On philosophical argumentation
Towards a pragma-dialectical solution of a puzzle
Philosophical argumentation presents a puzzle for
pragma-dialectics: both from the perspective of 2500 years of history and from
what we can ourselves witness in the present, philosophers seem to be
exclusively intent on strengthening and elaborating their differences of
opinion. Nothing like that happens in other academic endeavors. This is an
anomaly in pragma-dialectical terms because, if philosophical discussants do not
want to resolve their differences of opinion, then they would seem to be
unreasonable by definition. In other words, no critical discussion would be
possible in philosophy because of the peculiar way philosophers argue. The
anomaly can, however, be dispelled by using the elementary distinction between
single and multiple differences of opinion. It is argued that, in spite of
occasional appearances, all philosophical differences of
opinion are multiple . From that it is argued that the
‘institutional point’ (van Eemeren,
2010 ) of philosophy is to create the broadest map of arguable
positions. If this is true, then philosophers may after all be pursuing a
higher-order kind of consensus, bearing in particular on how many arguments can
be marshaled around any given philosophical question.
Article outline
1. Introduction
2. The pragma-dialectical concept of a disagreement
3. First example: Dante, Aristotle, and others
4. A few contemporary examples
5. The proposed solution to the puzzle
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
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