1.Introduction

The Dutch signific movement is not widely known. However, in the last few decades, this idealistic-linguistic movement, which existed from ca.1900 until ca.1960, has attracted considerable scholarly interest. This has resulted in valuable publications, most importantly Schmitz (1990a)Schmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum. and Schmitz (ed.) (1990)Schmitz, H. Walter ed. 1990 Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins..11.Other important sources of information about Dutch Significs are Petrilli (2009)Petrilli, Susan 2009 Signifying and Understanding. Reading the works of Victoria Welby and the Signific Movement. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. ; Pietarinen (2009)Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko 2009 “Significs and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy”. Journal of the History of Ideas 70:467–490. and the introductions in Van Eeden (2005)Eeden, Frederik van 2005 Logische Grundlage der Verständigung. Redekunstige grondslag van verstandhouding. Dutch-German parallel edition. German transl. by W. H. Vieregge and H. W. Schmitz. Ed., comm. and interpr. by W. H. Vieregge, H. W. Schmitz and J. Noordegraaf. Based upon the 1st ed. (1897) and 2nd ed. (1975), with an introduction by B. Willink. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. (Willink) and De Haan (1994)Haan, Jacob Israël de 1994 De taal zegt meer dan zij verantwoorden kan. Een keuze uit de verspreide rechtskundig-signifische geschriften van Mr. Jacob Israël de Haan. Coll. and introd. by G. C. J. J. van den Bergh. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri. (Van den Bergh). For this article, my foremost source of information was Schmitz (1990a)Schmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum., which exhaustively deals with the first period of Significs (until 1926), including Van Ginneken’s signific activities. I also benefited from Noordegraaf (1980)Noordegraaf, Jan 1980 “Jac. van Ginneken en de signifische beweging”. Was ik er ooit eerder? Een bundel opstellen aangeboden aan Dr. H.A. Wage ed. by S. A. J. Van Faassen. 41–61. ‘s-Gravenhage: BZZTôH., the first article about Van Ginneken’s role in Significs. Understandably, these publications mainly deal with signific work of the movement’s main characters: Frederik van Eeden (1850–1932), Gerrit Mannoury (1867–1956), Jacob Israël de Haan (1881–1924) and Luitzen (Bertus) Brouwer (1881–1966).

This article, however, focuses on the contributions to Significs by one of its minor characters, the Dutch linguist Jacques van Ginneken S. J. (1877–1945), who was involved in Significs from 1919 to 1924. During these years, Van Ginneken’s contributions to Significs carried some weight, despite his brief and not very intense involvement, and despite his intellectual and ideological distance to other significians. The curious combination of Van Ginneken’s considerable impact on the movement and the tensions between this prominent Jesuit linguist and the brilliant, but linguistically somewhat naïve intellectuals and social idealists calls for further analysis.

In the first part of this article (Sections 2–6), the story of Van Ginneken’s membership of the signific movement will be told. Two perspectives will be taken into account: the major significians’ and Van Ginneken’s. Central questions are: (i) What did the significians expect from Van Ginneken when they asked him to join their movement in 1919Ginneken, Jac. van 1919 Gelaat, gebaar en klankexpressie. Leiden: Sijthoff., and how did that work out for them? and (ii) What made Van Ginneken accept the significians’ invitation, what did he intend to contribute to their purposes, and why did he leave the movement in 1924?

In Section 2, some basic information will be presented about the signific movement and about Van Ginneken. Section 3 discusses Van Ginneken’s introduction to the signific movement. In Sections 4 and 5, Van Ginneken’s small but influential contributions to the movement will be described. Section 6 deals with Van Ginneken’s farewell to Significs.

In the subsequent Sections 7 and 8, Van Ginneken’s role in Significs will be further analyzed, taking into account his position in the linguistic landscape of his days. Section 7 discusses some common focuses of interest of Significs and Van Ginneken. Section 8, in turn, deals with differences between Van Ginneken and his co-significians, mainly with respect to the complex transition from linguistic psychologism to linguistic anti-psychologism during the first decades of the 20th century. In this section, parts of Van Ginneken’s 1917 book De roman van een kleuter (‘The story of a toddler’) and of his 1936Ginneken, Jac. van 1936 “Het woord”. Onze Taaltuin 5:97–109, 193–209, 225–235. article “Het woord” (The word) will be discussed in some detail. Together, these sections contribute to a more in-depth picture of the dynamics between Van Ginneken and the movement he joined with enthusiasm but criticized from the very beginning. Section 9 presents a brief conclusion.

2.Significs and Van Ginneken: “Bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble”?

Basic information about Significs and Van Ginneken will be presented in two separate subsections (2.1 and 2.2). The third subsection (2.3) consists of a timetable which combines data about important elements of the history of Significs and of Van Ginneken.

2.1Significs: Language research and idealism

What was Significs? Put briefly, Significs was an idealistic-linguistic movement, based upon the belief that language can advance (or hinder) societal progress. As core activities were envisioned: language analysis, language criticism and, ultimately, language reform, with a perspective on social reform. The aim was to gather a group of prominent broad-minded intellectuals of various disciplines and backgrounds, in order to create, through language reform, new and better types of communication, which would be unaffected by vagueness, ambiguities, hidden prejudices and misleading formulations. Misunderstandings and mutual distrust would thus be avoided, and a better and more peaceful world would come within reach.

Significs arose around 1900. The English philosopher Lady Victoria Welby (1837–1912) developed the initial principles and coined the name “Significs”, but the movement developed independently and became a purely Dutch matter, at least in the first of two periods of Significs (1900–1926), which is the period of Van Ginneken’s membership.22.Welby’s aim was “raising language from the irrational and instinctive to the rational and volitional plane” (Welby 1985Welby, Victoria Lady 1985 [1911] Significs and Language. The articulate form of our expressive and interpretative resources. With an introduction by H. W. Schmitz. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.: clxxiv). Van Eeden (1897)Eeden, Frederik van 1897 “Redekunstige grondslag van verstandhouding”. Studies, Derde reeks by Frederik van Eeden. 5–84. Amsterdam: Versluys., the first Dutch signific publication, was largely conceived independently from Welby’s work. See Schmitz (1990b)Schmitz, H. Walter 1990b “Frederik van Eeden and the Introduction of Significs into the Netherlands: from Lady Welby to Mannoury”. Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912) ed. by H. Walter Schmitz. 219–246. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins..

Core members in this period were the four scholars mentioned above:

• Frederik van Eeden (1850–1932), author, psychiatrist, social reformer

• Gerrit Mannoury (1867–1956), mathematician, philosopher, socialist/communist

• Jacob Israël de Haan (1881–1924), author, jurist, zionist

• Luitzen E. J. Brouwer (1881–1966), mathematician (founder of mathematical intuitionism), philosopher33.Extensive volumes, most of them in Dutch, have been devoted to the multi-faceted life and work of all four major significians: Fontijn (1990Fontijn, Jan 1990 Tweespalt. Het leven van Frederik van Eeden tot 1901. Amsterdam: Querido. and 1996Fontijn, Jan 1996 Trots verbrijzeld. Het leven van Frederik van Eeden vanaf 1901. Amsterdam: Querido.) about Van Eeden, Van Dalen (2001Dalen, Dirk van 2001 L.E.J. Brouwer 1881–1966. Een biografie: het heldere licht van de wiskunde. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. and 2013Dalen, Dirk van 2013 L.E.J. Brouwer – topologist, intuitionist, philosopher. London: Springer. ) about Brouwer, Meijer (1967)Meijer, Jaap 1967 De zoon van een gazzan. Het leven van Jacob Israël de Haan 1881–1924. Amsterdam: Polak & Van Gennep. and Fontijn (2015)Fontijn, Jan 2015 Onrust. Het leven van Jacob Israël de Haan, 1881–1924. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij. about De Haan and Kirkels (2019) about Mannoury.

Van Eeden was the first Dutch significian. He introduced Welby’s ideas to the Netherlands, after meeting her in England. Mannoury became by far the most prominent significian. He chaired the successive signific organizations founded during the first period of the movement: the International Institute for Philosophy and the Signific Circle, respectively. Moreover, Mannoury was the only significian who introduced a psychological-linguistic theory, intended to be directly applied in signific language and communication research. He distinguished a gradual hierarchy of language levels, which were thought to correspond to accumulating stages of ontogenetic and phylogenetic language development: through increasing social complexity and mutual coordination, semantic differentiation and stabilization become more and more necessary.

Each level represents, in a sense, a “language”, with its own functionality, in an increasing degree of semantic differentiation and semantic stability, which runs parallel to a decrease in emotive meaning (i.e. a loss of richness and depth) and an increase in indicative meaning (i.e. a gain in certainty and intelligibility).

Mannoury’s five “languages” are: (1) basic language (e.g. first child language, emotional language, hypothetical primitive language), (2) emotive language (e.g. popular language, poetic language, oriental languages with imagistic script), (3) utility language (e.g. language of trade and commerce, Western written languages), (4) scientific language (e.g. legal language, technical language), (5) symbolic language (e. g. language of mathematics and logic).44.Symbolic language is, however, devoid of meaning. The -not unproblematic- mix of epistemological, ontogenetical, phylogenetical, psycholinguistic, ethnolinguistic, sociolinguistic and formalistic considerations underlying the five-level system was, as far as I know, not discussed by the significians. Different English translations of Mannoury’s Dutch level terminology have been presented in various publications. In this article, I follow Schmitz (1993)Schmitz, H. Walter 1993 ”The semantic foundations and implications of signific language gradations”. Histoire Épistémologie Langage 15:53–79. .

Only in basic language do words derive their meaning directly from the speaker’s inner and outer psychical impressions. On all other levels, meanings result, to an increasing degree, from conventional connections with other language elements and from explicit definitions. Conventional connections consist of psychical associations between words, which are conceived as auditive and visual images, connected with meanings, i.e. with their effects as envisioned by the speaker and experienced by the listener. For example, in child language, word connections (e.g. causal, temporal or oppositive connections) used by adults have influence on the stability of the child’s mental lexicon and its transition to higher levels (Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 277–278).

According to Mannoury, semantic instability at the lower levels and the fact that natural languages do not sufficiently recognize the distinctions between levels are main causes of misunderstandings and unnecessary controversies. Signific work should repair these deficiencies. Initially, five-volume multilingual dictionaries, corresponding to the five language levels, were envisioned. Descriptions on each level were thought to presuppose only words of preceding levels. New words should be introduced (i) where existing words are thus far indistinctly used at various levels, (ii) where existing words are misleading and need purification. The dictionary program, which included a detailed description of the language levels, was designed by Mannoury and published as a programmatic text of the International Institute for Philosophy in 1919.55.Cf. Mannoury et al. (1919)Mannoury, Gerrit et al. 1919 “Signifisch taalonderzoek”. Mededeelingen van het Internationaal Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte te Amsterdam 2:5–29..

Ideas of language gradation and language reform were not at all new in the western intellectual tradition. Actually, Significs was a new branch of a centuries-old tree.66. Eco (1995)Eco, Umberto 1995 The Search for the Perfect Language. Transl. by J. Fentress. Oxford: Blackwell. presents a comprehensive overview of this tradition. Around 1900, these issues gained new impulses, through developments in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, epistemology, logic and mathematics, as well as in social-political thought.77.Various articles in Schmitz (ed.) (1990)Schmitz, H. Walter ed. 1990 Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. place Lady Welby’s work and Dutch Significs in these wider contexts. Cf. also Schmitz (1993)Schmitz, H. Walter 1993 ”The semantic foundations and implications of signific language gradations”. Histoire Épistémologie Langage 15:53–79. .

In a very broad sense, the various significians adhered to common basic linguistic-philosophical and idealistic principles, but their favorite sources of inspiration and their more detailed thoughts on the matter were very different. Van Eeden, Brouwer and De Haan developed gradation and reform ideas before Mannoury. These ideas differed from each other and from Mannoury’s ideas in many respects, but this did not prevent unanimous acceptance of the programmatic text.88.However, Brouwer wanted to add his own description of the language levels to the common programmatic text. This resulted in an additional text, again unanimously signed, but widely differing from Mannoury’s five-level description. Both texts were signed by Van Eeden, Brouwer, Mannoury and the author Henri Borel (1869–1933), an active member of the movement during its early years. De Haan did not belong to the signatories, because of his departure for Palestine in January 1919.

It is, therefore, not surprising, that even after the programmatic adoption of Mannoury’s conceptual framework, differences became manifest in further discussions, which was problematic for the next step: transforming the theory of language levels and the dictionary design into a concrete working program. Time and again, significians could not reach agreement about programmatic issues.

Such a lack of agreement became a hallmark of the movement. As soon as general aims and principles were discussed in more detail, let alone in terms of plans of action, opinions turned out to differ widely. In retrospect, we need not be surprised that the signific movement was much less successful than it hoped to be. Several attempts at internationalization failed, potential members declined invitations, disappointed members left the movement, financial problems accumulated. Together, these problems brought about the end of the ambitious International Institute for Philosophy in 1921. It was succeeded by a more small-scale organization, the Signific Circle. However, even in this modest form, signific cooperation could not survive. In 1926, the Signific Circle was terminated. Mannoury was the only member who continued signific work.

After a break during the years 1926–1936, the movement was reactivated by Mannoury and his son-in-law, the psychologist David Vuysje (1900–1969). This second period of Significs lasted for some decades. Its focus was more restricted to analysis and criticism of scientific terminology. International conferences were now its core activity. The movement faded out around 1960, four years after Mannoury’s death.99.The second period of Significs is briefly indicated in Figure (1) below, but will not be further discussed here. See for this period Heijerman (1986)Heijerman, A. F. 1986 “Een tragische komedie? Tien Internationale Signifische Zomerconferenties, 1939–1954”. Filosofie in Nederland. De Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte als ontmoetingsplaats 1916–1986 ed. by A. F. Heijerman & M. J. van de Hoven. 93–120. Meppel & Amsterdam: Boom..

2.2Van Ginneken: A Jesuit linguist in search of interdisciplinarity

Van Ginneken was not only an extremely productive linguist, but also an extremely active Jesuit priest. As a linguist, he was intensively involved in the rapid internationalization of the discipline, especially of the new non-historical structuralist approach, which developed during the first few decades of the 20th century. Even more conspicuously, Van Ginneken contributed to the broadening of the discipline by strengthening –and creating!– relations with other areas. This aspect of his work often functions as a guideline to the various periods of Van Ginneken’s career: three periods can be distinguished: a psycholinguistic (1903–1913), a sociolinguistic (1913–1926) and a biolinguistic period (1926–1945).1010.Compared with his impressive contributions to other areas, Van Ginneken’s signific contributions are very modest, which explains that, in overviews of Van Ginneken’s life and work, his signific work is almost totally neglected. Neither do obituaries mention his signific involvement, except for the “In Memoriam” written by his co-significian Mannoury (Mannoury 1946Mannoury, Gerrit 1946 “In Memoriam Jac. van Ginneken S.J.”. Synthese 55:35–37. ). It is, by the way, important to note that, apart from Mannoury, the overall historical importance of the brilliant and multi-talented core significians is also hardly due to their contributions to Significs, which are much larger than Van Ginneken’s. However, their comprehensive biographies (cf. note 3) pay due attention to their signific work. A biography of Van Ginneken does not yet exist. These labels must not be interpreted too strictly. For example, Van Ginneken’s article “Het woord” (The word, 1936Ginneken, Jac. van 1936 “Het woord”. Onze Taaltuin 5:97–109, 193–209, 225–235.) and his last book Het mysterie der menschelijke taal (‘The mystery of human language’, 1946Ginneken, Jac. van 1946 Het mysterie der menschelijke taal. Haarlem: Bohn.) were written during the alleged biolinguistic period, although their main characteristics were, respectively, psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic.

Precisely these two publications contain some brief but explicit remarks about Significs. Allusions to Significs are extremely scarce in Van Ginneken’s large oeuvre. Only in the 1935Ginneken, Jac. van 1935 “Wat is taal?”. Onze Taaltuin 3:265–275. article “Wat is taal?” (‘What is language?’) can other remarks about Significs be found. All these remarks were made long after Van Ginneken’s break from Significs.1111.In the meantime, the program of Significs had changed, but Van Ginneken ignores this. His remarks mainly refer to language reform, which was no longer aimed at during the second period of Significs, and was deemphasized already at the end of the first period (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 316–317). Unlike the core members of the movement, Van Ginneken never produced a book or article with Significs as its central theme.1212. Schmitz’s (1990a)Schmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum. information about Van Ginneken’s signific ideas is mainly based upon archive material: letters and minutes of signific meetings. A part of these minutes has been published in a stylized form in “Signifische Dialogen” (Signific Dialogues) (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.). Cf. also Brouwer et al. (1939b)Brouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939b “Over “theologische significa””. Synthese 4:239–243.. Van Eeden’s diaries are another valuable source of information.

Despite their brevity, the remarks reveal important aspects of Van Ginneken’s general attitude towards the signific movement, also during his membership. Therefore, I present them here, as a prelude to later explanations:1313.My translation, as in all non-English quotations that follow.

Language is not a dead algebra, which composes and decomposes through fixed and immutable rules; language is always life, free and happy as any life.[…]

Wrong guessing, and then doing some talk back and forth before understanding each other, in other words, the principle of plural meaning of one form, belongs to the essence of language itself. And the naïve significian, who would like to remedy this by turning it into a fixed algebra, is like a child that, from its cradle, reaches and commands to the stars, which emerge in wide magnitude and depth and majesty.(“Wat is taal?”,1935: 266, 269)

This [the phenomenon of misunderstanding] is due to the nature of human language. […] And misunderstanding cannot be cured by Significs, nor by any other device. Human beings can only be brought together by mutual intimate knowledge and togetherness. Only a broad understanding and warm love can nullify all misunderstanding.(“Het woord”,1936: 208)

[…] all misunderstanding is based upon deficient knowledge of and a lack of respect for each other’s intentions. I mention this especially in the interest of Significs.(“Het woord”, 1936: 225–226)

Modern Significs is wrong if it wants to fix all content words in definitions, ignoring metaphorical language use, and wants to oblige intellectuals to apply only these definitions. Intuition and loving empathy in human conversation will certainly bring us nearer to shared understanding than algebraic formulae. After all, language is much better and deeper than algebra or a signal code.(Het mysterie der menschelijke taal, 1946: 104)

These few statements, which show a curious mix of down-to-earthness and loftiness, are characteristic of Van Ginneken’s objections to Significs. He presented these ideas from the very beginning of his signific involvement onwards. Two central points can be distinguished:

1. Misunderstandings are inherent in human language and, therefore, unavoidable. However, empathy can prevent and dissolve misunderstandings.

2. Language cannot be captured in definitions through fixed algebraic formulae.

In the course of this article, these and some other points of criticism of Significs by Van Ginneken will be further explored, together with points of mutual appreciation.

2.3Significs and Van Ginneken. Timetable

In the chronological scheme below (Figure 1), I present some important events in the development of Dutch Significs and in the life and work of Van Ginneken, so that the period of their connectedness can be observed in a broader context. The timetable shows (in grey) Van Ginneken’s relatively brief involvement in Significs, compared to the total history of Significs and to the total career of Van Ginneken. The “grey” episode is the central theme of this article. Most publications, events and institutions referred to can be found in Figure 1.

Figure 1.Timetable

Significs	year	Van Ginneken
	1877	Jacobus Joannes Antonius van Ginneken was born in Oudenbosch, Netherlands.
Van Eeden meets Welby for the first time.	1892
	1895	Entry into Societas Jesu.
First Dutch Signific publication: Van Eeden’s Redekunstige grondslag van Verstandhouding (‘Logical Foundations of Understanding’).	1897Eeden, Frederik van 1897 “Redekunstige grondslag van verstandhouding”. Studies, Derde reeks by Frederik van Eeden. 5–84. Amsterdam: Versluys.
	1902	Student of Dutch language and literature at Leiden University.
Publication of Welby’s “What is meaning?”	1903
	1907	Doctorate cum laude at Leiden University. Thesis: Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique (‘Principles of psychological linguistics. Synthetic essay’). Supervisor: C. C. Uhlenbeck. In this book a short reference to Van Eeden (1897)Eeden, Frederik van 1897 “Redekunstige grondslag van verstandhouding”. Studies, Derde reeks by Frederik van Eeden. 5–84. Amsterdam: Versluys..
	1910	Ordination.
Publication of Welby’s “Significs” (entry in Encyclopedia Britannica), and “Significs and language”.	1911–12	Publication Het gevoel in taal en woordkunst (‘Emotion in language and verbal art’). In this book a short reference to Welby’s work.
	1913–14	Publication Handboek der Nederlandsche Taal (‘Compendium of the Dutch Language’, 2 volumes). First sociolinguistic work in the Netherlands.
1914: Van Eeden founds the international “Forte circle”, based on a Significs-oriented programme. Closing down in the same year.	1914 & 1916	J. I. de Haan writes letters to Van Ginneken, with questions and comments on Van Ginneken (1911–12Ginneken, Jac. van 1911–12 Het gevoel in taal en woordkunst. (Reprint from Leuvensche Bijdragen 9 and 10.) and 1913–14Ginneken, Jac. van 1913–14 Handboek der Nederlandsche taal. De sociologische struktuur der Nederlandsche taal. 2 volumes. Nijmegen: Malmberg.).
Doctorate De Haan at Amsterdam University. Thesis: Rechtskundige Significa (‘Juridical Significs’). Supervisor: J. A. van Hamel; opponent: Brouwer; “paranimf” (ceremonial assistant): Van Eeden.	1916	Member of Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen (Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences).
Foundation “Internationaal Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte” (International Institute for Philosophy) (Van Eeden, Brouwer, De Haan, Mannoury and some others).	1917	Publication secondary school textbook about language acquisition De roman van een kleuter (‘The story of a toddler’).
	1919	Nomination for professorship at Amsterdam University. Blocked by City Council. Reason: anti-semitism in chapter “Jewish language” in Van Ginneken (1913–14)Ginneken, Jac. van 1913–14 Handboek der Nederlandsche taal. De sociologische struktuur der Nederlandsche taal. 2 volumes. Nijmegen: Malmberg..
	1919	First attendance at a meeting of the “Internationaal Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte” (International Institute for Philosophy) at Mannoury’s home.
Last meeting of the “Internationaal Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte”. Small-scale continuation: the “Signifische Kring” (Signific Circle).	1922	Foundation of the “Signifische Kring” (Signific Circle), consisting of Van Eeden, Brouwer, Mannoury and Van Ginneken.
	1923	Professorship at Nijmegen University [Catholic University of Nijmegen, since 2004 Radboud University].
	1924	Departure from the “Signifische Kring”.
Closing down of the ”Signifische Kring”.	1926	Publication “De erfelijkheid der klankwetten” (‘The heredity of sound laws’)
Foundation of the journal “Synthese” (Synthesis) by Vuysje.	1936	Publication article “Het woord” (‘The word’) in the journal “Onze Taaltuin” (‘Our Language Garden’), vol. 5.
Foundation of the “Internationale Signifische Studiegroep (ISS)” (International Signific Study Group). “Signifische Dialogen” (‘Signific Dialogues’) published in “Synthese”.	1937	Publication in “Synthese” of Brouwer, Van Eeden, Van Ginneken, Mannoury “Signifische Dialogen” (‘Signific Dialogue’s’).
Publication of Signifische Dialogen as a separate book. First International Signific Summer Conference.	1939	“Signifische Dialogen” published as a separate book.
	1945	Van Ginneken dies in Nijmegen
ISS renamed: “Internationaal Signifisch Genootschap” (ISG) (International Signific Society). 2nd International Signific Summer Conference.	1946	Posthumous publication Het mysterie der menschelijke taal (‘The mystery of human language’).
ISG incorporated. Statutory establishment of six sections.	1948
10th and last International Signific Summer Conference. Death of Mannoury.	1956

3.Van Ginneken’s introduction to the signific movement

Initially, Van Ginneken was invited to attend signific meetings as a Roman Catholic theologian, but, of course, his linguistic expertise counted in his favor. In 1919Ginneken, Jac. van 1919 Gelaat, gebaar en klankexpressie. Leiden: Sijthoff., the International Institute for Philosophy was in need of more members, after the departure of some participants, among them De Haan, who left for Palestine.1414.In 1924, De Haan was murdered in Jerusalem by Hagana, a paramilitary Orthodox-Jewish organization. The Institute also aimed at more religious and social diversity among its members, in line with original plans. Moreover, the significians wanted to improve their insights to language and communication through a study of language varieties of specific groups, among them Roman Catholics, whose language was thought to represent a relatively stable conceptual system.1515.The significians were also interested in, e.g., differences between the proportion of indicative and emotive elements in male and female language. Therefore, this variety seemed to be suitable for a first exercise in language analysis in terms of the theory of language levels, as required for the dictionary project. Mannoury consulted a colleague-professor at the University of Amsterdam, a Thomist theologian, who mentioned Van Ginneken as a possible candidate.

When he was invited by the Institute, Van Ginneken already knew about the signific movement, as appears from several texts. In Van Ginneken’s magnum opus “Principes de linguistique psychologique” (1907), he pays brief –and mildly positive– attention to Van Eeden’s 1897Eeden, Frederik van 1897 “Redekunstige grondslag van verstandhouding”. Studies, Derde reeks by Frederik van Eeden. 5–84. Amsterdam: Versluys. book about human understanding. In his book about emotion in language and verbal art (Van Ginneken, 1911–1912Ginneken, Jac. van 1911–12 Het gevoel in taal en woordkunst. (Reprint from Leuvensche Bijdragen 9 and 10.)), he refers to Welby (1903Welby, Victoria Lady 1903 What is Meaning? Studies in the development of significance. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd. and 1911Welby, Victoria Lady 1911 Significs and Language. The articulate form of our expressive and interpretative resources. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd.) in a “for further reading” list.1616.This, of course, does not imply that Van Ginneken actually read Welby’s publications. I know of no further references to Welby’s work by Van Ginneken. He became more involved in Significs through exchanges of letters with De Haan in 1914 and 1916. De Haan contacted Van Ginneken for advice about semantic issues which were relevant to his juridical-signific dissertation (De Haan 1916Haan, Jacob Israël de 1916 Rechtskundige significa en hare toepassing op de begrippen “aansprakelijk, verantwoordelijk, toerekeningsvatbaar”. Amsterdam: Versluys.). Unfortunately, Van Ginneken’s answers to De Haan have been lost (cf. Begheyn 2005Begheyn, Paul S. J. 2005 “Twee brieven van Jacob Israël de Haan aan Jacques van Ginneken S.J. in verband met de Hollandse Significa”. Nieuw Letterkundig Magazijn 23:51–54.).1717.De Haan’s letters bear witness to his admiration for Van Ginneken’s work. He praises Van Ginneken (1911–1912Ginneken, Jac. van 1911–12 Het gevoel in taal en woordkunst. (Reprint from Leuvensche Bijdragen 9 and 10.)) and Van Ginneken’s sociolinguistic handbook (1913–1914Ginneken, Jac. van 1913–14 Handboek der Nederlandsche taal. De sociologische struktuur der Nederlandsche taal. 2 volumes. Nijmegen: Malmberg.). After the publication of vol. 1 of this book, he asks if vol. 2 is already available in manuscript or proof. Vol. 2 was also favorably received by De Haan, although it contained a chapter about Jewish language that he severely criticized in two articles. During the 1919 controversy about Van Ginneken’s nomination at the then municipal University of Amsterdam, De Haan had already moved to Jerusalem, but he followed the events closely. He rightly predicted that the antisemitic spirit of the handbook chapter would cost him votes in the Amsterdam City Council. Cf. Van der Stroom (2012Stroom, Gerrold P. van der 2012 Jac. van Ginneken onder vuur. Over eigentijdse en naoorlogse kritiek op de taalkundige J.J.A. van Ginneken S.J. (1877–1945). Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek VU & Münster: Nodus., ch. 2).

Seemingly, Van Ginneken could have known enough about the signific movement to realize that he might be an outsider if he joined the group. His abovementioned views about language and communication were not the only points of difference. Van Ginneken’s world view was deeply religious and conservative. To the extent that he adopted an idealistic prospect for the future, this was in line with the Christian belief in ultimate salvation. These ideas strongly deviated from the views of the main members of the signific movement. All held secular views; Mannoury was a communist, Brouwer loved Eastern spirituality, Van Eeden adopted a mix of idealistic socialism and spirituality.1818.In 1898, Van Eeden founded a farmer’s colony, Walden, based upon idealist-communist economic principles, and inspired by Henry Thoreau’s book Walden (1854). This experiment was a failure and ended in bankruptcy (1907). Their common idealistic design of a future human society was strictly egalitarian.

Nevertheless, Van Ginneken accepted the invitation. For this positive reaction, three reasons may have been relevant:

1. The strong interdisciplinary character of the signific movement, which perfectly fitted with Van Ginneken’s industrious pursuit of interdisciplinarity in linguistics.

2. The prominent interest of the significians in the study of language varieties of various social groups. This type of research was Van Ginneken’s main interest at the moment he joined Significs, which was in his sociolinguistic period. His earlier acquaintance with Van Eeden’s, Welby’s and De Haan’s work may also have encouraged ideas of possible good cooperation.

3. Van Eeden’s contemporary thoughts about joining the Roman Catholic Church, which were generally known in those days. This situation must have appealed to the passionate apologist Van Ginneken.1919.After years of preparation, Van Eeden eventually joined the Roman Catholic Church in 1922. Van Ginneken was one of the clergymen who played a prominent role in this conversion (cf. Fontijn 1996Fontijn, Jan 1996 Trots verbrijzeld. Het leven van Frederik van Eeden vanaf 1901. Amsterdam: Querido., ch. 14).

As an additional explanation, Van Ginneken’s often-reported vanity may be mentioned. He certainly regarded the invitation of the significians –all men of reputation– as honourable and enjoyed the possibility of sharing his double expertise –theological and linguistic– with them.

On the 8th of November 1919, Van Ginneken visited Mannoury’s Amsterdam house for his first meeting with the significians Mannoury, Brouwer and Van Eeden, during the 20th gathering of the International Institute for Philosophy. The discussion theme was “theological Significs”. Van Ginneken confirmed the significians’ suggestion that there are similarities between scholastic philosophy and aspects of signific language analysis. The signific program itself was criticized by Van Ginneken at several points.2020.In Brouwer et al. (1939b)Brouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939b “Over “theologische significa””. Synthese 4:239–243., detailed information can be found about this meeting and the next one on December 7, based upon Mannoury’s minutes of these meetings.

Nevertheless, Van Ginneken continued his visits to signific meetings. Eventually, he attended 25 assemblies, 15 of the Institute as “guest”, 10 of its successor, the Signific Circle, as member.

4.1919–1921. Van Ginneken’s first years as significian: “guest” member of the Institute

After Van Ginneken’s first two meetings with the significians, the theme “theological Significs” was not continued in following sessions. Henceforth, Van Ginneken participated purely as a linguist, although, in discussions, he often appealed to his theological background, in a somewhat similar way as Brouwer and Mannoury often appealed to mathematics.2121.When discussions took a mathematical turn, they became incomprehensible to Van Eeden and Van Ginneken. Van Eeden welcomed Van Ginneken’s honestly confessed lack of understanding as a shot in the arm (cf. Noordegraaf 1980Noordegraaf, Jan 1980 “Jac. van Ginneken en de signifische beweging”. Was ik er ooit eerder? Een bundel opstellen aangeboden aan Dr. H.A. Wage ed. by S. A. J. Van Faassen. 41–61. ‘s-Gravenhage: BZZTôH.: 52).

Already during the first meeting, it was Van Ginneken’s linguistic background that made him object to the signific program on two points. First, he criticized the five-level approach, briefly explained to him by Mannoury. His objections concerned the methodological application of the framework: starting from the lowest level and climbing upwards to the highest level by explaining each level in terms of the preceding level. Van Ginneken prefers “beginning at the opposite side”: the direct analysis of concepts of “thinking” people will be more revealing than attempts to reconstruct these concepts from vague and hardly describable conceptual elements of children and undeveloped peoples.

Second, he criticized the idea of language reform. He took a “very sceptical” position about artificial interventions in ordinary language, through addition and systematization, in order to prevent misunderstanding and thus advance spiritual agreement between humans. He regarded such interventions as useful only for scientific discourse.

How did the significians react? As to the first point, there was an immediate impact: Mannoury changed the working plan for the dictionary project. He now wanted to start by studying the third level (utility language), which is nearest to directly observable ordinary language as studied in linguistics.2222.In the 1919 programmatic text, utility language is already given some priority, at least for language reform. The actual sequence of work on the dictionaries is also claimed to be not necessarily identical to the logical building sequence from basic language to symbolic language. Van Ginneken was invited to elaborate the new approach. He agreed, but nothing was heard of it. Meanwhile, signific activities continued to focus on research of ordinary language, for which Van Ginneken called for following modern linguistic methods and for adding more linguists to the group.2323.Actually, alongside Van Ginneken, two other linguists attended some meetings of the Institute as “guest” in the period 1920–1922. Barend Faddegon (1874–1955), specialist in Sankrit and Indian philosophy, was invited together with some other scholars. He was the only one who accepted the invitation, but he soon resigned, due to doubts about the signific program. Andries Verschuur (1863–1945) was a specialist in history of linguistics and philosophy of language. He had some prior knowledge of Welby’s work. His invitation by Mannoury was supported by Van Ginneken. Just like Faddegon, Verschuur disagreed with the signific program, especially with its social reform aspirations, and resigned after attending six meetings.

A similar de-levelling was brought about by Van Ginneken in the higher language levels. We observed that his idea of “beginning at the opposite side” actually came down to a proposal to analyze concepts of “thinking people” first, which was interpreted as “studying the third level” first. The genuine opposite side, the highest level of mathematical-logical language, was regarded by Van Ginneken as linguistically irrelevant. As far as it is a purely formal calculus, it is “dead algebra” (cf. the quotation in section 2.2 above). As far as it is an interpreted calculus, which Mannoury also suggests now and then, it is language, but language deprived of any emotive meaning, which is impossible in natural language, according to Van Ginneken.

On this point, too, Van Ginneken convinced Mannoury. Formalization into mathematical language was no longer regarded as the ultimate result of a step-by-step process towards the highest and most disambiguated language level, but as an analytic tool for the indicative aspect of word meaning only. In this role, formalization could retain its usefulness in order to lay bare misleading pseudo-problems.2424.Mannoury cherished a wide concept of formalization. It covered, e.g., our division of reality in discrete units and also the meaning differentiation and stabilization in subsequent language levels (Cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 247, 277). The aim of eliminating pseudo-problems, and, partially, the means to achieve this, constitute an obvious connection between Significs and the Wiener Kreis (cf. Weststeijn 2003–2005Weststeijn, Arthur 2003–2005 “De Wiener Kreis in Nederland, 1934–1940”. Geschiedenis van de Wijsbegeerte in Nederland 14:249–260.). Remarkably, Van Ginneken supported the idea of formalization as a tool to reduce controversies to semantic differences “through proper signific reflection” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 39–40).

Schmitz (1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 286–287) concludes that Van Ginneken “regarded the problem of a systematic language construction as insoluble” and was “sceptical about a methodical application of the theory of language levels from the very beginning”. The doubt that Van Ginneken sowed marked the end of the dictionary project.

As to misunderstandings, the subject of Van Ginneken’s second objection, Van Ginneken emphatically advocated an alternative theory and an alternative remedy. He claimed that understanding between humans is based upon a common social, psychological and ideological background. Backgrounds always “color” word meanings, which are, therefore, inherently polysemous. Language reform cannot prevent this: the “coloring” is a never-ending process.

Misunderstandings may arise only in the case of background differences between communicative partners, but, according to Van Ginneken, this occurs much less often than assumed by the significians. Misunderstandings are due to differences between interlocutors in “coloring” and lack of insight or interest in these differences. Van Ginneken promoted the study of group languages, as practised by himself in Van Ginneken (1913–1914)Ginneken, Jac. van 1913–14 Handboek der Nederlandsche taal. De sociologische struktuur der Nederlandsche taal. 2 volumes. Nijmegen: Malmberg., as wholesome for a general awareness of semantic differences between social groups. In line with his statements quoted in section 2.2 above, his central claim, defended time and again, was that not language reform, but interest in each other’s background can prevent and remedy misunderstanding.

An additional element in Van Ginneken’s anti-reform attitude was his hostile standpoint about old-school prescriptive linguistics, which he shared with the great majority of contemporary professional linguists. He was connected to the “Taal en letteren” (Language and literature) movement of Dutch innovative authors and language teachers who propagated spontaneous and creative “living language” and combated the “straitjacket” of traditional grammar and obsolete language rules.2525.Cf., e.g., the pamphlet-like booklet (Van Ginneken 1917bGinneken, Jac. van 1917b Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden. Een hartig woord aan hen die belang stellen in de toekomst van het Nederlandsche volk. Nijmegen: Malmberg.) “Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden” (If our mother tongue education will ever be healthy again). Van Ginneken’s principled statement that “research of group influences on individual language and thought appears to me more promising than attempts at a more or less artificial extension and enrichment of our language resources, which I, as a philologist, still reject” bears clear witness of the linguistic element in his anti-reform view (cf. Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 64, italics mine).

Van Ginneken’s view of misunderstandings was, unlike the view underlying his first objection, never adopted by his co-significians. Although they agreed with him about the role of background differences and the importance of studying group languages, this was not the whole story for them, for two important reasons.

First, unlike Van Ginneken, the significians were inclined to agree with a view of language that may be labelled radicalized psychologism. This view, which will be discussed further in Section 8, implies that the “coloring” of meanings goes much farther than in “ordinary” polysemy: the speaker’s ever-changing psychical circumstances preceding and during an utterance all co-determine meaning. Therefore, the same sentence, repeated by the same speaker at different times, has a different meaning each time. This meaning instability prevents mutual understanding so severely that no solution could be expected from Van Ginneken’s approach.

Second, there was the central signific assumption that natural languages are not only ambiguous, but also deficient: laden with false, misleading or muddled logical, philosophical, ethical and political presuppositions. From this point of view, misunderstanding is a much more dramatic phenomenon than sheer communication failure. Accordingly, the alleged remedy had to be dramatic as well: creating a purified language, leading to purified thought, constructed upon a foundation of stainless basic words.2626.Similarities with the Wiener Kreis program are, again, obvious, cf. note 24. However, a fundamental source of differences is the signific assumption of language levels, each with its particular function and pros and cons, which complicates the very idea of language purification. Significantly, for 18th-century French Idéologues, the assumption of developmental language levels precluded the creation of one purified language (cf. Eco 1995Eco, Umberto 1995 The Search for the Perfect Language. Transl. by J. Fentress. Oxford: Blackwell., ch. 14). Van Ginneken did not share this type of distrust in language. Moreover, he claims that the desired pure language already exists: the language of God.2727.Cf. Brouwer et al. (1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 61). Van Ginneken adds that this divine language does not need any Significs in itself, although signific work might render mutual understanding among men more easy, which could possibly also improve their understanding of God’s language.

This foundational gap between Van Ginneken and his co-significians would continue during their whole period of cooperation. However, its importance diminished as the dictionary plan faded out and other plans to extend or reform language remained unrealized, due to fundamental differences within the language-reforming party.2828.Whereas Van Eeden and Brouwer favored the construction of a spiritually pure and socially wholesome language, be it in very different ways, Mannoury‘s central aim was rather analytic and diagnostic: lying bare language deficiencies and semantic gaps. His relativistic philosophy precluded positive language building as a signific task. Mannoury already revealed these programmatic differences during Van Ginneken’s first signific meeting in 1919. Mannoury persisted in the opinion that these different views of language reform do not impede signific cooperation (cf. Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld. and bBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939b “Over “theologische significa””. Synthese 4:239–243.).

All these impasses accelerated, together with practical factors mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, the termination of the Institute in 1922. Van Eeden, Brouwer, Mannoury and Van Ginneken decided to continue the signific project on a more modest scale: the Signific Circle was founded.

5.1922–1924. Van Ginneken as member of the Signific Circle

The Signific Circle’s first activity consisted of an attempt, proposed by Van Ginneken, to formulate a common statement of principles. This laborious process resulted in a general declaration, titled Signific language research and philosophy, based on a concept by Mannoury and amended by Brouwer and Van Ginneken. In accordance with a suggestion by Mannoury, who correctly foresaw that total unanimity would be unattainable, the general statement was followed by individual statements by all four members.

If we compare the general declaration with the 1919 programmatic text, the results of Van Ginneken’s interventions can be clearly observed. The five language levels have disappeared. Instead, there is a more global distinction between scientific and technical language, language of daily intercourse and primitive, passionate and poetic language. Graduality between these “languages” is retained, but only in terms of increasing semantic stability, not in terms of an epistemological/semantic hierarchy or onto- and phylogenetic evolution. Intellectual as well as emotional and volitional elements are assumed to be present in all “linguistic acts”, irrespective of the “language” to which they belong, be it in different proportions.2929.The centrality of the concept ‘linguistic act’ in this text was a major signific-theoretical renewal, but it was based upon pragmatic-communicative views developed by Mannoury in his earlier work (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 244). I owe the term linguistic act to Bas Willink (p.c.), who stressed the importance of distinguishing Mannoury’s concept from Searle’s partially similar but also quite different concept ‘speech act’, introduced in the 1970s (cf. Schmitz 1984Schmitz, H. Walter 1984 “Searle ist in Mode, Mannoury nicht: Sprech- und Hörakt im niederländischen Signifik-Kreis”. Zeitschrift für Semiotik 6:445–463.). In Section 8.2, linguistic acts will be discussed in more detail.

Neither the necessity of language disambiguation and purification, nor the means to attain these aims are mentioned as concrete program items. Instead, there is the rather vague suggestion that language analysis, explicitly mentioned as program item, “may improve the usefulness of language for communication and thought, and promote, be it indirectly, an effective extension of language resources” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 6). Significs should also be directed to a deeper philosophical insight in the relation between word and psychical content, which may influence the future human condition in a positive, unifying sense.

It is safe to say that old ideals are retained but seem to be deprived of the earlier programmatic means to realize them. Precisely these programmatic means were the targets of Van Ginneken’s earlier attacks.

In addition, the declaration bears traces of Van Ginneken’s influence in some more specific points: (i) the earlier distinction of “indicative” and “emotional” is replaced by a more subtle and gradual distinction in elements of consciousness which are “more intellectually colored” and “more saturated with emotion and volition”,3030.Van Ginneken rejected Mannoury’s dichotomy “indicative-emotional”, which he described, in a letter to Mannoury (December 28, 1921), as “superficially rendering two points on an axis, the continuation of which is totally unsurveyable to you, being not a psychologist of language” (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 387). Unfortunately, in 2022, this letter, referred to by Schmitz as a main source for Van Ginneken’s textual requirements for the declaration, turned out to be unfindable in the Significs archive in the library of the University of Amsterdam. (ii) the language of daily intercourse is positioned nearer to the lowest level than its precursor utility language, (iii) in the passage about the methods of language analysis, the role of statistical and experimental methods is emphasized.

The individual additions that follow the general statement reveal, once more, the diversity of the underlying agendas of the four members of the Circle, which was characteristic for the movement from its very beginning and would remain the main obstacle for a common action program. Although Van Ginneken’s text exhibits the strongest deviations from the general declaration, the individual statements of the other members also reveal many individual particularities.

The table below (Figure 2) presents a rough impression of the statements of the four scholars, and their relation to the common statement of principles (CSP) in terms of their degree of support (represented as 0–3) for the signific issues mentioned in the left column.3131.The declarations were included in the publication “Signifische Dialogen” (Signific Dialogues) (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.), which also presents a quasi-verbatim report of discussions between the four members of the Circle. There is no explanation for the great delay of this publication, which was already planned in the early 1920s.

Van Ginneken’s text mainly consists of an extended repetition of his psycho-social view of the source and remedy of misunderstanding.3232.In the first draft of his text, Van Ginneken’s emphasis on religious groups as prototypes of mental and linguistic congeniality aroused Brouwer’s indignation. Despite Mannoury’s attempts to interpret Van Ginneken’s words more mildly, Van Ginneken was asked to amend his text. Cf. Schmitz (1990Schmitz, H. Walter ed. 1990 Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.: 311–312). However, he also mentions briefly the possibility of social improvement through linguistic means, be it from a strictly theological perspective: a deeper spiritual unity of humanity can be furthered through “the language of apostles and prophets”. Moreover, in the hope of a future fulfilment of Jesus’ prayer and the prophesy of one stable and one shepherd, which agrees with Spencer’s3333.Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), philosopher and sociologist, pioneer of social darwinism. positive sociological expectations, significians should “constantly consider the signific means to further these joyful developments and warn of the dangers that menace them” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 13).

It is difficult to judge whether these rather artificial moves towards his co-significians were mainly motivated by Van Ginneken’s willingness to belong to the signific group, despite his deviating standpoints.

Not surprisingly, the Signific Circle did not succeed in transforming the rather vague declaration, in combination with the heterogenous supplements, into a concrete working program. After rejecting some suggestions by others, Van Ginneken proposed a “signific seminar”, and agreed with Brouwer’s idea that the new Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen, which would count Van Ginneken among its first professors, would become a suitable place for signific research. However, Van Ginneken never developed any activity to meet these expectations.

Eventually, Mannoury suggested the publication of an Encyclopaedia of Significs, an ambitious project, with a wide selection of renowned scholars as contributors. The book would cover the total range of signific aims, methods and applications. Mannoury’s proposal was accepted and it was agreed that Van Ginneken would elaborate further details.

Van Ginneken gave a remarkable turn to the project, however. He claimed that there is not (yet) a separate discipline “Significs”. Its research area, word meaning, was actually covered already by the various selected disciplines of the intended contributors (e.g. linguistics, theology, ethnology, mathematics). Therefore, the encyclopaedia could consist of discipline-bound contributions, without any obligatory link with Significs.

Again, Mannoury agreed with Van Ginneken. According to Schmitz (1990Schmitz, H. Walter ed. 1990 Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.: 316–317), the adoption of the project in this form actually heralds the abandonment of signific social idealism3434.For Van Eeden and Brouwer, this abandonment of social idealism was unacceptable. as well as the adoption of a more epistemological and terminology-critical orientation, as would be realized in the movement’s second period.

Anyway, the project had to be cancelled, and again for familiar reasons: the invited scholars declined or did not react at all. Only the Amsterdam psychologists Grünbaum and Révész gave a positive reaction, but did not keep further appointments.

Mannoury now proposed to prepare a more modest book, together only with the other members of the Circle, entitled Signific Dialogues. A theme suggested by Van Ginneken was “Experimental Significs”.3535.The idea of signific experimental research was not brand new. Suggestions can already be found in Welby’s work (cf. Petrilli 2015Petrilli, Susan 2015 “Welby’s Significs; its development and inner ramifications’. International Handbook of Semiotics ed. by Peter Pericles Trifonas. 217–235. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer. ). Experiments conducted by Mannoury, in cooperation with Révész, at Van Ginneken’s Nijmegen Seminary, would be discussed in the book. Révész initially agreed to give his advice, and Mannoury wrote to him about possible research questions.3636.In line with radicalized psychologism, Mannoury suggested, e.g., research questions about the distinctness of “sad”, “glad” or “calm” “languages” (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 321). But nothing was heard from Révész, and no experiments followed. Work at the Signific Dialogues, now based upon earlier minutes of signific meetings, became the only project left. No new activities were initiated.

Summarizing Van Ginneken’s participation in Significs up to this moment, we may conclude that, on the one hand, his contributions were often half-hearted and more reactive than proactive.3737.During his entire signific period, Van Ginneken did not submit any text, apart from his personal addition to the declaration of principles. Moreover, there were more imputable cases of lack of action after commitments. Schmitz (1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 319) reports that “half a dozen promised written submissions” were never presented by Van Ginneken. On the other hand, they were successful. Several times, the signific agenda was changed under his influence, in the direction of his favorite focal area: linguistic (including psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic) research. Language purification, favored by co-significians, but declined by Van Ginneken, was deemphasized. Time and again, Mannoury, who took all responsibility for the progress of signific activities, welcomed Van Ginneken’s suggestions: they were relatively practicable, in comparison to language reform, which, moreover, met with mutual disagreements. Also, in Mannoury’s personal view, language analysis, in cooperation with professional linguists, should be a prominent signific project, whereas active language reform should be facilitated rather than practised.

As long as the Signific Circle was more or less flourishing, Van Ginneken was a valuable member, whose ideas were taken seriously.

6.Van Ginneken’s farewell to Significs

However, as suggested above, the Signific Circle was soon in decline. Meetings became less frequent, new impulses were lacking. Van Eeden suffered from infirmities of old age, Brouwer became more and more disillusioned.

In this situation, the retirement of members is not very surprising. Still, Van Ginneken’s departure in 1924 was unexpected. That Van Ginneken was the first to leave the Circle in 1924 can, however, be explained by two important factors:

1. his appointment as professor of Dutch Language and Literature, Comparative Indo-Germanic Linguistics and Sanskrit at the new Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen, which necessitated his termination of many ancillary activities.

2. his move towards language biology. Two seminal publications about this theme appeared in 1925 and 1926 respectively: “De oorzaken der taalveranderingen” (The causes of language change) and “De erfelijkheid der klankwetten” (The heredity of sound laws).3838. Van Ginneken (1925)Ginneken, Jac. van 1925 “De oorzaken der taalveranderingen”. Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, afd. Letterkunde 59, A.2:13–47. discusses many possible causes of language change, among them political factors, a new element in Van Ginneken’s work, which may be inspired by his discussion with the significians (cf. Schmitz 1990Schmitz, H. Walter ed. 1990 Essays on Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.: 385). This area, which failed to make any connection with Significs, must already have strongly interested him towards the end of his signific period. Language biology was more important to Van Ginneken than any other subject studied before (cf. Van der Stroom 2012Stroom, Gerrold P. van der 2012 Jac. van Ginneken onder vuur. Over eigentijdse en naoorlogse kritiek op de taalkundige J.J.A. van Ginneken S.J. (1877–1945). Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek VU & Münster: Nodus.). It induced narcissistic fantasies about a Law of Van Ginneken alongside Grimm’s Law, and even about a Nobel Prize nomination.3939.Despite these explanations, there remains some lack of clarity about Van Ginneken’s departure from the Signific Circle. Unfortunately, his termination letter to Mannoury has been lost, and a preserved letter to Van Eeden only complicates the issue. It mentions Mannoury’s communism as a main reason. As argued by Schmitz (1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 323), this can hardly be taken seriously, given Van Ginneken’s knowledge about Mannoury’s communism from the very beginning, and, moreover, Mannoury’s general philosophical relativism, which implied respectfulness towards any religion, as became manifest in his defence of Van Ginneken’s religious views against Brouwer (cf. note 32). See Kirkels (2019)Kirkels, Mireille 2019 Gerrit Mannoury (1867–1956). Een relativistisch denker. Ph.D. dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. for Mannoury’s general relativistic-philosophical ideas.

Van Ginneken’s departure from the Signific Circle accelerated the eventual termination of the Circle in 1926Ginneken, Jac. van 1926 “De erfelijkheid der klankwetten”. Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, afd. Letterkunde 61, A.5:147–196.. Only Mannoury continued his work as a significian, in publications, lectures and courses in philosophy of mathematics at the University of Amsterdam. His acquaintance with the psychologist David Vuysje in the 1930s resulted in a restart of Significs in 1936. In this second period, which lasted until the end of the 1950s, the movement was more successful than its predecessor, especially in terms of number of participants, internationalization, and activities, such as well-attended conferences and the publication of the journal Synthese.4040. Synthese was founded in 1936 by David Vuysje. It continued to be the most important signific publishing platform. Synthese still exists as a general journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. Although the idealism of the first Signific period had not been entirely abandoned, the movement’s focus shifted from ”spiritual unity” in general to more specific ideals, partially similar to those of the contemporary Unity of Science movement, aiming at transparency in communication between various disciplines.

7.Van Ginneken and Significs; common areas of interest

When we compare the signific ideas Van Ginneken came across during his membership of the movement with his own ideas put forward throughout his linguistic publications, an ambivalent picture emerges. There are obvious affinities: substantial common interests. On the other hand, there are subtle but fundamental differences in the ways in which the common themes of interest are looked upon. In the following two sections, affinities and discrepancies will be discussed.

All previous sections reveal one characteristic feature of Significs: it was a movement of similar ideas and ideals rather than of unanimously accepted basic principles and programs. What held most significians together was a common love of the purity of logic and mathematics and the belief that this purity could somehow be extended to language and communication in general, to the benefit of humanity.4141.This formulation does, of course, no justice to the enormous differences in mathematical scholarship between individual significians.

Van Ginneken did not share these common interests, but there were enough others. Apart from the common preference for a broad, interdisciplinary approach, and an interest in group languages, we can observe, throughout Van Ginneken’s linguistic work, three main focuses that are shared by his signific colleagues:

Motivations differ: the significians’ reports of, e.g., various emotions accompanying utterances, are meant to show meaning instability; in Van Ginneken’s work, this type of report functions (i) as empirical basis for his program of establishing the psychical basis of language phenomena, (ii) as illustration of the colorfulness of “living language” in his plea for renewal in linguistics and language education.

However, a common fascination for what is “really going on” in speakers must have been mutually recognizable for both the significians and Van Ginneken.4242.For example, Van Ginneken’s (1917bGinneken, Jac. van 1917b Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden. Een hartig woord aan hen die belang stellen in de toekomst van het Nederlandsche volk. Nijmegen: Malmberg.: 63–64) explanation of “having something to say” in terms of selection of the most “suitable” among mental representations and emotions is very similar to Mannoury’s (1949Mannoury, Gerrit 1949 Signifika. Een inleiding. Den Haag: Servire.: 32 sqq.) description of a similar process in a specific situation: a street conversation about the way to the station.

Significians also stressed the importance of non-verbal communication channels such as facial expression and gesture. Their concept ‘linguistic act’ included these means of expression. In general, emotive meaning was at the centre of their attention, especially with respect to the lower language levels, where it was considered dominant over indicative meaning. Emotions were also thought important as sources of meaning instability and of connotative meanings of words, which, in turn, were central issues in signific discussions about misleading language and language purification.

Significians attached much importance to child language as an example of basic language. Its “philosophical relevance” was emphasized, and Van Ginneken’s toddler story was regarded as highly relevant for Significs (Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 264). Significians did not undertake research of this area themselves, but ideas about the alleged development of word meaning in child language (from variable to static, from emotional to indicative) figured in their argumentation.4444.For example, Mannoury discusses the semantic development of the word “mother” in child language (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 295).

8.Discrepancies

All focal themes just discussed fit perfectly in linguistic psychologism, the metalinguistic view that had its heyday during the second half of the 19th century and gradually faded out during the first decades of the 20th century, when linguistic anti-psychologism became dominant. In this section, I will argue that the significians and Van Ginneken, despite a common predominant psychologism, took some steps towards anti-psychologism, be it very different steps. These differences created distance despite affinities.

In subsection 8.1, the transition from psychologism to anti-psychologism will be briefly summarized.4545.A brief summary can hardly do justice to this transition, which was multi-faceted and multidisciplinary, and has been rightly characterized as “ein langer und widerspruchsvoller Prozess” Knobloch (1988Knobloch, Clemens 1988 Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer. : 298). The transition is comprehensively discussed in Knobloch (1988)Knobloch, Clemens 1988 Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer. , and Elffers (1999Elffers, Els 1999 “Psychological Linguistics”. Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 4. Sprachtheorien der Neuzeit ed. by Peter Schmitter. 301–341. Tübingen: Narr. and 2014Elffers, Els 2014 “Earlier and Later Anti-psychologism in Linguistics”. History of Linguistics 2011. Selected papers from the 12th international conference on the history of the language sciences (ICHoLS XII), Saint Petersburg, 28 august – 2 september 2011 ed. by Vadim Kasevich, Yuri A. Kleiner & Patrick Sériot. 127–136. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.). The following subsections discuss, respectively, the significians’ position in this transition (8.2) and Van Ginneken’s position (8.3). A concise comparison follows in 8.4.

8.1From psychologism to anti-psychologism

For the transition at issue, two developments were crucial: (i) the gradual replacement of 19th-century psychology of representation and association with newer types of psychology: Akt-psychology, Gestalt-psychology and phenomenological psychology; (ii) the rise of autonomist views of languages (and other cultural entities) as self-contained systems of conventionalized, mutually dependent elements, which do not directly reflect concrete psycho-physical reality, but are abstractly defined in terms of intra-systemically relevant features.4646.The term “anti-psychologism” is somewhat misleading, because it actually refers to the rejection of one type of psychology and the adoption of other types. Ontologically, “autonomous” systems were also interpreted psychologically. Cf. Elffers (1998)Elffers, Els 1998 “Linguistics and Psychology; how should we reconstruct their relationship?”. Metahistoriography. Theoretical and methodological aspects in the historiography of linguistics ed. by Peter Schmitter & Marijke J. van der Wal. 87–106. Münster: Nodus. for a tentative explanation of the use of the term “anti-psychologism”.

Considered from a psychologistic point of view, language is purely an exteriorization of the speaker’s mental life. Events in this ”inner theatre”4747.This expression is a translation of Knobloch’s (1984Knobloch, Clemens 1984 “Sprache und Denken bei Wundt, Paul und Marty. Ein Beitrag zur Problemgeschichte der Sprachpsychologie’. Historiographia Linguistica 11:413–448. : 415) well-chosen expression “innere Bühne”. (e.g. representations, emotions and their associative or apperceptive connections) are the meanings that are conveyed to the listener through linguistic signs.

Anti-psychologism redefines mental life in terms of intentional acts, each directed to an intentional object. Accordingly, the linguistic sign is no longer exclusively connected to the speaker’s mental events; it has essential purposive connections to the listener and conventionalized, representational relations to extra-psychical objects and states of affairs, all in line with the two aspects (goal-directedness and aboutness) of “intentionality”, the key concept of the newer psychology.4848.Bühler’s well-known triangular Organon-model (Bühler 1990 [1934]Bühler, Karl 1990 [1934] Theory of Language. The representational function of language. Ed. by Achim Eschbach. transl. by Donald Fraser Goodwin. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. : 34) can be considered as a pinnacle in the development towards anti-psychologistic linguistics.

For a clear reconstruction of the positions of the significians and Van Ginneken, three more specific elements of the transition from psychologism to anti-psychologism have to be mentioned.

1.Radicalized psychologism

As a stage before, and simultaneously as a trigger of the transition, a radicalized variety of psychologism arose during the last decades of the 19th century. As indicated in Section 4, this view favors so concrete and consistent an interpretation of the equation of linguistic meaning with actual occurrences in the speaker’s “inner theatre”, that meanings of words and sentences are assumed to vary from speaker to speaker. Even the meaning of various utterances of the same sentence by one language user at various moments is variable. The conclusion that mutual understanding is, therefore, impossible, was actually drawn by sceptical philosophers. For linguists, the unacceptability of this conclusion rather fostered a more abstract view of meaning.4949.Cf. Knobloch (1988Knobloch, Clemens 1988 Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer. : 289–297) and Elffers (1999Elffers, Els 1999 “Psychological Linguistics”. Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 4. Sprachtheorien der Neuzeit ed. by Peter Schmitter. 301–341. Tübingen: Narr.: Section 3.3). Radicalized psychologism was not a 19th-century invention. An early advocate of this view is John Locke (1632–1704). His remedy to the alleged “imperfection of words”, described in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) consisted of gradual word definition, somewhat similar to the signific dictionary project (cf. Locke’s 1975 [1689]Locke, John 1975 [1689] Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.).

2.“Levelled” depsychologization

Several scholars who took steps toward anti-psychologism, nevertheless stuck to (radicalized) psychologism with regard to language and thought of small children, “primitive” people and other “deviant” groups. These ideas are often connected with assumptions about a levelled structure of human cognition, which was popular in the period under discussion. Intentionality and conventionalization are regarded as built upon a substrate “inner theatre” of variable representations, associations etc. At the lowest level, only this substrate can be activated.5050.A levelled conception of cognition and language can, for example, be found in Ernst Cassirer’s 1923Cassirer, Ernst 1968 [1923] The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 1 Language. Transl. by Ralf Manheim. preface and intr. by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale University Press. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol.1. Cf. also Elffers (2015)Elffers, Els 2015 “Sensualism for dummies”. History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences. https://​hiphilangsci​.net​/2015​/03​/25​/sensualism​-for​-dummies.

3.The “reconstructing” listener

An important corollary of depsychologization was the refutation avant la lettre of the conduit metaphor of communication (cf. Reddy 1979Reddy, Michael J. 1979 “The Conduit Metaphor. A case of frame conflict in our language about language”. Metaphor and Thought ed. by Andrew Ortony. 284–324. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.): instead of simply “unpacking” the linguistically encoded message, the listener has to go through a complex reconstruction process, making use of all kinds of contextual and situational cues. Psychologism actually implies “mind-reading”, mediated by linguistic signs (or the impossibility thereof, as in radicalized psychologism). Anti-psychologism implies that the listener, relying on the abstract meanings he receives, has to work himself towards the actual states of affairs meant by the speaker.5151.Cf. Knobloch (1988Knobloch, Clemens 1988 Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer. : 295–296). Not surprisingly, phenomena such as deixis began to be prominent objects of research in this approach, e.g. in Bühler’s work (cf. note 48).

When we compare the major significians’ and Van Ginneken’s positions with respect to the multi-faceted transition from psychologism to anti-psychologism, some striking discrepancies catch the eye. Although both positions can be labelled as mainly psychologistic and only partially anti-psychologistic, this partial anti-psychologism concerned very different themes, roughly corresponding to the two aspects of intentionality: goal-directedness and aboutness. Signific steps toward anti-psychologism mainly concern the former aspect, Van Ginneken’s steps focus on the latter aspect.

8.2Significs: Hearer-directedness and semi-radicalized psychologism

1.Hearer-directedness

At one major point, the significians’ views clearly tend towards anti-psychologism, namely in their emphatically interactive and communicative view of language, which conforms to the goal-directness aspect of intentionality. The programmatic text Mannoury et al. (1919: 6) already bears witness of a deep awareness of hearer-directed purposes of linguistic utterances: word meanings are said to be “dependent on their effect, imagined by the speaker, or undergone by the hearer”. Even earlier, Brouwer (1916Brouwer, Luitzen E. J. 1916 “Review of J.I. de Haan – Rechtskundige significa en hare toepassing op de begrippen “aansprakelijk verantwoordelijk, toerekeningsvatbaar””. Groot Nederland 14:333–336.: 333) claimed that “verbal utterances are more or less developed imperatives”. Addressing someone is conceived as a kind of “commanding or threatening”, understanding as “obeying”. These views are far beyond the earlier psychologistic view of language as a mere “natural” exterioriation of the speaker’s internal imagery.

The significians’ emphasis on “linguistic acts” in the Signific Circle’s (mainly Mannoury’s) general declaration further strengthened their focus on the communicative character of linguistic utterances. Linguistic acts are regarded as the central units of research. The very first sentence of the general declaration Signific language research and philosophy bears witness of this centrality: “The meaning of a linguistic act for the speaker and the listener can only partially be assessed on the basis of their words and symbols, and can be expressed through other words only approximately” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 5).

Linguistic acts are purposive acts, meant to influence the listener. According to Schmitz, they are comparable to what are nowadays called “utterances”, with emphasis on their act-character, and without a counterpart at a systematic competence level. They purely exist as individual performances of the speaker and the listener, not as abstract and stable form-meaning units. Therefore, they do not presuppose grammatical concepts, such as ‘word’ and ‘sentence’. They are “complex, unanalyzed units in a communicative process, uttered by the speaker” (Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 306).5252.After the first signific period, Mannoury elaborated the concept ‘linguistic act’ further in many publications (cf. Schmitz 1984Schmitz, H. Walter 1984 “Searle ist in Mode, Mannoury nicht: Sprech- und Hörakt im niederländischen Signifik-Kreis”. Zeitschrift für Semiotik 6:445–463.).

2.Semi-radicalized psychologism

As suggested in the previous paragraphs, linguistic acts as conceived by the significians have a separate subjective existence for both the speaker and the listener. Therefore, speaker’s meanings and hearer’s meanings have to be distinguished from each other. This fits in with Mannoury’s general ideas about semantics. Mannoury regards words and their meanings as relative to the speaker, the utterance’s purpose and the listener, which implies that mutual understanding can only be attained approximately and that there is no room for linguistic signs as signifiant-signifié units (Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 244).

All this reveals that, in contrast to the goal-directed aspect of intentionality, the aboutness aspect of intentionality remains outside of the signific picture. The content of linguistic acts does not rest upon an autonomous conventionalized, representational system, but on the mental occurrences in the “inner theatres” of the speaker and the listener.5353.These psychologistic ideas were continued by Mannoury during the second period of Significs. It met with some criticism in the 1940s and 1950s. The linguist Stutterheim argued that the abstract phonetic word identity, necessarily assumed by the significians –otherwise they could not identify any word– is not matched by an equally abstract semantic identity (Stutterheim 1947Stutterheim, Cornelis F. P. 1947 “Signifique et Linguistique”. Synthese 6:81–88. : 86). Mannoury’s associationist psychology was criticized as obsolete by several mathematicians (cf. Schmitz 1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 249). Accordingly, their meanings are, as worded in Mannoury’s general declaration Signific language research and philosophy, “very intricated complexes of conscious an semi-conscious units of thought and emotion, more or less related to word images, and apart for each case” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 5). These views are very much in line with radicalized psychologism.

Statements of other significians confirm that, as indicated in Section 4, radicalized psychologism was prominent in signific ideas about meaning. Examples are Van Eeden’s claim that “there are no two people who know whether they mean the same by one word”, and Brouwer’s comparable statement that, even in case of words like “triangle”, ”no two persons feel the same way”. De Haan went even further: “The same word never has the same meaning for two different people. And the same word never has twice the same meaning for the same person”.5454.Cf., respectively, Schmitz (1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 129 and 198) and De Haan (1994Haan, Jacob Israël de 1994 De taal zegt meer dan zij verantwoorden kan. Een keuze uit de verspreide rechtskundig-signifische geschriften van Mr. Jacob Israël de Haan. Coll. and introd. by G. C. J. J. van den Bergh. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri.: xxxii).

However, ideas about language gradation mitigated the radicalized element of signific psychologism. As explained in 2.1, at the highest levels, meanings become more stabilized. Mannoury was most explicit at this point. His description of linguistic act meaning, cited above, actually applies to “primitive, passionate and poetic language, and even language of daily intercourse”, whereas in scientific and technical language “a relatively great stability of word meaning and linguistic act meaning can be achieved” (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 5). These ideas follow the line of thought of levelled depsychologization, be it only partially. Significians adopted the idea of levels and set some steps towards depsychologization by assuming an increasing meaning stability, through conventional connections for the highest levels. At the same time, these stabilized meanings vindicate their position in a thoroughly psychologistic framework: the connections and meaning stabilizations are based upon associative processes in the “inner theatres” of the speaker and the listener.5555.Knobloch’s (1988Knobloch, Clemens 1988 Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer. : 312) characterization of wavering anti-psychologism as “den mit psychologistischen Mitteln vorgegangenen Versuch den Psychologismus zu überwinden” (the attempt to overcome psychologism through psychologistic means) applies here perfectly. The same is true of Van Ginneken’ concept “assent”, which will be discussed below.

The signific combination of anti-psychologistic hearer-directnedness and a psychologistic view of meaning is not unique in the complex history of depsychologization. A strikingly similar “in between“ view can be found in Philipp Wegener’s 1885Wegener, Philipp 1885 Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens. Halle: Niemeyer Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens (‘Investigations into the main problems of the life of language’). Wegener, too, strongly emphasizes the hearer-directed purposes of linguistic utterances. In this respect, his work is nowadays generally regarded as “ahead of his time” (cf., e.g., Nerlich and Clarke 1996Nerlich, Brigitte & David D. Clarke 1996 Language, Action, and Context. The early history of pragmatics in Europe and America 1780–1930. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. , ch. 9.1). At the same time, the content of linguistic messages is described in terms of the speaker’s and the listener’s mental occurrences (cf. Elffers 1993Elffers, Els 1993 “Philipp Wegener as a Proto-Speech Act Theorist”. Linguistics in the Netherlands 10 ed. by Frank Drijkoningen & Kees Hengeveld. 49–59. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.).5656.Schmitz (1990aSchmitz, H. Walter 1990a De Hollandse significa. Een reconstructie van de geschiedenis van 1892 tot 1926. Transl. by J. van Nieuwstadt. Assen etc.: Van Gorcum.: 354) suggests a possible influence of Wegener’s work on the significians.

8.3Van Ginneken: A half-open “inner theatre”?

1. Psychologism and autonomism

On the one hand, Van Ginneken’s work is the epitome of psychologism. According to Van Ginneken (1907)Ginneken, Jac. van 1907 Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique. Amsterdam etc.: Van der Vecht, Rivière, Harrassowitz., his aim was to emulate Wundt as executor of the psychologistic program. There is no scholar who approximates the idea of an “inner theatre” as closely and realistically as Van Ginneken. In his Story of a Toddler (Van Ginneken 1917aGinneken, Jac. van 1917a De roman van een kleuter. Nijmegen: Malmberg.) the consciousness of the young protagonist (“Keesje”) is described as a “window” through which he “sees” his mental entities, which he gradually learns to exteriorize through language. Initially, the window is so small that only one representation, volition or emotion fits into it.5757.Unlike Van Ginneken, many contemporary (and earlier) scholars regard emotions as the only psychical counterparts of first language (conceived ontogenetically and phylogenetically). Sapir was, therefore, nor entirely right when he referred to Van Ginneken in his criticism of this view (cf. note 43). This is the stage of one-word sentences. As the window grows, more entities can be observed, which are related to each other in increasingly complex ways, which are linguistically exteriorized in increasingly complex syntactic constructions.

Throughout the book, this development is illustrated by pictures of playing children, who visualize mental entities. Initially, Keesje’s small window only allows one “child”. Later on, more and more “children” become visible, in all kinds of circus-like gymnastic positions, which correspond to psycho-syntactic relationships. Figure (3) exemplifies both stages.

Figure 3.(Van Ginneken 1917aGinneken, Jac. van 1917a De roman van een kleuter. Nijmegen: Malmberg.: 68 and 235)

On the other hand, as a linguist, Van Ginneken played a major role in the rise of European structuralism as a broad international movement. He adopted the new focus on languages as autonomous systems of conventional signs. In Van Ginneken (1917b)Ginneken, Jac. van 1917b Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden. Een hartig woord aan hen die belang stellen in de toekomst van het Nederlandsche volk. Nijmegen: Malmberg., after a psychologistic passage about the speaker’s “selection” of mental occurrences to communicate to the listener (cf. note 42), Van Ginneken discusses another “selection”, which, unlike the former one, has no signific counterpart: the choice of the best way to render our particular ideas in the standardized national language. This is a give-and-take process, resulting in a “compromise between the national tradition and our individual mental content” (Van Ginneken 1917bGinneken, Jac. van 1917b Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden. Een hartig woord aan hen die belang stellen in de toekomst van het Nederlandsche volk. Nijmegen: Malmberg.: 64). Implicitly, this is a step towards anti-psychologism. The meaning that is communicated to the listener belongs to the conventionalized language, and is not, as in the signific view, identical to the speaker’s preceding mental occurrences.

2.Small steps towards the listener

Compared to his example-to-emulate, the Ausdruckstheoretiker Wundt (cf. Bühler 1990 [1934]Bühler, Karl 1990 [1934] Theory of Language. The representational function of language. Ed. by Achim Eschbach. transl. by Donald Fraser Goodwin. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. : 170), Van Ginneken’s attention to the listener’s role in linguistic communication is considerable. For example, in the abovementioned passage about the “selection” of mental occurrences (Van Ginneken 1917bGinneken, Jac. van 1917b Als ons moedertaalonderwijs nog ooit gezond wil worden. Een hartig woord aan hen die belang stellen in de toekomst van het Nederlandsche volk. Nijmegen: Malmberg.: 64), he mentions a series of hearer-directed purposes (in his characteristic pompous style): “a cathartic answer to an urgent question, a salvation in danger, a clarification in dark confusion, a support for the forsaken, a comfort for the sad, a strengthening for the weak, an enrichment for the poor in spirit”. Hearer-directedness is, however, incidental in Van Ginneken’s work; it is not, as in Significs, a dominant theme and the kernel of anything comparable to their theory of linguistic acts.

The way in which Van Ginneken (1907Ginneken, Jac. van 1907 Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique. Amsterdam etc.: Van der Vecht, Rivière, Harrassowitz.: 39) discusses Wegener’s work is significant. He praises Wegener’s rejection of the earlier speaker-directed approach and his pioneering attention to the separate role of the listener. However, Van Ginneken’s focus in this passage is not on the hearer-directedness of communicative acts, but on the listener’s active role in language comprehension, which is also prominent in his own work (see (4) below). Wegener pays due attention to both aspects, Van Ginneken focuses on what receives his main attention.

3.Assent

For most psychologically-oriented linguists, and also for the significians, the “inner theatre” was an unquestioned background assumption rather than an area for creative research, as it was for Van Ginneken when he worked at the ambitious program of his 1907Ginneken, Jac. van 1907 Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique. Amsterdam etc.: Van der Vecht, Rivière, Harrassowitz. magnum opus. This program was based on very wide and critical reading and thorough linguistic-psychological investigations, which allowed him to introduce various new “actors” in the “inner theatre”. The introduction of assent (“adhésion”) was one of Van Ginneken’s major innovations; it changed, moreover, the “inner theatre” itself.

Assent is, according to Van Ginneken, a psychical act, essential to human language. It can be characterized as an act that links the “inner theatre” to the outside world. Through assent we confirm that our representations and volitions are directed to the objective world: “We have consciousness of our perceptions and our representations, and we also recognize objectivity as such: we adhere to our sensory knowledge” (Van Ginneken 1907Ginneken, Jac. van 1907 Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique. Amsterdam etc.: Van der Vecht, Rivière, Harrassowitz.: 55).5858.Van Ginneken regarded ‘assent’ as a major correction of Wundt’s too vague concept ‘apperception’. Lipps’s concepts ‘apperception’ and ‘claim’ (“Forderung”) however, anticipated Van Ginneken’s ‘assent’. Like many of Van Ginneken’s key concepts, ‘assent’ acquired several extensions through applications to widely different linguistic phenomena (cf. Cigana 2018Cigana, Lorenzo 2018 “At the Crossroad between Psychology, Phenomenology and Linguistics: van Ginneken’s notion of “assent””. Acta Structuralica, special issue 1:115–149. and 2023Cigana, Lorenzo 2023 “Assent, Sentiment and Linguistic Feeling in Jac. Van Ginneken’s Psycholinguistics”. Emotions. Metacognition and the intuition of Language Normativity, Theoretical, Epistemological, and Historical Perspectives on Linguistic Feeling ed. by David Romand & Michel Le Du. 103–122. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan. and Elffers 2004Elffers, Els 2004 “Paradoxaal (anti-) psychologisme in de begin 20e-eeuwse taalkunde”. Voortgang, jaarboek voor de Neerlandistiek XXII:177–204.).

The assumption of assent was another implicit step towards anti-psychologism. Unlike the significians, Van Ginneken fully recognizes the aboutness aspect of intentionality, and thus provided the “inner theatre” with a doorway to the outside world, and sentences with an objective content. Van Ginneken’s realization that the speaker’s “inner theatre” is not what he normally wants to inform his interlocutors about was essential for this step. The idea that communication is about mental events is even ridiculed, like in his example of the soldiers in Xenophon’s Anabasis, who began running after hearing the joyous cry “Thalassa!” Van Ginneken comments that, of course, they did not run because of a mental image, but because of the expectation of the real sea (Van Ginneken 1907Ginneken, Jac. van 1907 Principes de linguistique psychologique. Essai synthétique. Amsterdam etc.: Van der Vecht, Rivière, Harrassowitz.: 61).5959.Cf. Marty (1908Marty, Anton 1908 Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Halle: Niemeyer. : 237) for the same insight: “The announcement of one’s own psychic life is not the only, nor the primary thing which is intended in deliberate speaking”.

What about “Keesje”? As Van Ginneken claims that assent is essential to language, also to child language,6060.This is in line with Van Ginneken’s assumption that first child language reflects more than just emotions (cf. note 57). Van Ginneken denies the capacity to assent only to feeble-minded people, who lack the “fonction du réel” (cf. Elffers 1996Elffers, Els 1996 “Van Ginneken als Psycho-Syntheticus”. De taal is kennis van de ziel. Opstellen over Jac. van Ginneken ed. by Ad Foolen & Jan Noordegraaf. 51–80. Münster: Nodus. and 2015Elffers, Els 2015 “Sensualism for dummies”. History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences. https://​hiphilangsci​.net​/2015​/03​/25​/sensualism​-for​-dummies). he has to admit that the beautiful pictures of Keesje’s observations through his small mental window are not the whole story. And indeed, in the next chapter, we learn that what Keesje sees through his window is only genuine thought, if he interprets what he observes as real things and events. The “children” in his window are only images thereof. When Keesje talks, he does not refer to the images, but to their counterparts in the real world. And of course, when Keesje is whining for porridge, he does not whine for images –“his imagination can give him that as a present for free at each moment”– but for real edible porridge (Van Ginneken 1917aGinneken, Jac. van 1917a De roman van een kleuter. Nijmegen: Malmberg.: 117).

4.The reconstructing listener

Many of the significians’ alleged sources of misunderstanding were non-existent for Van Ginneken. He did not regard natural language as inherently misleading, he did not share the significians’ radicalized psychologism, and his wavering rapprochement to anti-psychologism facilitated a view of meaning as based on intersubjective conventions rather than on individual psychical occurrences. His psychologism made him sensitive to the meaning-coloring effects of psychical factors, and thus to the omnipresence of polysemy, but the meaning varieties he deals with are always convention-based, also in the case of small-scale conventions, as in his favorite examples: group languages.

On the other hand, steps toward anti-psychologism also revealed new sources of misunderstanding. The hearer’s necessity to reconstruct states of affairs referred to by the speaker implies the possibility of misreconstruction, and therefore misunderstanding. In addition, the recent distinction between phonetics and phonology, an important element and trigger of the view of languages as abstract autonomous systems, induced the awareness that, alongside, or prior to, the content of the communicated messages, the relevant sound features of language elements are also reconstructed (or: misreconstructed), not simply “heard”.

According to Van Ginneken, misunderstanding can only be prevented and corrected through “mutual intimate knowledge and togetherness” [..] “a broad understanding and warm love”, as he says in his 1936 article “Het woord” (quoted in section 2.2 above). This sounds rather vague and pompous, but in the same article, Van Ginneken presents a detailed model of human communication which gives substance to this idea, by showing how the listener, initially impeded by possible misreconstructions, eventually arrives at the intended interpretation, making use of contextual and situational cues and of world knowledge.6161.“Togetherness” etc. can be considered as neccessary conditions for a successful reconstruction process. As emphasized in present-day Gricean pragmatics and Relevance Theory, listeners must be willing to continue the reconstructive work until they arrive at a relevant and charitable interpretation. ^, 6262.“Het woord” was published in Van Ginneken’s post-signific period, but pre-conceptions of its content were probably present in Van Ginneken’s mind during his signific years. All of the mentioned scholarly sources of inspiration date from the period 1900–1920. The article’s two rather negative references to Significs also make plausible that, for the author, its content is narrowly related to ideas conceived in his signific period.

This model takes the shape of a variant of Saussure’s “circuit de la parole”. Unlike Saussure’s well-known model, which presents a straight transport of conceptual content from brain to brain through audible counterparts of the content, Van Ginneken presents this transport as a “train ride”, interrupted by many “stations”. On the speaker’s side, the “stops” allow for specifications and small modifications of the intended content during the process of verbalization. On the hearer’s side, the “stops” allow for successive reconstructive steps (including corrections of earlier steps), during which the phonological form of the utterance is first established and, subsequently, the intended content is derived from the verbal information and additional contextual cues. Each station is a potential source of misunderstanding. Figure 4 shows the entire process as envisioned by Van Ginneken.

Figure 4.(Van Ginneken 1936Ginneken, Jac. van 1936 “Het woord”. Onze Taaltuin 5:97–109, 193–209, 225–235.: 100)

English translations:

• Interlocutors: “spreker”: speaker; “hoorder”: hearer

• “Train ride”. “Begin-station”: Starting station. “bewustzijn & spreekwil”: consciousness & wish to speak. “Eind-station”: terminal station. “de mededeling wordt verstaan”: the communication is understood.

• Intermediate stations: Speaker’s side, respectively: choice of words station, (censorship station). Hearer’s side, respectively: phonetic station, phonological station, intentional station, riddle station, classification station.

In his explanation of the “stations”, Van Ginneken refers to the results of early psycholinguistic experiments. After an auditive impression (phonetic station), a familiar word is recognized (phonological station). At the intentional station, the listener’s attention is directed to the outside world, but almost without activation of meaning. This activation follows at the “riddle” station: all possible meanings of the word appear as in a “witches’ sabbath”. Some restriction appears at the classification station: the word is related to a category; e.g. “butter” is connected to the idea of nutrients. Finally, the word is connected with a specific referent or category of referents.

Van Ginneken presents an extensive –and not unwitty– example of the workings of his model.6363.Van Ginneken explains the step-by-step processes of both the speaker and the listener in detail. Only a summary of the latter one is described here; details are left out. He tells a story about two office mates, who had their first meeting only recently. One of them is reading a newspaper and becomes angry about some passages. He utters the sentences: “We need new people who do not stick to the past and are not hindered by their tradition when solving present problems, for present problems are more important than all those old traditions. We should set up a new party”.

Trying to understand this message, his interlocutor undergoes an intricate trial-and-error process at all “train stops” at the “hearer” section. Tentative conclusions about the speaker’s message have to be corrected time and again in light of additional information. This is the case even at the “phonological station”. The speaker articulates sloppily, so that, while listening, the hearer sometimes guesses which word he just heard, and has to correct some guesses later. Most corrections concern the message’s content, however. It took a while before the hearer understood that the statements do not refer to situations at the office but to domestic politics. For this conclusion, a glance at the colleague’s desk, where the newspaper was laid out, was helpful. Even after eventually understanding the gist of the message, the listener is in doubt about the political changes the speaker advocates. Is he a communist? Is he a member of the National-Socialist Movement (the then Dutch pro-Hitler party)? Van Ginneken envisions how the listener remembers this conversation at a later moment, when he and his colleague have become friends. Looking back to this exchange, he realizes that only now does he really understand what the interlocutor meant by his political statement.

This down-to-earth short story clearly illustrates Van Ginneken’s view that misunderstandings do not require any language reform, because benevolent and sensible reconstructive work of the listener is sufficiently helpful. Language reform is, moreover, anyhow unhelpful: the elements of an alleged perfectly disambiguated language have to pass all “stations”, which makes them as vulnerable to misinterpretation as natural language elements.

8.4Reconstructing an implicit controversy: Looking in the rearview mirror

Looking back, we observe some, largely implicit, anti-psychologistic elements in the overall psychologistic framework of the significians and Van Ginneken. These elements are, however, connected to very different aspects of this framework. Both parties’ complex and wavering positions prevented an explicit confrontation, let alone a confrontation in terms of the opposition ‘psychologism – anti-psychologism’, as our present-day viewpoint allows us to.6464.As far as I know, Van Ginneken refers to assent, in a signific context, only once and rather casually. In a discussion about “the formalistic method in Significs”, he claims that algebraic formulae are not genuine language, because they lack what is essential for language: assent (Brouwer et al. 1939aBrouwer, Luitzen E. J., Frederik van Eeden, Jac. van Ginneken S.J. & Gerrit Mannoury 1939a Signifische Dialogen. Utrecht: Erven Bijleveld.: 40–41). Nevertheless, this implicit controversy should be counted among the factors that diminished Van Ginneken’s connectedness with the significians and may partially explain his lack of action after commitments. Below the surface of common interests, more fundamental differences increased the mutual distance.

9.Conclusion

Van Ginneken’s involvement in Significs was only a footnote in his history and in the history of Dutch Significs. Anyhow, exploring the interdisciplinary dynamics between (i) a linguist, himself in search of interdisciplinarity, and (ii) an emphatically interdisciplinary movement with a rather unclear disciplinary status, is a project that goes beyond classical categories of the type “history of X”. It is rather in line with recent historiographical approaches that systematically focus on interdisciplinary “flows”, “epistemic transfer”, “boundary negotiation” and the exchange of “cognitive goods”.6565.Cf. Nefdt et al. (2020)Nefdt, Ryan M., Carita Klippi & Bart Karstens 2020 “Introduction”. Ryan M. Nefdt, Carita Klippi & Bart Karstens. The Philosophy and Science of Language, 1–9. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. .

Seen from this perspective, the discussed episode is instructive, if only because of the wide range of subjects under discussion, varying from practical methods and strategies to abstract mathematics and theology, with linguistics as a continuous, but heterogeneously conceived background. Depending on the subject at issue, Van Ginneken’s “linguistic transfer” was or was not successful for Significs. Transfer in the other direction took place only very sporadically. Van Ginneken never turned into a significian at heart.