Article published in:The Pragmatics of Making it Explicit : On Robert B. Brandom
Edited by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer
[Pragmatics & Cognition 13:1] 2005
► pp. 7–37
Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting
The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom’s normative pragmatics.
Keywords: material inference, Platonism, pragmatic foundation of semantics, Absolute truth, cooperative practice, regulism, explicit rule, regularism, idealization, implicit norm
Published online: 08 August 2005