Mind and Causality
On what mechanisms does the self-organisation of cognitive structure rest?
Can a naturalistic view account for the basic resources of intentionality, while avoiding the objections to reductive materialism?
By considering the developmental, phenomenological and biological aspects linking mind and causality, this volume offers a state-of-the art theoretical proposal emphasising the fine-tuning of cognition with the complexity of bodily dynamics. In contrast to the de-coupling of mind from the physical environment in classical information-processing models, growth of brain’s architecture and stabilisation of perception–action cycles are considered decisive, with no need for an eliminative approach to representations pursued by neural network models. The tools provided by physics and biology for the description of massive causal interactions, on top of which ‘qualitative’ changes occur, are exploited to suggest a model of the mind as a many-layered, co-evolving system. (Series A)
Table of Contents
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Preface | p. vii
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1. Causality and development: Past, present and futureBrian Hopkins | pp. 1–17
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2. Perception of causality: A dynamical analysisRiccardo Luccio and Donata Milloni | pp. 19–34
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3. Embodiment and the philosophy of mindAndy Clark | pp. 35–51
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4. Causes and motivations: Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology confronts psychological studiesAntonella Lucarelli | pp. 53–68
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5. Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalising theorySandro Nannini | pp. 69–95
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6. The envious frogMarco Salucci | pp. 97–117
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7. Knowing what it is like and knowing howLuca Malatesti | pp. 119–129
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8. Human cognition: An evolutionary perspectiveIan Tattersall | pp. 131–148
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9. Space, time and cognition: From the standpoint of mathematics and natural scienceFrancis Bailly and Giuseppe Longo | pp. 149–197
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10. Causality in the texture of mindAlberto Peruzzi | pp. 199–228
Cited by (33)
Cited by 33 other publications
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