To attempt to answer the question whether metaphors constitute or simply reflect cultural models requires an answer to the question of how abstract concepts emerge. We have considered several possibilities for the emergence of abstract concepts: (1) Literal Emergence, (2) Literal Emergence from some basic experience (3) internally motivated Metaphorical Emergence, and (4) Metaphorical Emergence motivated by some external experiential basis. We have argued that Literal Emergence (1) is not a viable way of thinking of the emergence of abstract concepts because it provides no account whatsoever of why abstract concepts have the particular content and structure that they do. We have also argued against Literal Emergence (2), a view which maintains that abstract concepts emerge directly - without the mediation of metaphor - from basic human experience. In particular we pointed out that Quinn's analysis of American marriage leaves out of consideration a large and significant portion of this concept - the part which is metaphorically conceived and from which the expectational structure of marriage derives. The notion of marriage, on our analysis, is partially based on and constituted by the generic metaphor NON-PHYSICAL UNITY IS PHYSICAL UNITY. Given this metaphor we can naturally account for why marriage has the expectational structure that it has, as well as for the fact that the same metaphor applies to many domains that are seemingly unrelated to marriage or love. I suggested in this paper that a number of abstract concepts can only emerge metaphorically. (Zoltán Kövecses)