Edited by Jonathan Cole and Marcelo Dascal †
[Pragmatics & Cognition 18:3] 2010
► pp. 597–606
Tye on materialism without phenomenal concepts
Comments on Consciousness Revisited
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009. xiv + 229 pp. ISBN 978-0-262-01273-7 .
In this review article I examine Michel Tye’s recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye’s reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve ‘singular when filled’ content schema, as well as a version of the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye’s theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp.