Human social interaction is explored by researchers in conversation analysis (CA) and psychology, but the ruling methodologies within these two disciplines are very divers. Assaying methodological differences in relation to main evolutions in the philosophy of science, it is proposed that a pivotal difference is that psychologists tend to observe Popper’s falsificationism in separating the context of discovery and the context of justification. In CA, following Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, these two contexts are much closer to one another, if not inseparable. While this dissociation grants the psychologist a much greater theoretical freedom, because psychologists “only” need to affirm their theories by producing confirmed predictions from experiments, it also carries the risk of producing theories that are less robust and relevant to everyday interaction than the body of knowledge gathered by CA. However, as long as crucial philosophical differences are well grasped, it is not an inherently bad idea to produce predictions from theories and employ quantitative and experimental methods to test them. It is both expedient and realizable to find a synthesis between methodologies that joins their strengths and evades their invalidities. This paper debates some dares that would need to be met and some chances that may result from generating such a synthesis.