The question addressed in this chapter is whether emotions are exclusively private or can be rendered public, indeed whether they might be only and uniquely public. This problematic has been addressed by philosophers of language and semioticians alike. Here the authors investigate it from the perspective of the relation between emotion, interpretation, and translation. The authors endeavor to demonstrate that emotions are not only translatable, but could not be perceived at all if not on the basis of translation-interpretation processes. The authors also interrogate the implausible belief that the language of emotions is a private language. A “semiotics of emotions” cannot but be a “semiotics of interpretation” as this has been asserting itself in contrast to semiotics (or rather semiology) of decodification. The prejudice concerning the private character of emotions is also addressed through a revisitation of the notion of subjectivity. The "I" is alterity such that to live coherently with its real constitution means to rethink the social in terms of the possibility of living together.