“The people want it”
Analysis and evaluation of the populist argument in the context of deliberation
This article reflects on the reasonableness of populist arguments supporting a prescriptive standpoint in the context of
deliberation (which I call ‘deliberative’ populist arguments). A literature survey shows a divide between authors who claim that populist
arguments are always fallacious and those who think that in some situations they can be reasonable, including the context of political
deliberation. It is then argued that deliberative populist arguments are based on a linking premise that appeals to majority opinion as a
principle of democracy. This linking premise differs from the one underlying the traditional interpretation of a fallacious populist
argument (argumentum ad populum) and appears at first sight to make the argument reasonable. However, I conclude that a
deliberative populist argument is also unreasonable, because it acts merely as a trump card, creating a false impression about democracy and
avoiding engagement in real debate and substantive reasons.
Article outline
- 1.Introduction
- 2.Studies of populist arguments
- 2.1The standard approach
- 2.2Walton’s ‘bolstered’ populist arguments
- 2.3Populist arguments in the context of political deliberation
- 2.4Johnson and Blair’s ambiguous position
- 3.The linking premise of a populist argument
- 3.1A criterial linking premise
- 3.2A procedural linking premise
- 4.Evaluating populist arguments in the context of deliberation
- Evaluation of the propositional content
- Evaluation of the justificatory power
- Evaluation in light of the institutional point
- 5.Conclusion
- Notes
-
References
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Cited by (2)
Cited by two other publications
van Laar, Jan Albert
2023.
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Jansen, Henrike & Maarten van Leeuwen
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