Part of
The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theoryEdited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 372–399
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 372–399
Constitution, realization and identity
Empirical implications for three theories of the metaphysics of consciousness
In this paper I will discuss the kinds of dependence relation that philosophers have suggested may obtain between neural events and conscious events; between Ns and Cs. The three candidate relations that I will spend the most time discussing are constitution, realization, and identity. There are other candidates for the mind/body relation, but these will serve as the major options. Indeed, these are already more than three options, because philosophers do not agree on the best way to understand constitution; still less to understand realization.
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