cologne? Oh, yes, ah, right.

[Off-screen presenter: Cologne, yeah.]

Horowitz: Exactly. Same thing, where the government was specifically trying to cover it up, and more than that, what they were desperately trying to do was cover up the ethnicity of the people making the attacks.

Varney: Why?

Horowitz: Because, they're pro –

Varney: They know they've got a problem.

Horowitz: Yes.

Varney: And they know they can't do a thing about it.

Horowitz: They're doubling down. They're bringing in as many migrants as they possibly can to Sweden.

Varney: But what do the Swedes think about this? Good Lord.

Horowitz: The Swedes are – they're, they're, they're not – they're, they're, they're not Vikings. Those Vi – the Vikings are gone. They're, they're a sweet people. They wanna help. And they – if you bring up the ethnicity of any of these attackers, the first thing they say to you is you're a racist. You're a racist to bring it up.

Horowitz: That's the problem you're dealing with.

Varney: This is incredible. This is incredible. I mean, I'm, I'm shocked by this. Now, you took video, I take it?

Horowitz: Of course, yeah.

Varney: And you're, you're organizing it, right?

Horowitz: Yeah.

Varney: And you're gonna make a, is it a documentary you're making?

Horowitz: It's like a short, uh, eight-minute video of [inaudible]

Varney: When you've done it, can we see some of it?

Horowitz: I think we could make an arrangement.

[Off-screen presenter: (Laughs.)]

Varney: If you could – (laughs) thank you very much indeed, we'd like to see that.

[Off-screen presenter: Yeah, we would.]

Varney: Uh, Ami Horowitz, you're a brave man and a good man, and we wanna see that video, and you can come back any time you like.

Horowitz: Ah, thanks.

Varney: Yeah, yeah, right. But, but thank you. Seriously, good stuff. Thank you, sir.

Appendix 2

Swedish original	English translation
Där var en gång en stolt stad	There once was a proud city
Med en alldeles egen karaktär	With a character all of its own
Ingen annanstans fanns en så god stämning	Nowhere else could one find such a great atmosphere
Det berodde inte på något överflöd	This wasn't because of abundance
Nej	No
Det här var en stad där man strävade och kämpade	This was a city where people strove and struggled
Där man gjorde rätt för sig	Where people did the right thing
Där var art arbete, tung industri	There was hard work and heavy industry
Men det gav resultat en känsla av sammanhang	But they resulted in a sense of cohesion
För varje kullager, varje bil, och varje fartyg som lämnade hamnen stärktes gemenskapen	With every ball bearing, car, or ship that left the harbour, the community was strengthened
Inget kändes omöjligt	Nothing felt impossible
Inte ens att spela in UEFA cupen två gånger	Not even making it into the UEFA Champions League twice
Det rullade på bra för stan	Things were going well for the city
Men det var längesen nu	But that was a long time ago

Swedish original	English translation
Människor skjuts ihjäl	People are shot dead
Bilar sätts i brand	Cars are set on fire
Det uppstod städer i staden, och Göteborg slits isär	Other cities have developed within the city, and Gothenburg is being torn apart
Hur blev Sveriges framsida ett tillhåll för jihadister och kriminella gäng?	How did the front side of Sweden become a lair for jihadis and criminal gangs?
Nu räcker det	Enough is enough
Vi måste till en förändring	We need change
Om alla arbetar hårt och är stolta över att vara Göteborgare då kan framtiden blir en annan	If everybody works hard and is proud to be a Gothenburger, the future can be different
Låt oss bli fler som går på jobbet	Let more of us be in employment
Och färre på bidrag	And fewer of us be on benefits
Låt oss möta fler poliser	Let's see more police
Och färre vapen på gatorna	And fewer weapons on the streets
Låt oss se fler byggekranar	Let's see more construction cranes
Och färre överklagande	And less red tape
I en stolt tradition, vi kan få en lysande framtid igen	In a proud tradition, we can once again look forward to a bright future
Där barnfamiljer slår rot och unga stanna kvar efter sin utbildning	Where young families put down roots, and students stay on after graduation
Där entreprenörer startar nytt och etablerade företag bygger huvudkontor	Where entrepreneurs start new businesses, and established ones build new headquarters
Där Göteborg växer och fler välja bli Göteborgare	Where Gothenburg grows, and more people choose to be Gothenburgers
En framtid där vi är en stad igen	A future where we are one city again
En stad där vi vågar stå upp för värderingar som är värda att bevara	A city where we dare to stand up for values that are worth preserving
Ett samhälle där rättsstaten aldrig backar	A society where the rule of law never backs down
Eller lämnar någon utanför	And nobody is left out
Vår bästa tiden har inte varit	Our best days are yet to come
Tillsammans bygger vi Göteborg starkt igen	Together, we will build a strong Gothenburg again

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