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Article published In:
Pragmatics & Cognition
Vol. 29:1 (2022) ► pp.82–110

On the strength of presumptions

| Nova University of Lisbon
Traditionally, a presumption is a dialogically privileged, yet defeasible proposition that allocates the burden of proof to a party who challenges it. This paper investigates the strength of presumptions. First, it explains how ‘strength’ contributes to defining the concept of presumption. Second, it provides an overview of (contextual, justificatory, and deontic) factors determining a presumption’s strength. Finally, it analyses the predominant view that defines strength in terms of the Challenger’s burden of proof: the stronger (weaker) the presumption p, the more (less) difficult it is to prove non-p. I argue that the latter proposal applies only to practical presumptions, and that strength is conceived differently for cognitive presumptions.
Keywords: burden of proof, cognitive presumption, context, plausibility, practical presumption, rebuttal
Article outline
  • 1.Introduction
  • 2.Strength in presumption theory
    • 2.1Conceptual research
    • 2.2Strength research
  • 3.What determines the strength of a presumption?
    • 3.1Contextual factors
      • 3.1.1The dialogue’s collective goal
      • 3.1.2The dialogue’s cooperativeness
      • 3.1.3Risks, stakes, and background information
      • 3.1.4The intended audience
    • 3.2Justificatory factors
      • 3.2.1The basic fact
      • 3.2.2The presumptive rule
    • 3.3Deontic factors
  • 4.Cognitive presumptions and the weight of rebuttal
  • 5.Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • Notes
  • References
Published online: 2 February 2023
DOI logo
https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.21017.bod
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