Article published in:New Theoretical Insights into Untruthfulness
Edited by Marta Dynel
[Pragmatics & Cognition 23:1] 2016
► pp. 174–208
Comparing and combining covert and overt untruthfulness
On lying, deception, irony and metaphor
This paper aims to differentiate between lying (seen as a type of deceiving) and irony, typically addressed independently by philosophers and linguists, as well as to discuss the cases when deception co-occurs with, and capitalises on, irony or metaphor. It is argued that the focal distinction can be made with reference to Grice’s first maxim of Quality, whose floutings lead to overt untruthfulness (notably, irony and metaphor), and whose violations result in covert untruthfulness (notably, lying, next to other forms of deception). Both types of untruthfulness are divided into explicit and implicit subtypes depending on the level of meaning on which they are manifest (what is said/made as if to say, or what is implicated). Further, it is shown that deception may be based on irony or metaphor, which either promote deceptive implicatures or are deployed covertly. Finally, some argumentation is provided in favour of why these cases of deceiving can be conceptualised as lying.
Keywords: flouting (of a maxim), irony, implicature, deception, first maxim of Quality, violation (of a maxim), lying, untruthfulness, metaphor
Published online: 29 September 2016
Cited by 12 other publications
Sheikh-Farshi, Shirin, Mahmoud Reza Ghorban-Sabbagh & Shahla Sharifi
Weissman, Benjamin & Marina Terkourafi
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