Cover not available
Part of
The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 348–371

Identity over time, constitution and the problem of personal identity

| Nottingham Trent University
| University of Nottingham

What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece of clay which presently constitutes it). This is the ‘constitution view’. In this paper we give a novel overview of the literature on personal identity, the constitution view, and surrounding topics.

Published online: 17 June 2015
DOI logo
https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.15cur
References
Baker, L.R
(2000) Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Burke, M.B
(1994) Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(3), 591–624. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Chisholm, R.M
(1973) Parts as essential to their wholes. Review of Metaphysics, 26(4), 581–603.Google Scholar
Doepke, F.C
(1982) Spatially coinciding objects. Ratio, 24(1), 45–60.Google Scholar
Fine, K
(2008) Coincidence and form. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 82(1), 101–118. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Hawley, K
(2010) Temporal parts. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition). Retrieved from [URL]
Johnston, M
(1992) Constitution is not identity. Mind, 101(401), 89–105. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D
(1976) Survival and identity. In A.O. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons (pp.17–40). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
(1986) On the plurality of worlds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
Locke, J
(1700/1975). An essay concerning human understanding. In P.H. Nidditch (Ed.), The Clarendon edition of the works of John Locke. An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J
(2002) Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: A response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly, 52(208), 369–372. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Mackie, P
(2008) Coincidence and identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 62, 151–176. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Noonan, H.W
(1993) Constitution is identity. Mind, 102(405), 133–146. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Nozick, R
(1981) Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Olson, E.T
(2001) Material coincidence and the indiscernibility problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 51(204), 337–355. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D
(1971) Personal identity. Philosophical Review, 80(1), 3–27. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
(1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A
(1975) On mereological essentialism. Review of Metaphysics, 28(3), 468–476.Google Scholar
Rea, M.C
(1997) Supervenience and co-location. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(3), 367–375.Google Scholar
(2000) Constitution and kind membership. Philosophical Studies, 97(2), 169–193. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S
(1963) Self-knowledge and self-identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
(1984) Personal identity: A materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker & R. Swinburne (Eds.), Personal identity (pp.67–132). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.Google Scholar
(2007) Physical realization. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Sider, T
(1996) All the world’s a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(3), 433–453. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Swinburne, R
(1984) Personal identity: The dualist theory. In S. Shoemaker & R. Swinburne (Eds.), Personal identity (pp.3–66). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Swinburne, R.G
(1973–1974) Personal identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74, 231–247.Google Scholar
Thomson, J.J
(1983) Parthood and identity across time. Journal of Philosophy, 80(4), 201–220. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Unger, P
(1980) The problem of the many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1), 411–468. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Wiggins, D
(1968) On being in the same place at the same time (with one remark about categories and materialism). Philosophical Review, 77(1), 90–95. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Williams, B
(1970) The self and the future. Philosophical Review, 79(2), 161–180. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
(1973) Problems of the self. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. DOI logoGoogle Scholar
Cited by

Cited by 3 other publications

Boniolo, Giovanni
2021. Demented patients and the quandaries of identity: setting the problem, advancing a proposal. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43:1 DOI logo
FLOQUET, Juliette, Corentin VOISIN & Laura WALDVOGEL
2022. Esquisse d’une approche interdisciplinaire sur les liens entre pratiques funéraires et identités : problèmes, débats et concepts. Archimède. Archéologie et histoire ancienne Archimède n° 9 ► pp. 182 ff. DOI logo
Noonan, Harold
2019. Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited. Disputatio 11:52 ► pp. 9 ff. DOI logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 20 april 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.