Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting
The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom’s normative pragmatics.
Cited by (2)
Cited by two other publications
Kivelä, Ari
2024.
A neo-Hegelian theory of Bildung and the problem of a priori intersubjectivism.
Journal of Philosophy of Education 58:4
► pp. 514 ff.
[no author supplied]
2022.
References. In
Interpreting Kant for Education,
► pp. 189 ff.
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