Philosophy of mind

Stefaan E. Cuypers
Table of contents

In contradistinction to both classical ‘armchair’ philosophy of mind and ‘a priori’ ordinary language philosophy of mind, and in spite of some forceful attempts to reverse this trend (e.g. Searle 1992), contemporary philosophy of mind is largely naturalized. Whereas the older forms of philosophy of mind were based upon the methods of introspection and conceptual analysis, recent philosophy of mind draws heavily upon the empirical methods and ‘objective’ findings of the sciences. The present link of philosophy of mind especially to psychology, neurophysiology, artificial intelligence and linguistics establishes it among the other cognitive sciences. Adopting a general scientistic outlook and, in particular, the naturalistic ontology this entails, excludes spiritualistic dualism — of whatever kind — as a possible theory of the mind from the start. The only viable frame of research for an investigation of the mind compatible with a scientific and naturalistic worldview is materialistic monism or — to use the current term — physicalism. It follows that most contemporary studies of the nature and typical aspects of the mind — consciousness and intentionality — are constrained by a minimal ontological commitment to the physical stuff of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology. It is this trend that I will focus on.

Full-text access is restricted to subscribers. Log in to obtain additional credentials. For subscription information see Subscription & Price.


Armstrong, D.M.
1968A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge.Google Scholar
Block, N.
1978Troubles with functionalism. In N. Block (ed.) 1980.: 268–305.Google Scholar
1980What is functionalism? In N. Block (ed.) 1980.: 171–184.Google Scholar
1986Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 615–678. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
1990The computer model of the mind. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (eds.) Thinking: 247–289. MIT Press.  BoPGoogle Scholar
(ed.) 1980Readings in philosophy of psychology, vol. 1. Methuen.Google Scholar
Borst, C.V.
(ed.) 1970The mind-brain identity theory. Macmillan. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Churchland Smith, P.
1986Neurophilosophy. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Churchland, P.M.
1989A neurocomputational perspective. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dascal, M.
1983Pragmatics and the philosophy of mind. John Benjamins. DOI logo  BoPGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D.
1984Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D.C.
1978Brainstorms. Bradford Books.Google Scholar
1987The intentional stance. MIT Press.Google Scholar
1990The myth of original intentionality. In K. A. Mohyeldin Said, W. H. Newton-Smith, R. Viale & K. V. Wilkes (eds.) Modelling the mind: 43–62. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
1991Consciousness explained. Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Dennett, D.C. & J. C. Haugeland
1987Intentionality. In R. L. Gregory (ed.) The Oxford companion to the mind: 383–386. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, F.I.
1981Knowledge and the flow of information. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Field, H.H.
1978Mental representations. In N. Block (ed.) 1981 Readings in philosophy of psychology, vol. 2: 78–114. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J.A.
1981Representations. MIT Press.Google Scholar
1987Psychosemantics. MIT Press.Google Scholar
1990A theory of content and other essays. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J.A
. & E. Lepore 1992Holism. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Grice, H.P.
1989Studies in the ways of words. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Harman, G.
1987(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics. In E. Lepore (ed.) New directions in semantics: 55–81.Academic Press.Google Scholar
Haugeland, J.C.
1990The intentionality all-stars. In J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4: 383–427. Ridgeview Publ. Co. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D.
1966An argument for the identity theory. In D. Lewis 1983 Philosophical papers, vol. 1: 99–107. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Millikan, R.G.
1984Language, thought, and other biological categories. MIT Press.Google Scholar
1993White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Papineau, D.
1987Reality and representation. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Place, U.T.
1956Is consciousness a brain process? In C. V. Borst (ed.) 1970.: 42–51.Google Scholar
Putnam, H.
1967The nature of mental states. In H. Putnam 1975 Language and reality: 429–440. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
1983Realism and reason. Cambridge University Press. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
1988Representation and reality. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O.
1960Word and object. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Ryle, G.
1949The concept of mind. Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Searle, J.R.
1983Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
1992The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Smart, J. J. C.
1959Sensations and brain processes. In C. V. Borst (ed.) 1970.: 52–66.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.
1953Philosophical investigations. Blackwell. [ See also: Cognitive science; Mentalism]Google Scholar