A brief review of the traditional semantic theories evolving from logical semantics, situational semantics to cognitive semantics reveals that are somewhat grounded on over-simplified and erroneous assumptions lacking compelling evidence from neuroscientific studies. The embodiment of abstract concepts has long been an unresolved controversy among philosophers psychologists, linguists and so on. The paradigm of embodied semantics has emerged from the integration of semantics with neuroscience. It is argued that developments in the fields of neuroscience support an embodiment view of semantic representation that concrete concepts are grounded in our sensory-motor experience, the embodiment of abstract concepts should be partially attributed to the interoceptive systems of the body. Comparing major semantic theories in the dimensions of modality, embodiment, stability experienceness philosophical assumption and methodology, the author proposes that future semantic theories should be built upon more solid foundations by integrating neuroscience with existing philosophical, sociological, anthropological and linguistic phenomenological approaches.