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Argumentation across Communities of Practice: Multi-disciplinary perspectives
Edited by Cornelia Ilie and Giuliana Garzone
[Argumentation in Context 10] 2017
► pp. 39–56

Chapter 2
Connection premises

Their character, criticism, and defence

By presenting an argument, a proponent commits himself or herself to the adequacy of the connection between the argument’s premises and its conclusion. What is this connection, and when is it adequate? I deal with these questions by using insights and techniques from dialectical approaches to argumentation. First, I show that by advancing an argument, the proponent commits himself or herself to its connection proposition, which dose not generalize upon the conclusion and premises. When a challenge turns this connection proposition into a connection premise, there may be a particularist defence available, so that the proponent need not commit himself or herself to any generalization of it. Second, I pay attention to situations where the proponent does choose to support the connection premise by means of a general argumentation scheme, showing there to be a variety of ways to justify that scheme.
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction
  • 2.The character of connection propositions
    • 2.1Connection propositions
    • 2.2Connection premises
  • 3.Justifying argumentation schemes
    • 3.1The dismissive response
    • 3.2The argumentative response
  • 4.Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
Published online: 2 November 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1075/aic.10.03van
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