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Part of
The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 293–309

The philosophy of mind needs a better metaphysics

The philosophy of mind employs plenty of metaphysical concepts such as “(mental) property”, “state”, “event”, “identity”, “causation”, or “supervenience”. However, it has no fully fledged metaphysical theory, let alone a generally accepted one. This flaw slows down the progress of the field in that the same old problems keep being discussed over and over without much hope of resolution. Examples are the (in)famous zombie argument against materialism, and the functionalist claim that machines could develop consciousness. This paper expounds the materialist ontological theory of Mario Bunge and explores its problem-solving power.
Published online: 17 June 2015
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https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.12mah
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Cited by (2)

Cited by two other publications

Weber, Ron
2023. Some Prognostications: Artificial Intelligence and Accounting. Australian Accounting Review 33:2 ► pp. 110 ff. DOI logo
Mahner, Martin
2021. Mario Bunge (1919–2020): Conjoining Philosophy of Science and Scientific Philosophy. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 52:1 ► pp. 3 ff. DOI logo

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