Psychological Concepts and Biological Psychiatry

A philosophical analysis

Peter Zachar | Auburn University Montgomery
ISBN 9789027251480 (Eur) | EUR 72.00
ISBN 9781556199912 (USA) | USD 108.00
ISBN 9789027299864 | EUR 72.00 | USD 108.00
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This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 28] 2000.  xx, 342 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
“Peter Zachar argues that the psychological has an essential role in the scientific understanding and clinical treatment of mental illness, and he provides a framework to explain and justify this role. [...] This is one of the most important books to be published in the philosophy of psychiatry.”
“[...] his thesis is timely, indeed perennial; no matter how good our biological accounts may be we will still be interacting with human agents who experience distress and describe beliefs about the world.”
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Cited by 20 other publications

Ahn, Woo‐kyoung, Caroline C. Proctor & Elizabeth H. Flanagan
2009. Mental Health Clinicians’ Beliefs About the Biological, Psychological, and Environmental Bases of Mental Disorders. Cognitive Science 33:2  pp. 147 ff. DOI logo
Aunger, Robert & Valerie Curtis
2008. Kinds of behaviour. Biology & Philosophy 23:3  pp. 317 ff. DOI logo
Cooper, Rachel
2012. Psychiatric Classification and Subjective Experience. Emotion Review 4:2  pp. 197 ff. DOI logo
Davies, Will
2016. Externalist Psychiatry. Analysis 76:3  pp. 290 ff. DOI logo
Gold, Ian
2015. Unity of Science. In The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology,  pp. 1 ff. DOI logo
Joubert, Callie
2015. Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?. Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry 17:3  pp. 185 ff. DOI logo
Krueger, Joel & Thomas Szanto
2016. Extended emotions. Philosophy Compass 11:12  pp. 863 ff. DOI logo
Maung, Hane Htut
2023. Externalist argument against medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. Journal of Medical Ethics 49:8  pp. 553 ff. DOI logo
Parthemore, Joel
2013. The Unified Conceptual Space Theory: an enactive theory of concepts. Adaptive Behavior 21:3  pp. 168 ff. DOI logo
2013. WHAT MAKES ANY AGENT A MORAL AGENT? REFLECTIONS ON MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL AGENCY. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 05:02  pp. 105 ff. DOI logo
Perring, Christian
2006. Conceptualiser les troubles mentaux chez les enfants et les adolescents. Philosophiques 33:1  pp. 65 ff. DOI logo
Sadler, John Z.
2013. Considering the Economy of DSM Alternatives. In Making the DSM-5,  pp. 21 ff. DOI logo
Schultz, William
2018. Neuroessentialism: Theoretical and Clinical Considerations. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 58:6  pp. 607 ff. DOI logo
Talvitie, Vesa & Juhani Ihanus
2010. On the relation between neural and psychological mechanisms: neuropsychoanalysis and the “new mechanists”. The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review 33:2  pp. 130 ff. DOI logo
Tsou, Jonathan Y
2016. Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of theDSM. History of Psychiatry 27:4  pp. 406 ff. DOI logo
Werkhoven, Sander
2021. Natural kinds of mental disorder. Synthese 199:3-4  pp. 10135 ff. DOI logo
Zachar, Peter
2006. Les troubles psychiatriques et le modèle des espèces pratiques. Philosophiques 33:1  pp. 81 ff. DOI logo
Zachar, Peter
2010. Has there been Conceptual Progress in The Science of Emotion?. Emotion Review 2:4  pp. 381 ff. DOI logo
Zachar, Peter
2020. Non-reductionism, Eliminativism, and Modularity in RDoC: Thoughts about a Progressive Mechanistic Science. In Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology,  pp. 267 ff. DOI logo
[no author supplied]
2022. , DOI logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 13 june 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.


Consciousness Research

Consciousness research





Main BIC Subject

JMT: States of consciousness

Main BISAC Subject

PSY020000: PSYCHOLOGY / Neuropsychology
ONIX Metadata
ONIX 2.1
ONIX 3.0
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  00056430 | Marc record