No one seems to have focused on the question of what roles metaphors play in actual psychological experimentation. It is one thing to demonstrate that both natural language about cognition and scientific theories of cognition are metaphorical, and quite another thing to show specifically how such metaphors articulate (if at all) with actual scientific practice. This is what we attempt to do in this chapter, following a lead given by Jerome Bruner (1965): "It is my impression from observing myself and my colleagues that the forging of metaphoric hunch into testable hypothesis goes on all the time.... [But] our articles, submitted properly to the appropriate psychological journal, have about them an aseptic quality.... we may be concealing some of the most fruitful sources of our ideas," (p. 5) In this chapter we hope to reveal some of the assumptions of experimental psychology by examining the use of cognitive metaphors in cognitive theories and research. (Robert Hoffman, Edward Cochran and James Nead, p.174)