This study blends the notions of humorous intent and meta-motivational states in Van Dijk's mental-model theory. It is presumed that, when people communicate, they provide public mental models of (facets of) situations to others, which are not inevitably similar to their private mental models. Recipients know this, and employing their mind-reading skills in interaction, they do not only attempt to deduce a speaker's public mental model, but also a speaker's private mental model. Observed disparities give rise to the re-construction of a speaker's a priori intent by the recipient. Humorous intent is determined as a kind of a priori intent, which can be displayed in a jocular manipulation. Such a manipulation can be uncovered by the recipient when a public mental model seems to be an altered version of a private mental model and when the public mental model seems to be introduced in a jocular or para-telic mental state. In the case of unintentional humour by very young children, a fantasy mental model can be built to make a manipulation and humorous intent credible. In three examples the theory is administered to show its potential.