

Metonymy without a referential shift

Adding evidence to the discussion*

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1. Introduction

This paper addresses the question whether metonymy is necessarily paired with a referential shift. Although a referential shift has traditionally been considered a definitional property of metonymy, this view is seriously questioned in recent articles (see e.g. Panther & Radden 2005, Radden & Kövecses 1999, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, Warren 2002). Unfortunately, the discussion on non-referential instances of metonymy is based on just a handful of examples, which are moreover not always unproblematic. If the more recent view is correct, it should be possible to find additional supporting data. Dutch and German dictionaries, which have long used the notion of metonymy to code linguistic material, are a useful resource for this. This paper analyses non-referential examples extracted from a number of such dictionaries, which will yield a better insight into what metonymy actually is.

2. Metonymy and referential shifts

The word *metonymy* literally means “change of name” (from the Greek *metonymia*). Since Aristotle, metonymy has been viewed as one of the principal figures of speech. Stylistic textbooks and literary lexicons usually define metonymy as involving the use of one term for another on the basis of a real world connection between the two underlying concepts (see e.g. van Gorp 1980:253; see also www.britannica.com). The two concepts are said to be contiguous, with the one that is expressed referring to the other. Consider the following prototypical examples:

- (1) a fleet of a hundred *sails*
- (2) The power of the *crown* was mortally weakened.

(3) I am reading *Shakespeare*.

(4) *The red shirts* won the match.

These examples show how pervasive metonymy is. It is therefore surprising that linguists have only recently begun to show an interest in it. While some traditional grammars and dictionaries use the label ‘metonymy’ to explain certain constructions and meaning configurations, there is hardly any linguistic work on metonymy predating the 1970s (Carlberg 1948 and Ullmann 1957 being notable exceptions).

In recent times, most research on metonymy has been carried out in the framework of cognitive linguistics. The growing interest in metonymy has no doubt been inspired by Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*. Although this book is primarily devoted to metaphors, which have aroused more interest than metonyms, it contains one chapter on metonymy. In it, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 35) define metonymy as “using one entity to refer to another related to it”. With this they essentially follow the literary tradition, where metonymy is seen as involving the use of one term for another, with the underlying concepts being contiguous, i.e. related in the real world. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 36) go on to observe that metonymical expressions have “primarily a referential function”, since they allow speakers “to use one entity to *stand for* another”.

Shifting reference is often considered a crucial element in the definition of metonymy. According to Langacker (1993: 30, 29), metonymy induces “changes in reference” and can be defined as “occurring when an expression that normally designates one entity is used instead to designate another, associated entity”. A metonymical expression serves as a “cognitive reference point” which establishes mental access to the interpreted object within some conceptual structure (or in Langacker’s terms, “dominion”). In (3), for example, the expression *Shakespeare* is the reference point which, within the context of reading, gives access to ‘a book by Shakespeare’.

Croft’s (1993) analysis of metonymy is slightly different from Langacker’s. Rather than a shift in reference, Croft views metonymy as an instance of “domain highlighting” (Croft 1993: 348), such that certain semantic traits of a concept receive a greater than normal emphasis.¹ Croft illustrates this with the different meanings of *Time magazine*, which, depending on the highlighting, can denote the newspaper itself, its publishing company, and so on. Another of Croft’s examples is the use of *Proust* to refer to Proust’s books (where the author himself is less prominent than his work). By defining metonymy in terms of the highlighting of parts of a domain, a referential shift is no longer a definitional property of metonymy. As Croft (1993: 349) notes, a referential shift is something that occurs “in the most prototypical examples [of metonymy]” only. Similar ideas are found

in later studies, where metonymy is viewed as a figure/ground effect that can be concept-oriented rather than referent-oriented (Koch 2004).

Most metonymies indeed seem to induce a referential shift. This is the case, for instance, for the examples in (1)–(4), where the expressions in italics do not refer to the entity which they literally denote, but to some other, related entity. However, it would be an oversimplification to say that in these examples one expression ‘stands for,’ or ‘is used instead of,’ another expression, despite the fact that they all involve referential shifts. In (1) *sails* does not just refer to boats, but to *sailing* boats. (2) refers not just to a book, but to a book *by Shakespeare*. In (3) and (4), *crown* and *red shirts* refer to the people who wear them. There is thus not a simple ‘stand for’ relation (cf. Warren 1999: 128); rather, the meaning of the metonymical expression is a complex combination of the literally expressed concept and a related one (cf. Radden & Kövecses 1999: 19).

Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) claims that a ‘stand for’ relation and a referential shift are not necessary ingredients of metonymies. The only truly definitional property is that metonymy establishes a link between concepts within the same conceptual structure or domain (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2000: 113). This domain-internal linking is due to the fact that metonymy connects contiguous concepts. Since these concepts are related in the real world, they automatically belong to the same conceptual structure.

At this point it is useful to compare metonymy with metaphor, with which it is often contrasted in the literature. Metaphors are crucially different from metonyms. The former are used to structure an abstract concept in terms of a concrete one, so that there are always two domains involved. For example, abstract concepts such as ‘time’ or ‘relationships’ can be structured with the help of ‘moving objects’ (e.g. *time flies*) and ‘journeys’ (e.g. in *our relationship was at a cross-roads*), respectively (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 42, 44). Metaphors are thus primarily used for understanding. Since metonymies are usually defined in contrast with metaphors (Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez 2001: 323), and since the former often induce a referential shift, the primary function of metonymies is considered to be referential. As was already noted, this shift occurs because metonymy combines contiguous concepts. Since these concepts automatically belong to the same conceptual domain, it is difficult to establish a structural relation between the expressed concept (the source) and the interpreted concept (the target), which, as with metaphors, can be applied to the target as a whole. Thus, as Ruiz de Mendoza (2000: 114) observes, the presence of a referential shift in metonymies is due to the nature of the conceptual mapping. However, this does not mean that metonymies must have a shifted reference. Section 3 considers some cases which are analysed in the literature as examples of non-referential metonymy.

3. Examples of metonymy without a referential shift?

Metonymies which do not refer to a shifted entity or concept are usually termed ‘non-referential’ or ‘grammatical metonymies’. These may involve phrases but they may also involve the meta-sentential level, e.g. the level of speech acts (cf. Panther & Thornburg 1997, Panther & Radden 2005) or propositions (cf. Warren 1999, Warren 2002, Panther & Thornburg 2006: 246). One purported type of grammatical metonymy concerns the predicative use of (nominal) metonymy, as is illustrated by the following examples.

- (5) She is (just) a pretty face.
- (6) John is a real brain.
- (7) Pete is a fine bass.
- (8) Jim is the fastest gun.
- (9) I am all ears.

(5) is taken from Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 37), who regard the example as a normal, referential PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. However, Radden & Kövecses (1999: 18–19) argue that *face* cannot stand for the whole person, given that (5) does not mean ‘she is pretty all over’. Similar observations apply to (6) and (7): *brain* and *bass* do not refer to the person as a whole, but say something about Pete’s and John’s characteristics (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez 2001: 323). Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez claim that (8) and (9) are similar to (5), (6) and (7); each contains an NP in predicative position which signals that the subject has an abstract property related to it (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2000: 114). However, closer inspection suggests that the above examples differ from each other in important ways. What is more, I suggest that they are not appropriate examples of non-referential metonymy.

The first problem concerns the fact that some of the above examples are idiomatic expressions. For instance, (5) does not just give information about the prettiness of her face, but also seems to imply something negative, i.e. that she is not very smart (notice the use of the word *just*). (9) is even more clearly idiomatic: this expression is strongly fixed, has to be learned by non-native speakers, and is non-productive; it is impossible to say things like **I am two ears* or **I am all hands*.² Illustrating general properties of metonymy on the basis of fixed, non-productive expressions is a dubious strategy.

A second problem is that it is questionable whether the examples in (5)–(9) differ from referential metonymies. If (6) means that John is a smart person, then the phrase *a real brain* has shifted its reference to ‘a smart person’. Similarly, if (7) means that Pete has a good deep singing voice, and (8) that Jim is the fastest

shooter, then *bass* and *gun* have been shifted to ‘man with a deep singing voice’ and ‘shooter’, respectively.³ The fact that a metonymy is used predicatively therefore does not prevent it from having a referential shift.

Examples such as (10) cast further doubt on the validity of the difference between ‘referential’ and ‘non-referential’ metonymies.

- (10) A real brain / The real brain has entered the room.

Both referential metonymies in (10) seem possible in a context in which John, who is a real brain, enters the room. The same would appear to hold for (7) and (8) (e.g. *Finally, our fine bass comes in, The fastest gun has also arrived*). I doubt whether (5) and (10) are fundamentally different: in both, the phrase *real brain* is used for ‘smart person’. It would seem to be the case that most examples of the predicative use of metonymy actually involve referential shifts.

The distinction between referential and non-referential metonymies has also been made in work in computational linguistics. For instance, Stallard (1993) uses the term ‘predicative metonymy’, which he contrasts with referential metonymy. The latter involves traditional, prototypical examples of metonymy, such as *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*. The NP *the ham sandwich* shifts its reference, given that the intended referent (‘the customer who ordered the ham sandwich’) is different from the referent of its literal meaning. In cases of predicative metonymy, on the other hand, the NP is interpreted literally. This is demonstrated by the fact that pronouns and anaphora can refer to the literal referent only, as is shown by the difference between (11) and (12) (taken from Stallard 1993: 87).

- (11) The ham sandwich is waiting for its check. [?]It/He is getting impatient.
 (12) Nixon bombed Hanoi. *They sang all the way back to Saigon. / He wanted the communists to negotiate.

Since it is impossible to refer to another referent than Nixon himself, *Nixon* must be interpreted literally.⁴ However, it should not be concluded from this that the verb *bombed* is metonymical, since it still refers to the action that is literally connected with the verb (cf. Stallard 1993: 88). As Stallard (1993: 89) observes, the best way to analyse predicative metonymy is by regarding it “as a coercion of a predicate argument place, rather than of the argument NP itself”.

Predicative metonymy can thus be opposed to referential metonymy, since the former does not involve a referential shift but preserves the original meaning of both the NP and the predicate. Nevertheless, metonymy plays an important role, since there is metonymical mapping (CONTROLLER-CONTROLLED) as well as some semantic coercion. Unfortunately, Stallard supports the idea of non-referential metonymy with no more than two examples.⁵ Section 4 provides more examples

of non-referential metonymies. As we will see, these fit the description of predicative metonymy given above.

4. Metonymical Object Changes (MOCs)

The first publications in which the notion of metonymy was applied not just to literary but also to normal language were dictionaries. For example, the German dictionary of Adelung, dating from the end of the 18th century, already uses the term *metonymisch* to describe certain verb–object combinations. An example is *ausklopfen* ‘(to beat out)’, which can be combined with the object that is beaten out as well as with the entity the object is beaten out from (e.g. *Staub ausklopfen* ‘beat out dust’ vs. *Kleider ausklopfen* ‘beat out clothes’). The same shift is found in Dutch (compare *uitkloppen*, the Dutch equivalent of *ausklopfen*). Traditional Dutch dictionaries, such as the *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal* (WNT), label this *objectsverwisseling* (lit. ‘object change’), which is defined as a special form of metonymy involving the direct object (cf. *Van Dale* 2005). I will refer to this phenomenon as Metonymical Object Change (MOC).⁶

Because of their traditional coding, Dutch and German dictionaries can be a useful source of non-referential instances of metonymy.⁷ However, dictionaries differ in the number of examples labelled explicitly as MOCs. Adelung gives 115 examples of MOCs labelled *metonymisch*, and 32 similar examples labelled *auf solche Art* ‘(in this way)’. A search of the terms *Objectserweiterung*, *Objectsvertauschung*, *Objectsaustausch* and *metonymisch* in Grimm’s dictionary yielded fewer than 20 instances. The terms *object(s)verwisseling*, *verwisseling van object*, *objectwisseling*, as well as abbreviations of these, in the WNT yielded the largest number of examples, viz. over 400 verbs. The same search in *Van Dale* yielded 151 verbs. Dictionaries differ not only in the number of examples, but they also give non-overlapping sets of examples.⁸

On the basis of this dictionary material, several metonymical patterns can be found. Most of these are similar to the example *Kleider/Staub ausklopfen* given above, in that they involve the relation LOCATION–LOCATUM (e.g. the Dutch and German equivalents of *clear the table/dishes*, *wipe the cupboard/fingerprints*, *dredge pancakes (with sugar)/sugar (on pancakes)*, *strip tobacco (leaves)/a (tobacco) plant*, *suck out the wasp sting/the poison*, and so on). Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1992) analyse some of these shifts in English, but restrict their attention to the semantics of the verbs. Their study neglects the important role of the direct object (which gives the shift its name) and fails to take into account the similarities between MOCs of different metonymical patterns, such as CONTAINER–CONTENT (*pack your suitcase/clothing*, *fire (off) a gun/bullet*), PRODUCT–MATERIAL/INGREDIENT (*squeeze juice/*

lemons, braid baskets/reed), SHAPE–OBJECT/MATERIAL (*untie the bow/shoe laces*), DAMAGE–OBJECT (*repair the leak/the roof, mend holes/stockings*), WHOLE–PART (*cast off the ship/the rope*), IMAGE–OBJECT (*paint a portrait/John*), etc. All these examples form a single class in terms of the metonymy involved.

In the above examples, the verb's semantics ensure that its direct objects are part of the same conceptual structure (cf. Croft 1993: 354). Both objects are essential in this structure: in one way or other, both are involved in the action expressed by the verb. Consider for example the verb *squeeze*. In order to be able to perform the act of squeezing, something must be squeezed out of something. Squeezing juice, for instance, requires some fruit or vegetables. This logical connection also works the other way around: If you squeeze a piece of fruit, you end up with juice. The same holds for all the other verbs. If you pack, you put things into a suitcase; carrying out repairs involves some damage and something that is fixed; firing a gun also involves firing a bullet, and so on. Thus, it is impossible to shift objects at random or to highlight just any part of the relevant conceptual structure in direct object position. A possible direct object must be a central part — a core element or “conceptually necessary component” (Ruppenhofer et al. 2006: 26) — of the relevant conceptual structure. In each of the cases considered above, the shifted objects are necessarily part of the conceptual structure evoked by the verb: Without them (and without the agent, which is another core element) the action expressed by the verb is principally impossible.

Since both possible objects belong to the same conceptual structure (as determined by the verb), they share an intimate relationship. This explains why so many objects are inseparable (e.g. *holes* and *stockings*, *juice* and *lemons*, *baskets* and *reed*, *string* and *bow*) or at least strongly connected (e.g. *dust* and *clothes*, *a portrait (of John)* and *John*). The strong connection between objects within a conceptual structure also explains why there are so many Dutch and German particle verbs that allow Metonymical Object Change. The particle specifies the relation between both objects. In *ausklopfen/uitkloppen*, for example, the particle *aus/uit* determines the connection between the dust and the clothes: The dust is beaten *out* by the verb action, and is thus *in* the clothes. Another illustrative example is the English verb *clear* (as in *clear the table*), which corresponds to a verb–particle combination in German and Dutch, i.e. *abräumen/afruimen*. These verbs can be combined with the table as well as with the things on the table, since it is clear that these things are in fact *on* the table, and taken *off* it (*ab/af* meaning ‘off’). Although the particle helps to clarify the relation, simplex verbs may also induce MOCs (such as *clear*). The connection between the objects can be evident even without a particle, since both direct objects must always be core parts of the verb's conceptual structure.

Waltereit (1998) provides a detailed analysis of the same phenomenon in French. Waltereit also analyses these cases as involving a contiguity relation between

both objects within a verb frame. While this account is therefore similar to the one outlined above, some differences must be noted. Waltereit (1998:56) claims that synchronically the metonymy in MOCs is one between semantic roles, and not between objects as such, while I have explained that there is in fact a metonymical relationship between the two possible objects. Furthermore, Waltereit (1998:64) treats shifts of this kind as involving polysemy of the verb. In my opinion, this is problematic, since the action expressed by the verb (i.e. its meaning) does not change. Verbs such as *clear*, *pack*, *squeeze*, *mend* and *untie* express the same action, regardless of whether the verb is combined with one direct object or the other. The choice of object would only seem to trigger a change in the focus of the event as a whole (cf. Koch 2004:47). Thus, although the semantics of the verb play a crucial role in determining the relevant conceptual structure, the meaning of the verb itself remains stable. A characteristic property of MOCs is that the two direct objects with which the verb can be combined do not necessarily change the truth conditions.

Not all objects which form core parts of a conceptual structure can function as the direct object of a verb. First of all, the relation between verb and (shifted) direct object must be unambiguous. This explains why certain shifts are impossible. For instance, although a verb like *remove* belongs to a similar frame as *clear*, it is impossible to say that *the table has been removed* (in the sense of 'the plates on the table have been removed'). Since tables can be removed themselves, they cannot function as a location (as in *clear the table*).

Furthermore, the shifted object must have some cognitive prominence. Objects can be cognitively prominent for different reasons. Sometimes MOC is possible, since one of the two objects is in some way already incorporated in the verb. An example of this is the Dutch verb *uitbaggeren* ('to dredge out'). This verb can be combined with the location where the mud is taken from (e.g. canals, harbours or ditches: *kanalen/havens/sloten uitbaggeren*) or with the mud that is taken out (e.g. *slib uitbaggeren* or, in attributive position, *uitgebaggerde slib*). In general, the location has cognitive prominence because it is the place that is affected by the dredging, despite the fact that it is the mud that is literally taken out. The mud itself is less salient as a direct object, since it is already incorporated in the verb, which is a conversion of the noun *bagger* 'mud'. The mud, in this example, is a so-called 'shadow object' or 'lexical object' (cf. Pustejovsky 2000), meaning that it can function as direct object only if its redundancy is decreased and its salience for the object position is increased, for example because the focus is on the mud or because the kind of mud is specified. In the absence of such focus, the default choice for the direct object of *uitbaggeren* is the location in which the dredging takes place.

The relevance of cognitive prominence due to non-redundancy can be used to explain certain cross-linguistic differences. Although a verb like *milk*, or Dutch *melken*, has both milk (Dutch *melk*) and a cow (Dutch *koe*) as its core parts, only

the latter can function as direct object; thus, the constructions *milking milk* and *melk melken* are considered redundant. However, while the German verb is the same as the Dutch one, i.e. *melken*, the drink is called *Milch*. As a result, none of the core parts is felt by speakers to be incorporated in the verb, so that *Kühe melken* and *Milch melken* are both felicitous (as is supported by a search of the internet and the DWDS-corpus; see www.dwds.de).

Other MOC patterns can also be explained in terms of increased cognitive prominence. For instance, a shifted object is more often a something concrete than a hole or some damage (*repair the roof*, *mend the stockings*). Since holes do not exist in the absence of the objects that they are part of, the concrete objects rather than the holes are cognitively prominent (cf. Langacker 1993: 30), and so can appear in direct object position. Furthermore, it is the objects that are fixed as a result of the action expressed by the verb.

This is an additional reason for their having cognitive prominence. Objects which are the direct result of a verb are always salient. For this reason, a frequent class of shifted objects are ‘resulting products’, as in *press juice* or *braid baskets*. Notice that, in addition to *braided baskets* and *repaired roofs*, examples like *dredged canal*, *cleared table*, *wiped cupboard* and *packed suitcase* also seem to involve a focus on the result of the action. This shows, again, that the action as expressed by the verb remains the same, and that only the focus on the event as a whole is slightly different. Hence, the metonymy involved in MOCs aids the understanding of the event as a whole.

5. MOCs: Evidence for instances of metonymy without a referential shift

Although shifting reference is traditionally considered a definitional feature of metonymy, more recently it has been claimed that there are instances of metonymy without a referential shift. Unfortunately, solid supporting evidence for this claim is missing, as I explained in Section 3. In Section 4 I have offered an analysis of MOCs, which are a specific type of metonymy (and labelled as such in dictionaries). In MOCs the two direct objects entertain a metonymical relationship to each other (e.g. location and object at the location, product and material, image and object). However, MOCs differ from the more prototypical examples of metonymy discussed in Section 2 in that the shifted objects of MOCs never refer to anything but their literal denotation. In the combination *squeeze juice*, for example, *juice* does not suddenly refer to ‘lemons’, nor can *table*, in the combination *clear the table*, refer to ‘the things on the table’.

Rather, what is metonymical in MOCs is the relationship between the objects, which is one of contiguity; the two objects are part of the same conceptual

structure or frame. Metonymy, as an underlying conceptual mechanism, induces the possibility of the shifted verb–object combination. Changing the object involves highlighting another core part of the conceptual structure evoked by the verb, which, in Langacker’s (1993:32) view, is “metonymic or very much akin to metonymy”. In other words, MOCs and prototypical cases of metonymy both involve domain highlighting, i.e. a shift in the prominence of a part of a semantic structure (cf. Croft 1993, Koch 2004, Moerdijk 1989). In addition, the highlighting found in MOCs perfectly fits Stallard’s definition of predicative metonymy, in that it shifts neither the meaning of the verb nor of its expressed direct object. Rather, it coerces the “predicate argument place” (Stallard 1993:89).

Although the verb in MOCs expresses the same action regardless of the object it combines with, the choice of object determines the focus of the event as a whole. For this reason, MOCs can be said to lead to a figure/ground effect within a frame (cf. Koch 2004, Waltereit 1998). This effect can be a new conceptualization based on the general concept as a whole, i.e. it can be “concept-oriented” in the sense of Koch (2004:25). This explains why metonymy is possible without necessarily involving a referential shift (cf. Koch 2004:46–47). The metonymy in these cases is used to structure an event, and thus to aid understanding. Lakoff & Johnson (1980:36–37), who assume that the primary function of metonymy is referential, already pointed out that metonymy can also be used for focussing and to aid understanding. MOCs, which helps us to conceptualize the event connected with the action expressed by the verb, are a perfect illustration of this, even without involving a referential shift.

Notes

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1. This idea does not go back to Croft alone, but can also be found in earlier approaches to metonymy, as explained in Moerdijk (1989).
2. A similar expression exists in Dutch and German, but with a slightly different construction: *ik ben één en al oor* (‘I am nothing but ear’) and *ich bin ganz Ohr* (‘I am entirely ear’) respectively.
3. It is dubious whether (7) in fact involves predicative use of metonymy. One of the meanings of *bass* is ‘a man with a very deep singing voice’. Given this, the only metonymy that is involved could be the metonymically related meanings of the word *bass* (i.e. metonymical or logical polysemy).
4. Ruiz de Mendoza (2000:114) treats this example as an instance of referential metonymy and offers an alternative explanation for the difference in anaphorical reference, in terms of a different relation between the domains of the metonymical expression (source) and the intended

referent (target). In (11) the metonymical expression *ham sandwich* is a subdomain of the intended referent *the customer*, whereas in (12) the metonymical expression *Nixon* is the superdomain (or “matrix domain”) of the intended army. Ruiz de Mendoza assumes that only matrix domains are available for anaphorical reference; this would explain why in (11) the pronoun can refer to the customer only, and in (12) to Nixon. While it is reasonable to say that the order in (11) is an element of the customer domain, it is unclear, at least to me, why a president is supposed to be the matrix domain of an army. Without objective criteria to decide this, this explanation runs the risk of being circular.

5. In addition to the example discussed in the text, Stallard (1993:87–88) gives the more complicated example *Which airlines fly from Boston to Denver?* where there is a metonymical mapping between *airlines* and *flights*, even though *airlines* seems to be used literally.

6. Subjects display similar metonymical shifts. Dutch and German dictionaries refer to this as *subjectsverwisseling* or *Subjektsvertauschung* and *metonymisch*, respectively. Unfortunately, reasons of space prevent me from discussing such cases.

7. This shows that Dutch and German lexicographers were quick to recognize the metonymical aspects of these shifts. It does not mean, of course, that Dutch and German are the only languages which allow MOCs. Waltereit (1998) provides an account of the same phenomenon in French. Although Waltereit (1998:56, 65) explicitly states that such instances of metonymy are interpreted literally, he does not discuss the consequences of this observation in any detail.

8. Of the 151 Dutch verbs found in Van Dale, 80 overlap with MOC verbs in the WNT. The only overlapping verbs in Grimm and Adelung are *pflanzen* and *gießen*. On the basis of the 150 German verbs, 36 new Dutch ones were found. Of the almost 500 Dutch verbs, only 80 translations into German did not allow MOCs (or had no direct German equivalent). These numbers are by no means exhaustive, since many verb–particle combinations (e.g. *abräumen/afruimen* or *ausklopfen/uitkloppen*) allow MOC.

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