From manipulation to social interaction

Change in the use of *lay* in initiating bets

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This paper is about constructional change that is brought about through change in non-linguistic practice. The English construction of interest is one that speakers use to initiate bets with their addressees. Its verb is *lay*, its subject is the speaker, and its direct object is the stake the speaker proposes to risk. It is argued that the motivation for the use of *lay* comes partly from the practice of laying down stakes when making bets. However, it is shown that over the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries this practice declines, weakening the basis for a physical interpretation and leading hearers to attend instead to the speaker-addressee relation. Concurrently, this relation is increasingly expressed through the use of a dative argument. This development is discussed in relation to Ariel et al.'s (2015) account of added datives.

Keywords: prominent relation, non-linguistic practice, action-naming, semantic change, constructional change, added dative

1. Introduction

The main point of this paper is to show how a construction whose origins are in the expression of a relation between a person and a thing comes to express grammatically the relation between two persons – a speaker and an addressee. The construction in question is an English one that has *lay* as its verb and is used to initiate betting, thereby evoking a betting frame. Examples of utterances instantiating the construction are highlighted in (1) and (2).

(1) "Now, by this iron and steell", quoth Stuely, "were it not that he is attendant on the good duke I would have him by the eares presently. **I will lay an hundred pound**, and <u>stake it downe straight</u>, **that Captaine Strangwidge and I will beat him and all his forty men.**"

<div align="right">(Deloney, Thomas, 1597, The gentle craft)</div>

(2)   "You think to frighten me, Funkelstein, and make me tremble at what I
        said a minute ago. Instead of repeating that, I say now: I will sleep in Lady
        Euphrasia's room this night, if you like."
        "**I lay <u>you</u> a hundred guineas you won't!**" cried the Bohemian.
        "Done!" said Hugh, <u>offering him his hand</u>. Funkelstein took it; and so the bet
        was committed to the decision of courage.
                                        (MacDonald, George, 1863, *David Elginbrod*)

Most uses of *lay* across different domains involve an asymmetric relation between
a person and a thing, with the person construed as doing something to the thing.
In initiating a bet, this kind of relation exists between the speaker and a stake –
the item of value, such as money, that is risked in the bet: *an hundred pound* in
(1) and *a hundred guineas* in (2). Another relation involving the speaker when
initiating a bet is with the addressee, who the speaker wants to engage in a bet.
The speaker's wish for the addressee to be involved is usually signalled in some
overt way – either grammatically, with an argument such as *you* in (2), or by peri-
phrastic means. Argument expression of the relation marks it out as central to the
speaker's purpose.

    Part of the motivation for using *lay* in initiating bets comes from the practice
of laying down stakes shortly after uttering *I'll lay* STAKE. The speaker in (1) de-
clares his intention to do this ("and stake it downe straight"). This practice declines
over the course of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. It is argued that the
decline weakens the basis for interpreting the use of *lay* as naming this physical act
and that this facilitates a shift in focus from the speaker-stake relation to the rela-
tion between the speaker and the addressee. During the same period, signalling of
the addressee's involvement becomes increasingly expressed grammatically, as an
indirect-object (or dative) argument, as in (2). The establishing of the addressee as
part of the construction represents a conventionalization of the speaker-address-
ee relation, as the construction shifts towards a more abstract, social-interactive
meaning.

    The practice of betting between individuals is described in section 2, where
it is treated as a frame. The elements of the frame are described, together with
its procedural aspects. In addition, inheriting frames are described that involve
different non-linguistic practices. One inheriting frame involves the laying down
of stakes. In another, there is no laying down of stakes but, instead, other non-
linguistic practices like shaking hands may be involved.

    The construction illustrated in (1) and (2) will be referred to as the LAY STAKING
CONSTRUCTION. Formal and semantic aspects of the construction are described in
section 3. In uttering instances of this construction – LAY STAKINGS, as they will
be called – the speaker participates in relations with a stake, a proposition, and the

addressee. Two variables are identified as having a bearing on the meaning of *lay* stakings: whether stakes are laid down following the utterance and whether the involvement of the addressee (and therefore the speaker-addressee relation) is signalled or not. It is shown that depending on these two variables, *lay* stakings may have a meaning that is partly concrete or one that is fully abstract.

Motivations supporting both concrete and abstract interpretations are explored in section 4. These come both from practices within betting and from connections with other domains.

In section 5, the two changes mentioned above (decline in the laying down of stakes, increase in argument expression of the addressee) and their effect on meaning are described. The addition of the addressee as an argument is discussed in relation to Ariel et al.'s (2015) account of how dative-marked participants are added to constructions.

The main points of significance beyond the present case study are discussed in the concluding section 6.

2. Betting

The kind of betting we are concerned with here is betting that occurs between individuals. This kind of betting is not done as part of some larger activity like playing dice or cards or horseracing. It is independent of such activities and the propositions that can be bet on are limited only by what can be verified by the bettors. In bets between individuals, two persons risk something of value (a stake) on opposite outcomes of an issue – that is, on opposite propositions. There are thus two bettors, two propositions, and two stakes involved. These elements, together with the procedure whereby the bettors engage to risk their stakes on their respective outcomes, constitute a frame: the frame for betting between individuals.

Evidence that this activity is sufficiently conventional to be considered a frame comes from two sources. One is the fact that is has a name. In English it is called *wager* or *bet* and it has names in many other languages. Evidence also comes from the nature of responses to utterances like the one highlighted in (2). Responses like *Done!* are conventional, with the characteristic brevity of habitual responses (indeed, *Done!* is a shortened form of *It is done!*). Such responses are indicative of the recognition of a conventional activity (i.e. a frame).

The FrameNet Wagering frame (Ruppenhofer et al. 2010) corresponds in most respects to the frame for betting between individuals. However, it is designed to cover the wider field of betting and gambling, including games of chance and betting in institutional contexts. The core frame elements of the Wagering frame are

shown in Table 1. In the rightmost column, the corresponding elements of the frame for betting between individuals are indicated.[1]

Table 1.   Core frame elements of the FrameNet Wagering frame

Asset	Something desirable possessed by or directly associated with the Gambler which is lost if the Gambler loses the wager.	(stake)
Gambler	The person who wages the Asset on a certain Outcome.	(bettor)
Outcome	The Gambler predicts that a certain Outcome will hold.	(proposition)
Uncertain_situation	The Gambler predicts how an Uncertain situation will resolve.	(issue)

The procedural part of the Wagering frame is defined thus:

> A Gambler commits an Asset to a prediction that an Uncertain_situation will have a particular Outcome (or class of outcomes). He or she loses the Asset if the prediction ends up being incorrect, and gains it back plus additional winnings if the prediction ends up correct.   (framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu)

The set of frame elements and the procedural definition of wagering miss one important element. Wagering is presented as involving only one agentive participant – the Gambler (bettor in our terms). In fact, however, all wagering (betting, gambling) involves two agentive participants and the relation between them. This is so whether the wagering is between individuals or between an individual and an organization (casino, state lottery, etc.).[2] It is this relation and its expression that is the focus of the present paper. In the kind of betting looked at here, the two agentive parties are both individuals.

Typically, bets between individuals arise out of a controversy between the parties to a conversation, or from a sense of competition between them. Often one party finds what the other says controversial and proposes a bet to settle the matter. In (3), the first speaker challenges Peter's credibility in discussing religion by proposing to bet on whether he even knows the Lord's Prayer. Peter, being confident that he does know it, agrees to bet (by saying *Done!*).

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1. Non-core elements – Beneficiary (not one of the wagering parties), Circumstances, Explanation, Frequency, Iterations, Place, Purpose, Time – are not shown.

2. The relation may be mediated by some impersonal means such as a slot machine but ultimately, two agentive parties are involved. The neglect of the second agentive participant in the FrameNet Wagering frame may be due to the FrameNet database being based exclusively on examples involving *wager* as the verb. With this verb – unlike other English betting verbs – the second bettor is rarely mentioned.

(3)   Prithee, Peter, (says he) don't thee pretend to talk about Religion, I am sure
     thou knowest nothing of the Matter. **I will lay thee a Guinea thou canst not
     say the Lord's Prayer.**
     Done! says the other
                         (Hildrop, John, 1754, *The miscellaneous works of John Hildrop*)

The bet stems from the conversation and it is both proposed and agreed to ver-
bally. A key part of the process of arranging such a bet is the initiation of the bet.
In this paper, we look at utterances belonging to one particular construction with
lay as its verb that is used to initiate betting, the *lay* staking construction. Formal
and semantic aspects of the construction will be looked at in section 3. For now it
suffices to note that *lay* stakings primarily express the speaker's point of view, with
the speaker expressed as *I*, and that the speaker stands in a relation to three other
frame elements: a stake (*a Guinea*), a proposition (*thou canst not say the Lord's
Prayer*), and the addressee (*thee*). In uttering (3), the speaker provisionally com-
mits to taking part in a bet, provided that Peter also agrees to take part. (If Peter
had declined, there would cease to be any obligation on the speaker's part.)

   Lay stakings can also be used to perform acts of staking when betting has al-
ready been initiated. In this paper, though, we focus on cases where the construc-
tion is used to initiate betting, since it is at this point that the addressee's involve-
ment must be established.

   Bets between individuals are made largely through speech, and with verbal
agreements of this kind there is always a possibility that one or other party will
renege on what has been agreed. Various practices have developed to prevent this.
One is for the bettors to lay down their stakes. In (4), the stakes (referred to as *the
Wager*) are laid on a 'board', i.e. a table. By convention, once the stakes have been laid
down and are out of the hands of the bettors, the bettors are committed to the bet.

(4)   he brought six Cannes of Beer from the Tap all full, in one hand, and set
     them on the Table, not spilling one drop; Sir, said the Tapster, **I dare to lay a
     Crown that I can do that**, I will lay as much that you do it not said the other;
     so the Wager was laid on the Board (Taylor, John, 1638, *Taylors feast*; EEBO)

In (5), money is laid into the hands of a stakeholder (identified as *such a one*) who
looks after the money until the outcome of the issue is known.

(5)   One Citizen in a scoffing manner called his neighbour Nicumpoope, and the
     other taking it for some very shamful and oprobrious name, resolved not to
     put it p [sic], but quarrels with him. Why, **I'll lay you forty shillings**, said the
     other, **you are**; and such a one shall be Judge between us. The Wager being
     laid in that persons hands, he sends for the mans wife to know whether he
     were a Nicumpoope or no.   (unknown, 1674, *Cambridge jests*; EEBO)

Laying stakes down also makes it clear that the bettors do indeed possess what they are purporting to risk. This seems to be Mockmode's purpose in displaying money in (6) and drawing attention to it with *Here's Silver*.

(6)   Lovewell   Sir, you don't know.

Mockmode   Zauns, Sir, wou'd you perswade me out of my Christen'd Name?
I'll lay you a Guinea that I do know, by the Universe.
–<u>Pulls a handful of Money out.</u>
<u>Here's Silver, Sir, here's Silver, Sir</u>; I can command as much Money as another, Sir; I am at Age, Sir, and I won't be bantered.
(Farquhar, George, 1699, *Love and a bottle a comedy*; EEBO)

When laying is not forthcoming, it may be solicited. This happens in (7), where the knight calls on Nevill to lay down money.

(7)   Then sir William went round about the Court with his fool, and another Knight met with him, and said, What, have you got a fool? yea, said Sir William Neuill, he is such a fool, that if he be set under one of these spouts of the leads that runs now with rainewater, he will never come away, until I do fetch him out of it. It is not so, said the Knight: yes, said Sir William Neuill, and **on that I will lay twenty pound**: I hold it, said the Knight, <u>lay down the money</u>.
(Boorde, Andrew, 1626, *The first and best part of Scoggins iests*; EEBO)

Stakes are not always laid down, however. Sometimes the bettors keep hold of their stakes until the outcome of the issue is known, and only then does the loser hand over his/her stake to the winner. In this case, the bettors may shake hands to confirm that they will honour the bet. This is what happens in (2). An alternative to shaking hands as a way of making sure that the bet is honoured is to record the terms of the bet in writing. An example of this practice will be seen in (12) below.

Betting involving the laying down of stakes – either on a surface or into a stakeholder's hands – can be considered a frame in itself, inheriting the elements of the frame for betting between individuals and adding the practice of laying down stakes. There are roles for a layer and a thing that is laid (the stake), corresponding, respectively, to each of the bettors and each of the stakes (Figure 1b).

The practice of *not* laying stakes down is associated with other non-linguistic practices – either shaking hands to confirm that the bet will be honoured or (less often) recording the terms of the bet in writing. Given that the absence of the laying down of stakes is associated with these other practices and that these are largely complementary to the practice of laying down stakes, it is again reasonable to treat betting without laying down stakes as a frame in its own right. Again this

frame inherits the features of the frame for betting between individuals (indicated by the plus signs on the links in Figure 1), and in this case what is added are the (optional) practices of shaking hands or recording the terms of the bet in writing (Figure 1c).


Figure 1. The frame for betting between individuals and its two inheriting frames

It will sometimes happen that when the idea of betting is introduced into the conversation, the frame that is evoked in the mind of the hearer is not the one that the speaker has in mind. The speaker may intend for the two parties to lay down their stakes, while the hearer expects that stakes will be retained until the issue is settled or vice versa. Where there is such a difference, there will be negotiation over what procedure to follow.

3. The *lay* staking construction

Utterances like those highlighted in the examples above belong to a conventional pattern whose function is to initiate a bet. They are instances of the *lay* staking construction. The formal elements of the construction may be represented as in (8).

(8)   *I'll lay* (ADDRESSEE) STAKE PROPOSITION

The verb is *lay* and this is qualified in most cases by a mood marker, usually *will* or *'ll*.

As mentioned, in initiating a bet the speaker stands in a relation to three other frame elements: a stake, a proposition, and the addressee. There are regular positions (slots) in the construction for each of these, although there is some variability in the form and positioning of the addressee and the proposition. The speaker and the stake are always present. The speaker is always expressed as *I* and the stake can be any noun phrase.

The proposition is nearly always expressed, although occasionally, when it has been expressed in the preceding utterance and can therefore be treated as active in the hearer's mind (Chafe 1994; Lambrecht 1994), it is left unexpressed.[3] Other active propositions are expressed with an obliquely marked pronoun (e.g. *of that*) or an elliptical clause (e.g. *he did*, in response to the preceding *he never said it*). Propositions that name the winner of a contest may be expressed by just mentioning the predicted winner's name, obliquely marked by *on* (e.g. *on Mr. Flintoff*). All other propositions are expressed with syntactically full clauses, possibly marked by *that*. No further attention will be paid to the proposition in the rest of the paper. Instead, we focus on the speaker, the stake, and the addressee.

In (8), the addressee argument is put in parentheses. This is because in many cases, the addressee is not expressed as an argument, though usually the involvement of the addressee is signalled in some other way. When the addressee *is* expressed as an argument, its position and form are usually as seen above in examples (2), (3), (5), and (6). Such an expression may be termed indirect-object or dative expression (the terms will be used interchangeably). When expressed this way, the addressee is mentioned immediately after the verb and before the stake. An alternative treatment is as a comitative argument. Here the addressee is obliquely marked by *with* and may appear either between the verb and the stake (like the indirect object) or after the stake, in which case it is separated from the verb. These two positions are illustrated in (9) and (10), respectively.

(9)   […] and then for the confrmation of the wonder a confederate with the juggler standeth up among the crowd […], saying, **I will lay <u>with you</u> forty shillings you shall not convey a shilling out of my hand**.

(Frost, Thomas, 1876, *The lives of the conjurors*)

(10)   AS a merry conceited Printer was going through S. Martins in London, with a friend of his, being merrily disposed, quoth he, **I will lay a quart of Wine <u>with you</u>, that I will go and kiss yonder Gentlewoman, who is coming on the other side of the way**.

(Pasquil (William Fennor), 1609, *Pasquils iestes*; EEBO)

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3.   97.1% of the examples in the sample used in section 5 have an overtly expressed proposition.

In many cases the speaker's wish for the hearer to be involved in a bet is not signalled by grammatical means but is nonetheless signalled by other, periphrastic means.

Where unequal stakes are mentioned, there are two stakes involved and this must mean that there are also two bettors, one being the addressee. In (11), the two stakes are one of the speaker's swine and whatever the addressee wishes to stake (*what thou wilt*).

(11)   What (qd. the other) will you make me a fool? think you I know not sheep from Swine? Marry (qd. the old man) **I will lay <u>one of my Swine against what thou wilt</u>, that they be no Sheep**.

<div align="right">(unknown, 1673, Sack-full of newes; CED)</div>

The same reasoning applies where unequal monetary stakes are designated as a ratio (i.e. as 'odds'), as in (12).

(12)   'And she 'll consent, you think?'
'I wish I had a bet on it,' said he.
'So you shall, then,' said I, endeavoring to seem thoroughly at my ease. 'It's a very unworthy occasion for a wager, Martin; but **I'll lay <u>five hundred to one she refuses you</u>**.'
'Taken, and booked,' cried he, writing it down in his note-book.

<div align="right">(Lever, Charles James, 1861, The Martins of Cro' Martin)</div>

The proposer of the bet may leave it to the addressee to set the stakes, again implying participation by the addressee. This was seen already in (11) and it happens also in (13).

(13)   I will lay <u>any thing</u> you cannot produce forty guineas apiece at one time.

<div align="right">(1772, Old Bailey Online: t17720109-49)</div>

The use of conditional marking in declaratives, such as *dare to* in (14), indicates that the speaker is willing to commit to staking, but only if the addressee agrees to take part.

(14)   Sir, said the Tapster, **I <u>dare to</u> lay a Crown that I can do that**

<div align="right">(Taylor, John, 1638, Taylors feast; EEBO)</div>

Finally, whenever the proposition is one that challenges the capabilities of the addressee, this is sufficient to indicate that the addressee is meant to take part in a bet, in order to rebut the challenge. In (15), for example, the speaker challenges the addressee's ability to read a text and understand it.

(15)   I'll lay a Pot in half an hour <u>you read it not In its true sense, as t'ought to be</u>

<div align="right">(unknown, 1654, no title; EEBO)</div>

In summary, the speaker's wish to engage the addressee in a bet may be signalled by a variety of means, some grammatical, others periphrastic. Grammatical means are an indirect-object (dative) argument or a comitative argument, and periphrastic means are the mention of unequal stakes or odds (leaving the stakes open for the addressee to decide on), conditional marking, and betting on a proposition that challenges the capabilities of the addressee.

If the addressee's involvement is not signalled by any of these means, then the utterance is open to an interpretation where it is only the speaker who stakes something. This is not what the speaker wants and so there is good reason for the speaker to preempt this interpretation by somehow signalling the addressee's involvement.

As described in section 2, stakes may be laid down in the process of making a bet. When this happens, it happens after the *lay* staking utterance. Whatever association is made in the mind of the hearer between the utterance – and in particular the use of *lay* in it – and the act of laying down stakes can only be made retrospectively, therefore. At the point where the utterance is heard, the hearer doesn't know whether the speaker intends to physically lay down a stake or not. If the hearer does connect the use of *lay* to the act of laying, this will affect his/her interpretation of *lay* on subsequent occasions. The effect, then, is a delayed one. This is in contrast to the effect of signalling the addressee's involvement by either grammatical or periphrastic means, which affects the interpretation of the utterance directly.

In considering how the hearer will interpret *lay* staking utterances, it is convenient to make a simple distinction between the interpretations of hearers who expect stakes to be laid down and those who do not expect it. For the hearer who expects stakes to be laid down, an utterance where the addressee's involvement is not signalled is likely to be interpreted as 'I'll lay down STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'. For the hearer who does not expect laying down, an utterance of the same form is likely to be interpreted as 'I'll risk STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'. The difference is one of concreteness. When laying is expected, the interpretation is a concrete one ('lay down') but when laying is not expected, the interpretation is abstract ('risk').

The interpretation is different in cases where the addressee's involvement is signalled, whether by grammatical or periphrastic means. For utterances where the addressee's involvement is signalled, the interpretation again depends on whether the hearer expects stakes to be laid down or not. If laying down is expected, then an utterance of this kind is likely to be interpreted as meaning 'I'll lay down STAKE in a bet with you in support of PROPOSITION'. But if laying down is not expected, then the interpretation will be something like 'I'll make a bet with you for STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'. Again, there is a difference in concreteness, 'lay down … in a bet with you' being more concrete and 'make a bet with you' more abstract.

The kind of abstract meaning is different here though. Whereas the abstract 'risk' meaning concerns the manipulative relation between the speaker and the stake, the abstract 'make a bet with you' meaning concerns the social-interactive relation between the speaker and the addressee.

The four possible interpretations outlined above, according to the parameters of (i) expectation of laying down or no such expectation and (ii) signalling of the addressee's involvement or no signalling, are summarized in Table 2. One of the two variables affecting the interpretation of *lay* stakings – whether the laying down of stakes is expected or not – involves a difference between frames. One frame or the other is evoked in the hearer's mind by the *lay* utterance.

Table 2. Interpretation of *lay* stakings with/without signalling of the addressee's involvement, according to whether the hearer expects stakes to be laid down

		Hearer's expectation of laying down of stakes	
		Expected	Not expected
Signalling of the address-ee's involve-ment	Signalled	(a) 'I'll lay down STAKE in a bet with you in support of PROPOSITION'	(b) 'I'll make a bet with you for STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'
	Not signalled	(c) 'I'll lay down STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'	(d) 'I'll risk STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'

The meanings in (a) and (c) above are primarily concerned with the physical act of laying down a stake. With these meanings there is self-description: the speaker is describing his/her own future act of laying down a stake. In both cases, though, the meaning goes beyond self-description, involving also an element of commitment. (In fact, as noted in section 2, the purpose of the physical act of laying a stake down is to demonstrate commitment.) This meaning of committing to engaging in a bet ((a) in Table 2) or to risking a stake is a performative function. So the meanings in (a) and (c) involve both self-descriptive and performative components. The meanings in (b) and (d), on the other hand, are purely performative.

Laying down a stake involves putting it in a state: a state of residing on a surface or in the custody of a stakeholder. Secondarily, it also involves the establishing of a social state, one of commitment, either to making a bet or to risking the stake. The meanings in (a) and (c) involve both kinds of state – the physical and the social. The meanings in (b) and (d), on the other hand, involve only the social state. We will return to the use of *lay* in expressing states in section 4.

The interpretations listed in Table 2 differ not only in the interpretation of *lay*, but also in terms of which relation between frame elements is made prominent. When laying down is expected (a, c) or where the involvement of the addressee is not signalled (c, d), the relation between the speaker and the stake is prominent.

When there is signalling of the addressee's involvement but no expectation of laying down stakes (b), it is the speaker-addressee relation that is prominent.

4.   Motivations for the use of *lay*

On a cognitive-linguistic view of meaning as conceptualization (Langacker 2008), in which construal is an important part of meaning, it may be assumed that on hearing an utterance, the hearer will seek to understand why the speaker construed the situation the way he/she did. There are many aspects to construal (Croft & Cruse 2004: Chapter 3; Verhagen 2007). With *lay* stakings, these include the first person singular perspective of the utterance as a whole, and treatment of the stake as a core argument and of the addressee also as core, oblique, or implied. Another important aspect of the construal in *lay* stakings is the fact that initiating a bet is construed as an act of laying. Although there is certainly an element of convention involved in the choice of construction, with speakers using *lay* in initiating bets simply because that is how it is usually done, it may be assumed nevertheless that since *lay* stakings are not the only way of initiating a bet (constructions with verbs including *hold* and *bet* are used concurrently), speakers have reasons for choosing this particular construal over others, and that hearers will seek to understand those reasons.

In discussing composite expressions, Bybee & Torres Cacoullos (2009: 189) suggest that they "differ in the extent to which the units composing [them] are associated with the etymologically same units in other constructions". In terms of meaning as represented by the individual language-user, it is the individual's personal etymological understanding that counts – their ability to make sense of different uses of a lexical item through the connections they have experienced between those uses. Nunberg et al. (1994: 498) make a similar point in defining the transparency of the use of an idiom as "the ease with which the motivation for the use (or some plausible motivation – it needn't be etymologically correct) can be recovered". On a constructional view, what applies in the case of idiomatic expressions also applies to less idiomatic expressions.

In this section we look at possible motivations for the use of *lay* in initiating bets. Some of these motivations come from within the domain of betting itself, in the way betting is carried out. Others involve connections to non-betting frames and the wider semantics of *lay*.

4.1 Concrete motivation

The 'general sense' of *lay* according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is 'cause to lie'. The practice described in section 2 of physically laying down stakes when making bets connects in an obvious way to this meaning. The connection is particularly clear in cases where *lay* is used together with *down*, as in (16).

(16)   and since you thinke your selfe so cunning in that (diuellish art) of corrupting womens chastitie, **I will <u>lay downe</u> heere a hundred pounds, against which you shall lay fifty pounds**, and before these Gentlemen I promise you, if that within a moneths space you bring me any token of this Gentlewomans disloyaltie (for whose sake I haue spoken in the behalfe of all women) I doe freely giue you leaue to inioy the same
(Kinde Kit, 1620, Westward for smelts; CED/EEBO)

Laying something down in a physical sense also occurs in betting on card games. Players lay down money as a stake on the card-table, along with the cards. (17) is from a description of one such card-game called 'lanterloo'.

(17)   […] and he that is loo'd must <u>lay down</u> as much Money on the Board, as every one had laid down before
  (Cotton, Charles, 1725, The compleat gamester: or, Full and easy instructions for playing at above twenty several games upon the cards)

Although, as explained in section 2, betting between individuals is not restricted to card games or other institutional activities, it is nevertheless likely that the practice of laying down money on the card-table contributes something to motivating the use of *lay* in betting between individuals. It should be noted, though, that the connection is not a linguistic one: *lay* is not used in performing acts of staking in the context of card-playing.

Lay down has a similar use outside the domain of betting, in referring to acts of paying. In this particular manifestation of the commercial transaction frame (Fillmore 1977), payment is made by laying down money on a table (18) or into someone's hands (19).

(18)   come, my Hostis sayes there's seven shillings to pay, **lets each man** drink a pot for his mornings draught, and **<u>lay downe</u> his two shillings**, that so my Hostis may not have occasion to repent her self of being so diligent, and using us so kindly
(Walton, Isaak, 1653, The complete angler)

(19)   if you will **<u>lay</u> me <u>down</u>** five crowns in my hand, you shall have it, otehwise no
(Jonson, Ben, 1601, Euery man in his humor; EEBO)

Central to these acts is the relation between a person and a collection of money. However, two other relations are also involved: those between payer and payee and between the payer and what is paid for.[4] In (19) the payer-payee relation (*you-me*) is expressed grammatically with an indirect object in a ditransitive construction, while in the transitive utterance in (18), the same relation (*each man-my Hostis*) is left implicit in the clause with *lay*.

There are correspondences between the participants in an act of paying by laying down money and those involved in laying down stakes as part of making a bet. These are shown in Table 3. The payer and the payee in an act of paying correspond to the two bettors in betting, and the money that is used as payment corresponds to the stake in a bet.[5] (Note that there is no counterpart in betting for the goods that are paid for in commercial transactions.)

Table 3. Correspondences between the participants of acts of paying by laying down money and acts of laying down money as part of making a bet

	Paying	Betting
agent	payer	bettor
affected party	payee	bettor
money	payment	stake

4.2 Abstract motivation

As noted in section 2, it is not always the case that stakes are laid down when a bet is made. Often the bettors keep hold of their stakes until the issue is settled. The absence of laying of stakes following utterances like (2) will lead hearers to seek some other motivation for the use of *lay*, which will have a bearing on the interpretation next time such an utterance is heard. As argued in section 3, this will be a more abstract interpretation: 'make a bet' or 'risk'. Geeraerts (2002: 445) notes that "the motivated nature of an expression is subject to considerable individual variation (depending, among other things, on individual differences in one's familiarity with the historically motivating context)", and bettors will differ in terms of how

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4. These correspond to the Buyer (payer), Seller (payee), and Goods (what is paid for) in FrameNet's Commercial_transaction frame.

5. In acts of laying things down, three things may be of relevance: the person doing the laying, the thing that is laid, and the place where the thing is laid. The physical staking use of *lay* has in common with the paying-by-laying-down use that when the thing that is laid down is laid on a table, that (default) location often goes unmentioned, as happens in (18). When the laying is into a person's hands, however, the location is more likely to be mentioned, as in (19).

familiar they are with the practice of laying down stakes, and how strongly they associate the use of *lay* with acts of laying. For hearers who don't make such an association, the use of *lay* will be treated abstractly.

It was argued in section 3 that in initiating a bet with a *lay* staking, a social state is established: a state of commitment. It was also noted that in those cases where stakes are physically laid down, a physical state is also established. This aspect of meaning of establishing a state is shared by many uses of *lay* in other domains. The state that is established is usually one that is somehow onerous, involving notions of constraint (e.g. *lay a snare*), burden (e.g. *lay a burden*), penalty (e.g. *lay a fine*), or obligation (e.g. *lay a command*). Some of these uses have transparent connections to physical meanings. Others, though, can only be interpreted abstractly because the thing that is 'laid' cannot be understood as a physical entity, even metaphorically. Such an example is *lay a necessity upon* someone – i.e. impose an obligation on them.

A use of *lay* that is similar to initiating a bet is its use in the making of what may be called SECURED PROMISES. These are promises where the promiser commits to losing something of value (a pledge) if an undertaking is not fulfilled. An example of the use of *lay* in making a secured promise is highlighted in (20). Here, the speaker offers to pawn his gown as a guarantee that he will pay the money that is owed (the *fes*).

(20)   Then said he, what is your fes? He said four pounds, Ah said Master Philpot, I have not so much, if you will take twenty shillings I will send my man for it, or **I will lay my Gown to gauge**
                    (Foxe, John, Thomas Mason, 1615, *Christs victorie ouer Sathans tyrannie*; EEBO)

The highlighted clause in (20) is an instance of the pattern *I will lay* PLEDGE *to gage*. Similar patterns used for making secured promises or referring to such promises involve *pawn*, *pledge*, or *wed*[6] in place of *gage*. (21) is a secured promise, while (22) and (23) are references to such promises.

(21)   I will **laie my wiues best gowne to pawne**.
         (Lodge, Thomas and Robert Greene, 1593, *A looking glasse, for London and England*)

(22)   they were compelled to **lay all that they had to pledge**
                                (Stow, John, 1566, no title; EEBO)

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6. Anglo-Saxon practices where *wedd* is used in securing the fulfilment of an undertaking, or the payment of a debt, are described in Berger (1940).

(23)   He made of hem, thorgh his high renown,
        So gret slaughter and occisioun
        That as the deth fro his swerd they fledde,
        And **who cam nexte leid his lyf to wedde**.

<div align="right">(Lydgate, John, 1421–22, The siege of Thebes)</div>

The general pattern is given in (24).

(24)   … *lay* PLEDGE *to* {*gage*, *pawn*, *pledge*, *wed*}

There are correspondences between the participants of a secured promise and those involved in initiating a bet. These are shown in Table 4. In both cases there is a speaker, an addressee, an item of value, and a proposition. The one who makes a secured promise (the promiser) corresponds to the initiator (proposer) of a bet. The addressee is the promisee in the context of a secured promise and the party proposed to when a bet is proposed. The pledge that is used to secure a promise corresponds to the stake that is risked in a bet. And the act that the utterer of a secured promise undertakes to perform corresponds to the proposition in a bet.

Table 4. Correspondences between the participants of secured promises and initiations of bets

	Secured promising	Betting
speaker	promiser	proposer
addressee	promisee	proposed-to
item of value	pledge	stake
proposition	undertaking	proposition

As well as these correspondences, there are also some differences. Most fundamentally, a secured promise is a complete act in itself, taking effect unconditionally on being uttered, whereas the initiation of a bet is merely the first step in making a bilateral arrangement that must be agreed to if it is to come into force (Fotion 1981). Secondly, the undertaking in a secured promise is always something that the speaker will perform him/herself, whereas the proposition that a speaker proposes to bet on is more flexible: it may be an act that the speaker undertakes to perform, or it may be a challenge of the addressee's capabilities, or a matter concerning only third parties.

A third difference between secured promises and bets has to do with the nature of the item that is risked. Money is the usual kind of stake in a bet, though other material items of value, such as a piece of jewellery, may also be risked, and paying for food or drink is also a common stake. The pledges in secured promises may also be material items of value, as in (20)–(22), but often they are less tangible

forfeits, such as life (23) or liberty. Importantly for the meaning of *lay*, these intangible pledges do not support a physical laying-down interpretation for *lay*, and so an abstract meaning will be apprehended by the hearer. An abstract motivation can be found in the fact that secured promising – like other uses of *lay* described above – involves the establishing of a state of obligation. In secured promising it is the promiser's obligation to fulfil an undertaking or forfeit the pledge, and in initiating a bet it is the bettor's obligation to relinquish a stake on losing the bet (i.e. his/her commitment to risking the stake).

The use of *lay* in making secured promises is a likely antecedent for its use in betting. There are similarities, both formal and functional. In terms of form, the two acts share a first person singular subject, the use of *lay*, and a direct object expressing an item of value.[7] In terms of function, a speaker makes a commitment to lose the item of value if a future state of affairs doesn't come about. Secured promises, as unilateral undertakings, are simpler than bets, which are reciprocal arrangements. The effect of a bet can be achieved, though, through two successive secured promises being made. One party commits to risking something of value on one outcome. The other party then commits to risking something of value on the opposite outcome. In fact, bets are sometimes made this way (25).

(25) Valingford   I say, this maid will have thee to her husband.
       Mountney   And I say this: and **thereof will I lay an hundred pound**.
       Valingford   And I say this: **whereon I will lay as much**.
       (Wilson, Robert, ?1591, *A pleasant commodie, of faire Em the Millers daughter of Manchester vvith the loue of William the Conqueror*; EEBO: A21328)

There is support for the secured-promising use of *lay* being an antecedent for the staking use from the fact that dictionaries of Anglo-Saxon mention secured promising but not wagering/betting. Toller (1921) gives *lecgan*, the Anglo-Saxon precursor of *lay*, as meaning both 'to cause to take a horizontal position' and 'to deposit a pledge'/'to deposit something as a pledge', the latter being secured-promising meanings. A search of the online version of the Bosworth-Toller dictionary (1898) and its supplement (1921) (www.bosworthtoller.com) yields no mention of wagering or betting, suggesting that the practice of making secured promises with *lecgan* was current at a time when the practice of betting had not yet developed in Anglo-Saxon culture.

A betting construction that is closely related to the *lay* staking construction is a construction (or small network of constructions) involving *lay a wager*. *Wager* is

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7. Stern (1968 [1931]: 273) claims that the use of *lay* to mean 'to stake, wager' is a shortened form of to *lay to pledge*. There is some support for this claim in the alternation between longer forms like those shown schematically in (24) and forms without *to* {*gage*, etc.}.

polysemous. It can mean 'stake' – that is, an unspecified stake – or 'bet'. When *wager* is interpreted as meaning 'stake', and the bettor-stake relation is in focus, *lay a wager* has possible meanings 'lay down a stake' or 'risk a stake', depending on the hearer's expectation of stakes being laid down physically or not. For the hearer who doesn't expect this, the overall meaning will be an abstract one. When *wager* is interpreted as meaning 'bet', the meaning of *lay a wager* will be 'make a bet'. The meaning here is a social-interactive one, concerned with the relation between the bettors.

   Lay a wager sometimes occurs in the same episode of bet-making as the *lay* staking construction, with its *lay* STAKE pattern. This happens in (26), where *lay a wager* introduces the idea of betting and *lay* STAKE is used to specify a stake.

(26)   The scholar [said] from whence haste thou brought these fair hogs? Hogs quoth the fellow, they be sheep: said the scholar, you begin to jest. Nay, sir, said the fellow, I speak in good earnest. Art thou in earnest, said the scholar? **Thou wilt lay no wager with me to the contrary.** Yes by the book of a pudding, **I will lay all the money in my purse**.
         (Boorde, Andrew, John Scogan, 1626, *The first and best part of Scoggins iests*; EEBO)

Given the parallels between the two constructions, both formally and semantically (including in their polysemies), it is likely that there is mutual support between them in terms of interpretation. In particular, both constructions can have a focus on the speaker-stake relation or on the relation between the two bettors, and are accordingly more or less concrete.

5.   Change affecting the speaker-addressee relation

In this section, we look at change in two variables that have to do with the meaning of the *lay* staking construction and the relative prominence of the speaker-stake and speaker-addressee relations. One of these variables is the frequency with which stakes are laid down after the construction is used. Change here has a causal effect on meaning. The other variable is the frequency with which the addressee is expressed as an argument. Change on this variable is a reflection of a change in meaning that is caused by the change in betting practice. We focus on the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Before this period, information on the non-linguistic practice that accompanies *lay* stakings is too rare to allow the kind of quantification that is aimed at here.[8]

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8. During the nineteenth century, constructions with *bet* emerged as alternatives to constructions with *lay*, and after the nineteenth century, the constructions with *bet* became the dominant ones.

5.1 Data

The data are 105 *lay* stakings from 1600 to 1899 that are used to initiate bets. They come from fictional dialogues in plays, novels and ballads, and from dialogues reported in the Old Bailey court proceedings (www.oldbaileyonline.org). Some of the fictional dialogues are from historical corpora: Early English Books Online (EEBO), Eighteenth Century Collections Online (ECCO), the English Broadside Ballad Archive (EBBA), and the Corpus of English Dialogues (CED). Others are from digitized book collections: Google Books, Internet Archive, Project Gutenberg, Hathi Trust. It is assumed that the relevant aspects of *lay* stakings – their form and the circumstances of their use – are adequately represented by the fictional data. Examples are included only where it is clear what non-linguistic practice is followed – in particular, whether stakes are laid down or not in the process of bet-making.

Examples from the historical corpora were obtained by first retrieving all examples of *lay* (and spelling variants) and then inspecting each example to determine whether it was an instance of the *lay* staking construction. For the book collections, which are much too large for this method to be used, more focused searches were done, involving sequences of speaker (always *I*), a mood marker (*will*, *'ll*, etc.), *lay*, an addressee (*you*, *ye*, *thee*, *with you*, etc.), and various kinds of stakes, particularly ones involving a numeral (*one*, *two*,…, *twenty*, etc.) followed by a currency unit (*crown*, *guinea*, etc.). Cases where the addressee follows the stake were also searched for.

5.2 Decline in the laying down of stakes

It was argued in section 3 that the hearer's expectation of physical laying down of stakes, based on experiencing this practice, affects the interpretation of *lay* stakings. Each time the hearer performs or witnesses the laying down of a stake following a *lay* staking utterance strengthens the hearer's association between the use of *lay* in this context and a physical meaning. Conversely, each time the construction is encountered without it being followed by laying down weakens that association. For hearers who have developed such an association, *lay* will be identified with the meaning of 'lay down', while for those who do not make that association, the meaning will be an abstract one – either 'make a bet' or 'risk'.

The incidence of laying down and not laying down stakes following *lay* stakings over the three centuries is shown in Table 5. The rate drops from 61.9% in the seventeenth century to just 8.3% in the nineteenth century. In other words, it goes from being the usual practice to being exceptional. The consequence, assuming these rates to be representative of bettors' experience, is that the hearers of *lay*

stakings come to associate the use of *lay* less and less with a physical meaning of laying down, and in proportion, abstract meanings of making a bet or risking a stake are allowed to come to prominence.

Table 5. Laying down/not laying down stakes following *lay* stakings

	Laying down		No laying down		
	N	%	N	%	
1600–1699	13	61.9	8	38.1	21
1700–1799	6	25.0	18	75.0	24
1800–1899	5	8.3	55	91.7	60
	24		81		105

In section 3, it was noted that when *lay* is interpreted with a concrete meaning ('lay down'), the speaker is simultaneously describing his/her own act of laying and performatively committing to engaging in a bet or risking a stake. It was noted further that when there is no expectation of laying stakes down, and the interpretation is therefore an abstract one, only the performative meaning is present. Having established that the practice of laying stakes down declines, we can infer that with the growth in abstract meanings that results, there is also a move towards a purely performative meaning. The self-descriptive component of the meaning is progressively shed.

In terms of the frames described in section 2, one involving the laying down of stakes (Figure 1b), the other not (Figure 1c), the decline in the frequency with which stakes are laid down amounts to bettors giving up one frame in favour of the other.

5.3 Increase in argument expression of the addressee

In section 3, it was argued that when a *lay* staking is uttered, the signalling – or not – of the addressee's involvement affects the interpretation. When the addressee's involvement is signalled, either grammatically or periphrastically, and when there is no expectation of stakes being laid down (Table 2b), the social-interactive speaker-addressee relation is a more prominent part of the meaning than when the addressee's involvement is left implicit.

The incidence of signalling the addressee's involvement over the three cen-
turies is shown in Table 6. Signalling by grammatical and periphrastic means is
shown separately.[9]

Table 6. Signalling of the addressee's involvement in *lay* stakings

	Grammatical signalling		Periphrastic-only signalling		No signalling		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
1600–1699	9	42.9	9	42.9	3	14.3	21
1700–1799	18	75.0	3	12.5	3	12.5	24
1800–1899	39	65.0	15	25.0	6	10.0	60
	66	62.9	27	25.7	12	11.4	105

It can be seen that the involvement of the addressee is signalled either grammati-
cally or periphrastically in the large majority of cases (62.9% + 25.7% = 88.6%).
Moreover, the overall rate of signalling remains roughly constant over the period
(42.9% + 42.9% = 85.8% ≈ 75% + 12.5% = 87.5% ≈ 65% + 25% = 90%). Therefore
this factor doesn't contribute to a change in the meaning of *lay* stakings. What
does change, however, is the *means* of signalling, with grammatical expression (i.e.
expression as an argument) rising from 42.9% to 65.0% and signalling by peri-
phrastic means alone decreasing roughly in proportion.

In section 3, we noted that when the addressee is expressed as an argument,
this could be a comitative argument or an indirect-object (dative) argument. In
fact, of the 66 cases of argument expression, only three are comitative, the rest be-
ing of the indirect-object type. From this point on we will focus on indirect-object
arguments.

5.4 Change in meaning and the prominence of relations between participants

It was seen in section 5.2 that the laying down of stakes decreases over the three
centuries. Table 7 focuses on those cases where there is no laying down of stakes
and where the involvement of the addressee is signalled (either grammatically
or periphrastically). The table shows that the rate at which these cases occur in-
creases markedly from 28.6% of *lay* stakings in the seventeenth century to 81.7%
in the nineteenth.

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9. Grammatical signalling may occur in conjunction with periphrastic signalling. This is count-
ed as grammatical signalling.

Table 7. Signalling of the addressee's involvement in the absence of laying

	Signalling of involvement, no laying		All other cases		
	N	%	N	%	
1600–1699	6	28.6	15	71.4	21
1700–1799	16	66.7	8	33.3	24
1800–1899	49	81.7	11	18.3	60
	71		34		105

In Table 2 (section 3), the meanings of *lay* stakings according to two factors – laying expected/not expected and the addressee's involvement signalled/not signalled – were listed. These meanings are repeated here as (27a–d). The combination that we have just noted as increasing over the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries is (27b), with the meaning of 'make a bet with you'. This is an abstract meaning, having to do with the social-interactive relation between speaker and addressee. Of the four meanings in (27), this is the only one that gives prominence to the speaker-addressee relation rather than to the speaker-stake relation.

(27) a. laying expected, addressee signalled   'I'll lay down STAKE in a bet with you in support of PROPOSITION'
b. laying not expected, addressee signalled   'I'll make a bet with you for STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'
c. laying expected, addressee not signalled   'I'll lay down STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'
d. laying not expected, addressee not signalled   'I'll risk STAKE in support of PROPOSITION'

It was seen in section 5.3 that expression of the addressee as an indirect-object argument increases over the three centuries. Knowing that the signalling of the addressee's involvement and the absence of laying down stake occur frequently in combination, we can ask whether signalling of the addressee in these cases is as an indirect-object argument. Table 8 shows the rate of indirect-object argument expression in the absence of laying, contrasted with all other cases (comitative arguments, periphrastic signalling of the addressee's involvement, no signalling, and cases where stakes are laid down).

Table 8. Indirect-object argument expression in the absence of laying

	Indirect-object, no laying		All other cases		
	N	%	N	%	
1600–1699	2	9.5	19	90.5	21
1700–1799	13	54.2	11	45.8	24
1800–1899	34	56.7	26	43.3	60
	49		56		105

Table 8 shows that when there is no laying down of stakes, indirect-object expression of the addressee increases from 9.5% of cases in the seventeenth century to 56.7% in the nineteenth. The growth of indirect-object expression in this circumstance accounts for much of the increase in signalling of the addressee's involvement that occurs when there is no laying down of stakes (Table 7). Of the 71 cases where the addressee's involvement is signalled in the absence of laying (Table 7), 49 (=69%) involve expression with an indirect-object argument (Table 8). The increase in indirect-object expression when there is no laying down of stakes is greatest between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (9.5% rising to 54.2%).

The increase in indirect-object expression of the addressee in the absence of laying represents a growth of the meaning 'make a bet with you' (27b) and an increase in the prominence of the speaker-addressee relation. The utterances in question are ones of the form in (28).

(28) *I'll lay you* STAKE PROPOSITION

The earliest occurrence of this pattern that I have found is dated 1599, shown in (29). However, it is only from the 1670s onwards that it appears in each successive decade in the present data, providing some evidence of it being established.

(29) Dick Coomes   Come, come, what do you protest?
      Francis Goursey By heaven to crack your Crown
      Dick Coomes   To crack my crown, **I lay ye a crown of that**, Lay it down
                     and ye dare
      (Porter, Henry, 1599, *The pleasant history of the two angry women of
      Abington*; EEBO)

The prominence of the speaker-addressee relation is particularly clear in utterances like the one highlighted in (30). This is an instance of a construction that is likely to have been derived from the pattern in (28). There are two reasons to suggest this as the origin. First, given the semantics of *lay*, it is likely that there was an earlier stage when there was a non-human direct object (a stake, in fact), which is absent in (30). Secondly, this construction appears much later than the

earliest examples of the *lay* staking construction. The example in (30) is the earliest I have found. Since the only frame elements expressed in this construction are the speaker and the addressee, it is the social-interactive, bet-making relation between them alone that is expressed, and as such, this relation must have prominence.

(30)   Woodall   Though I am a stranger in the house, it is impossible I should be so much mistaken: I say, this is Limberham's lodging.

       Brainsick   You would not venture a wager of ten pounds, that you are not mistaken?

       Woodall   It is done: **I will lay you.**
                              (Dryden, John, 1678, *Limberham: or, The kind keeper*)

There are similarities between the case of English *lay* and the development of Latin *promitto* 'put forward' described by Létoublon (1991). *Promitto* was used in ritualized acts of giving. The speaker proffered an item of value, usually money, to the addressee and declared the act with *promitto*, followed by an accusative object expressing the money. The money was 'put forward' by the speaker in a physical sense. The formulaic utterance thus involved self-description on the part of the speaker. According to Létoublon's account, eventually *promitto* came to be used without the money being present at the time of speaking, with the result that the verb was reinterpreted as a speech act, involving a verbal undertaking.

The similarities with the case of *lay* are the following. Originally the speaker described his/her own act of manipulating a concrete object, expressed as a direct object. Change in the way the activity was carried out – in particular, change such that there was no longer manipulation of an object that was manifestly concrete – prompted a reinterpretation. The new meaning was more abstract. It involved the social relation between the speaker and the addressee, one of commitment, rather than the manipulative relation between the speaker and a thing. The utterance was now performative only, without the original element of self-description.

5.5 Added datives

Ariel et al. (2015) give an account of how participants that are not central to the meaning of a predicative construction can nevertheless be added to it. They suggest that in adding a participant to a construction in dative form, speakers have four goals:

1.   to include a nonparticipant as involved in the predication
2.   to add a subjective point of view
3.   to profile the added participant as central to the event
4.   to profile the added participant as specifically affected by the event

As Ariel et al. explain, these goals must be reconciled with competing factors: constraints on the length of intonation units and the need to preserve the existing argument structure, including keeping the verb next to its arguments. They show that the needs of the existing argument structure and those of the added participant are satisfied where the added participant is one that is cognitively accessible (in the sense of Ariel 1990) and expressed as a pronoun. The construction to which the participant is added will already have a position where a new (non-accessible) referent can be expressed. Adding a further non-accessible referent would exceed the One New Argument Constraint: "Avoid more than one new core argument" (Du Bois 2003: 68). So initially, in order not to exceed this limit, any new participant must be an accessible one. And since accessible entities are expressed pronominally, the added participant will be expressed as a pronoun. The added participant should also not disturb the form of the construction, which would impair the hearer's recognition of it and the meaning it carries. Pronouns are brief in form, which means that they cause minimal disruption when they are added. In particular, inserting a pronoun is unlikely to force existing arguments into a separate intonation unit.

Ariel et al. suggest that once the pattern with the added slot becomes established, the slot may come to be used to express non-accessible referents. If this happens, the slot that previously hosted non-accessible referents would then, according to the One New Argument Constraint, be limited to expressing accessible referents.

In considering whether Ariel et al.'s analysis applies to the treatment of the addressee in *lay* stakings, the relevant comparison is between (31) and (28), repeated here as (32).

(31)   *I'll lay* STAKE PROPOSITION

(32)   *I'll lay you* STAKE PROPOSITION

Since there is always a second agentive participant involved when a speaker wants to initiate a bet, the addressee is already a participant in (31), even though his/her involvement is not marked grammatically. So the goal of including a nonparticipant (goal 1) does not apply.

As the potential winner or loser of a stake, the addressee is objectively affected by the bet that the speaker is seeking. So the goal of adding a subjective point of view (goal 2) does not apply either.

The two other goals have to do with profiling. The participant is not just central or affected, but is *construed* as central (goal 3) or as affected (goal 4). Both of these are relevant to *lay* stakings. Although the addressee is both central and affected whether his/her involvement is signalled or not, and regardless of the means by which involvement is signalled, grammatical signalling construes the addressee

as central to the speaker's purpose and as affected by what the speaker is proposing. Involvement is signalled directly, unlike with periphrastic signalling (unequal stakes, open stakes, etc.), where the addressee is left to infer it.

According to Ariel et al., goal 3 favours the expression of the added participant as a core argument, rather than as an oblique. And goal 4 favours uttering the added participant in a position adjacent to the verb, this being "the position that typically marks affectees" (2015: 269). These characteristics are found in the treatment of the addressee in (32). Expressed as an indirect object with no oblique marking, the addressee is treated as a core argument of *lay*. And the addressee is expressed immediately after *lay*. This treatment may be contrasted with the alternative comitative treatment described in section 3, involving oblique marking (by *with*) and a position that is sometimes after the direct object (i.e. after the stake) and therefore separated from the verb.

Although the treatment of the addressee in *lay* stakings conforms to Ariel et al.'s account, this is only partly for the reasons they describe. Rather than being added as a nonparticipant (goal 1) or to add a subjective point of view (goal 2), the addressee is a participant who is objectively affected by the speaker's act. The constraints described by Ariel et al. may represent the limits on the nature and formal expression of added participants, but in the case of initiating a bet there is no need to go beyond these limits in any case, because it is only to addressees that speakers propose bets, and addressees are expressed pronominally.

6.   Conclusion

This paper has largely been concerned with the relation between what is said and what is done, and how change in this relation results in change in meaning. Concrete actions that are worthy of being named generally have some purpose. If the purpose persists and continues to be expressed in the same way, but the action ceases to be performed, the result is a change in meaning.

Since the change in non-linguistic practice involves a physical action ceasing to be performed, the resulting change in meaning is necessarily in the direction of greater abstraction. In the particular case looked at here, the more concrete meaning ('lay down') is one involving manipulation, and the more abstract meaning ('make a bet') is one involving social interaction.

Many such cases involving change in practice (change in culture) have been documented in the literature on semantic change (e.g. Stern 1968 [1931]). To this extent, the present study simply adds one more case study, albeit one that is supported by quantification of the triggering change in non-linguistic practice and a change in form that reflects the change in meaning.

However, there are aspects of meaning change that occur in the case of *lay*, but are certainly not limited to betting, that have not received much attention. These again are effects that are caused by the change in the relation between what is said and what is done. One has to do with descriptive versus performative meaning and the other has to do with the prominence with which relations between participants (frame elements) are expressed.

The case of *lay* illustrates how a meaning that is primarily descriptive, but also with a secondary performative component, can become purely performative through change in the relation between what is said and what is done. Initially a speaker declares his/her own action by naming it. This is the primary part of the meaning. The action is done for a purpose, however, and achieving this purpose – making a commitment in the case of *lay* – is a secondary part of the meaning. When the action that was originally named ceases to be done as often, the element of self-description by the speaker becomes weaker, leaving the performative part of the meaning as the primary part. The same scenario also occurs with Latin *promitto* (Létoublon 1991).

It has been suggested by Traugott (1991) that some performative uses of verbs are derived from spatial uses through metaphor. What the case of *lay* shows (and that of *promitto* too) is that there is a non-metaphoric route by which at least some such verbs are derived, namely through change in non-linguistic practice and consequent weakening of the action-naming property of the verb. A secondary meaning, that has to do with the purpose of the action, becomes more central to the meaning.

Under various terms, such as generalization (Bybee & Pagliuca 1985) and bleaching (Givón 1975), the literature on grammaticalization has tended to emphasize the loss of features of meaning. Recently, no doubt with the recognition that schematic structures bear meaning (particularly since Goldberg 1995), there has been more attention to those aspects of change that involve expansion – the extension of the range of use of phrasal or clausal constructions and the growth in productivity of constructional slots (e.g. Himmelmann 2004; Traugott & Trousdale 2013). One kind of change that can't be characterized as either reduction or expansion is change in the prominence of relations between participants. The shift in prominence from the speaker-stake relation to the speaker-addressee relation that is caused by weakening of the physical meaning of *lay*, together with signalling of the involvement of the addressee, is a case of replacement, rather than loss or gain. One relation becomes prominent in place of another. Such a shift may be expected in any case where the action-naming property of a verb is weakened by a decline in the frequency with which the action is performed. This clearly goes beyond the domain of betting.

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