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Article published In:
Language and Dialogue
Vol. 10:3 (2020) ► pp.303–319

“You can’t say that”

The effects of group affiliation on moral condemnation in cases of group self-deprecation

| The Hebrew UniversityIsrael
Why does our moral intuition tend to differ when a person uses deprecating speech towards her own affiliation group as opposed to an outer affiliation group? This paper offers a descriptive mapping of moral intuitions behind group self-deprecation (GSD) as stemming from two theoretical fields: pragmatics and standing. The first possible explanation to our moral intuition focuses on the moral flaw in the utterance of condemned (i.e., the person using GSD). Here, I argue our moral intuition suggests the group affiliation of the condemned affects the utterance’s pragmatic interpretation, thus affecting its offensiveness. An alternative explanation focuses on the critic. Here, I argue practices of standing lay behind the offhand rejection of critiques from outer-group members, regardless of their validity.
Keywords: self-deprecating humor, offensive humor, standing, black humor, phrase reclaiming
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction
  • 2.Explaining the first moral intuition: The condemned’s group identity affects the deprecating implicature
    • 2.1Black humor: The case of group self-deprecating humor
    • 2.2Phrase reclaiming: The Cases of Queer and Slut
  • 3.Explaining the second moral intuition: The critic’s group identity denies the critic standing
    • 3.1The non-hypocrisy condition: Group paternalism
    • 3.2The non-involvement condition: Enjoying the fruits of deprecation
    • 3.3The business condition: An outside group member is not affected by the group deprecation
    • 3.4Know thy place condition: Group autonomy
  • 4.Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
Published online: 4 December 2020
DOI logo
https://doi.org/10.1075/ld.00072.ots
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