Part of
Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A defense of content-internalism and semantic externalismJohn-Michael Kuczynski
[Advances in Consciousness Research 69] 2007
► pp. v–viii
John-Michael Kuczynski
[Advances in Consciousness Research 69] 2007
► pp. v–viii
Table of contents
Introductionix
A defense of content-internalism and a descriptivist theory of concepts1
Basic concepts
The predicative nature of sense-perception
Uniquely individuating descriptions
Some semantic consequences or our analysis: Tokens versus types, semantics versus pre-semantics
Modality, intensionality, and a posteriori necessity
Cognitive maps and causal connections: Why the causal story is an important part of the descriptive story
Concepts as knowledge of series of interlocking existence-claims
The problem of de re senses
Publicity problems and the nature of linguistic communication
Content-externalism and self-knowledge
Why one’s mental content is fixed by one’s epistemic situation
Jackson and Pettit on program-causality and content-externalism
Fodor, Conceptual Atomism, and Computationalism215
Content-externalism and atomism
The concept of a symbol
Event-causation and the root-problem with CTM
Fodor’s first argument for conceptual atomism
Fodor’s second argument for conceptual atomism
Fodor’s third argument for conceptual atomism
Some arguments for the Symbolic Conception of Thought
A positive argument against SCT
Another argument against LOT: The concept of non-conceptual content
Propositional structure and the ineliminability of non-conceptual content
Conceptual content and the structure of the proposition
Peacocke on concept-possession
Semantics versus psychology
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
This article is available free of charge.
