The Presence of Mind

Daniel D. Hutto | University of Hertfordshire
ISBN 9789027251374 (Eur) | EUR 68.00
ISBN 9781556194337 (USA) | USD 102.00
ISBN 9789027283450 | EUR 68.00 | USD 102.00
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Will our everyday account of ourselves be vindicated by a new science? Or, will our self-understanding remain untouched by such developments? This book argues that beliefs and desires have a legitimate place in the explanation of action. Eliminativist arguments mistakenly focus on the vehicles of content not content itself. This book asks whether a naturalistic theory of content is possible. It is argued that a modest biosemantic theory of intentional, but nonconceptual, content is the naturalist’s best bet. A theory of this kind complements connectionism and recent work on embodied and embedded cognition. But intentional content is not equivalent to propositional content. In order to understand propositional content we must rely on Davidsonian radical interpretation.
However, radical interpretation is shown to be at odds with physicalism. But if the best naturalised theory of content we are likely to get from cognitive science is only a theory of intentional content, then a naturalistic explanation of scientific theorising is not possible. It is concluded that cognitive science alone cannot explain the nature of our minds and that eliminativism is intellectually incoherent. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 17]  1999.  xiv, 252 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
“Hutto's book provides an interesting and often convincing account of a number of issues about the nature of intentionality [...] A merit of this book is that it presents a comprehensive and well-balanced account of many topics, which are normally only discussed in specialist journals [...] It is encouraging that we are promised a further book from the same author and publisher.”
Cited by

Cited by 14 other publications

D’oro, Giuseppina, Paul Giladi & Alexis Papazoglou
2019. Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind. Inquiry 62:5  pp. 477 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
1999. Cognition without Representation?. In Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences,  pp. 57 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2003. Folk Psychological Narratives and the Case of Autism. Philosophical Papers 32:3  pp. 345 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2004. Questing for Happiness: Augmenting Aristotle with Davidson?. South African Journal of Philosophy 23:4  pp. 383 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2004. The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 19:5  pp. 548 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2007. Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation. In Folk Psychology Re-Assessed,  pp. 115 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2008. Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16:3  pp. 419 ff. DOI logo
Hutto, Daniel D.
2013. Why Believe in Contentless Beliefs?. In New Essays on Belief,  pp. 55 ff. DOI logo
Jacobson, Anne Jaap
2015. Three Concerns about the Origins of Content. Philosophia 43:3  pp. 625 ff. DOI logo
McGeer, Victoria
2007. The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology. In Folk Psychology Re-Assessed,  pp. 137 ff. DOI logo
Mittelstraß, Jürgen
2016. P. In Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie,  pp. 74 ff. DOI logo
Satne, Glenda L.
2014. Interaction and self-correction. Frontiers in Psychology 5 DOI logo
Sultanescu, Olivia
2015. Bridging the Gap: A Reply to Hutto and Satne. Philosophia 43:3  pp. 639 ff. DOI logo
Tooming, Uku
2018. There is Something about the Image: A Defence of the Two-Component View of Imagination. Dialectica 72:1  pp. 121 ff. DOI logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 03 february 2023. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.

Subjects & Metadata

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research


BIC Subject: HP – Philosophy
BISAC Subject: PHI000000 – PHILOSOPHY / General
ONIX Metadata
ONIX 2.1
ONIX 3.0
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  99022516 | Marc record