The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness

Greg Janzen | University of Calgary
ISBN 9789027252081 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
ISBN 9789027291684 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
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Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, “implicit” awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or “what-it-is-like,” dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 72] 2008.  vii, 186 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
“Janzen's account [...] provides a solid and admirably lean critique of contemporary accounts of consciousness and its phenomenal character.”
Cited by

Cited by 15 other publications

Kelly Becker & Iain D. Thomson
2019. The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015, DOI logo
Chaturvedi, Amit
2022. Attentional structuring, subjectivity, and the ubiquity of reflexive inner awareness. Inquiry  pp. 1 ff. DOI logo
Farrell, Jonathan
2018. Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness. Philosophical Studies 175:11  pp. 2743 ff. DOI logo
Goel, Rakshita & Rachana Bhangaokar
2021. Bhāvyātrā (Walking Pilgrimages): Insights for Self-development Through Service. Psychology and Developing Societies 33:2  pp. 208 ff. DOI logo
2011. IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49:3  pp. 271 ff. DOI logo
Janzen, Greg
2013. An adverbialist–objectualist account of pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:4  pp. 859 ff. DOI logo
Peebles, Graham
2018. Reflexive theories of consciousness and unconscious perception. Philosophical Psychology 31:1  pp. 25 ff. DOI logo
Peters, Frederic
2014. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24:4  pp. 441 ff. DOI logo
Roberts, Michael
2018. Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17:2  pp. 375 ff. DOI logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2016. The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness. Mind 125:500  pp. 1161 ff. DOI logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2018. The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness. Analytic Philosophy 59:3  pp. 293 ff. DOI logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2023. Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?. Erkenntnis 88:4  pp. 1555 ff. DOI logo
Textor, Mark
2013. Brentano on the dual relation of the mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:3  pp. 465 ff. DOI logo
[no author supplied]
2020. Literatur. In Was heißt es, wach zu sein?,  pp. 219 ff. DOI logo
[no author supplied]
2023. Körperlicher Umbruch [Medical Humanities, 11], DOI logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 10 february 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.


Consciousness Research

Consciousness research



Main BIC Subject

HPM: Philosophy of mind

Main BISAC Subject

PHI015000: PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
ONIX Metadata
ONIX 2.1
ONIX 3.0
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2007045723 | Marc record