Expressing *generic* and *transitory* opinions in Greek

A semantic analysis of the verbs *theoro* and *vrisko*

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This paper investigates the semantics of the Greek subjective attitude verbs *vrisko* ('find') and *theoro* ('consider'). I present data from Greek where both verbs embed small clauses including evaluative adjectives ('tasty', 'attractive') and I develop a tentative analysis for each verb following Sæbø's (2009) account of *find* and Chierchia's (1995) analysis for generic predicates. I propose that: a) *vrisko* is a stage-level subjective verb expressing transitory opinions about objects of evaluation as viewed within a particular experience situation; b) *theoro* is an individual-level subjective verb expressing generic opinions about objects of evaluation as realised across various experience situations. This approach explains the observed contrasts between the two verbs. Moreover, it shows that the individual- and stage- level distinction is manifested in attitude verbs and that language employs distinct verbs depending on how an object of evaluation is viewed by the relevant judge.

Keywords: semantics, subjectivity, attitude verbs, genericity, experience

1. Introduction

In this study, I investigate the semantics of two Greek attitude verbs, namely *theoro* ('consider', 'regard') and *vrisko* ('find'). Because both are followed by subjective complements, i.e. complements expressing personal taste or opinion, I will refer to them as 'subjective attitude verbs', following Sæbø (2009). This is illustrated in the following sentences in which *theoro* and *vrisko* have a similar interpretation:

(1) a.   Theoro/ Vrisko   to kreas nostimo.
          consider/ find-PRS.1SG the meat tasty[1]
          'I find meat tasty.'

     b.   Theoro/ Vrisko   kompsi ti Marina.
          consider/ find-PRS.1SG elegant the Marina
          'I find Marina elegant.'

However, in examples (2) and (3) we observe a contrast:

(2) [Two friends are eating at a restaurant.]
     -Pos su=fenete   to susi? -To=#theoro/ vrisko nostimo/
     how you=look-PRS.3SG the sushi it=consider/   find-PRS.1SG tasty/
     aghefsto.[2]
     tasteless
     '-What do you think of the sushi?
     -I find it tasty/ tasteless.'

(3) [Two friends are getting ready to go out.]
     -Pos su=fenome?   -Se=#theoro/ vrisko   kompsi.
     how you=look-PRS.1SG you=consider/ find-PRS.1SG elegant
     '-How do I look?
     -I find you elegant.'

In (2) and (3), the use of *theoro* is infelicitous. What is special about these examples
is that the speaker is asked to express her opinion about *sushi* or a person's ap-
pearance as these are experienced at that particular moment. By contrast, if the
speaker wants to express a *generic* opinion about sushi as a *kind* of food (exam-
ple (4)) or about a person as she *usually* looks (example (5)), *theoro* and *vrisko*
are both licensed:

(4) An kje to psari mu=aresi   poli, to susi to=theoro/ vrisko
     if and the fish   me=like-PRS.3SG much the sushi it=consider/ find-PRS.1SG
     aidhiastiko/ aghefsto
     disgusting/ tasteless
     'Although I like fish a lot, I find sushi disgusting/ tasteless.'

(5) An kje dinete   apla, ti=theoro/   vrisko   kompsi.
     if and dress-PRS.NA_REFL.3SG simply her=consider/ find-PRS.1SG elegant
     'Even though she dresses simply, I find her elegant.'

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1. In the glosses, I will only keep the features of the verbs for reasons of simplicity. In all the
examples used, the elements of the complement small clause bear accusative case.

2. I will distinguish between completely infelicitous sentences ('#') and odd but not totally un-
acceptable ones ('?').

Based on the above data, I assume that: (i) *theoro* is a generic subjective verb as it is used for generic evaluative statements; (ii) *vrisko* can be used to make generic evaluations, similarly to *theoro*, or to express opinions about particular instances of an 'object of evaluation'; I will refer to those opinions about instances as 'transitory' opinions.

The main research questions that this paper addresses are the following:

1. How is genericity encoded in *theoro* and how can the semantics of *theoro* be formulated?
2. How do the semantics of *theoro* and *vrisko* differ?

In section 2, I give a brief overview of the relevant literature on subjectivity; in section 3, I formulate my hypothesis; in section 4, I offer a semantic representation for *vrisko* based on Sæbø's (2009) account of *find* and then develop a semantics of *theoro* along the lines of Chierchia (1995); in section 5, I conclude.

2.   Theoretical background on subjective expressions

Subjective expressions are expressions whose interpretation depends on a particular person's perspective. Such expressions have been the focus in much recent work of linguistic research. Relevant to this paper are subjective adjectives related to opinion or taste, specifically 'multidimensional' adjectives (Bylinina 2014), e.g. *charming* or *smart*, and 'predicates of personal taste' (PPTs) (Lasersohn 2005, 2009; Stephenson 2007; Bylinina 2014, among others), e.g. *tasty*, *fun*, *interesting*. I will refer to both categories as 'evaluative' adjectives.

A common characteristic of subjective adjectives is that their interpretation is not based on a fixed standard of the property they express, as in the case of objective adjectives like 'wooden' or 'square'. Rather, their interpretation depends on a particular person's own standards or criteria.

When subjective adjectives occur unembedded, their interpretation is usually speaker-oriented (see (6)). In embedding environments, their interpretation depends on the person denoted by the subject of the matrix verb (e.g. Lucy in (7)).

(6)   This cake is tasty.

(7)   Lucy finds this cake tasty.

The verb *find* is used as a basic diagnostic for subjective adjectives (see Stephenson 2007; Sæbø 2009; Bouchard 2012) as it requires its complement to be subjective (as in (7)). Unless it is so, the sentence is infelicitous:

(8)   #John finds Bill dead.   [Bouchard 2012: 144]

Similarly to *find*, *consider* combines with subjective complements but sounds odd with complements expressing objective matters of fact (Lasersohn 2009; Kennedy 2012, among others). This is illustrated in (9):

(9)   a.   John considers the licorice to be tasty.
      b.   John ?considers the licorice to contain sugar.   [Lasersohn 2009: 365]

However, *consider* has not been studied as thoroughly as *find*. Some authors (Bouchard 2012; Kennedy 2012; Bylinina 2014) observe subtle contrasts between the two verbs without offering a more detailed account on the semantics of *consider*. In this paper, I will compare the Greek verbs *theoro* and *vrisko* whose meanings are similar to *consider* and *find*, respectively. I do not take the Greek verbs to be the exact counterparts of the English ones mentioned. However, I offer data from Greek and examine the differences between *theoro* and *vrisko*, as a first step to study the semantics of both verbs more thoroughly.

3.   Hypothesis

Theoro and *vrisko* pattern with complements expressing opinion or taste, as the examples below show:

(10)   (ton Yani) ton=??theoro/#vrisko   Elina/ sarandari.[3]
       (the John) him=consider/find-PRS.1SG Greek/forty.years.old
       'I ?consider/#find John Greek/ forty years old.'

(11)   (ton Yani) ton=theoro/vrisko   xazo/omorfo/vareto.
       (the John) him=consider/find-PRS.1SG stupid/beautiful/boring
       'I consider/find John stupid/beautiful/boring.'

These verbs are especially interesting because of the contrast shown in the introduction. In order to propose a semantic representation for both, I will compare them by studying their interaction with small clauses including evaluative adjectives.

The fact that *theoro* expresses only generic opinions whereas *vrisko* expresses generic or transitory ones resembles the contrast between Individual and Stage

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3.   In response to an anonymous reviewer, *theoro* is, in certain cases, more acceptable with objective complements, similarly to English *consider*. In (10), the speaker implicitly refers to her personal criteria for considering someone Greek, so 'Greek' is subjective in a sense. This difference between *vrisko* and *theoro* obviously reflects that they differ in their compatibility with different kinds of subjectivity. Which objective adjectives can be acceptable under *theoro* and what this reflects for their semantics are issues that have to await more fine-grained research.

Level Predicates (ILPs and SLPs, respectively). The two terms are attributed to Carlson (1977a, b) (as cited in Krifka et al. 1995: 21) who divided predicates into two classes, ILPs and SLPs. ILPs are lexically associated with permanent, stable or long-lasting properties, e.g. *know* and *love*, while SLPs lexically express episodic (transitory) properties and/or specific events, e.g. *smoke* and *speak* (Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995, among others).[4] However, depending on the morphological marking of an SLP, a sentence can be interpreted either episodically (12) or generically (13):

(12)   John is smoking a cigarette.

(13)   John smokes.

Theoro has only generic uses, in which way it resembles ILPs; on the other hand, *vrisko* can be used either for generic or transitory/episodic evaluations, resembling SLPs. Based on this parallelism, my main hypothesis is that *theoro* can be analysed as an ILP and *vrisko* as an SLP.

3.1 Terminology

I assume four classes of objects of evaluation: *objects, kinds, stages* (following Carlson 1977a, b, as cited in Krifka et al. 1995: 20) and *tokens*.[5] *Objects* and *kinds* form the category of *individuals. Objects* (e.g. a person as s/he usually looks, example (5)) and *kinds* (*sushi*, in (4)) are intensional in that they are determined by their essential properties which hold independently of a particular spatiotemporal location (henceforth 'situation'). On the other hand, s*tages* can be conceived of as instances of *objects* (see (3)) and *tokens* as instances of *kinds* (see (2)). As such, *stages* and *tokens* are extensional because they are determined by a certain situation.

Suppose y is an intension. By positing a situation argument s on y we have an extension of y, that is, y(s). I assume that extensions are of type e. Intensions can be conceived of as functions from situations to extensions <s, e>.[6] Overall, we have the following classification (table 1):

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4. Here I only mention verbal ILPs and SLPs.

5. The term *object* (italics) as used by Carlson is distinct from the term 'object of evaluation'.

6. The idea of intensions being functions from situations to extensions is based on Chierchia's discussion about kinds (Chierchia 1998).

Table 1. Objects of evaluation and their semantic types.

Object of Evaluation	Type
stage / token	extensional <e>
object / kind	intensional <s, e>

4.   *Theoro* as an inherent generic

4.1 *Theoro*, *vrisko* and ILP-properties

Chierchia (1995) discusses six key properties of ILPs. Here I will only mention the ones relevant to my analysis: incompatibility with temporal and locative modifiers and incompatibility with adverbs of quantification.

The examples below illustrate that *theoro* is incompatible with temporal (see (14)) and locative (see (15)) modifiers and also with *when*-phrases (see (16)); by contrast, *vrisko* can co-occur with such modifiers:

(14) Xtes   oli   se= #theorisan/vrikan   endiposiaki.
      yesterday everyone you=consider/find-PAST.PFV.3PL impressive
      'Everyone found you impressive yesterday.'

(15) Stin   orkomosia ti= #theorisa/vrika   kompsi, at-the party
      at-the defense   her=consider/find-PAST.PFV.1SG elegant sto   party
      (ti=vrika)   kakoghusti.
      her=find-PAST.PFV.1SG badly.dressed
      'I found her elegant at the defense, but (I found her) badly dressed at the party.'

(16) Ti= ?theoro/vrisko   elkistiki otan
      her=consider/find-PRS.1SG attractive when
      vafete.
      put.on.make.up-PRS.NA_REFL.3SG
      'I find her attractive when she puts on make-up.'

These data provide evidence for our assumption that *theoro* is an ILP: the opinion it expresses holds independently of any particular spatiotemporal location (examples (14)-(15)) and is not restricted to hold only in special circumstances (in (16), it is restricted to hold only in those situations where the person evaluated wears make-up). On the other hand, *vrisko* can be modified by the above adverbials, similarly to SLPs.

4.2 *Theoro* in connection with *find*-semantics

I assume that a generic opinion is the accumulation of distinct opinions about different extensions which are in turn based on direct experience on the part of the judge. Since *vrisko* can be used to express such 'extensional' opinions, I assume that *theoro* quantifies over evaluations where *vrisko* is or could have been used (henceforth *vrisko*-evaluations). This is how I intend to connect the semantics of the two verbs. As a first step, I will apply Sæbø's (2009) semantics of *find* to the Greek verb *vrisko*.

4.3 Semantics of *vrisko*

Sæbø (2009) suggests the following semantic denotation for *find*:

(17) $[\text{find}]^w = \lambda\varphi_{<e<s,\,t>>}\lambda x\ \varphi_w(x)$

The subject of *find*, i.e. the judge argument, is symbolised by x. The subjective small clause φ is semantically a 'property' of type <e<s, t>>: a function from judges (type e) to propositions (type <s, t>, i.e. functions from worlds – or 'situations' henceforth – to truth values).[7] Sæbø's proposal is that the only contribution of *find* is to make sure that the judge denoted by its syntactic subject is used as the judge for φ.

I represent the small clause φ as in (18); P is a property (denoted by the evaluative adjective) and y the object of evaluation:

(18)   P(y), where y is the argument of the property P.

I will represent the situation index as s and posit a Davidsonian situation argument s for *vrisko* following Chierchia (1995) who assumes that all predicates have such an argument. Crucially, here I am interested in the *stage-level* use of *vrisko*: *vrisko* refers to a situation where y *as realised in that situation*, therefore y(s), is experienced and evaluated by the judge. This has three implications: first, the situation to which *vrisko* refers is an *experience* situation; second, the judge identifies with the experiencer; third, the time of the evaluation overlaps with the time of experience.[8] I will phrase the first two requirements as constraints on the meaning of the verb and the third requirement as a constraint on the use of *vrisko*.[9] I suggest the following semantic representation for *vrisko*:

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7. On the contrary, an objective clause is a proposition, of type <s, t>: its truth value is the same across judges.

8. Note that the time of evaluation need not coincide with the time of utterance (see examples (14)-(15)).

9. The idea is based on Bylinina (2014) who actually phrases the first two requirements as presuppositions on PPTs.

(19)   [vrisko]^s = $\lambda\varphi_{<e<s,\,t>>}\lambda x_e \lambda s\ \varphi(x)\ (s)$: φ is true with respect to the shifted judge
       x in situation s, where
   a. φ is $P(y(s))$
   b.   s is an experience situation where $y(s)$ is the stimulus and x is the
        experiencer
        Constraint on the use of *vrisko*: The time of evaluation overlaps with the
        experience situation s.

Take sentence (2) as an example: it means that *that token* of sushi is tasty with re-
spect to the shifted judge x *in a particular tasting situation* on the part of the judge
with that *token*. The constraint on use ensures that the *vrisko*-evaluation coincides
with the experience event. I suggest that this is the key difference between the two
verbs: the use of *vrisko* is licensed by an experience situation, whereas the use of
theoro abstracts away from a particular experience event. This will be discussed in
the following section.

4.4 Semantics of *theoro*

I will build the semantic denotation of *theoro* based on Chierchia's (1995) for-
mulation of ILPs. According to Chierchia, ILPs are 'inherent generics': they are
lexically specified with a feature which triggers the presence of a generic operator
in its local environment. One of his basic assumptions is that all predicates have a
Davidsonian argument s which ranges over situations. The difference between ILPs
and SLPs is that in ILPs this argument is *always* bound by a generic operator (Gen)
while in SLPs it is *optionally* bound. This results in ILPs having only generic uses.
    The following is Chierchia's formulation for the ILP *know*:

(20)   John knows Latin $\Rightarrow$ Gen s [C (j, s)] [know (j, L, s)]

The left pair of brackets is the restriction C which provides the set of felicity
conditions, i.e. the contextually determined conditions under which each state
holds or each activity is realised. The right pair of brackets is the scope of the
generic operator.
    While for actions like *smoking* it is easy to specify explicitly what the felic-
ity conditions are, this is harder for states like *know*. Chierchia proposes that for
states, the content of C should be set to a "maximally general locative relation
in" (Chierchia 1995: 199) such that j is in s. As a result, (20) would mean that
"whenever John is or might be located, he knows Latin" (Chierchia 1995: 199). The
restriction as such captures the fact that ILPs are tendentially stable and that they
express properties that are *unlocated*, in Chierchia's words, particularly because
they are valid and true in all locations.

Combining Sæbø's and Chierchia's denotations we have the following representation for *theoro*:

(21) [theoro]^s = $\lambda\varphi_{<e, <s, t>>}\lambda x_e$. Gen s [[C (x, s)] [$\varphi$(x) (s)]],
where φ is as defined in (19).

The crucial difference from *vrisko* is that *theoro* triggers the generic operator which binds the situation argument of φ, as a result it quantifies over any experiencing situation s.

Since the meaning of *vrisko* is incorporated in the denotation of *theoro*, the constraints that (i) s in the scope of the operator refers to an experience situation and that (ii) the judge identifies with the experiencer still hold. However, the fact that there has to be a temporal overlap between the time of experience and the time of evaluation is a constraint on the use of *vrisko*, as such it does not apply to *theoro*. That is, a *theoro*-evaluation is independent of an experience event. The use of *theoro* is licensed under different conditions from the use of *vrisko*; I discuss those in the following section.

4.4.1   Restriction

The restriction for states as formulated by Chierchia might be quite strong for a state like *theoro*. A sentence with *theoro* would mean that "whenever the judge is or might be located, (s)he is of the opinion that …" and this would not allow for the fact that opinions are subject to change. Thus, the felicity conditions for *theoro* should refer to *typical* situations with respect to opinion holding. For this reason, I suggest that the restriction of *theoro* imposes the constraint that the opinion is stable within a *contextually provided sufficiently long time interval*.[10]

The second constraint is that this time interval also includes hypothetical situations. Note that according to our definition ("any situation that x is or might be in"), s may not only refer to past or present situations but also to hypothetical ones, thereby capturing the notion of genericity. This is further illustrated in (22):

(22) a. Theoro   to Pulp Fiction ekpliktiko.
consider-PRS.1SG the Pulp Fiction amazing
'I find Pulp fiction amazing.'
   b. Oses fores ki   an dho   to Pulp Fiction, to=vrisko
any   times and if see.PNP.1SG the Pulp Fiction it=find-PRS.1SG
ekpliktiko.
amazing
'Any time/Whenever I see Pulp Fiction, I find it amazing,'

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10. For more discussion on the restriction of the generic operator, the reader is referred to Chierchia (1995) and Krifka et al. (1995).

(22a) can have a continuation like (22b) including a conditional sentence *oses fores ki an dho* referring to hypothetical situations. From the whole sentence we infer that the speaker has seen the movie but the statement could actually be about any future situation in which the speaker might see the movie: in any such situation, the speaker will find the movie amazing.

Last but not least, I add one more constraint on C which provides the basis for a valid opinion: the existence of at least one previous experiencing situation on the part of the judge with the *stage/token* in question.

4.4.2 *Scope*

Taking the above into account, the complete meaning of *theoro* can be represented as follows:

(23) $[theoro]^s = \lambda\varphi\lambda x.$ Gen s $[[C (x, s)] [(\varphi) (x) (s)]]$: "In any situation where x is (*any* constrained to be within a sufficiently long time period, contextually provided, possibly including future situations), y has the property P according to x and this results from (at least one) previous experience on the part of x with at least one y(s)."

I assume that the s variable of φ and the situation variable of y(s) take the same value. Therefore, generic quantification also affects y(s): the operator quantifies over different instances y(s), finally yielding an intensional object of evaluation (y). The 'product' of *theoro* is thus a generic opinion about an object of evaluation (*object* or *kind*).

I will illustrate this with example (24a) which expresses an evaluation about a *kind*, and its corresponding denotation (24b):

(24)   a.   Theoro   tus Ispanus   filikus.
             consider-PRS.1SG the Spanish.PL friendly
             'I consider Spanish people friendly.'
       b. $[theoro]^s = [C (S, s)] [(friendly(Spanish(s))(S)(s)]$ (where S is the speaker)

(24a) expresses the speaker's opinion about Spanish people based on her previous experience with least one Spanish person. Again we see that *theoro* abstracts away from the experience event: uttering (24a) does not require the speaker being within an actual experiencing situation with the person evaluated.

In the following section, I present examples with *theoro* and *vrisko* in past tense and perfective aspect, showing that their different behaviour in this case provides further evidence for my initial hypothesis.

4.5 *Theoro* and *vrisko* in Aorist

In Greek, perfective aspect in past tense is realised by the use of the Aorist.

In general, perfective aspect describes events as "closed situations", with initial and final endpoints (Smith 1991: 105). This is no exception for Greek. Sentences with past perfective are typically interpreted episodically (Giannakidou 2009). Perfective aspect is thus used when the eventuality is presented "as a single and complete event" (Sioupi 2014: 158, 160). Statives can also be modified by the perfective, but then the stative takes an eventive interpretation (Giannakidou 2009).

Consider example (25) in which *theoro* and *vrisko* are in past perfective:

(25)   An kje itan apla   dimeni, xtes   sto   dhipno
       if   and was simply dressed yesterday at-the dinner
       ti=#theorisa/ vrika   endiposiaki.
       her=consider/find-PAST.PFV.1SG impressive
       'Even though she was simply dressed, I found her impressive at the dinner yesterday.'

In (25), the speaker's opinion is about a *stage* of a person. The use of *vrisko* in perfective gives rise to an episodic interpretation and expresses the speaker's opinion in a specific situation (yesterday's dinner). This opinion can be viewed as having initial and final endpoints, thus overlapping with an event. The semantic analysis of *vrisko* as formulated in section 4.3 explains why it is felicitous in (25): being intrinsically tied to a specific situation, an opinion introduced by *vrisko* can be located in time, as situations/events do.[11]

On the other hand, *theoro* expresses a state: the opinion it introduces is not tied to a specific situation, rather, it extends over a larger time interval with no determined endpoints. This captures a common characteristic of states which is that they describe "unbounded situations without an inherent endpoint" (de Swart 2012: 6). Taking this into account, because sentence (25) refers to a bounded event, the use of *theoro* – which is a state – is not licit.

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11. The following example illustrates that a *vrisko*-evaluation has to overlap with the experiencing situation it refers to. It is infelicitous to use it in present tense in order to evaluate something that was experienced in the past:

> #Vrisko   nostimo to susi pu faghame   xtes   sto   ghiaponeziko.
> find-PRS.1SG tasty   the sushi that ate-PAST.PFV.1PL yesterday at-the Japanese
> '#I find the sushi that we ate yesterday at the Japanese restaurant tasty.'

5.   Conclusions and further discussion

This paper investigated the contrast between two Greek subjective attitude verbs, *theoro* and *vrisko*. It was suggested that *vrisko* is an SLP and *theoro* an ILP showing that the semantic distinction between ILPs and SLPs is manifested in attitude verbs too. I proposed that the opinion expressed by *vrisko* is located in a time interval overlapping with the experience event, whereas the opinion expressed by *theoro* spans a larger time slice including past and possible experiencing situations. This shows that the language has different items in its inventory for expressing subjectivity depending on how an object of evaluation is viewed, i.e. across situations (*theoro*) or within a particular experience event (*vrisko*).

In this paper, I have mainly focussed on cases in which the notion of an experience situation is crucial for the interpretation of *theoro* and *vrisko*.[12] However, consider (26):

(26)   Theoro/ Vrisko   sosti tin apofasi su.
       consider/ find-PRS.1SG right the decision your
       'I consider/find your decision right.'

This combination of adjective and noun triggers a different behaviour on the part of *theoro* and *vrisko* in the Aorist as well:

(27)   Theorisa/ Vrika   sosti tin apofasi su.
       consider/ find-PAST.PFV.1SG right the decision your
       'I considered/found your decision right.'

Examples (26)-(27) differ from the previous ones in the kind of property and the object of evaluation they refer to. Applying 'right' involves a *reasoning* process, something different from the internal, experiencing process involved in adjectives like 'tasty' or 'fun'. Furthermore, a 'decision' is an 'abstract' object that does not consist of *stages/tokens*.

Additionally, dimensional adjectives (DAs) like *tall* and *wide* are also subjective (Kennedy 2012, Bylinina 2014) but do not involve experience. In Greek, DAs can in general be embedded under *theoro* and *vrisko*, but the acceptability depends on many factors (e.g. adjective modification, context of evaluation). Colour adjectives seem to be more acceptable with *theoro*.

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12. The adjectives used here may not all refer to experience as straightforwardly as 'tasty'. This study seems to capture other cases like 'lazy' (*tebelis*) though: there are speakers that accept it with *vrisko* in its episodic use. I assume that those adjectives also carry a situation argument which allows for different interpretations. What exactly the notion of 'experience' refers to is a topic for future research on its own.

The analysis put forward here takes the notion of experience as a fundamental, therefore non-experience cases remain puzzling. One possible solution would be to refer more generally to specific situations of assessment rather than experience situations. For example, to *theoro* a certain object P would mean that in all situations with similar standards of comparison/criteria as set by the judge (for whatever property is relevant), an object of evaluation y is P with respect to the judge.

It is also crucial that *theoro* and *vrisko* be studied in other environments too. *Theoro* can also take *that*-complements while this structure is quite rare with *vrisko*. In this respect, *theoro* resembles *pistevo* ('believe'): it selects for indicative, feature of veridical epistemic verbs, i.e. verbs whose subject is committed to the truth of their complement (Giannakidou 2009). In addition, episodic past is a veridical context (Giannakidou 2002) and *theoro* is used in past perfective in certain cases, which clashes with the general assumption that Gen is non-veridical (Giannakidou 2002). These issues deserve more fine-grained research with the aim to capture and represent the epistemic component in the meaning of *theoro* more transparently.

This study accounts mainly for taste and certain evaluative predicates. Yet, in order to have a complete semantic account of subjective attitude verbs, it is essential that the above issues be addressed in future research. It remains to be seen whether the distinction shown here can capture a wider range of cases and whether it is manifested cross-linguistically, thus providing evidence for the existence of two classes of opinion verbs: generic and transitory ones.

Acknowledgements

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