Article In:
Cognitive Linguistic StudiesVol. 12:1 (2025) ► pp.1–22
Implicit narrativizing and communicative understanding
This article argues that the intersubjective and self-constitutive function of narratives can be traced back to the coexistence and interaction of explicit and implicit narrative levels. Explicit narratives are visible and/or audible story constructions that take on concrete textual form in the process of communication. The deeper level of implicit narratives, on the one hand, is represented by specific models of meaning-making that represent event structures drawn from the personal experiences of individuals embedded in their cultural and social relations, which guide their behavior unconsciously, without reflection; and, on the other hand, represents the propositional attitudes of the individual who chooses among the possible actions in a given situation. The study will deal with the level of implicit narratives representing the relationship of the individual to the communication situation. The research would like to highlight that the hypothesis of this level of implicit narratives representing propositional attitudes can help understand why intersubjective narratives, used as tools in communicative processes to interpret the actions of others, can be applied to the description of the embodied self’s bodily experience of action. This level of narratives, in addition to being a condition for reproducing the intentional reasons behind intersubjective narratives, also provides the individual with a basis for choosing the most appropriate intersubjective narrative as an analogy for structuring his or her bodily experiences of action.
Keywords: narrative self, implicit narrativizing, intentionality, propositional attitude, communicative understanding, folk psychology
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.The narrative self
- 3.The levels of implicit narrativizing
- 4.Narrativity and folk psychology
- 5.Conclusion
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References
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