According to the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy pragmatics supposes that one’s speaker ability is adequate to let one to build, in range of notable cases, credible accounts of how speakers and audiences reason. The question is: are those who ascribe reasoning to speakers and audiences suffer from a “curious mental derangement” that impedes them to see that reasoning is rare? This paper embraces the fourth reply that a speaker’s utterance gives an audience proof for what the speaker means, but the audience typically does not reason to a conclusion about what the speaker means. But it asserts that attributions of reasoning in pragmatics can still play a notable explanatory role. I consider four responses. (1) Speakers and audiences do reason to the extent pragmatic explanations require; they just typically do not do so consciously. (2) The second reply concedes that speakers and audiences often do not reason even unconsciously in any relevant detail, but it insists that attributions of reasoning can nonetheless be, and often are, explanatory. (3) The third reply is a response to objections to the second. It identifies reasoning with information processing steps. (4) The fourth view is that a speaker’s utterance provides an audience evidence for what the speaker means, but the audience typically does not reason to a conclusion about what the speaker means. I reject the first three replies and embrace the fourth, but I argue that attributions of reasoning in pragmatics can still play a significant explanatory role.