The boundaries of lying
Casuistry and the pragmatic dimension of interpretation
The Holy Scriptures can be considered a specific kind of
normative texts, whose use to assess practical moral cases requires
interpretation. In the field of ethics, this interpretative problem results in
the necessity of bridging the gap between the normative source – moral
precepts – and the specific cases. In the history of the Church, this problem
was the core of the so-called casuistry, namely the decision-making practice
consisting in applying the Commandments and other principles of the Holy
Scriptures to specific cases or moral problems. By taking into account the sin
of lying, this paper argues that casuistic texts reveal an extremely
sophisticated interpretative method, grounded on “pragmatic” contextual and
communicative considerations and argumentative structures that resemble the ones
used in legal interpretation. These works show how the underspecified biblical
text expressing an abstract norm was enriched pragmatically by completing it and
modulating its meaning so that it could be used to draw a conclusion in a
specific context on a specific case. The mutual interdependence between biblical
interpretation, pragmatics, and argumentation sheds light on a much broader
phenomenon, namely the pragmatic nature of argumentation.
Article outline
- Introduction
- 1.The dimensions of biblical interpretation
- 2.Casuistry as practical interpretation
- 3.The pragmatic dimension. Casuistry and contextual meaning
- 4.The arguments of interpretation
- 5.Pragmatics and argumentation in the origins of casuistry: Lying in
Saint Augustine
- 6.Interpretation in casuistry – lying in the Summa
Sylvestrina
- 6.1The Summa Sylvestrina and the conditions of lying
- 6.2The boundaries of interpretation
- 6.3“Praesuppositio:” Explicatures, and tacit knowledge
- 6.4Unilateral explicatures: Ambiguity and subintellectio
- 6.5Implicatures and the speaker’s intention
- 7.
Secundum quid and casuistry
- Conclusion
- Notes
-
References