

A study of gender in a bilingual law dictionary (English/Spanish)

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Dictionaries are means of transmission of words and senses as a reflection of the prejudices and beliefs of their time. This paper takes a look into the ten editions of the *Diccionario de términos jurídicos (Inglés-español/Spanish-English)* by Enrique Alcaraz Varó and Brian Hughes to see how gender is treated. The analysis takes place both on the macrostructural and the microstructural level, and it illustrates the sexism present in the traditional lexicographical practice in Spanish dictionaries. Among others we have confirmed the presence of certain approaches such as: the concealment of women (by use of the generic masculine or an androcentric treatment of professions), or the presentation of stereotyped portraits of men and women and their relationship (by the selection of semantic fields referred exclusively to women or non-neutral examples of use in terms of gender).

Keywords: lexicography, bilingual dictionaries, law dictionaries, legal language, linguistic sexism

1. Introduction

Gender related matters are, nowadays, central to the critical thinking of our culture. An example of this is that, throughout the last decade, several states of the European Union have approved laws against gender-based discrimination with the aim of promoting equality between women and men in different aspects of life: employment, social politics, economics, culture, and civil society. In the same way, citizens have become especially sensitive to discriminatory conduct against women, such as: male violence against women, sexual harassment or gender inequalities in the labour market.

In this context, language plays a key role as an instrument for the transmission and perpetuation of ideologies. Philosophical tradition has taught us that the

world, as we believe it to be, is nothing more than a human construct, that is to say, that words are responsible for its organization, categorization, and classification (Forgas Berdet, 1996). We do not access reality directly, but rather this access is mediated by language and under no circumstances is this mediation neutral. Moreover, in this process of generating and disseminating the social imaginary, one of the fundamental weapons is words. Other language levels are able to transmit the sense (mainly grammatical and discursive), but the lexical level has the greatest conceptual relevance. As Calero Fernández (1999a, p. 149) points out, of all the language levels, the lexical makes the most crucial contribution to this process of generating ideology.

As instruments for the transmission of words and senses, therefore, dictionaries are cornerstones of this scenario, sometimes even executing some linguistic reforms involving social changes (Moon, 1989, p. 64). This is why it is impossible to separate the unavoidable fragmentation of reality through language from the practice of lexicography. In this regard, studies into ideology in dictionaries (Pascual & Olaguíbel, 1992; Kahane & Kahane, 1992; Calero Fernández, 1999a) insist that lexicographical works reflect the prejudices and beliefs of their creators, which are, in fact, the prejudices and beliefs of the society in which they live. Thus, each dictionary is the result of a selection of words and a carefully planned strategy of how to present the contents. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the work of the lexicographer is by no means neutral. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine to what extent lexicographers are *slaves* of their time as mere *use notaries* (Pascual & Olaguíbel, 1992, p. 81), or co-responsible for those uses and their evolution.

With the analysis of gender through the ten editions (from 1993 to 2007) of the *Diccionario de términos jurídicos (Inglés-español/Spanish-English)* by Enrique Alcaraz Varó and Brian Hughes (DTJ) (Alcaraz Varó & Hugues, 1993–2007) we aim to offer an example of how a dictionary is able to generate a biased view of reality by means of certain mechanisms, such as entry selection and ordering, the use of the generic masculine, the wording of definitions, the examples or the references. Of course, this is a result of language itself as a reflection of society, which is mostly sexist. For this purpose, we have chosen a dictionary which is an essential referent point in English and Spanish bilingual legal lexicography, both in quantitative (number of entries) and in qualitative terms (information offered in the articles). Therefore, we can postulate that the text examined may exert a powerful influence on the production of most of the legal translations between the aforementioned languages (especially in Spain, where this dictionary is widely used by translators).

The content of this paper is a summary of the results of a PhD carried out by the author. This investigation was made known to the new editor of the dictionary,

and the criticisms made on this lexicographical work as we present them in this paper have been addressed and most of them have been incorporated in the newest edition. This can only confirm both that the kind of research we have carried out is required in order to correct the lack of sensitivity in terms of the ideological influence that dictionaries can exercise over their users, and also that there is a need to revise the lexicographical corpus to ensure a better picture of the world the dictionaries show.

2. Macrostructural analysis

For the purposes of studying the sexist features present in the DTJ, we will try to separate the aspects regarding the macrostructure of the work from those affecting its microstructure. By doing so, we aim to offer a thorough analysis of those gender-related aspects that could be present in the work at the grammatical, lexical, syntactic or discursive level.

First of all, then, we shall tackle the sexist features at the macrostructural level of the dictionary, especially how they affect the selection of entries. To do so, we have established four levels of analysis: concealing women, the systematic use of the generic masculine, the androcentric treatment of professions, and the semantic fields reserved for women.

2.1 Concealing women

One of the more obvious sexist features in Spanish dictionaries is the scarce feminine presence, both from the quantitative and qualitative point of view (Rubio Pérez, 1998). This fact derives from an androcentric perspective of the lexicographical texts, which determines that men are the subject par excellence of those studies. In the DTJ, this can be seen from different aspects. First of all, the most frequent gender used in the headwords is the masculine, except in very few cases, such as the double entry “*divorciado-a*.”¹

Furthermore, the grammatical masculine is used systematically in the DTJ in the definitions and the examples in Spanish. As we are dealing with a bilingual dictionary, this is even more evident if we look at the equivalences presented for nouns that are grammatical neutral in English. As an example, for “legitimate child,” the equivalence offered is “*hijo legítimo*,” omitting all the female descendants.

1. In this case, as is usual in Spanish lexicography, the entry does not respect the alphabetical order when placing the masculine ending ‘o’ before the feminine ‘a’.

The use of the generic masculine in headwords, equivalences and definitions determines the interpretation of the text insofar as the male is conceived as the only referent. On this subject, we see a better implementation of the “principle of gender neutrality” (Williams, 2008) in English than in Spanish throughout the DTJ. In part this is caused by the intrinsic features of the English language; however, when terms in English possess grammatical gender, the DTJ entries include both the masculine and the feminine (for example, “widow” and “widower” or “testator” and “testatrix”). On the other hand, in the definitions in English for Spanish entries it normally uses terms embracing both genders (for example, the second equivalence for “*padre*” as “parent”) or expressions including the masculine and the feminine (as “husband and wife” for “*cónyuges*”).

A good example of how the English used in the DTJ affords greater consideration to gender diversity than the Spanish is the article “*alimento[s]*.” Despite this term having no connotation at all related to any kind of gender discrimination, this is the fact of the matter in the example of use shown in Spanish. In this example (“*Los hijos tendrán derecho a recibir alimentos de su padre tras el divorcio*”) it is assumed that the wife will be granted custody of the children after divorce and that the husband will be in a better financial position, which will lead to an economic compensation for the rest of the family. In the English definition, instead, it is said that “[...] the duty ceases when the children come of age or become independent, and also if the dependent status of the former spouse is altered by remarriage or by significant improvement in his or her financial position [...].” If we compare the stereotypes reflected in the example in Spanish with respect to those reflected in the explanation in English, we can observe that, in the second case, it is not determined which parent will be granted custody of the children nor which will have the major purchasing power. Thus, whereas the Spanish definition does reflect chauvinist stereotypes, the one in English remains neutral in this regard.

2.2 Use of generic masculine

As far as gender-based lemmatization is concerned in the Spanish section of the DTJ from 1993 to 2007, a predominant use of generic masculine is detected. In this respect, most of the Spanish entries for nouns and adjectives are in the masculine, even in the case of words that could refer to persons of either gender (for example, “*amancebado*”, “*bígamo*” or “*compañero sentimental*”). As this dictionary does not include labels of grammatical gender (and as generic masculine prevails), English speaking users of the work will not have the corresponding information to form the feminine, something that could be considered an inconvenience for a bidirectional dictionary.

Nevertheless, the masculine as generic in Spanish is not used systematically in the DTJ. Although less frequently, it does also contain separate entries for the masculine and the feminine in some cases. This is to be found in terms such as “*alcahueta*” and “*alcahuete*,” “*buscón*” and “*buscona*,” “*esposa*” and “*esposo*” or “*viuda*” and “*viudo*.” Curiously, this duplicity is especially apparent in words belonging to semantic fields referring to prostitution and marriage. Among headwords related to gender issues we also found two other double entries. The first one is “*adúltero*,” “*adúltera*,” probably generated by imitation of the English entry “*adulterer*,” “*adulteress*”; the second one is “*divorciado-a*.” All this shows a hesitation in the application of grammatical gender in Spanish within the dictionary.

As regards the examples of usage, we can conclude that the male is the subject par excellence in the DTJ in the Spanish-English section (with the exception of sentences referring exclusively to feminine issues, as is the case with the article “*abortar*” where the following example appears: “*La mujer embarazada no debe tomar misoprostol porque corre el riesgo de abortar*”). In the dictionary we can also find examples such as these: “*El juez dictó una orden de alejamiento dirigida al marido maltratador*” in the article for “*orden de alejamiento*,” or “*El usufructuario deberá cuidar las cosas dadas en usufructo como un buen padre de familia*” in the entry for “*padre de familia*.”

Last of all, in our analysis of the use of generic masculine in the Spanish-English section of the DTJ, we will look at the words used as references. Here also, masculine is the grammatical gender par excellence. For the articles referring to people where the entry is in the masculine, the words used as references reproduce the same gender. An example of this is the article corresponding to “*empresario*,” whose references are “*dueño*,” “*patrono*,” and “*empleador*.” In contrast, when the entry refers specifically to women (in the feminine), the nouns used as references normally appear in the feminine, but the adjectives, in the masculine. As an example, in the article for “*alcahueta*” the reference is “*celestina*,” but also “*obsceno*,” and “*deshonesto*.”

In the English-Spanish section, we primarily found that equivalences for nouns and adjectives referring to people of neutral gender in English are automatically presented in the masculine in Spanish. So, we have “*agnado*” as the equivalence for “*agnated*,” “*juez*” for “*judge*” or “*violador*” for “*rapist*.” In the case of nouns with gender variation in English, the double formulation is reproduced in the equivalences. Some examples are: “*adúltero, adúltera*” for “*adulterer*,” “*adulteress*,” “*empresario, hombre de negocios*” for “*businessman*,” “*empresaria, mujer de negocios*” for “*businesswoman*,” or “*testadora*” for “*testatrix*” and “*testador*” for “*testator*.” In the definitions in Spanish of the English entries, generic masculine is the norm when the gender of the person is not specified. An example of this is the

definition offered for “*natural child*,” where it is said that “*en el pasado se aplicaba al nacido [our italics] fuera del matrimonio*.”

With the English lemmatization in the DTJ, the feminine of nouns is systematically reproduced (“adulterer/adulteress,” “testator/testatrix,” “widow/widower”). The exceptions are nouns ending in ‘-man’ (“gownman,” “hangman,” “talesman,” “venireman,” “workman,” among others) where there are only few feminine forms offered. Curiously, the feminine forms of both these lemmas in English and also of their Spanish equivalents are still absent in the 2012 edition (Alcaraz Varó, Hugues, & Campos, 2012), which represents one of the few remaining examples of the generic masculine still to be found in the present-day dictionary. Nevertheless, this implies that, although there is less gender discrimination in English on the grammatical level, it could be found on the discursive level, and that is the case with the information offered in the articles about these entries.

In the two sections of the DTJ, we can find a collection of expressions in legal language which use the masculine with a clear generic sense that leads to women becoming invisible. In this group, there are expressions such as “gentlemen’s agreement” or “word of honour/word as a gentleman” in English and “*acuerdo de caballeros*,” “*buen padre de familia*,” “*diligencia razonable o del buen padre de familia*,” “*diligencia del buen padre de familia*,” “*hogar paterno*,” “*hombre bueno*,” “*hombre de confianza*,” “*jefe de familia*,” “*licencia paterna*,” “*pacto de caballeros*,” in Spanish. Here we can observe, on the one hand, expressions referring to good practices and, on the other hand, expressions referring to the person holding the familial authority. In both cases, there is no doubt about the generic sense of these expressions, as is evidenced in the equivalences and the definitions. In this case, we are faced with the customary legal expressions that a specialized dictionary should include. From our point of view, although we concur with this argument, this is another example of the androcentrism of the language, and legal language, which is unquestioningly reproduced in the DTJ.

2.3 Androcentric treatment of professions

As far as professions are concerned, the lexicographical studies focusing on gender generally emphasize the invisibility of women in the description of the labour world (Bengoechea Bartolomé, 1998; Mediavilla Calleja, 2002). In the same way, in the DTJ the subjects of the professions are all masculine, with some exceptions. As regards the English vocabulary, for nouns with a double gender (by means of the suffixes -man, -woman) the dictionary uses the generic ending with -man in all cases (“gownman,” “hangman,” “talesman,” “venireman,” “workman,” among others). The only confirmed exception is “businessman” and “businesswoman,” articles introduced in the 2003 edition. Thus, and also in the section of

the dictionary dedicated to legal terms in English, the DTJ maintains the generic masculine norm. Curiously, the lack of a feminine form both in the case of these lemmas in English as well as for their Spanish equivalents remains in the 2012 edition, thus representing one of the few examples of the generic masculine still currently present in the dictionary.

In the case of the Spanish section, the overall criterion of the dictionary is also that of using the grammatical masculine as the representative of the human species. Accordingly, the majority of nouns referring to professions or charges are only shown in the masculine. Some examples of this are: “*abogado*,” “*empleado*,” “*empresario*,” “*fiscal*,” “*juez*,” “*letrado*,” “*magistrado*,” “*ministro*,” “*presidente*,” or “*procurador*.” We have found only one exception to this norm in the entries “*alcalde*” and “*alcaldesa*.” In this case, the article corresponding to the masculine has been part of the dictionary since the first edition of 1993, while the feminine was incorporated in 2003. Notwithstanding this, if we examine the whole article, we can appreciate that the rest of the subentries are maintained in the generic masculine, as is the case with “*alcalde de barrio*” or “*alcalde pedáneo*.”

In the current world, it is at the very least anachronistic that a legal dictionary does not include entries like “*abogada*,” “*empresaria*” or “*ministra*.” These are words naming women who effectively carry out those kinds of jobs. Moreover, the *Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española* (DRAE), the official dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy of the Language, has already incorporated those words with complete normality. In our opinion, we should also accept terms like “*fiscal*” or “*jueza*.” Regarding this question, we agree with Hampares (1976) or García Meseguer (1977), who defend the prescriptive value of dictionaries. Some studies (e.g. Calero Fernández, 2006), underline the invisibilizing effect exerted by the generic masculine on female participation in the working world. This should be sufficient reason to include the feminine of every profession in dictionaries.

Although the use of the generic masculine in the case of ergonyms was the norm followed by the DTJ from 1993 to 2007, we can see that the indiscriminate use of the generic masculine in Spanish has been largely corrected in the last edition in 2012. Each and every one of the Spanish entries automatically follows the o/a system in order to show the derivation in both genders. The same system is used for the equivalents in the English/Spanish section, as well as for most of the definitions and examples of use. In so doing, when any substantive is presented, it is clear that the subject may be male or female, thereby also easily avoiding the aforementioned inconveniences of the generic masculine. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the custom in Spanish lexicography of putting the masculine ending “o” before the feminine one “a” goes against the strict alphabetical order and so still grants priority to the masculine; in this way, the feminine is not so

much concealed as it is, in some respects, subordinate. The effort made in the last edition to reflect a more equal treatment of both genders is, however, noteworthy.

In a legal dictionary, it is foreseeable that the terms referring to the professions included in it should be principally those for professions within the legal world. Nevertheless, in many studies into lexicography and gender, it is worth pointing out the disproportionate attention paid by dictionaries to the world of prostitution (Marco López & Alario Trigueros, 1998; Forgas Berdet, 1999, among others). In the case of studies focusing on legal language, the only possible justification for the inclusion of this semantic field is that prostitution used to be an offence. However, after the approval of the new Spanish Criminal Code in 1995, Spanish law only criminalises (Sections 187 and 190) the incitement or intimidation to prostitution. That is to say that, from 1995 onwards, Spanish criminal law does not punish the prostitute but the pimp. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the DTJ can be used for the solution of terminological doubts from texts that could have been written some time ago. Therefore, the dictionary should include a balanced content of both the expired and the current terms.

The fact that dictionaries generally offer a comprehensive coverage of the phenomenon of prostitution phenomenon denotes an interest in reproducing some stereotypes which show women as the object of sexual commerce. Furthermore, synonyms of “prostitute” are still used as an insult against women. Therefore, lexicographers should be especially careful with this semantic field, because, in fact, the excessive attention paid to it responds to ideological reasons.

The DTJ only serves to confirm this trend as we find that, within the group of terms related to gender issues, 7.5% of the entries in Spanish and 10% of those in English correspond to the semantic field of prostitution. Moreover, most of them are words which were already included in the 1993 edition and were present until the last edition of 2007. For example, the entry “bawd” is added in 2003, although the dictionary already contained “bawdy” and “bawdy house”; “prostitution” also appears in 2003, but it already included “prostitute” and “prostitution ring.” In the Spanish section, “*comercio sexual*” and “*prostituirse*” are added up to “*prostíbulo*,” “prostitute,” and “*prostitución*.” Thus, the scarce updating of this semantic field implies a neglect of the ideological background of the dictionary.

Another matter of relevance to the group of words related to prostitution is the abundance of synonyms, archaisms, euphemisms and insults. More than in other semantic fields, herein may be observed a proliferation of synonyms,² and derivatives (“bawd,” “bawdy,” and “bawdy house” or “*prostíbulo*,” “*prostituta*,”

2. The amount of synonyms for brothel is remarkable: “bawdy house,” “brothel,” “disorderly house,” and “house of evil/ill repute,” in English, and “burdel,” “*casa de lenocinio*,” “*casa de prostitución*,” “*lupanar*,” and “*prostíbulo*,” in Spanish.

“*prostitución*,” and “*prostituirse*”). The abundance of entries referring to a specific semantic field in a dictionary is highly significant if we consider that this multiplication of terms implies the concession of a greater relevance to that field. As far as archaisms referring to prostitution are concerned (such as “*bawd*” or “*alcahueta*”), we cannot find any justification for the fact that the weight assigned to this semantic field in the DTJ should be superior to the weight assigned to current words. Nor does it seem entirely justified the fact that a legal dictionary should include euphemisms and insults. In the DTJ, however, we can find expressions like “house of evil/ill fame,” “whore,” and “*ramera*.” It should be noted that although some of the offensive entries, such as “whore” or “*alcahueta*” have disappeared from the 2012 edition, all the rest remain. Last of all, it must be pointed out that male prostitution is practically inexistent in this dictionary. Thus, in the world of prostitution shown in the DTJ, men are only represented as clients (“*kerb-crawler*”) or pimps.

2.4 Semantic fields referred to women

The DTJ reproduces the general trend in the Spanish lexicography to link some semantic fields exclusively to women. First of all, we should analyse whether the adscription of the terms to the sphere of women is a consequence of stereotyping; that it is to say, if those words could also be used for men. Furthermore, as we are dealing with a dictionary specializing in legal terms, the question could arise as to whether those terms should be included in this kind of lexicographical work or not. This would be the case only with *technical* or *semitechnical* words.³ Although these words could also appear in a legal text, the question is whether they should not rather be part of a general dictionary, most of all because they could imply any ideological component. In semantic fields that are, apparently, exclusive to women, for example maternity, there can exist some spheres of action shared by the couple that are overlooked in the LTD, such as paternity leave. Other fields, like prostitution, are not exclusive to women; what is more there are many ways to treat them respectfully without the need to add discriminatory or derogatory elements.

The most outstanding semantic field reserved for women is the one referring to pregnancy and maternity (“*bear*,” “*maternal*,” “*maternity*,” “*maternity leave*,” “*surrogacy*,” “*surrogate mother*,” in English, and “*baja por maternidad*,” “*claustró materno*,” “*madrastra*,” “*madre*,” “*madre adoptiva*,” “*madre sustituta*,” “*madre sustituta o de alquiler*,” “*maternidad*,” “*materno*,” “*matriarcado*,” “*matricida*,” “*matriicidio*,” “*parto*,” “*permiso por alumbramiento*,” in Spanish). Some of these entries

3. The authors of the dictionary themselves describe technical and semitechnical words as: “*unidades léxicas del tronco común que han pasado a la especialidad con otro significado*” (Alcaraz & Hughes, 2007, p. vii).

belong to the dictionary since its first edition in 1993 (“bear,” “maternity leave,” “surrogate mother,” “*baja por maternidad*,” and “*madre sustituta*”), but most of them were incorporated into the revised and updated edition of 2003.

Pregnancy is a phenomenon exclusively to women, so its adscription to the feminine gender is obvious. Notwithstanding this, it is not so obvious that words like “bear,” “*claustró materno*” or “*parto*” should be included in a legal dictionary. On the other hand, pregnancy represents but one phase of the relationship between parents and children. However, when we search in the DTJ for entries from that semantic field, we find fewer words referring to men (“paternal,” “paternity,” in English, and “*padrastró*,” “*padre*,” “*padre de familia*,” “*padre putativo*,” “*paternidad*,” “*paterno*,” “*patriarcado*,” in Spanish). Curiously, the entries “*baja por paternidad*” or “*padre adoptivo*” are not present, although both concepts have existed in the Spanish legal system since at least the year of the first edition of the DTJ (1993). Furthermore, paternity leave has recently been the object of several legal amendments in Spain, all of which have been accompanied by subsequent social debate.

The DTJ treats the concept of *woman* itself is treated with more attention than that of *man*. In English, we find “discoverf feme,” “female,” “feme,” “feme covert,” “feme discoverf/feme sole,” “maiden,” “maiden name,” “née”; in Spanish, “*mujer*,” “*mujer casada*,” “*mujer soltera*,” “*viuda*” or “*divorciada*.” For *man*, however, we can only find the entries: “husband,” “male,” and “male issue” in the first part of the dictionary, and “*hombre*” and “*marido*” in the second. In this group of words pertaining to the semantic field of *woman*, there is a reproduction of the scheme, also revealed in other studies into lexicography and gender (see Benhamou, 1986; Olmedo Rojas, 1996, 1997), of the woman defined according to her marital status. This may lead to the understanding that although the man is a valid being in his own right, the value of a woman is dependent on her marital status. Thus, while the man is just *husband*, the marital status of the woman is treated in the DTJ in 6 entries in English and 2 in Spanish. It should be pointed out that in the 2003 edition, the articles “*mujer casada*” and “*mujer soltera*,” “*viuda*,” or “*divorciada*” were deleted. Nevertheless, all the English articles on this subject are present without any modification in the dictionary throughout all of the editions until 2012.

Special mention should be made to the entry “*amparo y dependencia de la mujer casada*,” which was maintained in the dictionary from its first edition to its fifth but disappeared completely in 2003 (but is still present in the current edition as the definition for “coverture,” a clearly obsolete concept in which the woman lost her legal status after marriage). First of all, the fact that it is a considerably long phraseological unit is remarkable (although we defend the convenience of the incorporation of phraseological units in dictionaries). In this case, it is an archaism with a foreseeably null presence in recent legal texts in Spanish. Moreover, the meaning of this expression could easily be solved by querying it in general dictionaries.

As we mentioned before in Section 2.3, another semantic field reserved for women in the DTJ that is treated with special attention, is prostitution. Of the words belonging to this group referring to women, the DTJ includes: “prostitute,” “streetwalker,” and “whore,” in English, and “*alcahueta*,” “*celestina*,” “*chica de alterne*,” “*prostituta*,” and “*ramera*,” in Spanish. It could be argued that, insofar as sexual commerce is partly a criminal act both in the Spanish legal system and in the legal system of many English speaking countries (most of all the activity of procuring), the inclusion of this semantic field in the dictionary could be justified. Nevertheless, we do not find it so appropriate that the DTJ includes words with derogatory connotations, as is the case with “streetwalker,” “whore,” “*celestina*,” or “*ramera*.” It is also curious, that equivalents for male prostitutes do not appear in this dictionary.

3. Microstructural analysis

For the purposes of studying the sexist features present in the DTJ on a microstructural level, we will first look at the definitions and equivalences, because these are usually complementary in bilingual dictionaries. Therefore, definitions are not included in every article, but only in those where the equivalence is not exact or could lead to confusion. Sometimes, when there is no term of the same category to be found in the other language, definitions also serve as equivalences; consequently, the traductological technique of description is used, by means of which a word is replaced by its definition (Hurtado Albir, 2007, p. 270). After that, we shall analyse the sexist features in the examples offered by the dictionary and the terms used as references. Last of all, we will devote some attention to the labels, the ones used in the DTJ and the ones we think should be added.

3.1 Sexist features in definitions and equivalences

Definitions are a basic transmission channel of ideology in dictionaries. Definitions can be written in many ways; including, as García Meseguer (1977, p. 82) points out, from a sexist perspective. By showing the different aspects of life in which women (or men) are portrayed or from which they are excluded through their definitions, dictionaries provide us with a clearly defined picture of both genders. Generally speaking, in the case of definitions the sexist conception of dictionaries is embodied in four fundamental issues: the grammatical gender of hyperonyms, unequal definitions for feminine and masculine, reference to women in specific fields only and apparent dualities (Lledó, 1998; Rubio Pérez, 1998; Calero

Fernández, 1999b; Forgas Berdet, 1999; Vargas Martínez, 1999; Jiménez Ríos, 2001; Andrés Castellano, 2002).

As regards the first question, the hyperonyms, gender-sensitive lexicography offers no advice on the use of the generic masculine as it links the term defined with the picture of a man as subject. To avoid this problem, the use of neutral formulations is recommended in Spanish, such as “*persona*” or “*ser humano*.” In the DTJ, however, the generic masculine is applied generally as a hyperonym in definitions. If we, for example, look at the definition for “magistrate,” we will find the words “*juez*” and “*ciudadano*,” both masculine.

Evidently, this phenomenon occurs mainly in the part of the dictionary with entries in English defined in Spanish, as, thanks to the English language offering greater neutrality in terms of gender, it is much less frequent in the case of definitions in English for Spanish terms. Notwithstanding this, the fact that definitions in English of a Spanish word presented in the dictionary as generic masculine do not specify that this word cannot be attributed in a specific sense to a woman could also be considered a concealment of women. An example of this is “*abogado*,” defined as “legal practitioner who represents his or her client before a court [...]”

From the different context in which Rubio Pérez (1998) detects a sexist use of hyperonyms in definitions, in the DTJ we found the following cases:

- Articles with entries in masculine and feminine which only have a definition in the masculine. The only double entry detected is “adulterer,” “adulteress,” in English, and “*adúltero*,” “*adúltera*,” in Spanish. Nevertheless, as we are dealing with a bilingual dictionary where not all the articles include definitions, the dictionary indicates the equivalents for both genders in the two examples found, so we cannot see a case of sexism here.
- Articles referring to words of generic value defined only in the masculine. We were able to find some examples of this; for instance, the equivalents of “indecency with a child” as “*abuso deshonesto con un menor*,” “adulterine” as “*adulterino*,” “bigamist” as “*bígamo*,” “indecent” as “*indecoroso*,” and all of the nouns and adjectives referring to people included in the dictionary as entries in the English section. In reference to “care,” we also found the expression “*diligencia del buen padre de familia*.” It is a frequently used expression in legal Spanish, and therefore, we cannot reproach the inclusion of this clearly androcentric expression in the DTJ.

The second question, the unequal definitions for the feminine and masculine, is evident in the cases of double entries, that is to say, when the dictionary presents the masculine and the feminine in different articles. In double entries that have been more recently incorporated into the dictionary, such as “businessman” and “businesswoman,” the information presented is symmetrical (“*empresario, hombre*

de negocios” and “*empresaria, mujer de negocios*”). Other examples of double entries without discrimination are “*esposa*” and “*esposo*” or “*viuda*” and “*viudo*.” In not-so-recent articles, the decompensation is more marked, as may be seen in the article for “testator” which includes the definition “*testador, el que hace testamento*,” while “testatrix” is only defined as “testadora.” In the last edition of 2012, the problem of double entries (present in all previous editions) is solved easily by means of single entries (with double ending o/a), as it is recommended by gender-sensitive lexicography.

Thus, a progressive trend towards parity in the definitions for double entries may be detected over the successive editions of the DTJ. Nevertheless, we have also seen that definitions written in the first editions remain unaltered until the last one, although it is true that they are less proportionated. We agree with the opinion of gender-sensitive lexicography that double entries favour the inequality of information offered by the masculine and the feminine article, as the definition of the feminine is usually subordinated to the masculine.

Definitions of the DTJ referring to general concepts also contain inequalities in terms of how the genders are treated; primarily, it is in the field dealing with the relationship between genders where we can find some evidence of this. In the English section, the term “coverture” is defined as “amparo y dependencia de la mujer casada; esta dependencia le impedía celebrar contratos sin permiso del marido.” It is an English term that corresponds to a clearly obsolete legal concept by means of which the woman lost her legal capacity after marriage. It could be argued that a dictionary specializing in legal terms should include legal concepts from other times. Nevertheless, in our opinion, lexicographical works should reflect, first of all, the society of their time. Therefore, we consider that the inclusion of out-of-date words should be, at the very least, compensated for with the inclusion of words in current usage and marked with a temporal label as obsolete.

Another sphere in which dictionaries usually exhibit gender inequality is that of terms referring to sexual relations and we can see some samples of this in the DTJ. The entry “date rape” is defined as follows: “*acusación de violación por el acompañante que la invitó al cine, a pasear, a cenar, etc. y se aprovechó de ella forzando las relaciones sexuales*.” This definition is a perfect reflection of the traditional male and female stereotypes as regards couples and their relationship. The male is the active character, the one with initiative and the one who forces non-consensual sexual intercourse; the woman is only presented as the object of desire. In the article referring to “ravish,” the term is also defined in a sexist way: “*violar [a una mujer]*.” Last of all, in “sexual intercourse,” the definition “*conocimiento carnal con penetración en la vagina*” once again gives the active role to the male and the passive to the female.

There are some references exclusive to women in the definitions and equivalences in the DTJ. Firstly, the indisputable ones are those dealing with questions related to pregnancy and maternity (“maternal,” “womb,” etcetera). The question arises again whether this information is presented symmetrically when compared with other equivalent concepts for men.

Secondly, there is another group of legal terms exclusive to women:

- (1) *née* (*nacida [con el nombre de], de soltera; la palabra francesa née va seguida del nombre de soltera para que no haya confusiones de identidad*)
- (2) maiden name (*apellido de soltera; de acuerdo con la legislación y la convención, la mujer al casarse pierde el apellido paterno y toma el del marido, si no expresa formalmente el deseo contrario; sin embargo, en muchos casos, se sigue pidiéndole que consigne su nombre de soltera en los documentos oficiales para que no haya confusiones de identidad, y en las declaraciones es frecuente el uso de la fórmula Margaret Smith née Jones, en donde la expresión francesa née introduce el nombre de soltera*)

These two terms are sexist as they imply that women undergo a loss of identity when married. In this case, the DTJ defines the concepts in as neutral a way as possible.

Thirdly, we find equivalents and definitions referring to outdated situations of inequality, for example “coverture.”

Fourthly, there are cases of sexist stereotypes about sexual relationships being reproduced, as is the case with “date rape” defined as the “male companion accused of rape by the female companion who he invited to the cinema, for a walk, etc., and abused her by forcing her to maintain sexual relations” and with “ravisht” “to rape [a woman]; in British English it is an obsolete term.” In both cases, it is supposed that men are the only ones who carry out sexual violence, once again granting the active role to men and the passive to women. The first case is more blatant than the second, in which the subject is not clear (and could, therefore, be another woman); nevertheless, as the generic masculine is used systematically in the DTJ, the supposition that a male should be the subject is quite evident.

Fifthly, concerning the role attributed to the man and the woman in the context of marriage, the image reflected in the definitions of the DTJ is the traditional one. An example of this is the definition of “separate maintenance” as “*pensión alimenticia abonada por el marido a la esposa tras la separación o divorcio*.” The stereotypes here transmitted are a man as the main source of income of the family and a woman as the weak spouse after the divorce. Although this is the most frequent circumstance, we think that the transmission of social stereotypes in the lexicographical works serve as a perpetuating factor. Therefore, in order to avoid that the definition contains any sexist feature it should be preferably formulated

as follows: “*pensión alimenticia abonada por un cónyuge al otro tras la separación o divorcio.*”

Sixthly, we would like to comment on the peculiar definition of “*compañero sentimental*”:

(lover, partner, girlfriend, boyfriend; mistress *pejorative*; it is a nice question whether the term “mistress,” itself originally a euphemism, is now to be regarded as essentially pejorative, or whether terms such as “partner” and *compañero/a sentimental* are bland contemporary euphemisms reflecting the preferences or prejudices of our times; in any event, to many people the word « mistress » now often sounds demeaning; however, in a context such as *El conocido jefe mafioso fue detenido junto a su compañera sentimental*, a translator might well opt for the familiar register prevalent in the popular press, and provide a version along the lines of “The well-known gangland boss was arrested along with his mistress”).

In this definition, the authors of the dictionary reflect on the advisability of the equivalent *mistress*. If we consider that this word is derogatory in a sense (a condition that the entry “*compañero sentimental*” does not have), from a lexicographical point of view it would be more reasonable to omit that equivalent.

Last of all, in respect of apparent dualities, we also found cases of definitions referring to different concepts for the masculine and the feminine in the DTJ. For example, in the articles for “*buscón*” and “*buscona*,” the first one is defined as “petty thief” and the second as “whore.” In this case (and in consonance with the DRAE), the masculine is conceived as generic and includes all the people involved in robbery or fraud, while the feminine is only considered as a (derogatory) substantive referring to women practising prostitution. This is yet more evidence of the power that the inclusion of apparent dualities in dictionaries has to perpetuate stereotypes.

3.2 Sexist features in the examples

As a gap through which sexist features may gain access to a dictionary via the reproduction of stereotypes, it is probably true to say that the examples of use have been overlooked. Whether the origin of the example of use is the reproduction of a quotation or something produced by the authors, lexicographers in general do not seem to pay much attention to the socio-cultural significance of the selected texts, and in this way unconsciously transmit traditional archetypes (Rivero Ortiz, 1999, p. 621).

There is a traditional style which can be clearly perceived in the DTJ, one which we will illustrate with the selection of the following examples of use both from the dictionary entries in Spanish and in English:

- (1) **age of consent** *It is unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a girl before she reaches the age of consent.*
- (2) **care and control** *By the divorce settlement, the parents were granted joint custody of their child, the mother being further granted care and control.*
- (3) **carnal knowledge** *Carnal knowledge with a female under the age of consent constitutes rape.*
- (4) **file for divorce** *She has filed for divorce on the ground of her husband's infidelity.*
- (5) **molest** *He was convicted of molesting his two daughters.*
- (6) **sexual advances** *She rejected his most abhorrent sexual advances.*
- (7) **acoso sexual** *Hasta un chiste verde puede constituir acoso sexual.*
- (8) **alimento[s]** *Los hijos tendrán derecho a recibir alimentos de su padre tras el divorcio.*
- (9) **compañero sentimental** *El conocido jefe mafioso fue detenido junto a su compañera sentimental.*
- (10) **infidelidad conyugal** *La infidelidad conyugal es causa de separación legal.*
- (11) **marido maltratador** *El juez dictó una orden de alejamiento al marido maltratador.*

From this selection, it seems clear that the DTJ reproduces stereotypes as regards personal relationships between genders. On one hand, the examples that illustrate the articles dealing with matrimonial separation show a clear picture of the traditional marriage. Firstly, the text constantly talks about the heterosexual marriage (as in “care and control,” “file for divorce” or “*alimento[s]*”). Secondly, it is made clear the lower social status of women and their dependence on men, and this fact contributes to perpetuate that marriage model. On the other hand, in these examples, we also find the transmission of the archetype of a woman whose main duty in life is the care of her children. Last of all, the husband’s infidelity is curiously introduced as the cause of separation in various examples; this also leads us to the stereotype of the active and polygamous husband as opposed to the passive and abandoned wife.

These examples also show up an unequal perspective when illustrating sexual relationships. In these cases, Spanish dictionaries tend to present the image of an active male and a passive woman, and the DTJ is not an exception. In the case of “carnal knowledge,” the passive individual is a “female,” which is to say that the active male is the only one that has sex, while the woman is the object of sexual satisfaction. The same idea is repeated in the example of “sexual advances,” where it is the man who is active and the woman, at the very most, simply rejects the action. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the sexual subject-object relationship between men and women is demonstrated in the examples of the LTD, whether it represents an offence (“molest”) or not (“sexual advances”). One final

remark about the examples illustrating sexual relationships is the importance attached to the woman's age (as opposed to the irrelevance of the man's age). The favourite female sexual stereotype for men (the young woman) is accurately reflected in "age of consent," "carnal knowledge" and "molest," where the objects of men's sexual desires are young women (even underage girls).

Another commonly occurring image very present in the DTJ is that of the woman playing a supporting role in the man's life. This is to be seen in examples referring to marriage and separation, where the husband has a higher position in the social scale and the wife depends on him. In the article referring to the entry "compañero sentimental," we can find another curious example of this kind. In this case, the man is the public figure, while the woman is presented as a mere companion, "compañera sentimental." This is one of the few samples we have found in the DTJ where the defined term is in the feminine in the example (although the entry is only expressed in the masculine); however, it cannot help to promote equality between genders as the woman appears as an accessory to the man. This is one of the few examples of use that have disappeared from the 2012 edition. Curiously, the examples of use are one of the elements of the dictionary that has changed the least throughout the editions; in all likelihood, this is because they are considered to be merely complementary and so have not been paid the attention they deserve. They can, however, provide a clearly defined succinct illustration of certain, generally speaking, sexist stereotypes.

Last of all, we would like to discuss another case in which the DTJ makes use of a sexist cliché. We are speaking about the example selected for "*acoso sexual*" containing the sentence: "*Hasta un chiste verde puede constituir acoso sexual.*" It is a very ambiguous expression that could be interpreted both positively and negatively as regards gender issues. Therefore, we do not find it suitable in a dictionary, where the examples should help to clarify the significance of entries from the context. Furthermore, in a delicate matter, as is the case of sexual harassment, it does not seem appropriate to use an example containing a value judgment of this type. Luckily, this example of use was also replaced in the latest 2012 edition by another that does meet the criteria required by those in the field of lexicography who are demanding a non-sexist use of language in dictionaries: "La insistencia en referencias al sexo puede constituir acoso sexual."

3.3 Sexist features in references

When analysing dictionaries, little attention is paid to the references (focusing fundamentally on the entries and definitions). Nevertheless, references are another lexicographical gap of which sexism can take advantage to gain admittance. The function of references in dictionaries is, for the main part, similar to the function

of the examples, that is to say, to give a context to the headword. Therefore, it seems sensible to think that they should belong to three principal categories: synonyms, hyperonyms, and opposites. In any case, from our point of view, references should maintain the same register as the entry or, at the very least, they should not contain derogatory or discriminatory connotations which are not part of the entry in question. Otherwise, it would produce a *contamination* phenomenon of the word previously unaffected by that circumstance.

As far as references are concerned, we have detected two sexist trends in the DTJ. On the one hand, the reproduction of some male and female stereotypes, such as a biased vision of the genders and their relationships. On the other hand, there is also a contribution from a series of references with derogatory connotations which the entries of the articles themselves do not contain. Generally, it can be observed that very little attention has been paid to the selection of references in the DTJ in terms of how this can affect the understanding of concepts.

As regards the first question, we were able to find examples in the following entries: “*abandono injustificado del hogar*,” “*conducta injuriosa o vejatoria*,” “*convivencia conyugal*,” and “*conyugal*.” Strangely enough, in all of these cases the first reference (and in the case of the last three, the only one) is the term “*infidelidad conyugal*.” In none of these cases are we talking about a synonym, a hyperonym or an opposite of the entry, but about a possible cause or circumstance. As a consequence, the stereotype (as a simplification of the reality) transmitted by that information is that marital infidelity is the cause of the abandonment of the family home, or of insulting or vexatious treatment. The link that the dictionary established between these terms originates in the sources from which they were picked. Notwithstanding this, we consider that some criticism has to be levelled at the sources. Perhaps, in the cases mentioned, it would have been more correct to choose “*separación matrimonial*” as a reference for “*abandono injustificado del hogar*” or “*matrimonial*” for “*conyugal*.”

On the subject of references with derogatory connotations that the entries to which they refer do not contain, we were able to find the articles “*alcahueta*” and “*celestina*” in the DTJ. If we look at the definition of these words in the DRAE (which is the same), “*Persona que concierta, encubre o facilita una relación amorosa, generalmente ilícita*,” there is no morally reprehensible information to find (except for the fact that it could be an offence in the context of prostitution). Nevertheless, the variable element of the definition (the illegality) is turned into the main issue in the references of the DTJ: “obscenity” and “dishonesty.”

Moreover, in these cases we can also find an imbalance between the double entries in masculine and feminine. Although in the DRAE there is only one article for “*alcahuete, ta*” (with quite neutral definitions: “*Persona que ...*”), in the DTJ there is considerable imbalance between “*alcahueta*” and “*alcahuete*.” While

references for the first term are “*celestina, obsceno, deshonesto*,” the references for the second are “*chulo, proxeneta*.” That is to say, although we can find some synonyms in both cases, other words with value judgments (“*obsceno, deshonesto*”) are added in the case of the feminine.

3.4 Sexist features in labels

The DTJ is characterized, among other things, by its excellent use of diatechnical labels, which appeared for the first time in the 2003 edition. Altogether there were 12 categories included for the different areas of law: civil, criminal, procedural, administrative, commercial, company, labour, fiscal, constitutional, international, succession and family; and other labels for related areas: general, public health, intellectual property, economy, insurance, and Europe. In a study such as the one we are conducting, the question of how diatechnical labels affect the treatment of gender in the DTJ has arisen.

Some of the semantic fields taken into account in the present study for the purposes of analysing the dictionary entries are included in this systematisation. This happens with the area dealing with family (by means of the label FAM) which includes marriage, separation, divorce, filiation and family ties. We also found a certain regularity when labelling concepts related to tax law, and other semantic fields scarcely affected by linguistic sexism. As regards these groups of articles, although there are some errors detected in the consistent use of diatechnical labels,⁴ this does not seem to have implications as far as sexism is concerned.

Nevertheless, there are other semantic fields where a discriminatory treatment of genders is the case. First of all, we shall pay attention to the sphere of prostitution. Generally speaking, it could be stated that, in accordance with the current legislative trend, terms referring to incitement or intimidation to prostitution should be considered part of criminal law, while the act of prostitution itself should be part of the general vocabulary. This is the criterion the DTJ seems to follow when labelling as PENAL entries like “bawd,” “brothel,” “panderer” or “prostitution ring” in English, and as CRIM “*alcahueta*,” “*comercio sexual*” or “*red de prostitución*” in Spanish. Under the label GRAL, we can also find “prostitute,” “solicit” or “streetwalker,” and “*chica de alterne*,” “*prostitute*” or “*ramera*.” However, we also observe that “disorderly house,” “pimp” or “solicit,” and “*casa de prostitución*,” “*celestina*” or “*prostíbulo*” are labelled GRAL. In essence, what we can see here is that the diatechnical label is not strictly applied, and that the label GRAL is used as a hotchpotch for every word not pertaining to any specific area of law. As

4. As occurs with the article “*abandono de familia, hogar, etc.*,” where the labels CIVIL, CRIM or FAM are used.

far as gender treatment is concerned, the fact that terms like “*celestina*” or “*casa de prostitución*” are not included in the field of criminal law indirectly implies that these activities are not considered as offences.

Another interesting group of words, as regards the way in which the diatechnical labels can affect the gender treatment in the DTJ, is the one referring to non-criminal sexual behaviour, that is to say, sexual behaviour not classified as an offence by the current criminal law in civilised countries. Most entries in this field are labelled in the DTJ as GRAL. Nevertheless, there is a significant group under the label corresponding to criminal law. Strangely enough, there is a certain parallel between terms labelled PENAL/CRIM in both sections of the dictionary. This is the case with: “bestiality,” “buggery,” and “sodomy,” on one hand, and “*bestialidad*,” “*sodomía*,” and “*sodomizar*,” on the other hand.⁵ We can find here words for non-criminal sexual behaviours, although they could be present in a criminal action (a rape, for instance). Maybe the attribution of the label PENAL to these words in the DTJ is caused by the determination of the texts from which where they are extracted. Nevertheless, as a dictionary is, in essence, a text composed of headwords and decontextualized information about them, any biased fact should be avoided. In any case, the attribution of the label PENAL to these words implies, from our point of view, sexism as it presents some conducts as inappropriate.

One way to introduce an androcentric conception of society in a dictionary is to write the articles with double entries for masculine and feminine in different forms. In this respect, we have found different labels for articles in masculine and feminine, as is the case with “*alcalde*,” labelled ADMIN, and “*alcaldesa*,” labelled GRAL. Although the equivalent presented in both cases is the same (“mayor” and “mayoress”), the different labels determine the perception of the concept. In the case of the masculine, the categorization under administrative law leads the term to be assimilated as a more relevant activity than the one categorized as general.

The DTJ does not include any label other than some grammatical ones and the diatechnical. From a non-sexist point of view of lexicography, there are other types of label, such as the diaphasic and time labels, that could help to balance out the headings of the dictionary more fairly. Accordingly, the information offered by the labels is largely positive as they alert us of the presence of discriminatory connotations or tell us of the *offensiveness* of a word (Dykstra, 2006, p. 29). In the DTJ, we have only found one diaphasic label *col*, which is infrequently used. In the entries dealing with gender-related questions, this label appears four times in English: “kerb-crawling,” “palimony,” “plight one’s troth,” and “quick divorce;” and three in the Spanish entries: “*buscón*,” “*buscona*,” and “*dar palabra de matrimonio*.”

5. Besides this parallelism, we found another examples, such as: “hard core pornography,” “sexual advances,” “*acceso carnal*,” “*incesto*,” “*pornografía*” or “*proposiciones deshonestas*.”

First of all, as far as these entries are concerned, we should consider whether a law dictionary ought to contain them, especially when the term is a particularly derogatory one, such as “*buscona*.” In any case, in the DTJ there is a lack of other diaphasic labels for *pejorative*, which could help to better understand words such as the ones mentioned, or “*ramera*” (also included in the dictionary under only the diatechnical label, GRAL).

Last of all, we would like to comment on the scarce presence of temporal labels in the DTJ. Legal language, as previously mentioned, is highly archaic as can be seen at the grammatical and lexical levels of the texts. Nevertheless, this does not imply that those linguistic forms have fallen into disuse, but rather that they are used almost exclusively in this kind of text. Therefore, we cannot argue that these words are obsolete but that they have been maintained over time as specialized terms. However, this is not the case with the only three cases detected in the DTJ labeled “obsolete”: “elope,” “jactitation,” and “*buscón*.”⁶ For any of these examples, it would be difficult to establish whether they are actually legal terms. Therefore, beyond the convenience of labeling terms as being in disuse, a law dictionary should only take into account obsolete terms when they really are legal concepts.

4. Conclusions

The treatment of gender in a bilingual law dictionary, the DTJ, has been the subject of analysis in this paper. From a critical point of view, our aim has been to address issues related to the influence of ideology in dictionaries. As a result, we have seen how it is impossible to untangle the unavoidable fragmentation of reality through the language from the lexicographical practice. Moreover, as words are the most conceptual linguistic components, it seems clear that the lexicon is crucial in the construction of ideologies. Therefore, practical lexicography should make a commitment to its own responsibility in terms of the transfer of certain social values. Obviously, the creators of dictionaries are not the *creators* of language as they are tied to an existing terminology and network of meanings, but it is also certain that their role as sieve or interpreter is significant in the transmission of ideology.

As the desire of the dictionary-user is to find the correct use of a word, the dictionaries have an undeniably normative character; and this is so despite the current trend towards conceiving lexicography as a mere confirmation of linguistic uses (although these can sometimes be diverse or even contradictory). Therefore, the lexicographer should be rigorously aware of the ideological approach which he

6. Nevertheless, some indications, like “*término obsoleto*” in the definition of “ravish” or “*en el pasado*” for “natural child,” have been detected.

or she employs when facing the challenge of creating a dictionary. In this sense, this paper has tried to prove how the selection of the entries can establish a limit of both the visible and invisible of a certain culture (both by the inclusion or exclusion of some kinds of words). In the same way, the wording of definitions, the ordering of entries, the placing of phraseologisms, the selection of examples of use, synonyms, antonyms, or even the use of labels, all shape concepts that broadcast a cosmovision that generally responds to the dominant ideology.

Gender is a fundamental issue in the transmission of some values that perpetuate power relationships. In this context, furthermore, language is one of the most relevant instruments with which to promote gender-based social inequalities, especially as positive law (in the West at least) is doing its best to turn this page of history. As Butler (1990, 1993, 1997) points out, language has a specific capacity (performativity) to model the world we live in and shape individualities as a consequence of the ability of discourse to penetrate reality. Nevertheless, this same capacity can be seen a positive if we consider it as a means not necessarily to perpetuate but to transform the prevailing values. At the very least, a lexicographical study should reflect the complexity of the society to which it refers. In the case of gender, understanding that “relations between men and women are constructed rather than natural” (Cameron, 1992, p. 4) is crucial when composing the network of meanings in a dictionary.

In the present paper, we have centered most of our attention on the generic masculine, as the paradigm of linguistic sexism, and the problems derived from granting a universal value to one specific gender. This grammatical norm, apparently neutral, leads to an evident discrimination as grammatical gender is usually interpreted in terms of sex. Thus, the concealment of women in definitions, examples of use and labels points to the androcentric view from which dictionaries are developed (and which is more evident in languages, like Spanish, where gender is permanently present). In this sense, we agree with authors like Russell (2011, p. 5) when she stresses that “these issues of sexism and androcentrism in general-purpose dictionaries should not be discounted as peripheral concerns to the lexicographical project at large.”

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Resumen

Los diccionarios son instrumentos de transmisión de palabras y significados que reflejan los prejuicios y creencias de una época. En el presente artículo se analiza el tratamiento del género a lo largo de las diez ediciones del *Diccionario de términos jurídicos (Inglés-español/Spanish-English)* de Enrique Alcaraz Varó y Brian Hughes. Este análisis, que se lleva a cabo tanto a escala macroestructural como microestructural, pone de relieve el sexismo presente en tradición lexicográfica española. Entre otros, hemos podido confirmar la presencia de diversos rasgos sexistas como: el ocultamiento de la mujer (mediante el uso del masculino genérico o el tratamiento androcéntrico de las profesiones), o la presentación de una imagen estereotipada del hombre

y de la mujer (con la selección de campos semánticos referidos exclusivamente a la mujer o de unos ejemplos de uso no neutrales en términos de género).

Palabras clave: lexicografía, diccionarios bilingües, diccionarios jurídicos, lenguaje jurídico, sexismo lingüístico

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