In contradistinction to both classical, armchair philosophy of mind and a priori, ordinary language philosophy of mind, and in spite of some forceful attempts to reverse this trend (e.g. Searle 1992; Hasker 1999), contemporary philosophy of mind is largely naturalized. Whereas the older forms of philosophy of mind were based upon the methods of introspection and conceptual analysis, recent philosophy of mind draws heavily upon the empirical methods and objective findings of the sciences. The present link of philosophy of mind especially to psychology, neurophysiology, artificial intelligence and linguistics establishes its position among the other cognitive sciences. Adopting a general scientistic outlook and, in particular, the naturalistic ontology this entails, excludes spiritualistic dualism – of whatever kind – as a possible theory of the mind from the start. The only viable frame of research for an investigation of the mind compatible with a scientific and naturalistic worldview is materialistic monism or – to use the current term – physicalism (Gillett & Loewer 2001). It follows that most contemporary studies of the nature and typical aspects of the mind – consciousness and intentionality – are constrained by a minimal ontological commitment to the physical stuff of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology. It is this trend that this paper will focus on. The paper starts with outlining the basic solutions of a physicalistic theory of the mind to three fundamental problems: the mind–body problem, the problem of intentionality or the status of folk psychology and the debate on psychosemantics. It ends with a note on cognitive pragmatics.