Article published in:
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology
Edited by Rocco J. Gennaro
[Advances in Consciousness Research 56] 2004
► pp. 203225
Cited by

Cited by 9 other publications

Gaskin, Richard
2019. A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’. Mind 128:511  pp. 673 ff. Crossref logo
JANZEN, GREG
2011. IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT-IT-IS-LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49:3  pp. 271 ff. Crossref logo
Jehle, David & Uriah Kriegel
2006. An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT Theory. Philosophical Psychology 19:4  pp. 463 ff. Crossref logo
Kreuch, Gerhard
2019.  In Self-Feeling [Contributions to Phenomenology, 107],  pp. 3 ff. Crossref logo
Mehta, Neil
2021. The fragmentation of phenomenal character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Crossref logo
Niikawa, Takuya
2021. Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Studies 178:1  pp. 1 ff. Crossref logo
Sebastián, Miguel Ángel
2018. Embodied appearance properties and subjectivity. Adaptive Behavior 26:5  pp. 199 ff. Crossref logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2016. The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness. Mind 125:500  pp. 1161 ff. Crossref logo
Weisberg, Josh
2011. Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154:3  pp. 409 ff. Crossref logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 21 may 2021. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.