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The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theoryEdited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 445–464
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 445–464
The structure of phenomenal consciousness
Philosophers have largely abandoned the claim that the special sciences will ultimately reduce to microphysics in favour of the view that the special sciences trade in functional explanations. However, a careful examination of scientific practice reveals that the explanatory strategy of the special sciences is neither reductionist nor functionalist, but mechanistic. Mechanistic explanations appeal to active material entities organized so as to produce the target phenomena. We claim that phenomenal consciousness will also succumb to mechanistic explanation: it will turn out to be the activity of specific neural mechanisms in the brain. In this chapter we explore the implications of this perspective for the ontology of consciousness, arguing that it has a complex structural essence.
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Cited by (1)
Cited by one other publication
Kob, Lukas
2023. Exploring the role of structuralist methodology in the neuroscience of consciousness: a defense and analysis. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2023:1 
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