Quine once argued that semantics had split into two provinces “so fundamentally distinct as not to deserve a joint appellation at all” (1953: 131): the theory of meaning whose main concepts, apart from meaning itself, are synonymy, significance and analyticity, and the theory of reference whose main concepts are those of naming, truth, denotation and extension. Katz (1972: 182) expresses full agreement with this view and describes the term ‘semantics’ as ambiguous.

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