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The Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation has, since its very beginnings, conceived of itself as a collaborative, interdisciplinary project, maintained and enriched by the active exchange Frans van Eemeren has constantly held and promoted with scholars from all over the world. The Hispanic academic community, in Europe as well as in the Americas, has not been the exception. This 632-page volume, selected, edited and translated by Fernando Leal Carretero (*Centro Universitario de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades*, University of Guadalajara), intends not only to portray for the Hispanic audience the evolution and the state of the art in Pragma-Dialectical theory – as accounted for by its very leading figure – but also, and indeed quite importantly, the distinctive reception and contribution of Hispanic scholars to this ongoing research program.

The volume's double purpose determines its two-part structure. Part I, Chapters 1 to 10, comprises a selection of key texts by Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, Jean Wagemans and Bert Meuffels intended for the reader to have a sense of the breadth and depth of the Pragma-Dialectical project. Part II, Chapters 11 to 22, consists of unpublished contributions by scholars from Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Spain, which are both critical reactions to the theory (Chapters 11 to 17) and a sample of possible applications (Chapters 18 to 22).

Part I bears witness to the evolution and the current stage of development of the Pragma-Dialectical theory. It opens with an unpublished piece ("Del modelo ideal de argumentación crítica al discurso argumentativo situado. La evolución paso a paso de la teoría pragma-dialéctica de la argumentación"), written especially for the volume, where Van Eemeren recounts – in a tone that evokes that of an intellectual autobiography – the development of a research agenda set out, from the very beginning, to bridge the gap between a normative, ideal model of argumentation and a descriptive, factual account of the wide range of everyday, concrete argumentative practices. The chapter briefly presents the ideal model of critical discussion and its four stages, discusses its heuristic, analytic and evaluative role, points out its compatibility with the real arguers' most varied commitments, and underscores its accordance with what they, intersubjectively, deem reasonable. Very importantly, the chapter reveals how, by looking at the ideal model

and the actual practices side by side, the Pragma-Dialectical research program has defined (and keeps defining), in a sort of reflective equilibrium, the direction of its own evolution. The articulation of rhetorical demands in the form of strategic maneuvering, and the characterization of the institutional contexts guiding the argumentative exchange, were thence developed. The path is now open for extensive qualitative and quantitative research on the different domains of communicative activity, their institutional preconditions, their stereotypical argumentative patterns and typical argumentative moves.

Van Eemeren's recount also prefigures themes that will pervade not only the first part but, as we will see, the entire volume. Among the most salient are the role of logic, formal and informal, in the Pragma-Dialectical model (Chapters 2 and 4), the articulation between the philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical and practical components of the theory (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), the Pragma-Dialectical notion of reasonableness (Chapter 5), the precise relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness (Chapters 6, 8 and 10), and the fallaciousness, as it were, of the fallacies (Chapters 7 and 9).

In what follows, I will briefly present some of these themes in tandem with the critical reactions included in Chapters 11 to 16, so the reader gets a sense of how the volume gets to portray the very rich and engaging dialogue between Van Eemeren and his Hispanics colleagues, who at times invite us to extend, complement, reconsider or simply appreciate in more depth certain aspects of the theory. Then, I will close by presenting those chapters concerned with possible applications.

As to the place of logic in the Pragma-Dialectical model, Chapter 2 (Van Eemeren, 2012) sets out to clarify how logic plays a part in the reconstruction, analysis and evaluation of the argumentative moves. This matter involves, indeed, great subtleties. As it is well known, in Pragma-Dialectics argumentation is a complex of interactive and communicative acts aimed at the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits, where these merits are determined by a set of procedural rules spanning across the four stages of the resolution process: confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion. Since proposing and accepting/rejecting a certain reason for a claim are speech acts pertaining exclusively to the argumentation stage, the role of logic is limited to the reconstruction and evaluation of these moves. On the reconstruction side, while formal logic is a useful tool to discover unexpressed premises, it is also limited – since the premises rendering the argument formally valid must be at the same time pragmatically consistent. On the evaluation side, formal logic only helps us verify the correctness of a thoroughly explicit chain of reasoning. But when the reasoning is not thoroughly explicit, or when the arguer does not pretend her argument to depend on its formal validity,

we need to draw upon argument schemes, which again will not carry justificatory force unless they had been made explicit and verified intersubjectively.

Chapter 4 (Van Eemeren, Garssen & Wagemans, 2012) precisely shows, among other things, how this subordination of logical to pragmatic elements actually works when reconstructing and evaluating concrete cases. KLM's advertorial constitutes a derailment of strategic maneuvering because, in order to be effective, it purposely hides a pragmatic inconsistency (they apologize for something they, at the end, should not be held responsible for), violating the rule of the use of language. This pragmatic inconsistency, however, results from making explicit points that are, on the one hand, pragmatically optimal in the light of KLM's interests and, on the other, completely expected in hybrid communicative activity types such as the advertorial.

But according to Lilián Bermejo-Luque (Chapter 11: "El modelo normativo lingüístico de argumentación en el contexto de una discusión crítica. Perspectivas para una integración"), this does not settle the matter of the role of logic in Pragma-Dialectics. There are, she argues, at least two senses of the term "argumentation" in Pragma-Dialectical theory. While one refers to the dialectical exchange, which unfolds in four stages, the other refers to the argumentative speech acts actually deployed in one of them: the argumentation stage. In relying on formal validity and informal strength to settle the case for their inferential goodness, Pragma-Dialectics can only be a normative theory of the argumentative exchange, but not of the argumentative speech acts occurring in it. As Van Eemeren, Garssen and Wagemans themselves reckon in Chapter 4, since KLM's symptomatic argumentation is crucial to evaluate their whole case "a crucial point (…) will be to verify to what extent the critical questions associated to this argument scheme can be answered satisfactorily."

Of course, she recognizes the role of intersubjective procedures (inference, explicitation, identification) in assessing the argumentative speech act's justificatory force, but since its ultimate evaluation requires a reconstruction that makes it an instance of some formal or argument scheme, Pragma-Dialectics ends up relying on these schemes as the only source of its justificatory/refutative quality. As she herself puts it, "for Pragma-Dialectics, it is the argumentative speech act, and not the critical discussion, the minimum unit of justificatory force" (p. 390). This concession, far from representing a subordination of the logical to the pragmatic elements of argumentation, entails a recognition of logic's crucial role in both reconstructing and evaluating the argumentative speech acts, which are, ultimately, what draws the interlocutor's assent and makes possible the resolution of the difference of opinion.

To not depend on logic for the reconstruction and evaluation process, Pragma-dialectics may incorporate – she argues – a model of interpretation of

argumentative speech acts as carrying justificatory force *themselves*. And she claims the *Linguistic Normative Model for Argumentation* (LNMA) fulfills such a role. Argumentative speech acts are, in this framework, complex speech acts of adducing and concluding, comprising both ontologic modals (elements conveying, with pragmatic force, representations of the world) and epistemic modals (elements conveying, with pragmatic force, the degree of support of our reasons). The evaluation of such speech acts will not depend on reconstructing them as instances of some argument scheme, nor their justificatory quality will depend on the evaluator's own reconstruction.

In Chapter 12 ("La fuerza del mejor argumento"), Hubert Marraud also challenges the Pragma-Dialectical account of the role of logic in the evaluation of argumentative moves. Drawing from the distinction between *argumentative* and *argumental* dialectic, he claims that we should adopt a *comparative* account of compelling argument. Briefly, dialectic is argumentative when it focuses on the confrontation of arguers and, therefore, on the rules and procedures governing their conversation, disagreement or debate. Dialectic is argumental, on the other hand, when it focuses on the confrontation of arguments as products, on the relationship of opposition between them, as well as their strength relative to one another. Pragma-Dialectics would be argumentative, while Plato's dialectic argumental. While the former aims at managing the disagreement, and assumes a qualitative account of compelling argument, the latter aims at finding truth (in the wide sense) and assumes a comparative one. Imitating the style of Grice's conversational maxims, Marraud proposes that we change Rule 8 so as to say: "Make the strength of your argument the appropriate to the moment and conditions of the argumentative exchange". This way, we would be able to recast the role of both argument and formally valid schemes: they will not, or not only, be heuristic in the process of finding implicit premises, but in the process of building up the background of opposing arguments against which we will be able to evaluate a specific argument.

With regards to the articulation between the philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical and practical components of the theory, the volume includes some interesting discussions. One of them has to do with the meta-theoretical principles of Pragma-Dialectics. In Chapter 3 (Van Eemeren, 2006), these four principles are made explicit and discussed. The first one is *functionalization*. Very often argumentation is described in purely structural terms, which clearly overlooks its most fundamental foundation, its general function: to manage disagreement. Argumentation always comes as a response, or in anticipation, to a difference of opinion, and the justificatory moves are contrived with the sole purpose of settling the difference. The study of argumentation must, therefore, revolve around its being a resource to advance and resolve disagreements.

Cristián Santibáñez Yáñez (Chapter 14: "Función, funcionalismo y funcional-ización en la teoría pragma-dialéctica de la argumentación") agrees that we should adopt a functionalist perspective in the analysis of argumentation, but he argues that Pragma-Dialectics does not critically examine, philosophically or cognitively, its own functionalization of argumentation as a human activity. This might be seen as a shortcoming, mainly because the functionalization of the practice of argu-mentation plays such an important role in the reconstruction, analysis and evalua-tion of argumentative discourse. As a matter of fact, every move will be assessed in terms of the extent to which it is conducive to advance and resolve the difference of opinion, that is, the extent to which it accomplishes its proper function.

For Santibáñez, it is not clear what kind of concept of function Pragma-Dialectics endorses – a flaw it actually shares with Paglieri & Castelfranchi (who count the improvement of credibility, degree of agreement, strategic advantage and reputation among the functions of argumentation), with the Functional-Pragmatic approach (for which arguments are forms of action to exert influence, altering or perpetuating real structures), and with Trautmann (who considers ar-gumentation a way of managing existing knowledge). These approaches errone-ously assume that isolating an argument is a straight-forward, clear-cut task, and that using distinctions *constructed in language* to map out important dimensions of the *use of language* amounts to analyzing verbal activities in genuine intentional contexts. Drawing from Ruth Millikan's notions of proper and derived functions, Satibáñez points out that while Pragma-Dialectics targets a derived function of argumentation it lacks a view of its proper function, and that an evolutionary per-spective could provide us with some clues to identify it. Briefly speaking, argu-mentation is an exadaptation of language and cooperation, resulting in a way to guarantee cognitive diversity and promote better group problem-solving skills.

Xavier de Donato and Jesús Zamora (Chapter 17: "Dónde acaba un argumen-to") follow up on this very same question. For them, to resolve a difference of opinion is not the only possible purpose of argumentation. One may, for example, intend to reinforce a conclusion that is already believed to be true (as in the case of axiomatic systems), or provide an abductive explanation of a very well-known phenomenon (as in the case of scientific research), or even merely inform an audi-ence. In these cases, there is no difference of opinion to resolve and argumenta-tion does not turn out, nonetheless, superfluous. For them, a general theory of argumentation should (1) deal with arguments in the logical, epistemic and prag-matic sense, (2) recognize the different possible purposes of argumentation, and (3) study argumentation within the framework of the speech act theory. Pragma-Dialectics scores very well in (1) and (3), but perhaps not so well as far as (2) is concerned. However, by characterizing the proper *implicature* of the act of argu-ing, they set out to show that a wide range of purposes can be accounted for, and

that demarking the beginning and end of an argument crucially depends on the arguer's (or the community of arguers') intended purpose. They explore the case of academic journals, where papers can be considered arguments whose purpose is to establish a reliable node within a great and intricate web of arguments, which itself constitutes a huge argument the conclusion of which is, as it were, the discipline's state of the art.

Further contributions relate to the methodological premises of socialization and externalization. As it is well known, in Pragma-Dialectics argumentation is not the expression of individual thought processes, nor does it occur in a social vacuum. Besides, it entails submitting our reasoning to public scrutiny and, therefore, it depends on the arguers' externalized (or externalizable) commitments and responsibilities – as well as the consequences of such commitments and responsibilities.

Regarding socialization, María Navarro (Chapter 16: "El lugar de la controversia en la argumentación") calls for a historical turn, as it were, in the contextual approach to argumentation. For her, the normative end of Pragma-Dialectical theory, by projecting itself onto the most varied social and institutional macro-contexts, past and present, may hinder our capability to appreciate the process of evolution and the historical development of controversies. It is essential to historize, she claims, the set of strategic maneuvers available, otherwise they may well end up being a projection of our own sociological and political conceptions.

Regarding externalization, Constanza Ihnen-Jory (Chapter 15: "Negociación versus Deliberación") sets out to make explicit the arguer's commitments in negotiations and deliberations. Her goal is to set forth a set of criteria that allow the analyst to clearly distinguish, in practice, these two discursive genres. Very briefly, while the macro-speech act underlying negotiation is offering, the one underlying deliberation is proposing, and we can identify two main differences between the two. Firstly, the act of proposing necessarily entails collective actions, while that of offering entails an action that may or may not involve a joint intention. Secondly, the act of proposing necessarily entails a proposed action that fulfills a shared interest, while that of offering entails interests that are not shared by the speaker and the listener. A third, crucial difference is treated separately: negotiations do not necessarily involve argumentation while deliberations clearly do.

It remains the issue of fallacies, covered in Chapters 7 and 9 (Van Eemeren, 2013 and Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffles, 2012, respectively) and discussed by Luis Vega Reñón (Chapter 13: "El tratamiento pragma-dialéctico de las falacias y el reto de Hamblin"). Vega makes an inventory of what he considers the main criticisms to the Pragma-Dialectical approach to fallacies. He classifies them in three main categories: issues of justification and motivation, issues of internal organization, and issues of domain and scope.

Among the issues of justification and motivation, he counts three. First, by treating fallacies as violations of Pragma-Dialectical rules, Pragma-Dialectics is no longer able to differentiate fallacies from bad arguments. Second, it is not at all clear whether higher order conditions of argumentation (such as attitudes, dispositions, abilities and, in the social realm, power relations, issues of authority, etc.) are mere conditions of possibility or rather normative and, therefore, determinant of fallacious moves. Third, given the continuum between correct and fallacious reasoning, it is sometimes very difficult to determine whether something is to count as correct or not. For example, if we say that "it is a truism that argumentation always arises in response to, or in anticipation of, a difference of opinion", are we "declaring a standpoint as sacrosanct" and, therefore, violating the rule of freedom?

Regarding the issues of internal organization, Vega discusses problems of classification and hierarchy of the Pragma-Dialectical rules. If the set of rules is irreducible and each one is essential to track a distinctive aspect of correct (and fallacious) reasoning, or if we can establish an order of priority of the rules, then our understanding of the fallacies would certainly be affected.

Lastly, among the issues of domain and scope, Vega counts two. First, if the Pragma-Dialectical rules do not cover all the possible purposes of argumentation then its treatment of the fallacies may suffer from the same sort of incompleteness. Second, it is not always clear in what sense the set of rules is necessary and sufficient, and that certainly has consequences for the detection and identification of fallacies. Vega finally concludes that, despite its many successes, Pragma-Dialectics has not yet provided us with a satisfactory theory of the fallacies.

To conclude, I will rapidly introduce Chapters 18 to 22, which present some applications of the Pragma-Dialectical theory to concrete cases. Roberto Marafioti (Chapter 18: "El corte de la corte") analyzes a two-day hearing that took place in the Palacio de tribunales de Buenos Aires in August of 2013 in relation to a law that sought to promote the democratization of audiovisual communications. Luisa Puig (Chapter 19: "Antonieta Rivas Mercado. Un análisis discursivo y argumentativo de sus cartas a Manuel Rodríguez Lozano") analyzes Mexican intellectual, writer and feminist Antonieta Rivas Mercado's love correspondence with the painter Manuel Rodríguez Lozano. Celso López Saavedra and Ana María Vicuña Navarro (Chapter 20: "Las reglas de una discusión crítica y la formación de una comunidad de indagación") argue for the relevance of Pragma-Dialectics in the Philosophy for Kids program. Cristóbal Joannon L. and Constanza Ihnen Jory (Chapter 21: "Argumentación de calidad") explore some pedagogical implications of adopting a Pragma-Dialectical approach. Fernando Leal Carretero and Joaquín Galindo Castañeda (Chapter 22: "Dónde empieza el análisis de una argumentación: reflexiones en torno a un libro de texto") discuss the virtues of Van

Eemeren, Grootendorst & Henkemans' famous textbook *Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation.*

This volume not only constitutes an excellent compendium of foundational texts, but also one that, at long last, presents to the Spanish speaking audience the power, scope, development and impact of a theory that changed the field and has ever since inspired waves of renewed reflections on the practice of argumentation.

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