This study offers an embodied, action-oriented perspective on metaphor. It weaves together 3 theoretical ideas: (a) Lakoff & Johnson's (1980a, 1980b, 1980c; Lakoff, 1993) idea that metaphors are cross-domain conceptual mappings, (b) Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) idea that individuals are coupled to the world through embodied interactions with the environment, on which their sense of what is real is based, and (c) Gibbs's (1999) nascent idea that metaphors can be off-loaded into the cultural world. I argue that metaphors, as cross-domain mappings, can be directly realized in the coupling of the external settings that frame and sustain one's activities and what people, individually and collectively, do to and in the world. A comparison of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory is made from this perspective. I argue that the blending theory is overly stretched when it is applied to an analysis of metaphorical activity that can be jointly explained by cross-domain mappings and the external structures that constrain and modulate the activity. As for the conceptual metaphor theory, I argue that the theory is overly restrictive if domains are construed exclusively in neural terms. (Norman Y. Teng)