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Article published In:
Pragmatics & Cognition
Vol. 26:2/3 (2019) ► pp.239–266

The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind

| The University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing (PP) framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as a failure of synchronization between two ways of generating the liar situation in two different (idealized) PP sub-models, one corresponding to language processing and the other to the processing of meaning and world-knowledge. In this way, I put forward the claim that the liar sentence is meaningless but has an air of meaningfulness. I address the possible objection that the proposal violates the Principle of Unrestricted Compositionality, which purportedly regulates the conceptual competence of thinkers.
Keywords: Liar Paradox, Predictive Processing, Semantic Paradox, Unrestricted Compositionality, Yablo Paradox
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction
  • 2.Motivating a cognitive-psychological treatment of the liar paradox
  • 3.Predictive Processing and a dual account of language and conceptual knowledge
    • 3.1The Predictive Processing framework
    • 3.2The Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) Model
    • 3.3The LASS model and Predictive Processing
  • 4.A cognitive approach to the semantic paradox
    • 4.1An assumption: Meaning as speaker meaning
    • 4.2Two ways of conceiving of the liar paradox
      • 4.2.1Conceiving in the LSM (linguistically focused prediction)
        • Self-referential liar situation
        • Non-self-referential liar situation: Yablo’ s paradox
      • 4.2.2Conceiving in the WSM (semantically focused prediction)
        • Self-referential liar situation
        • Non-self-referential liar situation (Yablo’ s paradox)
      • 4.2.3Accommodation effects: Explaining the psychological pull of the liar
  • 5.An objection: The Principle of Unrestricted Compositionality
    • 5.1Argument from (material) inferential roles of category mistakes
    • 5.2Argument from failure to formalise categorical restrictions
    • 5.3Argument from scientific progress
  • 6.Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • Notes
  • References
Published online: 12 February 2021
DOI logo
https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19014.mic
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