In this article the author draws on Aristotle, who divides human activities into saying, doing and making and which can be interpreted as modes of judgement. The question the authors aks is whether translation is making, doing or saying, or perhaps even all of them all the time and all at once, i.e. whether translation falls within one of the three modes of judgement or whether it emphasize a unique mode distinct from the others. First the author clarifies the different modes of judgement and in a second step he examines what kind of judgement is particularly involved in translation. In conclusion he finds that a translation is the articulation of a judgement in another language or form, or for other conditions and circumstances, with the following properties: a. it is an active judgement to the extent that it provides a practical equivalent of the original judgment and its modality relative to the translator's conditions and circumstances; b. it is an active judgement to the extent that it certifies that the translation preserves such practical equivalences; c. it is an assertive judgement to the extent that it implicitly asserts that it preserves such practical equivalence; d. it is a judgement of whatever modality is apporpriate to such pracitcal equivalences.